Opinion Summaries

The court considered whether the omission of one of the Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation adequately conveys the substance of the warnings and concluded it did not, notwithstanding the fact that defendant continuously interrupted the administration of the warnings. Acknowledging out-of-state authority holding that a suspect may waive Miranda warnings by interrupting their delivery, the court concluded that the suspect's interruption of the warnings does not discharge law enforcement of their duty to deliver them. Finding that the erroneous introduction of the partially unwarned statements was not harmless error, the court reversed defendant's conviction, which followed a bifurcated jury trial, and vacated his guilty plea on the weapons offense. Relying on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), however, the court rejected defendant's contention that suppression of the weapon was mandated as a remedy for the Miranda violation despite the fact that the weapon was seized as a result of a search warrant based on the statements.

The court held that when police file a use of force report (UFR) regarding an officer's interaction with a minor charged as a delinquent, it is available under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, if redacted to remove the minor's name, as are UFRs filed regarding interactions with adults. Deletion of the minor's name preserves the confidentiality of a juvenile's records of delinquency or family in crisis as guaranteed pursuant to Rule 5:19-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60. Redacted UFRs filed regarding police encounters with minors charged as a delinquent are not records "pertaining to juveniles"—they are government records capturing details of police conduct available to the public.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression, requiring the court to determine whether Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012), require defense counsel to advise their clients whether – and under what circumstances – the successful completion of the pretrial intervention program would permit a defendant to avoid immigration consequences. The Law Division judge denied defendant's petition for postconviction relief, finding Padilla and Gaitan did not apply here, where defendant did not enter a guilty plea.

Because neither Padilla nor Gaitan expressly limits its holding to cases in which a defendant enters a guilty plea, the court declines to narrowly construe their application only to those dispositions. Instead, the court interprets those decisions to impose an obligation upon defense attorneys to advise their clients of the potential immigration consequences of any criminal disposition, whether that disposition will result from a guilty plea, trial, or diversionary program. Accordingly, the court reverses and remands for an evidentiary hearing.

In this appeal, the court held that an intoxicated defendant asleep and behind the wheel of a parked motor vehicle with its engine running is "operating" the vehicle within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, a fellow golfer, with whom plaintiff was playing in a foursome. Defendant rented a golf cart, and plaintiff alleged that defendant – contrary to the rental agreement – allowed the cart to be driven by another golfer, who was allegedly unfamiliar with its operation and who, while operating the cart, struck plaintiff, causing his injuries. The trial judge granted summary judgment because, among other things, he viewed the rental agreement as a contract of adhesion that benefitted only the golf course, not other golfers like plaintiff.

In reversing, the court held, among other things, that the rental agreement was irrelevant because defendant owed plaintiff a common law duty to refrain from negligently entrusting the golf cart to an allegedly incompetent operator. The court also rejected the argument that the rental agreement was a contract of adhesion, as well as defendant's argument that plaintiff was not a beneficiary of the promises contained in that agreement.

This case probes the boundaries of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that under the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. In this case, defendant's original sentence to special probation was revoked for a series of violations. He was resentenced on his second-degree robbery conviction to the statutory maximum ten-year sentence after already serving roughly four years of special probation. He was given credit towards his prison sentence for the time spent in county jail and in residential treatment but not for the time he participated in outpatient treatment.

Defendant claims his prison sentence violates Apprendi because the combination of the ten-year prison term and time previously spent on special probation exceeds the ten-year maximum sentence for a second-degree conviction. In State v. Hawkins, __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div.), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2019), the court rejected the argument that under Apprendi, a year on special probation undergoing outpatient treatment counts as a year in prison. However, the court in Hawkins affirmed the defendant's eight-year prison sentence on his second-degree conviction “without ruling directly on . . . whether imposition of the maximum custodial sentence plus special probation would be constitutionally defective.” __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op. at 12).

The court in the present case addresses that issue and holds that such a sentence, which was actually imposed in this instance, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The court embraces the reasoning in Hawkins and concludes that time on special probation outside a residential treatment facility cannot be combined with a prison term when determining whether a sentence exceeds the "prescribed statutory maximum." The court finds further support for that conclusion in the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the line of Apprendi cases, United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). Based on an analysis of Haymond and other precedents, the court holds that the Sixth Amendment issues raised in Apprendi and its progeny apply only to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment; Apprendi principles simply do not apply to non-custodial forms of punishment such as special probation.

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to design and construct a renewable solar generating facility on the campus of the Mercer County Community College. The Mercer County Improvement Authority issued bonds in excess of $29,000,000 to fund the project. The subcontractor filed a mechanics' lien notice against the Authority when it was unable to resolve a payment dispute with the general contractor. The subcontractor settled its claim against the general contractor and filed a complaint against the Authority to foreclose on its mechanic's lien.

The Law Division granted the Authority's motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court held that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:37A-127, all of the Authority's property was exempt from judicial process.

In this appeal, the subcontractor argues it's municipal mechanic's lien is enforceable against the Authority's project fund pursuant to the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44-125 to -142. Amicus curiae Utility and Transportation Contractors Association of New Jersey, Inc. supports the subcontractor's legal position. The Authority argues the subcontractor's mechanic's lien is not valid under the County Improvement Authorities Law, N.J.S.A. 40:37A-44 to -135.

This court affirms the Law Division's order dismissing the foreclosure complaint as a matter of law under Rule 4:6-2(e), but for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court. Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018). As a matter of first impression in a published opinion, this court holds that the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law does not apply to county improvement authorities.

The Court agrees with both the Tax Court and the Appellate Division that the Division properly taxed the entirety of the residence when both life interests were extinguished, and the remainder was transferred to Marita. The property’s transfer, in its entirety, took place “at or after” Mary’s death, and was appropriately taxed at its full value at that time. In light of the estate-planning mechanism used here, any other holding would introduce an intolerable measure of speculation and uncertainty in an area of law in which clarity, simplicity, and ease of implementation are paramount.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. As the Appellate Division noted, in the 2012 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:15-15, the Legislature did not expressly address the statute of limitations. The Legislature is, of course, free to do so in the future.

The court holds that New Jersey's Constitution should be construed consistent with the federal Constitution in that a "class-of-one" equal protection claim cannot be asserted by a public employee. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's constitutional equal protection claim. The court also affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, because those claims were precluded when he asserted retaliation as a defense in the administrative proceedings upholding his termination as a municipal police officer. Therefore, plaintiff cannot relitigate the retaliation issue in a CEPA action. See Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 (2012).

This application raises a novel question concerning whether an error made by condemnation commissioners should negatively impact the right of the defendant property owner to file an appeal of the commissioners’ award. More specifically, if the commissioners’ award is filed without the statutorily required oath, does the time limit to appeal the award start to run when the award is filed or when the oath is subsequently filed? The court also considered whether good cause exists to extend the time to file the appeal. In a case of first impression, the court held that the report was not considered “filed” until the oath was filed; thus, the appeal was timely as it was filed within forty-five days of the filing of the commissioners’ oath.

Tenure is a statutory right controlled by law. The tribunals that concluded petitioner suffered no deprivation of her tenure rights engaged in legal error by labeling the position as “extracurricular” and then short-circuiting the requisite analysis based on that classification. This instructional and tenure-eligible position did not become extracurricular and tenure ineligible simply because petitioner already held tenure in another position. Petitioner met the statutory criteria for tenure and is entitled to a remedy for the violation of her right not to be removed or reduced in salary while protected by tenure for her work in the BookBinders program.

The invalidation of the retainer agreement is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Although the Appellate Division’s concerns over the retainer agreement in this case are understandable, the ethical pronouncements issued in its opinion may have far-reaching and negative effects, not only on employment-law attorneys and attorneys handling fee-shifting claims, but also on their clients. Some of those pronouncements appear too broad and some unsound, and others are worthy of the deliberative process by which new ethical rules are promulgated by the Court. The Court addresses those issues under its constitutional authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys in this State, N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3, and directs that an ad hoc committee be established to address the professional-responsibility issues discussed in this opinion. The Court expresses no ultimate opinion on the matters referred to the committee, which will report its recommendations to the Court.

The Directive, issued pursuant to the Court’s administrative rulemaking authority, requires a hearing and is controlling on this issue. The Court remands this matter to the Law Division to conduct a hearing on Carlstrom’s application for a carry-permit and provides guidance as to the scope of that hearing.

These consolidated appeals present an issue of first impression, requiring the court to decide whether the State's utilization of federally-contracted civilian monitors, who were sworn as "Special County Investigators," violated the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37. Unlike Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, New Jersey's Wiretap Act does not expressly permit delegation of wire interception to civilian personnel.

Because the Prosecutor exercised his inherent power to appoint personnel as part of his responsibility to carry out the duties of his office here, the court concludes the monitors were cloaked with the investigative responsibility of law enforcement officers when they intercepted the communications at issue. Accordingly, the court discerns no violation of the Wiretap Act, and affirms the Law Division order that denied defendants' motion to suppress the intercepted communications and the evidence seized as a result of those communications.

Criminal defense counsel who represented a State witness who was questioned in the investigation of a murder may not then represent the defendant in the same case. On leave granted, the State argues that because defense counsel was present for the witness's interview with detectives, she will be hampered in her ability to effectively cross-examine the witness at trial, materially limiting her ability to represent defendant Lucian Faulcon. The anticipated testimony of the witness involves his identification of a phone number that the police connected to defendant and used to trace defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder. Defense counsel's former representation of the witness materially limit's counsel's ability to represent defendant. To allow this conflicted representation is contrary to the fair administration of justice.

The circumstances of this case do not legitimize the stop. Law enforcement must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of a traffic violation, the commission of a crime, or unlawful activity before executing a traffic stop. Accordingly, the roadside statement given by defendant during the unlawful stop should have been excluded at trial, and the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s reversal of her convictions for hindering apprehension and false reporting. Because defendant’s roadside statement permeated the trial, severely affecting her credibility and ability to mount a defense to the separate burglary charge, that conviction is reversed as well.

The court affirms a decision by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development's Board of Review (Board) that disqualified petitioner from unemployment benefits. Petitioner was arrested on multiple charges and incarcerated for fifty-five days. While he was in jail, his employer filled his position. The grand jury did not indict petitioner. He was released from jail and the charges were dismissed. He unsuccessfully filed for unemployment compensation benefits after his release. The court agrees petitioner is disqualified from benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30. It is consistent with the Act's amendment in 1961 to review petitioner's incarceration as a voluntary separation that is "without good cause attributable to such work . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Because his loss of employment was not related to his work, petitioner was disqualified from benefits.

Ramslee Motors’s lease agreement directly addressed responsibility for maintenance of the property, which includes removal of snow and ice. That duty rested solely with Ramslee Motors, whether based on the lease or common law. Ramslee Motors retained complete control over the premises where plaintiff fell and was exclusively responsible for plaintiff’s injuries. The Court declines to hold the landlord responsible for property over which it had relinquished control.

Following the stop of defendant's car for allegedly violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because the license plate frame on the car's rear license plate "conceal[ed] or otherwise obscure[d]" the words "Garden State" at the bottom of the license plate, a warrantless search of the car uncovered an unloaded handgun. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the search and seizure of the handgun, and defendant subsequently pled guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1).

In defendant's appeal, the court was asked to decide: (1) whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33; and (2) whether the subsequent search and seizure of the handgun was legally permissible.

Based upon the common understanding of the words "conceal" and "obscure," this court concludes there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 where the minimal covering of "Garden State" did not make the words indecipherable. Hence, the seized gun was inadmissible to prove a second-degree certain persons offense.

For the sake of completeness, the court further decides that even if there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for a N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 violation, the subsequent search was not legally permissible because it did not satisfy the State's proffered exceptions to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, i.e., a search incident to arrest, or a protective sweep.

Accordingly, the court reverses and vacates the conviction for second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, and remands so defendant can move to vacate his guilty plea and have the judgment of conviction vacated pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f).