Opinion Summaries

In this action, the Attorney General and Director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights alleged defendants violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by asking a prospective tenant of an apartment if she was a Muslim, refusing to lease the apartment based on the prospective tenant's religion, and making statements concerning the gender of a Division on Civil Rights investigator posing as a prospective tenant. A jury returned a no-cause verdict on plaintiffs' claims. The court reverses and remands for a new trial.

The court determines the trial court erred by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran in violation of N.J.R.E. 610 and in derogation of the privilege embodied in N.J.R.E. 512. The court rejects defendants' argument the cross-examination was permissible because the prospective tenant "opened the door" to questions about her religious beliefs and the teachings of the Quran during her direct testimony.

The court also concludes the trial court abused its discretion by allowing cross-examination of the prospective tenant about the alleged use of the term "infidels" by Muslims to refer to individuals that do not practice Islam. The court finds the cross-examination testimony, which defendants relied on to attack the prospective tenant's credibility, inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 608.

The court also finds the trial court did not conduct a proper analysis of the admissibility of the available portions of one of the defendant's recorded interview with a news organization, during which the defendant spoke about his interactions with prospective tenant and his beliefs concerning Muslims. The trial court incorrectly determined the available recorded portions of the interview were inadmissible under the "rule of completeness" without conducting the required analysis for the admissibility of the available portions of the recorded interview under the standard established by the Court in State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015).

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

In this workers' compensation case, the court reverses an order dismissing with prejudice a claim petition and a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. The court concludes the judge of compensation denied petitioner's due process rights by determining at the outset of case, and based solely on petitioner's affidavit supporting his motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, that petitioner was a "multiple liar" who lacked credibility. During the numerous subsequent proceedings in the matter, and without hearing any testimony from petitioner, the judge repeatedly found petitioner was a liar and, at one point, found petitioner's lack of credibility rendered it unnecessary to hear to any evidence on the merits of petitioner's claim. The court reverses the dismissal of the claim petition and denial of the motion for medical and temporary disability benefits, and remands for further proceedings before a different judge.

This domestic violence case concerns the breadth of “household member” jurisdiction in the context of a modern, blended-family where the parties are adult, half-siblings who shared meaningful, regular parenting time with their common father during their youth – though never resided together. Throughout their youth, the parties regularly and consistently spent substantial periods of time at their common father’s home, including the defendant spending overnights every other weekend during the school year and more extended times during the summer at their father’s home. Although he did not have a bedroom, he had a fixed sleeping arrangement and drawers containing underwear, gym shorts, and toiletries. During and after college, their in-person contact decreased, but they still gathered informally and at family milestones and vacations.

In view of those facts, for purposes of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s (“PDVA”) jurisdictional “household member” requirement, the court holds that a child whose parents are separated during youth but who spends meaningful, regular periods of time at a parent of alternate residence’s home such that he or she is substantially integrated into that household may have two “households” creating jurisdiction vis-à-vis a victimized half-sibling who resided solely with the common parent. “Household member” as used in the PDVA’s definition of “victim of domestic violence” must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the ever-changing dynamics of modern families. To restrict a child whose parents are separated to only one household despite meaningful, regular time in a second household would untenably alter the statutory construct, discriminate against members of blended families, and unduly restrict the broadly designed, legislatively crafted protections afforded victims of domestic violence.

The caseworker’s testimony regarding Sharie’s statement is clear evidence of third-party guilt and was therefore impermissibly excluded at trial. As such, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s convictions for crimes against Sharie. However, the State’s leading questions were appropriate for the child victim witnesses, and defendant’s sentence was not manifestly excessive with respect to the convictions for crimes against Brianna. The Court finds no reason to disturb defendant’s convictions or sentence as to his offenses against Brianna.

In this appeal from a final judgment of divorce and an order denying reconsideration, the court rejected a trial judge's reliance on Gilligan v. Gilligan, 428 N.J. Super. 69 (Ch. Div. 2012), to the extent it held an award of social security disability to a spouse during the marriage was not sufficient to establish a party's inability to work for purposes of income imputation in the calculation of spousal and child support. The court held here that despite Gilligan's holding, the court continued to hew to its holding in Golian v. Golian, 344 N.J. Super. 337, 338-43 (App. Div. 2001), that when the Social Security Administration has determined a party is disabled, a presumption of disability is established and the burden shifts to the opposing party to refute that presumption

The court also rejected the trial judge's reliance on income averaging in her determination of whether a party was earning income commensurate with his or her earning capacity because the judge ignored current earnings and relied upon six years of income that were earned prior to the parties separating, which was more than five years before the trial date. The court held that the judge on remand should use the years prior to the trial when determining earning capacity.Finally, the court concluded that the trial judge also improperly deviated from the Child Support Guidelines by relying on the elimination of parenting time in the final judgment of divorce. The court concluded that because the amount of parenting time is an element of the Child Support Guidelines, a reduction based on elimination of parenting time did not support a finding of an injustice warranting a downward deviation in support.

Both ordinances at issue are unquestionably zoning ordinances subject to the limitations of the MLUL, the plain language of which contains no exception for the retroactive application of changes in zoning requirements within two years of the issuance of a final approval. The City therefore cannot apply either ordinance to the Project, because they became effective within two years of the issuance of Shipyard’s final approval. And Shipyard’s period of statutory protection has been tolled.

Here, where a patient removed the tube herself and refused replacement, important questions about the procedures, protocols, and duties of a licensed nurse in these circumstances must be explained in order to establish a deviation in the standard of care. In addition, important considerations about patient autonomy complicate the standard-of-care analysis. A jury could not reach a determination as to a nurse’s responsibility under these circumstances without the benefit of expert opinion as to the appropriate balance between patient autonomy and prescribed treatment. An affidavit of merit was therefore required.

In this case of first impression, the court examines the meaning of a "dating relationship" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, where the parties never experienced a traditional, in-person "date." Instead, their relationship was demonstrated by the intensity and content of their communications, including the exchange of nearly 1300 highly personal text messages.

Acknowledging the prevalence of virtual communications in today's society, especially in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court recognized text messaging and other forms of electronic communication enable rapid yet deep interactions at all hours. Those communications can form bonds that may be no less intimate than traditional dating activities.

The court concluded the proliferate and exceedingly intimate communications between the parties in the present matter constituted a dating relationship within the meaning of the Act and supported entry of the final restraining order.

An attorney has an obligation to inform the court if he or she is not able to handle an assigned matter professionally due to a lack of expertise and inability to obtain sufficient knowledge to appropriately represent the client, and also is unable to retain a substitute attorney knowledgeable in the area. We sua sponte determine that appellate counsel was so ineffective in this contested adoption appeal that the mother was deprived of her right to appellate counsel. In counsel's five-page brief he relied on an inapplicable statute, cited to no cases and failed to mention the lack of a transcript of the judge's decision. We therefore adjourn this appeal to appoint substitute appellate counsel and obtain the transcript.

In these consolidated appeals, the court is asked to determine whether two sentences imposed on convicted sexual offender R.K. for violating a New Jersey Parole Board regulation imposing a Community Supervision for Life (CSL) condition banning the use of the Internet to access social media are unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. The trial judge denied R.K.'s motions to correct his illegal sentences finding the ban did not violate his constitutional rights of free speech. Because the court concludes the blanket social media prohibition is both unconstitutional on its face based on Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), and as applied to R.K. based on J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204 (2017) and K.G. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 458 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2019), the trial court's rulings are reversed, and the court remands for: (1) resentencing to remove the 2007 CSL condition prohibiting R.K. from accessing social networking on the Internet without the express authorization of the District Parole Supervisor; and (2) allowing R.K. to withdraw his September 2012 guilty plea for violating the terms of his CSL condition prohibiting him from accessing social networking.

In this opinion, the court addresses the novel issue of whether a firearms toolmark identification expert's use of untested three-dimensional (3D) computer imaging technology known as BULLETTRAX, in conjunction with the traditional technique of comparing evidence and test bullets using a comparison microscope, requires that a Frye1 hearing be held to establish the scientific reliability of the BULLETTRAX machine and related software.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the State's expert relied upon the BULLETTRAX technology and the images it produced in concluding that a bullet fragment taken from the murder victim likely came from a handgun later seized from defendant. In so ruling, the trial court made extensive factual and credibility findings pertaining to the expert's testimony about his use of the images, and its findings are entitled to deference on appeal.

Under these circumstances, the court holds that a Frye hearing was necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the computer images of the bullets produced by BULLETTRAX before the expert would be permitted to testify at trial.

The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the parties’ dispute did not raise a scope-of-negotiations question and that the trial court therefore properly asserted subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment on the vested-rights claim. As the governing contracts made clear, a given teacher’s right to sick leave compensation did not vest until that teacher, having served the length of time required by the agreement, retired or otherwise separated from employment with his or her sick leave still unused. When the Board and the Association limited such compensation in their 2015 Agreement for the Association’s members, they did not infringe on a vested right. The cases on which the trial court and Appellate Division relied address issues distinct from those involved here and warrant no departure from the unambiguous contractual terms to which the Board and the Association agreed.

In State v. North Beach 1003, LLC, 451 N.J. Super. 214, 223 (App. Div. 2017), this court held that the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had the authority to "condemn private property to take perpetual easements for shore protection purposes" as part of the Manasquan Inlet to Barnegat Inlet Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction Project to reduce flooding in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. This court also held that "easements that allow for publicly funded beach protection projects can include public access and use." However, this court expressly did not extend its holding to properties that were protected from flooding by an existing revetment.

In these sixty-seven consolidated condemnation appeals, this court affirmed the trial judge's final judgments upholding DEP's taking of permanent easements where the properties were protected by the revetment. This court agreed with the trial judge's conclusions that DEP properly determined that the revetment provided insufficient protection, and that the taking was not the product of fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse of power.

In State v. North Beach 1003, LLC, 451 N.J. Super. 214, 223 (App. Div. 2017), this court held that the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had the authority to "condemn private property to take perpetual easements for shore protection purposes" as part of the Manasquan Inlet to Barnegat Inlet Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction Project to reduce flooding in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. This court also held that "easements that allow for publicly funded beach protection projects can include public access and use." However, this court expressly did not extend its holding to properties that were protected from flooding by an existing revetment.

In these sixty-seven consolidated condemnation appeals, this court affirmed the trial judge's final judgments upholding DEP's taking of permanent easements where the properties were protected by the revetment. This court agreed with the trial judge's conclusions that DEP properly determined that the revetment provided insufficient protection, and that the taking was not the product of fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse of power.

In State v. North Beach 1003, LLC, 451 N.J. Super. 214, 223 (App. Div. 2017), this court held that the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had the authority to "condemn private property to take perpetual easements for shore protection purposes" as part of the Manasquan Inlet to Barnegat Inlet Hurricane and Storm Damage Reduction Project to reduce flooding in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. This court also held that "easements that allow for publicly funded beach protection projects can include public access and use." However, this court expressly did not extend its holding to properties that were protected from flooding by an existing revetment.

In these sixty-seven consolidated condemnation appeals, this court affirmed the trial judge's final judgments upholding DEP's taking of permanent easements where the properties were protected by the revetment. This court agreed with the trial judge's conclusions that DEP properly determined that the revetment provided insufficient protection, and that the taking was not the product of fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse of power.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. The Court comments briefly on the Appellate Division’s reversal of the trial court’s decision to exclude the opinion of Dianne Simmons-Grab and offers guidance for the trial court on remand in its role under N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703 as the gatekeeper of expert witness testimony.

The TCA applied to Nieves’s legal malpractice action, and his claim for loss of liberty damages failed to vault the verbal threshold for a pain and suffering damages claim under the strictures of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d). Defendants were entitled to summary judgment

The prosecutor did not impermissibly interfere with the grand jury’s investigative functions. As the trial court found, the grand jury here sought clarification rather than specific instructions on lesser-included offenses for murder. The Court provides guidance as to when such instructions should be given.

Plaintiff alleged defendant violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, by terminating his employment in retaliation for his opposition to defendant's requests that he make false statements concerning, and seek a baseless restraining order against, a co-employee in retaliation for the co-employee's filing of a complaint alleging defendant violated the LAD. The motion court granted defendant summary judgment, finding plaintiff did not present evidence establishing the prerequisite for a LAD retaliation claim under the Supreme Court's decision in Carmona v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354 (2007). More particularly, the motion court found plaintiff failed to demonstrate there was a good faith and reasonable basis for his co-employee's LAD complaint.

The court reverses the summary judgment order, finding Carmona's good faith and reasonable basis prerequisite for a LAD-retaliation claim applies to the protected activity under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) triggering the alleged retaliatory actions. Unlike the plaintiff in Carmona, plaintiff did not allege he was retaliated by engaging in the protected activity of filing a LAD complaint. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). Instead, plaintiff alleged he was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity under N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d) by opposing "acts forbidden under" the LAD—defendant's requests he make false statements and obtain a baseless restraining order against the co-employee in retaliation for her filing of a LAD complaint. The court holds that to satisfy the Carmona prerequisite for his LAD retaliation claim, plaintiff was required to demonstrate he had a good faith and reasonable basis to oppose defendant's requests because he alleged that protected activity triggered the alleged retaliation against him.