This case arises from a violent confrontation during which defendant shot and killed his sister-in-law's former boyfriend with a bow and arrow. The case examines when a trial court in a murder prosecution must instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter when the court decides to instruct the jury on self-defense. The court rejects the notion that passion/provocation manslaughter must always be charged when self-defense is raised, noting that that the two doctrines are triggered by different material elements, serve different purposes, and produce markedly different results. The court nonetheless recognizes that both doctrines address when and how a victim's conduct may affect a defendant's culpability for causing the victim's death; the same circumstances that prompt a responsive use of deadly force may provoke an impassioned reaction, requiring that the jury in a murder trial be given the option to convict for the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. Accordingly, the court recommends a new rule of procedure that when a trial court at a Rule 1:8-7(b) charge conference decides to instruct the jury on self-defense, the court should make findings on the record whether to charge on passion/provocation manslaughter, regardless of whether the defendant requests that instruction. This will help ensure that the decision is made in the first instance by the trial court, informed by the arguments of the parties, and not by an appellate court reviewing a cold record after a verdict has already been reached. The court also highlights the significant differences between the "rational-basis" test that applies when a defendant requests a jury instruction at trial and the more demanding "clearly-indicated" test that applies when a defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the court should have delivered the instruction sua sponte.
The court also addresses the geographic scope of the self-defense principle that a person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling before using deadly force, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c). The court rejects defendant's argument that the term dwelling includes the "curtilage" of a home. The court also explains that a trial court need not instruct the jury on the principles of legal causation unless causation is at issue at trial.