Opinion Summaries

There is no obligation to send Rice notices here, where the Board determined from the start to conduct its discussion about faculty reappointments in public session. Turning to the release of meeting minutes, the delay that occurred is unreasonable no matter the excuses advanced by the Board, but the Court modifies the Appellate Division’s holding requiring the Board to set a regular meeting schedule.

In Pool v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 400 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (App. Div. 2008), this court ruled that a worker's compensation lien under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 attached to funds that an injured plaintiff received from a defendant physician in a medical malpractice case pursuant to the terms of a "high/low" agreement. Pool held that the money paid to plaintiff as the negotiated "low" figure in accordance with the agreement was subject to the statutory lien, even though a jury had rendered a "no cause" verdict in favor of the physician and absolved him of liability. Id. at 575-77.

Similarly, in the present case, despite a "no cause" decision, an injured plaintiff recovered the "low" amount under a high/low agreement he entered into with defendants who provided medical treatment to him after a work-related accident. Relying upon Pool, his employer's workers' compensation carrier seeks to enforce its lien for compensation benefits it paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that N.J.A.C. 11:1-7.3(a)(1), a regulation adopted by the Department of Banking and Insurance exempting certain payments made under a high/low agreement from physician reporting requirements, alters the analysis in Pool. Plaintiff claims the regulation renders the compensation lien unenforceable in this setting. In essence, plaintiff desires a lien-free "low."

The panel rejects plaintiff's novel argument. It concurs with the trial court that the regulation does not affect the validity and enforceability of the carrier's Section 40 lien, and that the lien applies to the proceeds collected by plaintiff from the medical malpractice defendants. A contrary result would allow plaintiff to retain an inappropriate double recovery.

The plain language of the MLUL defines an “application for development” as the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3. Because Dunbar’s application lacked many of the documents required by the Ordinance, the application was not complete upon submission and does not benefit from the TOA Rule.

In a per curiam opinion, the panel affirms the denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing substantially for the reasons stated in the trial court's published opinion reported at 448 N.J. Super. 113 (Law Div. 2016).

The Mayor of the City of Orange Township appointed defendant as Acting Business Administrator. Plaintiff did not confirm the appointment, and the municipal ordinance required the mayor to remove acting persons after ninety days. In contravention of the Council's directive and the applicable law, the mayor appointed defendant as Deputy Business Administrator. Defendant thereafter performed functions, signed official documents and collected a salary as the Business Administrator. Following the entry of an order to show cause directing defendant to cease performing all functions of a Business Administrator, defendant left the position. The mayor then appointed him as chief of staff. A second judge vacated certain portions of the order to show cause, but left intact the provision that only a department director had authority to appoint a deputy. Nevertheless, defendant resumed the title and salary, and performed the functions of Business Administrator. N.J.S.A. 40:69A-43.1 provides that only the director of a department may appoint a deputy director. Therefore, the mayor had no authority to appoint defendant to the position. Furthermore, the City abolished the position of deputy business administrator in 1985 by municipal ordinance. The panel finds defendant's appointment as deputy was an illegal act — an act that was ultra vires in the primary sense and, therefore, void. The panel rejects defendant's argument that he accepted the position of Deputy Business Administrator in good faith and with the "reasonable understanding" that the mayor had the authority to appoint him to the post. Defendant is a highly educated man who had served in the state legislature and taught college courses in municipal government and public administration. He acknowledged having reviewed the Faulkner Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1 to -210, and the City ordinances that pertained to his employment. Defendant did not demonstrate any factual dispute in the events surrounding his appointment, nor any ambiguity in the controlling statutes. Because he lacked good faith in accepting and remaining in the post, the panel rejects defendant's argument that he should be permitted to retain his salary under equitable theories of quantum meruit or equitable estoppel. The sole remedy to make the aggrieved taxpayers whole is to disgorge defendant of the monies paid to him during his service in the unlawful appointment.

The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.

The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.

Absent a contract, statutory provision or court rule authorizing fee-shifting, New Jersey follows the so-called "American Rule," requiring litigants to bear their own litigation costs regardless of who prevails. In this consolidated action, the panel reverses an award of attorneys' fees, jointly and severally, against the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, and plaintiff's former employer, the Township of Middletown.The panel concludes the trial court, in an action in lieu of prerogative writs against the Board, Middletown, and certain of their employees, erroneously awarded counsel fees to plaintiff on equitable grounds. Because there was no legal basis to support the award of those fees, the panel reverses.

The language of Section 26.1 is plain and unambiguous. It became effective years after J.V. was waived to adult court. The Court concludes the Legislature intended the statute to apply prospectively to those juvenile waiver hearings conducted after the statute became effective. The statute does not apply to J.V.

In a residential foreclosure where an investor such as Freddie Mac owns the note but not the mortgage, the plaintiff must have both the note and a valid assignment of mortgage to have standing to foreclose. Given that defendant knew the servicer for Freddie Mac, given that Freddie Mac is a GSE (government-sponsored enterprise) that publicly declares its policy to foreclose through its servicers, and given that the servicer did possess the note at an earlier foreclosure proceeding and had a valid mortgage assignment, the irregularities are insufficient to defeat this foreclosure. Standing is not jurisdictional in New Jersey, and the equities here favor foreclosure.

These three appeals involve the non-consensual towing of vehicles and raise questions concerning the Predatory Towing Prevention Act (Towing Act), N.J.S.A. 56:13-7 to -23, the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20, and the Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18. The court holds that: (1) the Towing Act does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) or dispute resolution procedures established by municipalities that have towing ordinances; (2) the Tort Claims Act (TCA) does not provide immunity against claims based on the fees companies charge for non-consensual towing of vehicles; and (3) the Towing Act and its regulations limit the services for which a towing company can charge. The court also holds that the TCCWNA applies to the non-consensual towing of vehicles because the bills issued by towing companies are contracts and notices within the definition of the TCCWNA. Finally, the court holds that class actions may, in the right circumstances, be appropriate for claims under the Towing Act, the CFA, and the TCCWNA. Accordingly, we reverse the orders on appeal in each of these three cases and remand for further proceedings.

The CJRA -- like the federal and D.C. laws on which it is based in part -- provides defendants a qualified right to summon adverse witnesses. Before calling an adverse witness, a defendant must proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to negate probable cause or undermine the State’s evidence in support of detention in a material way.

A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated manslaughter of her husband, as a lesser included offense of murder; first degree attempted murder and second degree endangering the welfare of her minor daughter; and second degree endangering the welfare of her minor son. Defendant asserted the affirmative defense of insanity under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1. The central issue in this appeal concerns the proper assessment of this defense by the jury. This court reverses defendant's conviction and remands the matter for a new trial. As a matter of plain error under Rule 2:10-2, this court concludes that the State's expert witness' testimony usurped the jury's exclusive role to decide defendant's state of mind at the time she committed these offenses, rendering the verdict unsustainable. State v. Simms, 224 N.J. 393, 396 (2016); State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 424 (2016). The trial judge also engaged in ex parte interactions with the pool of prospective jurors before the jury selection process had even begun. Although not outcome determinative, this court also holds that the trial judge's ex parte interactions with the pool of prospective jurors violated defendant's right under Rule 3:16(b) to be present "at every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury," as well as the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Husain, 220 N.J. 270 (2014), not to engage in ex parte interactions with the jury at any stage of the trial. See also Rule 1:2-1.

The panel reverses the denial of an accidental disability pension to a corrections officer who was disabled after falling on ice near the parking lot on the grounds of jail where she worked. Unexpectedly directed to serve a second consecutive shift, the officer was on her way to retrieve feminine hygiene products from her car, because she was menstruating. In holding that her fall "occurr[ed] during and as a result of the performance of [her] regular or assigned duties," N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), the panel concludes the officer took the equivalent of a restroom break, which the Court in Kasper v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564, 586 n.7 (2000), stated was included within "an employee's performance of his or her regularly assigned tasks," if "within the confines of the workday at the work location." The panel rejects the Board's statement that parking lot accidents are categorically not eligible for accidental disability pensions, and distinguishes a parking lot accident that occurs during the journey to or from work, such as the one presented in Mattia v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, decided today.

The panel affirms the final determination of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, finding former corrections officer Paul Mattia was not eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. The panel distinguished Kasper v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000), where the Supreme Court determined an education media specialist, who was mugged on the steps of the school when she arrived early to distribute materials prior to the official start of classes, had finished her commute for purposes of pension analysis.Mattia suffered a disabling injury when he slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot of the jail where he was employed, before he was able to check in and receive his assignment. Because Mattia had not yet begun performing his regular assigned duties, the Board denied his claim for accidental disability retirement benefits, determining he was still commuting when he was injured. In doing so, the Board rejected the decision of an Administrative Law Judge granting Mattia's petition. The panel affirmed, finding he was still commuting when he fell in the parking lot.

In this Title Nine action, defendant appeals from a Family Part order finding he abused or neglected his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter by sexually assaulting her. Defendant principally argues the court erred by finding the child's statements concerning the assault were corroborated under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4) based on her consistent repetition of what occurred, a doctor's report containing a diagnosis she was sexually assaulted, and a psychologist's report stating she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual abuse.The court found the child's consistent repetition of her version of the events did not constitute corroboration of her statements concerning the sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), and the diagnoses contained in the doctor's and psychologist's reports did not provide corroboration because they constituted inadmissible complex diagnoses. The court, however, determined that admissible objective findings in the doctor's report, including descriptions of the child's physical injuries, and defendant's admissions concerning the circumstances surrounding the sexual assault provided some evidence supporting the child's sexual assault allegation, satisfied N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)'s corroboration requirement, and permitted the court's reliance on the child's statements in making its abuse or neglect finding.

The court determined the entire controversy doctrine (ECD) did not preclude the State Operated School District of the City of Newark, Essex County from prosecuting a conduct-unbecoming tenure charge against a third-grade teacher stemming from his infliction of corporal punishment on two students, even though the corporal punishment predated — and the related charge was not joined with — tenure actions instituted against the teacher for inefficiency. The limited scope of the inefficiency arbitrations, considering the legislatively-mandated procedures specific to those arbitrations under the TEACHNJ Act, is not conducive to the inclusion of other charges, including conduct unbecoming. Further, there was little or no transactional nexus between the inefficiency and conduct-unbecoming charges to warrant application of the ECD.

Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the warrantless seizure of a small amount of marijuana from his vehicle. A police officer seized the marijuana after stopping defendant's vehicle for an equipment violation. During the stop, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana coming from inside the car while questioning defendant through the open passenger side window.The State contends the officer's slight intrusion inside the vehicle's window, for the sole purpose of better hearing defendant over the noise of passing traffic, did not constitute a search. Defendant argues it was a search, and that it was unlawful because the officer was not legally in the "smelling area" when he detected the odor of marijuana and developed the probable cause to seize it. Assuming without deciding that the officer conducted a search when he leaned his head inside defendant's open window, the panel concludes that the officer's slight, momentary intrusion inside the car window to hear defendant's responses was reasonable. Consequently, the search did not violate the Constitutional protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures." The marijuana was then properly seized pursuant to the "plain smell" exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court order denying the suppression motion is affirmed.

Neither exigency nor the hot pursuit doctrine justified the officers’ warrantless entry here. However, defendant’s brother’s actions did not constitute state action and were sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct to preclude application of the exclusionary rule to the evidence.

Mount has proven, under requirements established in case law construing N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), that he experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event and that the event was undesigned and unexpected. The Court remands to the Appellate Division panel to decide Mount’s claim that his mental disability was a direct result of that incident. Martinez has not demonstrated that the incident that caused his disability was undesigned and unexpected and therefore is not entitled to accidental disability benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7.