Opinion Summaries

A violation occurred when the State was allowed to enter into evidence information set forth in the affidavit of a non-testifying officer concerning the no-permit results from a search of the State firearm registry, and that violation was not cured by testimony concerning the search of an Essex County firearm database. Further, the trial court’s incorrect N.J.R.E. 609 ruling constituted harmful error requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the Court declines to adopt the position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless.

Tax Court: New West Developers, LLC v. Township of Irvington, Docket No. 014704-2013; 010653-2014; 009474-2015; 014706-2013; 010648-2014; 009475-2015; Crown Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v. Township of Irvington, Docket Nos. 009727-2016; 009728-2016, opinion by Bedrin Murray, J.T.C., decided December 23, 2021. For plaintiff – Daniel G. Keough (Ventura, Miesowitz, Keough & Warner, PC, attorney); for defendant – Jarrid H. Kantor (Antonelli Kantor, PC, attorney).

Held: Defendant’s motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaints under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b), which requires a taxpayer to satisfy certain local property tax obligations prior to filing an action in the Tax Court, are granted. While the requirement was previously jurisdictional, allowing the court no discretion in determining if a matter should proceed, the statute was amended in 1999 to provide for relaxation of the tax payment provision in the interests of justice. Plaintiff New West, owner of the 15 properties during tax years 2013 through 2015, offers no reason for relaxation. Plaintiff Crown, owner of the properties for tax year 2016, contends its difficulty in ascertaining arrearages owed for all tax years warrants relaxation of the tax payment requirement. The court rejects plaintiff’s argument, holding that the interests of justice would be subverted by allowing the complaints to go forward under the circumstances. In addition, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s failure to object to the non-payment of property taxes when these matters were before the county tax board bars it from raising the same objection in Tax Court. The court holds that while the county tax boards and Tax Court are governed by tax payment provisions under N.J.S.A. 54:3-27 and N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b) respectively, they are separate and distinct, and contain different payment schemes. Thus, the court concludes defendant is not barred from raising the objection in Tax Court.

The State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court cannot conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’ confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses in judicial proceedings, the Court addresses a method to avoid confrontation violations in these settings.

The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the Ciluffo pro tanto credit does not further the legislative intent expressed in the Comparative Negligence Act and does not reflect developments in case law over the past four decades. In its stead, the Court sets forth a procedure to apportion any damages assessed in the trial of this case and future successive-tortfeasor cases in which the plaintiff settles with the initial tortfeasors prior to trial.

Because Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee in 2016, Cooper -- a Medicare provider -- was required to bill and accept payment from Medicare, which promptly covered Mecouch’s medical expenses in accordance with its fee schedule. Cooper could not seek payment from Selective other than for reimbursement of the Medicare co-payments and deductibles.

Tax Court: Punish and Indu Malhotra v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 010788-2018; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided December 16, 2021. For plaintiffs - Punish and Indu Malhotra (Self-represented); for defendant - Miles Eckardt, Deputy Attorney General (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Plaintiffs sought relief from penalties and interest after being assessed for an erroneous income tax refund due to an error on their tax return for New Jersey income tax withholding. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery of the erroneous refund with applicable penalties and interest. Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment requesting that penalties and interest be abated due to the lengthy passage of time for assessment.

The court first determined whether defendant had statutory authority to recover the erroneous refund pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant argued that the statute of limitations to obtain the erroneous refund was either three years from the date the tax return was due or an extended five-year statute of limitations due to a misrepresentation of material fact on the tax return. Plaintiff argued that the mistake on the tax return does not qualify as a misrepresentation.

The court found that the three-year statute of limitations expired three years from the making of the refund and the five-year statute of limitations did not apply because plaintiffs’ mistake did not rise to the level of a misrepresentation. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment to recover the erroneous refund. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was granted to abate the penalties and interest as there was no tax due and any payments made, or tax refunds withheld, were to be returned with applicable interest.

Plaintiff alleged he was sexually molested by his sixth-grade teacher during the 1996–97 school year, but he reasonably did not realize he suffered injury as a result until 2016. His 2017 motion to file a late notice of claim was denied without prejudice; the judge concluding the certifications in support of the motion were not based on personal knowledge and otherwise inadequate.

In 2019, the Legislature made sweeping changes to the Tort Claims Act, the Child Sexual Abuse Act, and the Charitable Immunity Act, and it also enacted entirely new statutes of limitations for tort claims arising from sexual abuse and exploitation of minors, and sexual crimes committed against adults. See L. 2019, c. 120, and L. 2019, c. 239.

In particular, effective December 1, 2019, plaintiffs alleging sexual abuse as a minor that occurred prior to, on or after the effective date, may file suit at any time until reaching the age of fifty-five. The date the claim accrued no longer mattered. Effective the same date, a suit alleging sexual abuse by a public employee or employer no longer needed to comply with the predicate procedural requirements of the TCA, including, the notice of claim provision in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. Plaintiff filed this suit in January 2020, and defendants — elementary school and school district — moved to dismiss, contending plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within ninety days of the accrual of his claim. Ibid.

The court affirmed the motion judge's denial of defendants' motion, albeit for different reasons than he expressed. The court concluded that a retroactivity analysis was not required under the facts of this case, because plaintiff filed suit after the effective date of the new legislation and within the new statute of limitations; and, when filed, the complaint was no longer subject to the TCA's procedural requirements.

In 2019, the Legislature expanded public-entity civil liability for claims based on sexual assaults and other sexual misconduct by enacting N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a), which disables in those instances the immunities provided by the Tort Claims Act. In this action, plaintiff alleges he was the victim of the sexual misconduct of a teacher employed by the defendant board of education. In appealing the partial denial of its summary judgment motion, the board argued that this new statute does not apply unless the public entity – and not just the public employee – has engaged, in the words of the statute, in "willful, wanton or grossly negligent" conduct. The board also argued that even if triggered, N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a) deprives the public entity only of its Tort Claims Act immunities, and not two defenses under the Act: the verbal threshold, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), and the declaration that a public entity "is not liable for the acts or omissions of a public employee constituting a crime . . .," N.J.S.A. 59:2-10.

In affirming the denial of the board's summary judgment motion, the court enforced N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) as written, concluding that a public employee's sexual offense was sufficient to provide the "willful, wanton or grossly negligent" conduct required of "the public entity or public employee" (emphasis added). The court also held that N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 is an immunity disabled by N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) but that the verbal threshold in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) is a limitation of liability, not an immunity, and remained applicable.

Tax Court: Cargill Meat Solution, Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n; Docket No. 008146-2018, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided December 15, 2021. For plaintiff - Kyle O. Sollie (Reed Smith LLP, attorneys; Kylie O. Sollie and Matthew L. Setzer on the brief); for defendant – Joseph A. Palumbo, Deputy Attorney General (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: The Clean Communities and Recycling Grant Act imposes a user fee, commonly referred to as the litter tax. The fee is based upon the sales of litter-generating products by manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Wholesaler-to-wholesaler sales are exempt. While plaintiff admits it manufactures the products at issue, it also asserts the wholesaler-to-wholesaler exemption applies for sales it makes to wholesalers.

The court noted that under plaintiff’s argument, all manufacturers that sell to wholesalers would claim the exemption thus rendering the statutory reference to manufacturer sales superfluous. In addition, the court held that the plain language of the Act provides that the fee is based upon sales within the state, not whether the manufacturing occurred in-state. Moreover, the Legislature did not intend to put local manufacturers at a disadvantage. Finally, the longstanding regulations adopted by the Director provide that the location of where the manufacturing takes place is not determinative.

Appellants are a group of twenty-nine New Jersey farms that maintained barns and other storage facilities on their properties. During the growing season, appellants housed farm workers in these structures. Despite this obvious change of use from structures intended to store agricultural products and equipment to residences for human beings, appellants refused to implement the additional fire safety measures required for residences by the New Jersey Uniform Construction Code (UCC), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-119 to -141.

In May 2018, the Director of the Division of Codes and Standards in the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) sent a letter to local construction officials reminding them of their responsibility to issue notices of violation when a farm failed to add fire suppression systems to the buildings in which their workers lived as required by the UCC. In March 2019, the Director sent a similar letter to the construction officials. As a result, the officials cited eighteen of the twenty-nine appellants for violating DCA's fire safety regulations between 2018 and 2019. None of these farms challenged the notices of violation.

On February 4, 2020, the Director sent a third letter to the construction officials again instructing them to enforce the change-of-use regulation when a farm converted a commercial farm building to residential living quarters for workers. The Director forwarded a similar letter to the New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture outlining the UCC requirements for residential structures used to house farm workers and the Secretary distributed that letter to a number of farms. Appellants thereafter filed a notice of appeal alleging that the Director's February 4, 2020 inter-agency letter to the Secretary constituted a "new agency rule" that DCA did not adopt in accordance with the rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31.

The court rejected this argument and concluded the Director's February 4 letter bore few of the qualities that characterize a rulemaking activity subject to the procedural requirements of the APA as set forth in Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984). Because the letter was not a new agency rule, the court dismissed appellants' appeal.

This interlocutory appeal presents an unsettled question concerning the fair and appropriate sequence of proceedings in the prosecution of a juvenile offender who the State wishes to waive to adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1. The question arises in a context where the juvenile moves to suppress evidence that the State will rely upon at the waiver hearing and also possibly seek to admit at an eventual trial.

The juvenile, joined by amici, argues the suppression hearing should take place first in the Family Part. Conversely, the State argues the waiver hearing should occur first, and, if the juvenile is waived, the Criminal Part then should hear the suppression motion.

Responding to the motion judge’s observation of the need for guidance in the absence of a Court Rule or precedent on point, the court holds the Family Part has the discretion to determine the optimal sequence of proceedings, depending upon the circumstances presented in a particular case. In exercising that discretion, the trial court should apply a general preference to have the suppression hearing conducted first in the Family Part. As explained in this opinion, however, that preference may be outweighed by other considerations, such as whether (as is the case here) an adult alleged co-perpetrator or an already-waived juvenile co-perpetrator has filed a cognate suppression motion in the Criminal Part. Thus, unless a future Court Rule prescribes a different approach, the sequencing decision is best handled in the trial court in a case-by-case discretionary manner with that preference in mind.

Additionally, the court adopts the State's concession that if the juvenile offender is waived first but a Criminal Part judge thereafter grants the suppression motion, the offender can move to have the case remanded back to the Family Part if the remaining non-suppressed evidence can no longer support the continued prosecution of the juvenile as an adult.

Because the Family Part judge in this case did not misapply his discretion in choosing to proceed with the waiver hearing first, the court affirms that determination.

Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) "and/or" (b). At trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict if it found defendant made a threat with "the purpose to terrorize" or with a "reckless disregard" of the risk of causing terror, under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), or if it found defendant threatened to kill "with the purpose" to put the victim in imminent fear of death, under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b). During deliberations, the jury asked whether it was required to find a violation of both subsections (a) and (b); the judge responded one was enough but did not instruct the jurors that they had to unanimously agree on one of the theories to convict. In appealing his conviction, defendant argues N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) violates the First Amendment in part and that the jury unanimity instructions were erroneous.

The court reversed, determining that N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a)'s "reckless disregard" standard is unconstitutionally overbroad and that the jury instructions did not adequately ensure against a patchwork verdict.

Defendant's municipal clerk determined that plaintiffs' petition for a referendum on a rent-regulation ordinance lacked sufficient signatures; the clerk's decision resulted from her discerning of differences between some of the petition's e-signatures and the corresponding voters' pen-and-ink signatures on the voter rolls. The court affirmed the trial judge's determination that the clerk acted arbitrarily and capriciously because, among other things, the court found it was unreasonable, in light of the limiting circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Governor's emergency order precluding door-to-door solicitations, for the clerk not to reach out and provide voters with an opportunity to cure any alleged uncertain signatures before attempting to disenfranchise them from the referendum process.

Defendant filed a Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) and a Motion for a Judicial Furlough under State v. Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220 (Law Div. 1992). Defendant had asserted that, as an insulin dependent diabetic requiring two injections daily, his continued incarceration had placed him at a very high risk of contracting COVID-19 and suffering extremely serious health consequences, including death. After rejecting the State’s contention that defendant was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing such motions, the court addressed both motions on the merits.

With respect to the Motion for Release Due to Illness or Infirmity under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), the court weighed the factors set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985), for determining whether an inmate should be released. In so doing, the court held that while defendant had proven that he was suffering from an illness, defendant had not presented any evidence that the pandemic was having a "deleterious effect" on his medical condition and did not show that medical services unavailable at the prison would be essential to prevent further deterioration of his health. Similarly, while the pandemic constituted a change in circumstances, the Department of Corrections had taken efforts to mitigate and protect against the spread of the disease and defendant failed to present any evidence that COVID-19 was causing a "serious deterioration" to his health. Lastly, due to defendant’s extensive prior record and the serious nature of the charge for which defendant was incarcerated, defendant’s release would not be in the best interests of public safety and welfare. Thus, the motion under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) was denied.

With regard to the Motion for a Judicial Furlough under Boone, the court noted that the defendant in Boone required lifesaving treatment out-of-state and there was no statutory or rule-based authority for granting such relief. As such, the trial court in Boone exercised its inherent authority to grant a judicial furlough to save the defendant’s life. Here, the court found that there was explicit statutory authority, vested in the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and his agents, through which defendant could seek a furlough. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.3. Since defendant had statutory authority by which to seek a furlough, the court found it had no authority to grant a judicial furlough and denied the motion.

On January 22, 2019, the staff of the Board of Public Utilities issued a "Cease and Desist and Refund Instructions" Letter (2019 Letter) stopping third-party suppliers of electricity generation and transmission from passing through a price increase to their fixed- or firm-rate customers when those increases were allegedly due to a new provision of the Clean Energy Act, L. 2018, c. 17 (eff. May 23, 2018). Appellant, an organization representing these suppliers, filed a petition with the Board seeking the withdrawal of the 2019 Letter. Two other providers, together with the Division of Rate Counsel, asked to participate in the matter.

Although the Board's Secretary later offered other providers the opportunity to "reach resolution and close out the matter" and "thereafter be released" from the terms of the 2019 Letter, the Board never addressed appellant's petition asking that the directive be withdrawn in its entirety. After waiting over twenty months for the Board to act, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the Board's inaction.

Under these circumstances, the court remanded the matter and directed the Board to consider and resolve appellant's petition within sixty days of the date of the remand.

The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s invalidation of N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.4(d)(1) as inconsistent with its state enabling legislation and contrary to legislative intent. But the Court has grave concerns that the regulation’s method of operation is also inconsistent with the federal Medicaid law. The Court accordingly vacates that portion of the Appellate Division’s analysis that rejected the federal-law argument by cross-petitioners.

In re Adoption of a Minor Child by J.B. analyzes whether the precedents of Garden State Equality v. Dow and Obergefell v. Hodges have impacted the scope of the second parent exception to New Jersey’s Judgment of Adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50—particularly, whether its requirement that all parental rights, except for those rights of a legal parent who is the "spouse" of the petitioner, must be terminated upon the entry of a Judgment of Adoption. A strict reading of the statute contrasts with numerous court rulings issued prior to Garden State Equality v. Dow, yet the ability for same-sex couples to now marry removes a barrier to recognition that would allow for satisfaction of the statute’s restrictive requirements.

Before same-sex couples had a legal pathway to marriage, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 was interpreted to allow unmarried couples to adopt without terminating a biological parent’s rights in cases such as In re Adoption of a Child by A.R., 152 N.J. Super. 541 (Probate Div. 1977), In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 267 N.J. Super. 622, 623 (Ch. Div. 1993), and In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1 (1995). Yet, those cases carefully articulated that the petitioning couples had no legal ability to wed and were thus unable to satisfy the statute’s "spousal" requirements. Now that same-sex marriage has been legalized by Dow and Obergefell, the question of whether the exception still applies—after it was based upon couples for whom marriage was prohibited—must be answered, as well as to clarify that the statute’s strictly read requirements remain unnecessary. Despite the conflict between statutory language and relevant case law, the second parent exception should be affirmed to avoid terminating the rights of worthy, unmarried parents and petitioners seeking to form a family unit.

An Ocean County Prosecutor's Office (OCPO) detective was operating a county vehicle while performing official duties when she struck another vehicle injuring a passenger. After the passenger sued the OCPO and the detective for personal injuries, the State agreed to defend and indemnify both defendants. However, the State asserted that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 it could avail itself of the County's self-insurance and excess insurance policies mandated by N.J.S.A. 40A:10-3 as the primary sources to satisfy any judgment or settlement in the tort case. The State sued the County seeking a declaratory judgment to this effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the court affirmed and held that N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 grants the Attorney General the ability to direct who shall take up the defense on behalf of the State. However, pursuant to Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422 (2001), where an employee is entitled to a defense by the State, the State shall also bear the costs of indemnification. N.J.S.A. 59:10A-5 does not alter the State's obligation to defend and indemnify utilizing its resources.

This court held that the exclusionary rule applies where police violate Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution by unreasonably and unjustifiably ignoring a search warrant requirement that they knock and announce their presence before entering a dwelling. Doing so deters police from flagrantly violating knock-and-announce search warrant requirements; safeguards against unconstitutional, unreasonable, and illegal search and seizures under New Jersey law; and, importantly, upholds the rule of law and integrity of our administration of justice.

In this appeal, the court held that the Legislature intended prospective application of the amended refusal statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. That intent was manifested by the Legislature's express statement that the amended legislation—which imposed on all defendants convicted of refusal the less onerous penalty of installing an interlock device rather than forfeiting his or her license as mandated by the former statute—would become effective on December 1, 2019, over four months after it was signed into law, and apply only to those defendants who committed an offense on or after that date. That unequivocal legislation pronouncement militates against retroactive application even for defendants who were sentenced after December 1, 2019.

In such circumstances, courts need not consider the common law exceptions to the presumption of prospective application as discussed in Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) and James v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552 (2014), nor the timing of the penalty incurred under the general savings statute, N.J.S.A. 1:1–15. The Legislature's determination that interlock devices serve as a greater deterrent than license forfeiture supports the conclusion that the amended legislation was neither ameliorative nor curative, in any event.