Defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) "and/or" (b). At trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict if it found defendant made a threat with "the purpose to terrorize" or with a "reckless disregard" of the risk of causing terror, under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), or if it found defendant threatened to kill "with the purpose" to put the victim in imminent fear of death, under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b). During deliberations, the jury asked whether it was required to find a violation of both subsections (a) and (b); the judge responded one was enough but did not instruct the jurors that they had to unanimously agree on one of the theories to convict. In appealing his conviction, defendant argues N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) violates the First Amendment in part and that the jury unanimity instructions were erroneous.
The court reversed, determining that N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a)'s "reckless disregard" standard is unconstitutionally overbroad and that the jury instructions did not adequately ensure against a patchwork verdict.