Opinion Summaries

The Court cannot conclude that there is evidence of a clear intention on the part of the Legislature to deviate from the carefully constructed no-fault first-party PIP system of regulated coverage of contained medical expenses and return to fault-based suits consisting solely of economic damages claims for medical expenses in excess of an elected lesser amount of available PIP coverage. Unless the Legislature makes such an intent clearly known, the Court will not assume that such a change was intended by the Legislature through its amendments to the no-fault system in the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act.

Caraballo’s failure to utilize the Act’s administrative remedies to obtain knee replacement surgery precludes his failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD. In addition, Caraballo’s total knee replacement surgery cannot qualify as a reasonable accommodation under the LAD.

Defendant was convicted of third-degree stalking and he appealed. The court affirms the constitutionality of the anti-stalking statute as it was amended in 2009, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, holding that it is not facially overbroad nor unconstitutionally broad or vague as applied to defendant. The court rejects defendant's other claims that he was deprived of a fair trial.

The court held this indigent defendant should not have been required to proceed unrepresented in his appeal of a municipal court conviction. It resulted in a consequence of magnitude. Defendant did not waive his right to counsel, assumed he would be assigned a third attorney after two were relieved, and did not engage in such egregious conduct as to constitute a forfeiture of his right to representation. The conviction was thus reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial de novo in the Law Division.

During defendant's robbery trial, in his case-in-chief, he moved into evidence a 9-1-1 tape of his call to police. The trial judge admitted the evidence under two exceptions to the hearsay rule: present sense impression, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(1), and excited utterance, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). The judge allowed the State, in rebuttal, to introduce defendant's sanitized criminal history for impeachment purposes pursuant to N.J.R.E. 806 and gave the Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Credibility - Prior Conviction of a Defendant," (rev. Feb. 24, 2003). The court concluded that the admission of the prior criminal history was proper, accompanied by the limiting instruction. Although defendant did not testify, the rule allows the use of impeaching material when hearsay is introduced.

Because Rule 3:11 was not fully followed, and because the record does not reveal whether the shortcomings were technical or substantive, the Court remands for a full hearing consistent with Wade and Henderson. Based on the evidence developed at the hearing, the trial court will be in the best position to determine whether a new trial is warranted.

The Court stresses that the police officers had the right to enter defendant’s home under the emergency-aid doctrine, which permits warrantless entry under circumstances like those presented in this case. Because defendant’s refusal to remove the door chain did not constitute an affirmative interference for purposes of obstructing justice within the meaning of the obstruction statute, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s conviction.

In defendant's original appeal, the court reversed three convictions of theft of immovable property and remanded for a new trial, leaving the other six convictions intact. State v. Kosch, 444 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 369 (2016). The trial judge then resentenced defendant on the other six convictions – to the same aggregate sentence – without disposing of the three remanded charges; the court reversed because, among other things, the trial judge failed to comply with the prior mandate. State v. Kosch, 454 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018). The State then voluntarily dismissed the three remanded charges, and the judge resentenced defendant; to reach an aggregate sentence the equivalent of the original sentence, the judge imposed for the first time a fifteen-year extended term on one of the remaining convictions – to which defendant had originally been sentenced to a non-extended seven-year term.

In this third appeal, the court followed State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984), and adhered to State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2005), in finding no double jeopardy or due process violations because the new sentence did not exceed in the aggregate that which was originally imposed and which defendant had begun serving. But the court also held that just because the sentencing judge possessed the constitutional authority to impose the same aggregate sentence didn't mean he should have. The court remanded for resentencing because, by imposing the same sentence, the judge failed to adequately appreciate the impact caused by the absence of three convictions on which the original sentence was imposed.

The record reveals that the detectives failed to inform Vincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. That failure deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted.

The question presented is whether or not defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges. Defendant was arrested and detained in New Jersey on New Jersey charges. He was thereafter transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center to answer federal charges which were lodged subsequent to his New Jersey charges. Because defendant’s transfer was performed pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, defendant was always in New Jersey custody and is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges.

The Court reiterates its holding in Olds that the entire controversy doctrine does not compel a client to assert a legal malpractice claim against an attorney in the underlying litigation in which the attorney represents the client. 150 N.J. at 443. However, the collection action at issue in this matter was not an “underlying action” as that term is used in Olds, and the entire controversy doctrine may bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, is inadequate for an application of the equitable rules that govern here.

In this case, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that respondent orchestrated the alleged misconduct, the OAE’s complaint must be dismissed. That said, the record highlights a series of troublesome practices and leaves a number of questions unanswered. The Court briefly addresses some of those areas to offer guidance to private practitioners and prosecutors.

In the aftermath of Super Storm Sandy and the ensuing statewide gasoline shortage, appellant, the executive director of a regional sewerage authority, permitted some essential employees to fuel their private vehicles from the Authority's gasoline pump. She also permitted a member of the Authority's board of commissioners, who was an employee and authorized to sign authority checks, to gas up his private vehicle after asking him to find food for the Authority's employees at nearby restaurants and to "commandeer" a local gas station to meet the needs of the essential employees.

By permitting the board member to use Authority gas, the Local Finance Board (LFB) concluded appellant violated N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(c), a provision of the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, which provides: "No local government officer or employee shall use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or advantages for himself or others."

The court reversed, concluding that this provision of the LGEL, unlike others, requires proof of a specific intent on the part of the local officer to secure the unwarranted privilege or advantage. In addition, the court concludes the gasoline appellant secured for the board member and employee was not an "unwarranted privilege or advantage" under the statute.

The admissibility of medical expert testimony utilizing terms such as “somatization” and “symptom magnification” must be determined by trial courts on a case-by-case basis, consistent with N.J.R.E. 403, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s allowing use of those terms under the circumstances of this case. The Court disagrees with the Appellate Division’s equation of the terms used by the experts with the term “malingering.” The Court also disagrees with the panel’s determination that one of defendant’s experts, who is a neurologist rather than a mental-health specialist, was not qualified to testify about somatization or symptom magnification. The Court concurs, however, with the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence at trial plaintiff’s past medical history.

Tax Court: Mitchell Medoff v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n;. Docket No. 009867-2018, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided March 1, 2019. For plaintiff - David S. Neufel and Jeremy S. Cole (Flaster Greenberg, attorneys); for defendant – Ramanjit K. Chawla (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

In 2009, the Legislature amended the law to tax lottery winnings. Previously, such winnings were free from income tax. Plaintiff paid taxes from 2009 through 2012 on installments from a 1993 prize. After the Tax Court’s decisions in 2016 holding the 2009 law invalid as it applied to prizes won prior to its enactment, plaintiff sought a refund. The refund was sought outside the three year statute of limitations imposed on Gross Income Tax refunds.

Even if a tax provision is found to be invalid, a refund can only be allowed in accordance with statute. Plaintiff could have filed a timely request for refund as did the lottery winners in the 2016 decisions invalidating the retroactive application of the 2009 law. There is not any equitable basis such as square corners or manifest injustice to override the statute of limitations in this case.

The legal question in this appeal is whether, as a matter of law, a police officer is ineligible for ordinary disability benefits as a member of the Police & Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) if the officer separates from service by irrevocably resigning from employment to resolve pending drug-related disciplinary charges. Recognizing that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) requires disability retirees to return to duty once their disability has "vanished or has materially diminished," and emphasizing that an irrevocable resignation makes returning to duty impossible and therefore deprives the PFRS Board of Trustees from terminating benefits, this court held that such a member is ineligible.

The court granted the State leave to appeal from an order granting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.

Defendant entered into a plea agreement calling for a five-year Drug Court probationary term with an alternate sentence of a four-year prison term subject to an eighteen-month period of parole ineligibility if he was terminated from Drug Court. Before sentencing, defendant was charged with armed robbery and related weapon offenses. Defendant remained incarcerated on the new charges while awaiting trial. After being acquitted of the new charges, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea. By the time the motion was heard, defendant had accrued an additional 366 days of jail credit. The trial court granted the motion, finding defendant's reasonable expectations at the time of his plea were not met because of the additional jail credit.

The court reverses and remands for sentencing, finding the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. Defendant did not present a colorable claim of innocence. His reasonable expectations as they existed at the time of the plea hearing were met by enforcing the plea agreement despite the unanticipated accrual of additional jail credit before sentencing.

Appellant was denied promotion to the position of sergeant when his employer chose the first, third and fourth police officers from a certified list, skipping over appellant who placed second; the first and third are Caucasian officers, while appellant and the fourth are African-American. The Civil Service Commission denied appellant's claim of retaliation arising from grievances about an earlier promotion; in so acting, the Commission did not conduct an evidentiary hearing but simply rejected what it called appellant's "mere allegations" that the employer retaliated against him. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing so the parties' factual disputes could be resolved and so the Commission might determine – even if not expressly or clearly raised previously – whether the employer's reasons for skipping over appellant were unlawfully pretextual.

Tax Court: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 008305-2007, opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided February 27, 2019. For plaintiff – Craig B. Fields and Mitchell A. Newmark (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., attorneys); for defendant – Marlene G. Brown and Joseph Palumbo (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Defendant did not reasonably and fairly exercise its discretion in deeming only a portion of the royalty expenses paid by plaintiff to its subsidiary as excepted from the addback requirements simply because subsidiary paid a smaller amount of corporation business tax (“CBT”) based on its New Jersey allocation factor which was lower than plaintiff’s New Jersey allocation factor. Where the subsidiary included the entire amount of the royalties as its income, and paid CBT on its allocated portion, and defendant did not dispute the validity of either plaintiff’s or the subsidiary’s allocation factor, the difference in their respective allocation factors, does not, without more, mean that plaintiff established that only a partial addback of the royalty payments was unreasonable. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

In these four small claim suits, plaintiffs sought relief from defendants because their negligence caused damage to plaintiffs' vehicles. Of interest, plaintiffs sought damages because databases like CarFax mention the vehicles' newly-acquired accident histories that – plaintiffs claimed – diminished the vehicles' value even though they were repaired to their pre-accident condition and function. In finding these damages recoverable, the court held that fixing an amount for the stigma of this accident history did not require undue speculation. Such a claim, the court held, is merely subject to proof, which plaintiffs provided via an expert who testified that the "scarlet letter" of an accident history reduces a vehicle's value; in other words, the court found the claim cognizable because it is reasonable to assume that, all other things being equal, a buyer will likely pay less for a vehicle with an accident history than a vehicle without.