Opinion Summaries

These two appeals raise challenges to the use of the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) to determine the risk of re-offense by persons who have been convicted of possessing or distributing child pornography. Defendants both pled guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by distributing child pornography in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii). Following the completion of their custodial sentences, they were both found to pose a moderate risk of re-offense and were designated as Tier Two registrants under the Registration and Community Notification Laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, commonly known as Megan's Law.

Defendants appeal from the orders imposing that level of classification, contending that, as applied to them, the use of the RRAS was improper. They also argue that the use of the RRAS in tiering sex offenders who have been convicted of one offense related to possessing or distributing child pornography gives a skewed tiering result. Thus, defendants argue that the RRAS should be modified, replaced, or not used in tiering one-time child pornography offenders.

The court concludes that neither defendant created the record to support his arguments. Accordingly, the court affirms and issue this consolidated opinion to address the common arguments presented by defendants

The court rejected the applicability of the ongoing-storm rule, which arbitrarily relieves commercial landowners from any obligation to try to render their property safe while sleet or snow is falling. The court held a commercial landowner has a duty to take reasonable steps to render a public walkway abutting its property—covered by snow or ice—reasonably safe. The court imposed a duty of ordinary care and identified factors to consider when determining whether the landowner breached that duty, emphasizing that reasonableness is the polestar.

The spousal privilege prevents a spouse or partner in a civil union of the accused from testifying against the accused. N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-17(2) and N.J.R.E. 501(2). One exception to the privilege is when "the accused is charged with an offense against the spouse or partner, a child of the accused or of the spouse or partner, or a child to whom the accused or the spouse or partner stands in the place of a parent." N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-17(2)(b) and N.J.R.E. 501(2)(b). The court in this opinion determines that the term "child" in the spousal privilege exception refers to an unemancipated child.

Defendant pled guilty to an accusation charging him with the third degree offense of strict liability vehicular homicide pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3a.The State agreed to recommend probation conditioned on defendant serving 364 days in the county jail. Mitigating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(5), allows a judge to consider whether the victim's conduct induced or facilitated the commission of the crime. The trial judge held mitigating factor five was inapplicable in this case as a matter of law because N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3d provides: "It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to his [or her] own death by reckless or negligent conduct." This court reverses and holds N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3d does not preclude a judge from finding and applying mitigating factor five. This court remands the matter for resentencing because the record shows a basis to find mitigating factor five.

Defendant Amy Amzler filed a motion to enforce plaintiff Mark Amzler's alimony obligation, as required under the parties' 2009 matrimonial settlement agreement (MSA). The MSA included an anti- Lepis1 provision, which stated that a "voluntary reduction in income of either party" would not constitute a substantial change in circumstances for the purpose of reviewing the alimony obligation. Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion seeking to modify or terminate his alimony obligation, as he had recently retired, before reaching full retirement age, due to medical issues. The trial court terminated plaintiff's alimony obligation, applying N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(2), which governs the review of alimony awards where the obligor retires before reaching full retirement age.

As a matter of first impression, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(2) applies only to alimony orders entered after the effective date of the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute. The court relied on Landers v. Landers, 444 N.J. Super. 315, 324 (App. Div. 2016), where it held that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(1) applies only to alimony orders established after the effective date of the 2014 amendments. In construing the statute, the Landers court held that although subsection (j)(1) does not explicitly state that it applies only to orders or agreements established after the 2014 amendments, "the particular language used in subsection (j)(3) clarifies the Legislature's intent to apply (j)(1) only to orders entered after the amendments' effective date."2 Id. at 324. In the current matter, the court found that there was no sound basis to depart from its reasoning in Landers and that construing subsection (j)(2) consistent with its construction of subsection (j)(1) conforms to the Legislature's intent in enacting subsection (j). Thus, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), which governs the review of final alimony orders or agreements established before the effective date of the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, is applicable to this case. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders under review and remanded the matter to the trial court to reconsider the parties' applications, applying the correct

1 Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).2 Subsection (j)(3) provides that it applies when "there is an existing final alimony order or enforceable written agreement established prior to the effective date of this act." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).

provision of the statute and considering whether the anti-Lepis provision in the MSA prohibits a reduction of plaintiff's alimony obligation.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion

Tax Court: Scott Dickerson v. Town of Dover,Docket Nos. 005403- 2010; 004187-2011; 008887-2012; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided March 30, 2020. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Buro (Zipp & Tannenbaum, LLC, attorneys); for defendant – David C. Pennella (Law office of David C. Pennella, attorneys).

Held: The Saturday, June 1, 2019 deadline for defendant to remit the refund payment to plaintiff without interest cannot be extended to Monday, June 3, 2019 pursuant to R. 1:3-1, N.J.S.A. 36:1-1, or equitable principles, given that the Saturday, June 1, 2019 deadline was not a court-ordered payment date, but rather a contractual deadline negotiated between the parties and set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement.

Following defendant's guilty plea for accepting a $300 bribe while employed with the Jersey City Tax Assessor's Office, the State filed a complaint and order to show cause seeking the complete forfeiture of defendant's pension benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1. Defendant principally argued that forfeiture of his entire pension (which he was already receiving) was an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution.

The trial court concluded that defendant's federal conviction mandated a complete pension forfeiture and did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause as receipt of pension benefits was a contractual arrangement between a public employee and employer conditioned on rendering honorable service, as opposed to a property right, and thus did not constitute a fine. The court concludes, contrary to the trial court, that defendant's right to receive pension benefits was a property right and the total forfeiture of his pension was a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Although the trial court did not address whether the forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive, the court concludes defendant's conduct was sufficiently egregious to warrant a complete pension forfeiture and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Tax Court: Buckeye Perth Amboy Terminal, LLC, v. City of Perth Amboy;Docket No. 013403-2019; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C.,decided March 27, 2020. For plaintiff - John S. Wisniewski (Wisniewski & Associates, LLC, attorneys); for defendant -William T. Rogers (Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst & Doukas,LLP, attorneys).

Held: Defendant’s imposition of an assessment in September 2019 for tax year 2019, to capture the assessment on a bidirectional petroleum pipeline that was constructed and placed in service in May 2018, is proper under the omitted assessment statute, N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.31, although defendant’s assessor called it an “added” assessment in the assessment notice. The newly constructed pipeline was assessed for the first time in 2019. Therefore, precedent voiding added or omitted assessments to change an already-imposed regular assessment (even if the improvement was valued at $0) does not control. Additionally, the omitted assessment statute presupposes the existence of an improvement as of an assessment date; therefore, invalidating an assessment on this ground cannot be supported under the statute’s plain language, or its underlying intent and purposes as interpreted by our higher courts.

For the first time in this appeal, the biological mother of a five-year-old child argues the judgment of guardianship, which terminated her parental rights, must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial because the resource parent, with whom the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) placed the child, worked as a domestic violence liaison in the district office that was responsible to investigate and manage this case from its inception. At oral argument, this court requested supplemental briefs from the parties exclusively on this issue.

This court holds the DCPP violated the Conflict of Interest Law, N.J.S.A. 52:13D-12 to -27, and the ethical standards and protocols promulgated by the Department of Children and Families in its Policy Manual when it failed to transfer this case to another regional office based on the resource parent's assignment as a domestic violence liaison. The Division's failure to take timely and effective action to address this material conflict of interest tainted the management of this case from its incepti.

Independent of this ethical transgression, the Family Part judge who presided over this trial did not: (1) make credibility findings regarding the biological mother's testimony, (2) identify which of the two psychologists who testified as expert witnesses he found more persuasive, or (3) incorporate the opinions offered by the experts in his analysis of the four statutory prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). This court remands this matter for the judge to conduct a plenary hearing to determine whether reunification with her biological mother is in the child's best interest at this stage of her emotional, psychological, and cognitive development. The judge must assess what psychological and/or emotional harm the child may suffer if she were to be removed from the custody of the resource parent and returned to the physical custody of her biological mother.

Finally, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:13D-21(h), this court directs the Appellate Division Clerk's Office to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Ethics Commission Office.

The court holds that a career service employee who is disciplined by an appointing authority for violating the New Jersey State Policy Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace (State Policy), N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.1, may not appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), but instead must first appeal either in a departmental hearing or, if applicable, in accordance with the procedure in a collective negotiations agreement. The court interprets the plain language of N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(n) and N.J.A.C. 4A:7-3.2(n)(3) to permit a direct appeal to the Commission from a finding an employee violated the State Policy only where no discipline is imposed.

In this consolidated appeal, Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Maya Van Rossum and Delaware Riverkeeper in one appeal, and Stony Brook-Millstone Watershed Association, Save Barnegat Bay, Raritan Headwaters Association, NY/NJ Baykeeper, Hackensack Riverkeeper and Association of New Jersey Environmental Commissions in the other, challenge the issuance of the Tier A municipal separate storm sewer system permit, claiming that it does not comply with federal and state law. They maintain that the permit does not include effluent limits and monitoring as required by federal law, and that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) inclusion of best management practices rather than effluent limits was a further violation of applicable law. Appellants also argue that the permit requirements are neither "clear, specific, and measurable," nor provide for meaningful review and that the DEP violated federal law by issuing permits without the public's involvement. Acknowledging its deferential standard of review, the court affirms the final agency decision.

The trial court erred by admitting both prejudicial testimony and, separately, lay opinion testimony as to defendant’s guilt. Yet, the evidence against Trinidad was overwhelming, and any error was therefore harmless. There was no error in the sentencing of defendant or the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Appellants filed for benefits under New Jersey's Medicaid — Aged, Blind and Disabled (ABD) program. Both were disabled and lived with other family members; each applicant's total "countable income" was below the federal poverty level (FPL) for a family of their size, but each applicant's individual Social Security Disability benefits exceeded the FPL for a family of one. The Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (the Division) applied N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1), which stated that an applicant was ineligible if his or her "countable income . . . exceed[ed] the poverty income guideline for one person[.]" The Division denied the applications.

The court held that the regulation did not violate the federal Medicaid statute, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but did violate New Jersey's Medicaid statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4D-1 to -19.5, which defines a "qualified applicant" as, among other things, a disabled individual "whose income does not exceed 100% of the [FPL], adjusted for family size," N.J.S.A. 30:4D-3(i)(11), and defines FPL as "the official poverty level based on family size[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4D-3(p).

Under the plain language of subsection (f), the fifteen-year period during which an eligible registrant must remain offense-free to qualify for registration relief commences upon his or her conviction or release from confinement for the sex offense that gave rise to his or her registration requirement.

The court addressed two issues of first impression in New Jersey: (1) whether the swabbing of a defendant's hands for gunshot residue (GSR) constitutes a search under applicable constitutional doctrines, and if so, (2) whether such a search is valid under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The court held that the swabbing of a defendant's hands for GSR is a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution because it intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Balancing the intrusion of GSR testing on an individual's privacy against promoting vital governmental interests, the court further concluded that if an individual is lawfully arrested and in police custody, a delayed search of the arrestee's person for GSR evidence after the arrestee is transported to police headquarters is constitutionally permissible under the search incident to arrest exception as long as the delay itself and the scope of the search are objectively reasonable. In this case, given the existence of probable cause, the timeline, location, and limited intrusion involved in the testing, as well as the ready destructibility of GSR evidence, the court was satisfied that the search was objectively reasonable in time and scope to pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, the court reversed the Law Division's order suppressing the GSR evidence and remanded for further proceedings.

Third-party defendants are subject to the contribution claims filed against them by joint tortfeasors, unless there exists a right to a dismissal of the claims against them. Here, Fernandez fails to present a meritorious right to dismissal. Fernandez is therefore an active third-party defendant who must participate at trial.

This matter was before the court on defendant’s application to disestablish paternity, terminate child support, and vacate child support arrears. After genetic testing confirmed that defendant was not the child’s biological father, the court granted those parts of the application seeking to disestablish paternity and terminate ongoing support.

The court denied that part of defendant’s application seeking to vacate arrears. In particular, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the arrears could be vacated on equitable principles.

There was no abuse of discretion with respect to either the imposition of sanctions or the denial of reconsideration.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. The Court declines, however, to adopt the Appellate Division’s view that "the Compassionate Use Act intended to cause no impact on existing employment rights." See 458 N.J. Super. at 428.