Opinion Summaries

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. The Court declines, however, to adopt the Appellate Division’s view that "the Compassionate Use Act intended to cause no impact on existing employment rights." See 458 N.J. Super. at 428.

Because the Kinship Legal Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, provides a permanent home for children, we affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Education that the children must now go to school where their kinship legal guardian lives. Neither the educational stability law, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-26; N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(a)(2), nor the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 to 1482, allows the children to remain enrolled in the school district where their biological mother is located.

Before depriving S.T. of the right to control the direction of her case and appointing a guardian to make legal decisions on her behalf, the court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether she lacked "sufficient capacity to govern [herself] and manage [her] affairs" "by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability." See N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2; N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24; R. 4:86-4. At such a hearing, S.T. had the right to independent counsel. See R. 4:86-4(a)(7). In the absence of a guardianship hearing and a judicial finding by clear and convincing evidence that S.T. lacked the requisite mental capacity to decide how to proceed with her lawsuit, the court had no authority to accept a settlement against S.T.’s wishes.

Defendant argued that unused prior service credits could be applied to reduce the period of mandatory parole supervision imposed by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court held that prior service credits could not be applied to reduce the period of parole supervision required under NERA.

In this appeal, the court examined whether a child's biological mother, who voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to allow her own mother, the child's maternal grandmother, to adopt the child, had standing as the child's legal sibling, per N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, to seek visitation rights against a non-relative adoptive mother. The court found the biological mother did not have standing under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1.

The child was placed with his non-relative adoptive mother following the death of his maternal grandmother. Several years later, a Family Part judge granted the biological mother's request to visit with the child pending his adoption. The visits continued for approximately one year until the child's non-relative adoptive mother adopted the child and stopped the visits. The biological mother filed a complaint to reinstate her visits post-adoption and her complaint was dismissed by another Family Part judge without an evidentiary hearing.

In adhering to the legal precepts expressed in Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1 (2016) and In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545 (2010), the court determined the biological mother lacked standing as a legal sibling and was not entitled to visits under any other legal framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Family Part judge's dismissal of her complaint without an evidentiary hearing.

Invoking its supervisory authority, the Court holds that if grand juries decline to indict on two prior occasions, the State must obtain advance approval from the Assignment Judge before it can submit the same case to a third grand jury. To decide whether to permit a third presentation, Assignment Judges should consider whether the State has new or additional evidence to present; the strength of the State’s evidence; and whether there has been any prosecutorial misconduct in the prior presentations. Based on the circumstances of this case, which did not violate defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair grand jury presentation, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division and declines to dismiss defendant’s indictment

In this appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of class certification to three plaintiffs who asserted claims under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681x, which prohibits retailers who accept credit or debit cards from printing more than the last five digits of the card number or expiration date upon any receipt. The complaint was dismissed as to all three plaintiffs for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Plaintiff Ellen Baskin is a New Jersey resident who made a purchase at one of defendants' New Jersey stores and plaintiffs Kathleen O'Shea and Sandeep Trisal are New York residents who made purchases at defendants' New York stores.

The court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs failed to establish that class action was warranted under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3). Specifically, plaintiffs only alleged technical violations of FACTA, and they did not assert they were victims of identity theft, fraud, or other harm. The court determined that individual actions in the small claims section would be a superior means to adjudicate claims of technical violations of FACTA. Thus, the superiority and predominance requirements of Rule 4:32-1(b)(2) were not met.

The court held that the New Jersey courts do not have general jurisdiction over defendants or specific jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the New York plaintiffs. However, the court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing Baskin's complaint because she is a New Jersey resident with an alleged FACTA claim emanating from a transaction at one of defendants' New Jersey stores. Therefore, the court reversed dismissal of Baskin's claims and reinstated the complaint as to her individual claims only.

Tax Court: Pella Realty, LLC v. Paterson City; Docket Nos. 002345-2017 and 002348-2017; opinion by Novin, J.T.C., decided February 27, 2020. For Pella Realty, LLC – Peter J. Zipp and Joseph G.Buro (Zipp & Tannenbaum, LLC, attorneys); for Paterson City –Michael T. Wilkos (Florio Kenny Raval, LLP, attorneys); for amicus curiae, Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation – Abiola G. Miles and Michelline Capistrano Foster (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The court concluded that the Director of the New Jersey Division of Taxation’s regulation sanctioning use of an annual reassessment program, under N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(i), was intended for counties electing to adhere to the Real Property Assessment Demonstration Program, N.J.S.A. 54:1-101 to -106 (the “RPADP”). During the tax years at issue, Passaic County was not a "demonstration county" under the RPADP, therefore, Paterson’s implementation of an annual reassessment program was improper. Moreover, the court found that implementation of an annual reassessment program under N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(i) does not preclude application of the Freeze Act, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8, as same does not constitute a complete reassessment of all real property in the taxing district. Finally, the court found that the Director inappropriately determined that Paterson’s annual reassessment program should receive credit for completion of a district-wide reassessment and recognition in the Director’s annual Certified Table of Equalized Valuations. Therefore, the court will conduct a plenary hearing to determine whether the annual reassessment program implemented by Paterson satisfied the district-wide reassessment criteria as expressed under established legal authority, N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.14(c), and the Application for Full Reassessment, Form AFR.

In February 2017, defendant was charged with the crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in a quantity greater than twenty-five pounds and was released on home arrest with electronic monitoring (PML3+EM). On December 17, 2018, defendant entered a guilty plea to count one of the indictment, as amended to a second-degree offense. In consideration for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a maximum sentence of a five-year state prison term. Defendant requested an extended sentencing date to “put his life in order” before commencing the custodial term. The court set April 5, 2019, as the sentence date and, in its discretion, continued defendant on pretrial release.

Defendant retained new counsel and on June 10, 2019, present counsel for defendant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, requesting that the sentence be adjourned and that he continue free on pretrial release, pending the return of the motion. Defendant argued that pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJR), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, he was entitled to remain on release until sentencing or the resolution of the motion to vacate the plea. The court denied the request to remain free, holding that CJR did not vest defendant with any substantive or procedural grounds to remain free on pretrial release after entering a plea of guilty. Instead, in its discretion, the court remanded defendant pending same.

The matter presents the novel issue as to whether a defendant is entitled to continue pretrial release pursuant to CJR.

Barbara J. Boyd (defendant) and her husband William L. Boyd practiced law under the firm name, Boyd & Boyd. They did not have a partnership agreement and were never actually partners in the firm. After defendant left the firm and retired from the practice of law, William L. Boyd continued to practice under the firm name. The firm provided legal services to decedent, Renee M. Barbuto, and her estate later obtained a legal malpractice default judgment against the firm.

The estate claimed defendant was liable for the default judgment under N.J.S.A. 42:1A-20(a) and (b), which define the liability of purported partners under the Uniform Partnership Act (1996), N.J.S.A. 42:1A-1 to -56. At trial on the claim, plaintiff conceded defendant was not an actual partner in the law firm but argued defendant was liable because inclusion of her last name in the law firm's name constituted a representation she was a partner. Following presentation of plaintiff's evidence at trial, the court granted defendant's motion for dismissal. The trial court determined defendant is not liable for the firm's malpractice as a purported partner because plaintiff did not present any evidence decedent relied on a representation that defendant was a partner when decedent employed the firm to provide legal services.

The court affirms the dismissal. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 42:1A-20(a) and (b) imposes liability only where a plaintiff demonstrates reasonable reliance on a representation that the purported partner is a partner. The court rejects plaintiff's contention partnership liability may be imposed based on violations of RPC 7.5(c) and (d), which establish standards for inclusion of deceased and retired partner's names in law firm names, because RPC violations do not give rise to civil causes of action

This case addresses the question of whether a residential landlord’s failure to comply in all respects with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70 (a tenant protection measure within the New Jersey Foreclosure Fairness Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 to -71) precludes the landlord’s right to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent when the tenant’s defense is that the rent has been paid to the former landlord because the tenant was unaware of the existence of the new landlord. The court answered the question in the affirmative.

The deemer statute does not incorporate by reference the basic policy’s BI level for insurers, like GEICO, to which the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 applies. From the perspective of the insurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remain $15,000/$30,000. As to the equal protection claim, New Jersey insureds are the ones who have a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum BI amount. The obligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum is the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. The equal protection claim therefore falls flat.

Tax Court: Stanard v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 008149-2018; opinion by Fiamingo, J.T.C., decided February 24, 2020. For plaintiff - Joseph Kernen and Ellis L. Reemer (DLA Piper, LLP, attorneys); for defendant – Ramanjit K. Chawla (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Plaintiffs appealed the final determination of the defendant ("Director") disallowing an offset of partnership income with a partnership loss distributed to a single-member limited liability company ("LLC") owned by plaintiff husband, under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(k). The Director determined that the net income of the single member LLC, inclusive of the partnership loss at issue, constituted net profits from business and must be reported under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(b). The court found that by law, a single-member LLC is treated as a disregarded entity and the member is treated as the direct owner of the assets of the LLC for income tax purposes under N.J.S.A. 42:2C-92(b). The court further found that even if the single-member LLC is treated as a sole proprietorship for income tax purposes, the Director had misapplied his regulations in determining the net profits from business of the single-member LLC for the tax year under review. The court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and denied the Director’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court granted defendants leave to appeal from orders that denied their request to declare they were not statutorily ineligible for Drug Court and to process their applications. The judge accepted that recent revisions to the Drug Court Manual (the 2019 Manual ) preserved two "tracks" for entry into the program: one, pursuant to special probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14; and a second, as a general condition of probation, N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1. See, e.g., State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421 (2007).

Defendants were not eligible for special probation, because they faced current charges that were not "subject to a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). Additionally, defendants were previously convicted of crimes that made them ineligible pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(6), (7). The judge accepted the State's argument that although there were two tracks for entry into Drug Court, the 2019 Manual created one uniform standard for eligibility under both tracks, specifically, that an applicant was legally ineligible if he failed to meet the criteria in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14.

The Court reversed, concluding that the full text of the 2019 Manual did not support the State's interpretation, which was contrary to the clear intention, both legislatively and administratively, to broaden eligibility for Drug Court.

Defendant Frank Campione, a licensed physician assistant, who was federally registered to prescribe opioid medications, was indicted on charges of the unlawful practice of medicine, distribution of a controlled dangerous substance to patients, and possession of prohibited weapons. The State alleged that Campione misrepresented himself as a physician to patients, improperly wrote prescriptions in non-traditional settings, such as vehicles and restaurants, and wrote prescriptions for opioid medications that were not medically necessary. Defendant Howard Katz, a licensed physician who agreed to serve as Campione's supervising physician, was charged with unlawful practice of medicine.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the entire indictment was granted by the motion court. The motion court also granted defendants' motion for discovery of the identity, opinions, and reports of the experts consulted by the State post-dismissal of the indictment.

The court affirmed the dismissal of all charges against Katz. The State presented no evidence to the grand jury that Katz participated in Campione's alleged acts of improperly holding himself out as a physician to patients.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the counts alleging the unlawful practice of medicine based on Campione's alleged failure to practice under the direct supervision of a physician and failure to provide notice of his employment to the State Board of Medical Examiners. Such conduct involves professional misconduct punishable by civil penalties, not criminal acts.

Similarly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the count charging defendants with conspiring to commit the unlawful practice of medicine. Because Campione was a licensed physician assistant who was registered to prescribe opioid medications and Katz was a licensed physician, violating the Physician Assistant Licensing Act (PALA), N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28, is professional misconduct punishable by civil penalties, not criminal conduct under our Criminal Code. Thus, conspiring to violate PALA is not a crime

The court reversed the dismissal of the weapons counts because the State was not precluded from introducing evidence of the possession of the prohibited weapons in a subsequent grand jury proceeding that was not introduced during the first presentment.

The court also reversed the order compelling the State to provide postdismissal discovery of the State's experts. Because the indictment was dismissed in its entirety, the criminal action was no longer pending.Accordingly, the discovery afforded under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) does not apply even though defendant Campione still faced a civil forfeiture action and administrative disciplinary proceedings brought by the Board of Medical Examiners.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of murder, arguing he was denied the right to a jury of his peers

During the voir dire, after an African American male juror was found acceptable to the court and seated in the jury box, the prosecutor performed acriminal background check on the juror and discovered someone with the same name had an outstanding municipal warrant. Without explanation to or from the juror, the trial judge granted the State's motion to remove the juror for cause so he could be arrested outside the presence of other jurors. Defendant argued the exclusion of the juror was racially motivated

The court reverses because the judge did not question the juror himself to ascertain the accuracy of the State's representation and the judge should have addressed defendant's objection under a Batson/Gilmore analysis.

In a prior appeal, this court reversed and remanded the trial judge's open duration alimony determination directing him to find the marital lifestyle numerically and, if necessary, adjust the life insurance securing the alimony. The trial judge failed to enumerate the marital lifestyle and instead supplemented the supported spouse's current expenses with some expenses incurred during the marriage. The trial judge also decreased the life insurance obligation and calculated the death benefit using the supporting spouse's full social security age as the presumed end date for alimony.

The court reverses and remands the matter again to the trial judge and holds that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4) requires the judge to numerically calculate the marital lifestyle. The court's decision explains the purpose for and the means by which to calculate the marital lifestyle. The court also reverses and remands the life insurance computation and provides a method for calculating the present-day value of the alimony obligation to determine the life insurance death benefit.

In these two consolidated appeals, calendared back-to-back for the purposes of a single opinion, plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of his access, to the names and addresses on dog license records issued by defendant municipalities. The Law Division determined plaintiff was not entitled to the information because his sole purpose was to solicit dog licensees to install invisible fences at their homes. The court reverses.

The court concludes there is no outright prohibition under OPRA for the access of public records for commercial purposes, Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 435 (2009), and the licensees' names and addresses are public records in which they have no, or an insufficient, expectation of privacy in the information, Brennan v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 233 N.J. 330, 338, 342 (2018). Accordingly, the court need not reach plaintiff's common law argument.

The court addressed whether the unconscionability standard embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act is preempted by federal regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) provides that the unconscionability of a rent increase is a defense in a summary dispossess action to removal for cause based on a tenant's failure to pay rent. Relying on the language in the governing HUD regulations, explicitly preempting the entire field of rent regulation, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) is preempted by the regulations. As a result, HUD-approved rent increases are not reviewable in summary dispossess proceedings, and the trial judge properly precluded evidence challenging the increase as unconscionable. The court also concluded that if the unit in which the tenant resides is subject to a HUD Section 8 housing assistance payments contract, then the operation, management, and maintenance of that unit, including the approval of rent increases, is governed by HUD's regulatory control irrespective of whether the tenant receives a Section 8 housing subsidy.

Defendant, while incarcerated for a parole violation, was arrested for a homicide he committed while on parole. After defendant completed his parole violation sentence, he remained in jail awaiting resolution of the homicide charges. He thereafter entered a guilty plea to the homicide charges. At sentencing, the trial court, following the holding in State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), awarded defendant eighty-six days of jail credits for the period from the day he completed his parole violation sentence to the day of sentencing.

Defendant acknowledged that if Black applies, the trial court awarded the correct number of jail credits. He argued, however, that the holding in Black was effectively overruled by the Court in State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), and as a result, he is entitled to 1149 days of jail credits for the period from the day he was arrested on the homicide charge to the day of sentencing.

The court rejected defendant's argument, noting that Hernandez concerns circumstances unlike those in Black and that in Hernandez, the Court discussed its holding in Black at length without stating it was departing from that holding. In addition, the court reviewed a number of precedents cited by defendant applying the holding in Hernandez but found all inapposite to the circumstances addressed in Black. In the absence of a Supreme Court decision overruling its prior decision, the court declined to stray from the unequivocal holding in Black and affirmed the award of jail credits.