Opinion Summaries

Based on the record, the Court cannot determine whether part or all of the protections outlined in Henderson should apply to identifications made by law enforcement officers. For the reasons expressed, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division and upholds defendant’s convictions

After determining defendant's plea allocution did not establish a factual basis for each element of theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, because defendant did not admit he deceived the victims at the time he obtained their money, the court ruled the trial judge's reliance on the theft consolidation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a), to accept defendant's factual basis for a different form of theft was misplaced as that statute applies only in trial settings — not to plea proceedings.

The plain language of the Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to repair and restore churches, and Morris County’s program ran afoul of that longstanding provision. Based on its understanding of the current state of the law, including the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), the Court concludes that that the application of the Religious Aid Clause in this case does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.

The jury properly apportioned fault between defendant and the John Doe defendant because plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s UM carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiff had fair and timely notice that defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident.

Defendant's putative paramour filed a complaint against defendant under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, alleging he forcibly entered her residence and assaulted and threatened her. After considering the victim's sworn testimony, a Family Part judge issued an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(g) and a warrant to search defendant's apartment and seize any firearms as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(j).

The police arrested defendant on fourth degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1), when he refused to permit the officers to enter his apartment to execute the domestic violence search warrant. Once inside, the officers found in plain view cocaine and drug paraphernalia. Based on the sworn testimony of a detective, a Criminal Part judge issued a telephonic warrant to search the apartment for narcotics.

The remodeling of Courtroom No. 2 in Warren County has been the subject of years of litigation. The matter was first initiated by the Office of Public Defender (OPD), when it successfully objected to a criminal trial being conducted there, after renovations made in 2008. The OPD took the position that a defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the design of the courtroom. Warren County eventually filed an action for judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-5 to -62, that more recent modifications satisfied any constitutional concerns. The panel reversed the judge's decision that the OPD lacked standing to participate in the proceedings, remanded the case, and suggested the appointment of a special master to make findings and develop a more complete factual record under Rule 4:41-1.

(1) The inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) in contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery of household furniture may alone give rise to a violation of a "clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller" for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. (2) A consumer who receives a contract that includes language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), but who suffers no monetary or other harm as a result of that noncompliance, is not an "aggrieved consumer" entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

Each defendant in these five back-to-back appeals by the State was convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The statute prescribes a sentence of a "fixed minimum " term of at least 180 days without parole eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c). The State contended the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing intermittent sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7). The panel concluded that a minimum period of parole ineligibility measured in days requires service of continuous twenty-four-hour periods, but does not require an uninterrupted 180-day term. The panel rejected the State's argument that intermittent periods of release were akin to parole.The panel held the trial court was authorized to impose weekend sentences running from Friday night to the same time Sunday night. Such a sentence would allow a defendant to accrue two days of credit each weekend toward the 180-day sentence. But, a sentence of nights only was not an authorized sentence, as aggregation of part-days is not permitted. The panel therefore modified two sentences; reversed two others; and remanded one for reconsideration.

Due to the complete absence of notice by Ferrante to NJM at any point over years of litigation, including the lack of notice about the high-low agreement or completed jury trial during the UIM process, NJM may refuse to pay the UIM benefits.

Plaintiff was in line at the bank behind a man of the same race who passed a note to defendant-bank's teller demanding money. The teller complied and the robber left. Another employee, seeing the note and believing the man in front of the teller's window — plaintiff — was the robber, called 9-1-1 and provided a description, including the race of the suspect. Police arrived and questioned defendant, who claimed he suffered from PTSD as a result of the incident.

Plaintiff sued the bank alleging negligence in the violation of bank policies and in his misidentification as the robber. The court concludes, consistent with decisions in several other states, that there is no cause of action for negligent identification/misidentification, nor should New Jersey recognize such a tort, given the state's strong public policy to foster cooperation between citizens and law enforcement.

To preserve its constitutionality, the Juvenile Justice Code (Code) must be interpreted to prevent incarceration of all developmentally disabled juveniles in county detention facilities, because not all counties have access to an approved post-disposition short-term incarceration program. Because the Code prohibits the incarceration of developmentally disabled youth in a State facility, the inequity must be avoided of developmentally disabled juveniles in one county facing incarceration while those similarly situated in another do not. T.C., who was seventeen at the time of the offense, admitted participating with two other juveniles in the unarmed forcible theft of marijuana from the backpack of a fourth juvenile. Although he has already served the thirty days of incarceration imposed, the matter is not moot because he is serving juvenile probation that he could violate, and the issue is one of public importance that may evade review in the future. The disposition is reversed.

The panel reversed the Board of Review's denial of unemployment compensation. The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision that the claimant voluntarily quit her job as a group home worker without good cause related to her work. Her child care fell through unexpectedly and she could not find a co-worker to cover her shift. The panel held that the Board overlooked evidence that the claimant was entitled to benefits under N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.5, because she quit in the face of imminent discharge: her supervisor threatened she might be fired if she did not come in. Had the claimant been fired for staying home, she would have been eligible for benefits. Although "good cause related to the work" under the voluntary quit statute, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), excludes compelling personal reasons, "good cause for being absent from work," in the regulation defining simple misconduct, includes "any compelling personal circumstance, which would normally prevent a reasonable person under the same conditions from reporting work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.2(b). The panel concluded that, in order to be eligible for benefits, the claimant was not required to wait to be fired when discharge was imminent.

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, landlord and property manager of a multi-family apartment building, on the basis that they did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, who at the time was an infant staying in the apartment with the tenant's consent, to protect him from the apartment's excessively-hot-uncovered radiator. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the radiator is part of the building's heating system that defendants have control of under common law and N.J.A.C. 5:10-14.3(d), and should have been covered, and reverse.

Search warrants are prospective in nature—they authorize the taking of action. A later-obtained search warrant does not retroactively validate preceding warrantless conduct that is challenged through a suppression motion focused on the legitimacy of the seizure that gave rise to a later search. The State must bear the burden of proving the legitimacy of the seizure that led to a later warrant and search—in this case the stop.

Applying the doctrine of probable intent, see Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561 (1962), the panel reverses summary judgment and holds that the trial court was obliged to consider extrinsic evidence to interpret a trust, even though the language on its face appeared clear. Relying on extrinsic evidence, including the settlor's alleged personal usage of the apparently plain term, "grandchildren," the trustee contended the settlor's gift to her "grandchildren" was intended to exclude the children of her daughter who married outside the settlor's faith. The panel rejects, as contrary to caselaw, the dictum in In re Estate of Gabrellian, 372 N.J. Super. 432, 443 (App. Div. 2004) that "[t]he doctrine of probable intent is not applicable where the documents are clear on their face and there is no failure of any bequest or provision." The matter is remanded for trial on the issue of the settlor's intent.

The court considered, among other things, whether a third party may take advantage of an estoppel doctrine – first recognized in Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J. 114 (1962) – that has been found to apply when an insurer, while reserving its rights or declining coverage, fails to clearly seek its insured's consent to the insurer's control of the defense. The court held that the insurer here could not, as a matter of law, be estopped from denying coverage because there was no clear evidence that the defunct insured changed its position to its detriment even if the insurer assumed the defense without consent. The court also rejected the argument that Eggleston permits avoidance of estoppel only if the insurer uses certain magic words in communicating with its insured; the insurer's disclaiming letter, which expressed the insurer's "willingness" to provide a "courtesy defense," could reasonably be interpreted as conveying an offer rather than a unilateral declaration of a right to control the defense. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the parties seeking estoppel – the victim of the insured's alleged negligence and its property-damage insurer.

The totality of the circumstances in this case evince an objective exigency, relaxing the need for a warrant and rendering the officer’s warrantless blood draw constitutional.

Defendant Amy Locane, who had been convicted of second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), and third-degree assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2), was sentenced on our remand to precisely the same three-year term of imprisonment as on the first occasion. The panel remanded the matter a second time because the trial judge again erred in the application of the downgrade statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). The judge found mitigating factors not supported by the record, and accorded too much weight to them. Further, the judge failed to find aggravating factors that were present, and thus accorded them insufficient weight. Not only did the mitigating factors fail to substantially outweigh the aggravating, but there were no compelling reasons requiring a downgrade. See ibid.

The panel further found that double jeopardy barred the State from appealing the concurrent terms that were improperly imposed for the offenses. The panel nonetheless discussed State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 428 (2001), concluding that it creates a rebuttable presumption favoring consecutive sentences when a drunken driver inflicts grave harm on more than one victim. Ultimately, a careful and close application of the Yarbough factors must be made in vehicular homicide cases, as in every other instance. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).

In reversing a partial summary judgment entered in defendants' favor, the court rejected the notion that plaintiffs – in alleging an invasion of their privacy in an office building's restroom – could only claim the presence of a hidden recording device by demonstrating their images were actually captured. In adhering to the general principles delineated in Soliman v. Kushner Cos., 433 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 2013), the court concluded that an intrusion on seclusion occurs when a recording device is surreptitiously present notwithstanding whether the victim was ever recorded because the tort is intended to protect the victim's peace of mind and the comfort associated with the expectation of privacy.

The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion during defendant’s sentencing proceedings or infringe defendant’s allocution right in any way.