Opinion Summaries

The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The parties were involved in litigation relating to the Hackensack Planning Board's zoning determinations and ordinances adopted in the City's redevelopment plan. Separately, plaintiff's attorney submitted requests for records from defendants pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, designated as OPRA requests from the attorney.

Defendants argued plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under OPRA because the requests were submitted from plaintiff's attorney. The trial judge rejected the standing argument because counsel had implied authority to submit the requests. The trial judge also noted the Denial of Access complaint form adopted by the Government Records Council requires parties represented by counsel who make a request to state the name of the client on whose behalf the complaint is being filed.

Among other arguments raised by the parties in their respective appeals, defendants repeated their standing argument and urged the court to "establish the standard that if an attorney is filing an OPRA request on behalf of a client, it must clearly disclose that fact to the custodian of records, or if the response proceeds to litigation the attorney must be deemed the 'requestor.'"

The court affirmed, rejecting defendants' argument for the same reasons expressed by the trial judge. Although N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 states the right to institute a suit under OPRA belongs "solely" to the requestor, OPRA and the rules of standing are broadly construed. Therefore, the literal reading of the statute urged by defendants should be eschewed.

In this breach of contract action, the owner/operator of an aerobic biodigester facility sued defendant, Denali, which was contractually obligated to deliver quantities of organic waste to the facility for processing. Shortly after entry of the initial case management order, Denali served subpoenas on plaintiff and several nonparties, including Symbiont Science, Engineering and Construction, Inc. (Symbiont), which had designed and retrofitted the facility for plaintiff. Symbiont's subpoena required it to identify a corporate designee with familiarity in seventeen topic areas and demanded documents and electronically stored information in thirteen categories.

Much of the requested information centered on communications between plaintiff and Symbiont, such as the terms of Symbiont's agreement with plaintiff, "including the drafting, revision, and execution of the agreement"; "[t]he calculation of Symbiont's guaranteed maximum price to complete the construction to retrofit the Trenton Facility"; and "[a]ll communications with [plaintiff c]oncerning the construction and design" of the facility, "including but not limited to, the construction cost, construction schedule, and design modifications." Denali served similar requests on plaintiff.

When negotiations regarding the scope of production broke down between Denali and plaintiff, and between defendant and Symbiont, Denali moved to compel, and plaintiff and Symbiont moved to quash. The judge granted Denali's motion as to both plaintiff and Symbiont, relying on the broad scope of discovery permitted by Court Rules and case law.

The court granted Symbiont's motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Despite the broad scope of discovery permitted between parties, a court facing a discovery dispute involving a nonparty to the litigation must consider additional factors. The court also noted the special recognition the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide to discovery demanded from nonparties.

In these matters arising out of the tragic shooting of a minor during a football game and his subsequent death several days later, the court considered whether the time for a minor's parent to file a notice of tort claim for her Portee¹ claim is tolled under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3. In reading in pari materia N.J.S.A. 59:8-8, which extends the statute of limitations for an injured minor to institute a cause of action until two years after their eighteenth birthday, and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which tolls a parent's claim for the duration of the child's tolling period, and because the parent's Portee claim essentially includes the elements of the minor's claim, the court concludes it is only logical to toll the notice requirements under the TCA for the parent's Portee claim to coincide with the tolling period of the minor's claim. The court's ruling is consistent with the purposes underlying the entire controversy doctrine and in promoting judicial economy.

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¹ Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980).

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

When an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep. Here, a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case.

After being waived to adult court, defendant pled non vult to two murders that he committed when he was seventeen years old. He was sentenced to two concurrent life terms with no specified period of parole ineligibility, rendering him eligible for parole in May 1995, after serving thirteen years.

Defendant had no prior juvenile charges or adjudications of delinquency. Defendant has been a model prisoner during his decades of imprisonment. He has incurred no disciplinary infractions, committed no new crimes, obtained his GED, engaged in multiple programs to address his behavior and substance abuse, taken vocational courses, achieved and maintained gang minimum custody status, and serves as the electrician for the correctional facility. Defendant has now served over forty years in prison after being denied parole seven times and receiving lengthy future eligibility terms, despite multiple psychological evaluations that concluded he was a low risk for committing a new offense if released.

Defendant filed a motion for an adversarial hearing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to correct an unconstitutional sentence. Defendant contended that being eligible for parole was not the same as having a "meaningful opportunity for release." In support of his motion, defendant submitted parole data statistics regarding inmates who received life terms with no specified period of parole ineligibility. Defendant argued that although his sentence was life with no specified period of parole ineligibility, he was serving the practical equivalent of life without parole, which was not the intent of the sentencing judge. Defendant also emphasized that he has "a perfect institutional record" and "is a trusted inmate."

The State opposed the motion, arguing that the parole data was not relevant to whether defendant's sentence was illegal, and that defendant was not entitled to a Miller/Zuber¹ hearing because his original sentence was neither life without parole nor "the practical equivalent of life without parole."

Although recognizing that defendant had a blemish-free institutional record, the trial court denied the motion, finding it did not have the authority to review Parole Board or Appellate Division decisions. While crediting the parole data submitted by defendant and acknowledging that the "continued incarceration of defendant at the hands of the Parole Board did not seem to be the intention of [the sentencing judge]," the trial court nonetheless concluded that defendant's sentence was not within the purview of Miller, Zuber, or Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Noting the absence of any "mandated system of review for all lengthy juvenile sentences," the trial court held "there [were] no grounds for relief to defendant under the holdings in Miller, Graham or Zuber."

Applying Article I, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution and the fundamental fairness doctrine, the court extended the procedure recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___ (2022), for a juvenile convicted of homicide to petition the trial court for a review of their sentence after having served twenty years in prison, to defendant, who was sentenced to life without a specified period of parole ineligibility, and has now been imprisoned more than forty years as a result of seven parole denials.

The court reversed and remanded for an adversarial hearing to afford defendant the "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" envisioned by Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Zuber, and adopted by Comer. At the evidentiary hearing, defendant shall have the right to be represented by legal counsel, present witnesses and expert testimony, cross-examine the State's witnesses, and introduce his nonconfidential parole records and other relevant, admissible exhibits. The court left the admissibility of such records and exhibits and any request for discovery to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court directed the trial court to consider the Miller factors and determine whether defendant has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

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¹ State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).

Defendant and the State of New Jersey jointly appeal the denial of their joint motion to modify defendant's sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(3). In 2019, defendant pled guilty to first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1); the judge imposed a sentence of eleven years' imprisonment with twenty-four months of parole ineligibility, in accordance with the negotiated plea under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (Section 12).

In April 2021, the Attorney General issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2021-4, "Directive Revising Statewide Guidelines Concerning the Waiver of Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Non-Violent Drug Cases Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12," (the Directive). Pursuant to its terms, prosecutors were to file joint motions when requested by defendants, like defendant, who were serving mandatory minimum sentences for certain Chapter 35 offenses. The motions sought sentence modification eliminating, or reducing, the mandatory minimum feature of the sentence.

In all, more than 600 motions were filed. Defendant's motion was the first heard by a judge specially designated by the Supreme Court to hear these motions. The judge denied the motion, essentially concluding that a modification of defendant's sentence to eliminate the mandatory minimum term was contrary to the Legislature's intent when it enacted the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 (the CDRA), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to -36A-1, and the Directive thereby invaded the province of the Legislature contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. See N.J. Const. art. III, para. 1.

The court reversed, concluding the judge misconstrued Section 12 of the CDRA, and overlooked case law developed and statutory amendments enacted since its passage more than three decades ago. However, the court reiterated that the necessary finding of "good cause" for a modification under Rule 3:21-10(b)(3) is solely for the court to decide on an individual basis, and the mere filing of a joint motion did not establish "good cause" to modify the sentence.

Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

In these ten back-to-back appeals, consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion, Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC filed post-judgment motions in the Chancery Division, Family Part, to enforce its retainer agreements against its former clients. The law firm sought judgments for unpaid fees, or alternatively, orders compelling the parties to attend binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision in its retainer agreements. The court affirms the denial of the law firm's enforcement motions, concluding: its applications should have been filed as complaints in the Law Division pursuant to the Rules of Court; the law firm was not entitled to entry of judgment for fees in any of the matters because it failed to provide the courts with the necessary information to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested by the firm; and the binding arbitration provision in the firm's retainer agreement is unenforceable because its vague, confusing and contradictory language fails to support the conclusion that the clients and the law firm mutually assented to its terms.

After sixty-three years of marriage, plaintiff Sylvia Steiner commenced this divorce action. At the conclusion of a bifurcated trial for the sole purpose of resolving the parties' dispute about whether there were grounds for divorce, the trial judge found irreconcilable differences and entered a judgment of divorce. In appealing, defendant David Steiner argued, among other things, that bifurcation should not have been permitted and that the trial judge erred in finding irreconcilable differences. The court affirmed, holding that what constitutes irreconcilable differences varies from couple to couple and that the judge's determination that this couple's differences were irreconcilable and had endured for six months, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(i), was entitled to deference. The court also held that the presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in bifurcating the cause of action from the parties' equitable distribution issues because of both the parties' ages and judicial economy, considering that a potential ruling on the cause of action in defendant's favor would negate the need for a time-consuming and costly trial on the parties' extensive equitable distribution issues.

*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012).

This case arises from a violent confrontation during which defendant shot and killed his sister-in-law's former boyfriend with a bow and arrow. The case examines when a trial court in a murder prosecution must instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter when the court decides to instruct the jury on self-defense. The court rejects the notion that passion/provocation manslaughter must always be charged when self-defense is raised, noting that that the two doctrines are triggered by different material elements, serve different purposes, and produce markedly different results. The court nonetheless recognizes that both doctrines address when and how a victim's conduct may affect a defendant's culpability for causing the victim's death; the same circumstances that prompt a responsive use of deadly force may provoke an impassioned reaction, requiring that the jury in a murder trial be given the option to convict for the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. Accordingly, the court recommends a new rule of procedure that when a trial court at a Rule 1:8-7(b) charge conference decides to instruct the jury on self-defense, the court should make findings on the record whether to charge on passion/provocation manslaughter, regardless of whether the defendant requests that instruction. This will help ensure that the decision is made in the first instance by the trial court, informed by the arguments of the parties, and not by an appellate court reviewing a cold record after a verdict has already been reached. The court also highlights the significant differences between the "rational-basis" test that applies when a defendant requests a jury instruction at trial and the more demanding "clearly-indicated" test that applies when a defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the court should have delivered the instruction sua sponte.

The court also addresses the geographic scope of the self-defense principle that a person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling before using deadly force, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c). The court rejects defendant's argument that the term dwelling includes the "curtilage" of a home. The court also explains that a trial court need not instruct the jury on the principles of legal causation unless causation is at issue at trial.

*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012).

This case examines whether and in what circumstances a jury trial conviction for leaving the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, merges with a conviction for endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2. The State appealed from the trial court's decision to impose concurrent state prison terms, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2 both expressly require that the sentences be served consecutively. Defendant cross-appealed, arguing that the trial judge should have merged the two convictions. Because the decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent prison terms necessarily presupposes that a defendant has been convicted of at least two separate crimes, the threshold question is whether defendant's two convictions merge.

The court applies the "flexible" multi-faceted test for merger that focuses on the elements of the crimes and the Legislature's intent in creating them, and on the specific facts of each case. See State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15 (2019). The court compared the elements of the leaving-the-scene and endangering crimes and also construes the express non-merger provisions codified in both N.J.S.A. 11-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 12-1.2. Both crimes are designed to protect injured individuals by creating incentives for persons to remain at the scene of an injury, to report the incident, and to render or summon aid. The two offenses thus offer alternative bases for punishing the same criminal conduct.

With respect to the critical fact-sensitive portion of the multi-part merger test, the court concludes that there was no continuous transaction to split into stages; rather, the criminal conduct was initiated and completed in a brief instant. In this instance, the leaving-the-scene and endangering crimes involved a single voluntary act—defendant's split-second decision to abscond from the accident scene—and were committed in the same place at exactly the same time.

Considering all of the relevant circumstances, the court concludes that the convictions must be merged, rendering academic the State's contention that consecutive sentences should have been imposed.

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Sabatino’s published opinion. The determination of whether to admit, under N.J.R.E. 701, lay opinion testimony estimating the perceived ranges of children’s ages or heights is best suited for case-by-case assessment. The Court disapproves of State v. Koettgen and its categorical approach to the admission of such lay opinion evidence about age. Henceforth, the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, shall assess whether there exists a proper foundation for the lay opinion being offered, and if so, allow its admission subject to a Rule 403 balancing of the relative probative value and prejudicial effect of the testimony. The Court generally endorses and adds to the Appellate Division’s helpful guidance to trial courts when performing that gatekeeping role and protecting against the admission of unreliable age-related lay opinion testimony.

Here, sufficient evidence was present for a reasonable jury to find that what Livingston Township Councilmembers perceived to be Police Chief Handschuch’s discriminatory attitude toward Township Manager Meade influenced the Council’s decision to terminate her, in violation of the LAD. Accordingly, the Court reverses the grant of summary judgment and remands this matter for trial.

In this appeal, plaintiffs, Seaview Harbor Alignment Committee and certain residents of Seaview Harbor, challenge Egg Harbor Township's denial of their deannexation petition, which would have permitted Seaview Harbor to secede from the Township and annex with neighboring Borough of Longport. The trial court correctly affirmed the Township's decision. In doing so, the court considered and applied the three-part test enumerated in N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and concluded that although plaintiffs established that the Township's refusal to consent to deannexation was detrimental to a majority of Seaview Harbor residents, the Township's decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and plaintiffs failed to establish that deannexation would not cause significant harm to the well-being of the Township.

The court holds that a petition under N.J.S.A. 40:7-12.1 may be appropriately denied where a municipality establishes that deannexation would be detrimental to the majority of residents despite the undisputed fact that deannexation would produce considerable property tax savings for the petitioning homeowners, who seek to become part of a lower tax municipality. That detriment can include the loss of significant services to the community at large, removal of a diverse citizenship, and likely erosion of valuable civic participation caused by the absence of those homeowners who seek to deannex from the community

Here, the harm to the residents of Egg Harbor included not only the potential loss of revenue and attendant services, but the removal of a critical municipal resource – the diverse Seaview residents. That unique loss was not limited to its current and future economic impact, but also encompassed the transfer of a portion of Egg Harbor's population that historically participated in all phases of local government, and brought significant and substantive value to the deliberative decision-making process necessary for a healthy and robust community and government.

A defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing and cannot support an aggravating factor. On resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). The weight to be given to that factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion.