Opinion Summaries

Based on the plain language deliberately crafted by the Legislature, read in context with the law as a whole, “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the remaining activities.

Defendant appealed from a final restraining order (FRO) entered against him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based upon predicate acts of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4, and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. He contended the trial court failed to make factual or credibility findings, and abused its discretion in entering an FRO after drawing an adverse inference when he chose not to testify. The court concluded the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, vacated the FRO, reinstated the amended temporary restraining order (TRO), and remanded for a new FRO hearing before a different judge.

Additionally, the court concluded, as a matter of law, it is not appropriate for a trial court to draw an adverse inference solely from defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to not testify in an FRO hearing. Despite the remedial nature of the PDVA, and the statute's language insulating a defendant's testimony from use in a criminal proceeding relating to the same act, a defendant's election to not testify cannot give rise to an adverse inference in an FRO hearing. 

The only precondition to applying “the PSA’s privilege is whether the hospital performed its self-critical analysis in procedural compliance with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) and its implementing regulations.” Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 247 (2018). One of those regulations requires that a facility’s patient safety committee operate independently from any other committee within the facility. See N.J.A.C. 8:43E-10.4(c)(4). The facilities in these consolidated appeals did not comply with that procedural requirement, and the disputed documents are therefore not privileged.

The plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Commission’s ability to do so is not constrained by Ballinger.

The Court concurs with the trial court and Appellate Division that the Division met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 in this matter. The Division established good cause and compelling need based on specific facts for an order authorizing it to use Arlo’s expunged records at the Title 9 abuse and neglect factfinding trial. It demonstrated that the subject matter of the criminal proceeding will also be the subject matter of the Title 9 trial. The trial court properly granted the Division’s application, and the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment.

This appeal requires the court to determine whether an ordinance limiting property ownership in certain senior housing communities to persons aged fifty-five or older is valid.  Both the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(h), prohibit housing discrimination based on familial status, but provide an exemption for qualified housing for older persons, see 42 USC § 3607(b)(1); N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(n).  However, the exemption in both statutes permit restrictions on occupancy, not ownership, to persons aged fifty-five and older.  Relying on the text and the underlying purpose of the statutes, the court determined that because the exemptions do not expressly permit the restriction on ownership, and the ordinance's restriction discriminates on the basis of familial status, the ordinance violates the FHA and the NJLAD.  As a result, the court affirmed the trial judge's decision invalidating the ordinance.

Alternatively, the court invalidated the ordinance on the ground that its enactment exceeded the scope of the Township's authority because the ordinance unreasonably infringed upon the well-established and constitutionally protected right to own and sell property, and the restriction unreasonably and irrationally exceeded the public need.  The court therefore concluded the ordinance was arbitrary and unreasonable, and required the Legislature's approval as a precondition to such a radical regulatory development. 

This appeal arises from a denial by respondent New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") of a request by appellants to rescind what is known as a flood hazard area general permit-by-certification 5 ("GPC 5") granted to a neighboring residential property owner, Kenneth Nicosia.

Appellants own residential property that abuts Nicosia's parcel, both located within a block of the Atlantic Ocean shoreline.  Nicosia, a developer, sought the permit to replace a single-family house on the site with a new house.

After receiving notice of Nicosia's application for a GPC 5, appellants and several other local residents submitted comments to the DEP contesting the application.  The comments objected to the issuance of the GPC 5, and further alleged that Nicosia's ongoing construction of the new house was not adhering to the permit's conditions.  A DEP Section Chief responded to appellants by email, rejecting their objections and declining to modify or rescind the permit.  This appeal ensued.

Appellants principally argue that (1) the written notice they received of Nicosia's permit application was deficient because it failed to state the permit was effective during the comment period; and (2) the applicable DEP regulations should be construed to require a GPC 5 applicant to show that an existing structure is not in "usable condition" due to "decay" or "damage."  See N.J.A.C. 7:13-1.2 (defining the terms "reconstruct" and "repair" under the regulations).

The court concludes the GPC 5 notice did not violate any statutory or regulatory provisions, nor was it constitutionally deficient.  In addition, although the pertinent regulations are poorly worded and punctuated, the DEP has reasonably construed them to not require an applicant who, as here, seeks to replace a lawfully existing structure to demonstrate the structure is decayed, damaged, or otherwise not in usable condition.  But nothing in this opinion precludes the pursuit of available enforcement remedies if the construction, as built, does not comply with the conditions of the GPC 5 or applicable statutes or regulations.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, FINANCE.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS. ADMINISTRATION & PROCEDURE, ASSESSMENTS. STATE & LOCAL TAXES, REAL PROPERTY TAXES. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, CLAIMS BY & AGAINST. LEGISLATION, INTERPRETATION. HEARINGS, EVIDENCE.  AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS, RELATION BACK.  

Tax Court: Town of Morristown v. Morris County Board of Taxation; Docket No. 005100-2024, opinion by Novin, J.T.C., decided July 24, 2024.  For plaintiff – Emil H. Philibosian and Shaun S. Peterson (Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst & Doukas, LLP, attorneys); for defendant - Michelline Capistrano Foster, Deputy Attorney General (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Defendant argued, under motion for summary judgment, that because plaintiff failed to object to defendant’s 2024 preliminary Morris County equalization table at the county hearing, under N.J.S.A. 54:3-18, plaintiff was precluded from challenging defendant’s 2024 final Morris County equalization table before the Tax Court under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-4a.  Defendant also argued that plaintiff’s challenge to the 2024 final Morris County equalization table was untimely filed under R. 8:4-2(a)(1), and that plaintiff cannot demonstrate defendant’s adoption of the 2024 final Morris County equalization table was arbitrary and capricious.  Therefore, defendant sought dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
  
Holding: The court found the statutory language under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-4a and N.J.S.A. 54:51A-5b, permitting a taxing district or taxpayer to challenge a final county equalization table, to be clear and unambiguous.  Our Legislature required: (i) the filing of a timely a complaint in the Tax Court; (ii) the complaint must be served on the county board of taxation and on the chief executive officer and the clerk of the Board of Chosen Freeholders and on the clerk of every taxing district in the county; (iii) the complaint shall not suspend the apportionment of moneys or collection of taxes in the county; (iv) the Tax Court hearing shall be conducted in the county; (v) five days’ advance written notice of the hearing must be given by mail to the governing body of each taxing district in the county; and (vi) the hearing shall be conducted and a decision rendered on or before September 10, annually.  The court concluded that the Legislature did not impose any requirement that a taxing district object to a preliminary county equalization table, as a prerequisite to challenging a final county equalization table before the Tax Court.  In addition, the court determined that plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed, under R. 8:4-2(a)(1).  Finally, the court discerned that whether the adoption of the 2024 final Morris County equalization table is arbitrary and capricious, or whether the table is unreasonable, incorrect, or plainly unjust, and impresses upon plaintiff a substantially excessive share of the county tax burden, is a disputed material fact.  Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

(38 pages)
 

In this long-running dispute between Verizon New Jersey, Inc., inheritor of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company's local exchange service telephone network, and the Borough of Hopewell, the court affirms Judge Menyuk's 2012 decision on summary judgment finding N.J.S.A. 54:4-1's 51% market-share calculation must be performed annually, and that an annual market-share calculation, as applied to Verizon, does not violate the State and federal equal protection guarantees, the State prohibition of special legislation or the Uniformity Clause, as well as Judge Brennan's 2019 decision following trial that Verizon is subject to the tax imposed for tax year 2009 because it provided dial tone and access to 51% of the Hopewell Local Telephone Exchange in 2008.  The published version of this opinion omits discussion of whether the 51% test of N.J.S.A. 54:4-1 is to be applied annually as well as Verizon's constitutional challenges to the statute.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Accurso’s opinion. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division “that ‘local telephone exchange’ as used in N.J.S.A. 54:4-1 means a local telephone network within a defined geographical area as depicted on Verizon’s tariff exchange maps.”
___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 52).

The six members of the Court who participated in this appeal unanimously agree that the standard set forth in in McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 51, applies in this case. The Court thus readopts that standard, with two refinements to accord with recent United States Supreme Court precedent, as set forth in Section III.C. of Justice Patterson’s concurring opinion. See infra. at ___ (slip op. at 26-32). The members of the Court are equally divided as to whether discovery is required in this case. As a result, the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on summary judgment without discovery, is affirmed

The court reverses the denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered by a detective following a dog sniff after an admitted pretext stop.  Although not questioning the detective's good faith or impugning the trial court's finding that he was a credible witness, the court finds neither is enough to justify this stop.  "The suspicion necessary to justify a stop must not only be reasonable, but also particularized."  State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 37 (2016).  The detective failed to offer facts sufficient, as a matter of law, to allow the court to determine he possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion that Boone failed to maintain his lane "as nearly as practicable."  N.J.S.A. 39:88(b).  See State v. Woodruff, 403 N.J. Super. 620, 627-28 (Law Div. 2008).  We do not reach defendant's argument that the automobile exception did not apply because the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not spontaneous and unforeseeable as required under State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447-48 (2015).  See State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 171 (2023).      

The Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably for failing to credit the Department of Corrections’ view that the sustained charges against the officer undermined prison security and touched directly at the heart of his ability to obey the protocols pertaining to his employment at a correctional facility. The Commission’s decision to impose a six-month sanction is disproportionate to the serious and highly concerning offenses found in this record.

        This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding when the State may be compelled to provide field and health reports of narcotics detection canines in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).  Defendant was indicted with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, fourth-degree possession of hollow nose bullets, third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and second-degree certain persons not to have a weapon.  The Law Division denied defendant's motion to compel the State to provide discovery of records related to a narcotics detection canine used to conduct a sniff of the vehicle and whose positive alert gave the basis for probable cause to conduct a full search.

         Upon granting leave to appeal, the court concludes that under Harris, the canine's field and health records are not per se irrelevant to reliability and probable cause determinations and therefore, the trial court should have first heard the State's motion challenging the expert before denying the defendant's motion for discovery. 

         Because the records may be deemed relevant by the trial court, the court reverses and remands for consideration of the State's motion to bar defendant's expert using the Daubert[1] standard adopted by our Supreme Court for criminal cases in State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 151 (2023).

[1]  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

The central issue in these back-to-back appeals, which have been consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, is whether municipalities have an implied contractual (seller-consumer) relationship with residents to whom they distribute metered potable water.  The answer to that question determines whether plaintiffs may sue defendants under a breach-of-contract theory on the grounds that the water supplied to them contains a high level of contaminants. 

Plaintiffs rely on older cases holding there was a contractual relationship between residents and their towns with respect to water service.  Defendants rely on more recent cases recognizing a different type of relationship between municipal water distributors and residents—one that is not based on principles of contract law.

The court concludes that under the current governance framework for public water systems, potable water is a public resource owned by the people and held in trust for them.  Under that paradigm, defendant municipalities distribute water to their residents for a governmental purpose.  They are not tantamount to private companies that sell water for profit.  The fact they charge residents for the costs incurred for providing this governmental service —which varies based on the amount of water a resident receives—does not automatically create a contractual relationship.    

The court also concludes that for all practical purposes, the theory of liability in plaintiffs' complaints, while carefully drafted to employ the terminology of contract law, is indistinguishable from a warranty of fitness cause of action explicitly precluded under a provision of the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(b).  Stated another way, using the label of a contract dispute to describe the cause of action does not change its essential character or transform the relationship between municipal water distributors and residents into a contractual one.  The court thus concludes there is no foundation upon which contractual damages may be claimed against defendant municipalities.

The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's personal injury action under the Landowners Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10.  Plaintiff fell while rollerblading in a park owned and maintained by the County of Bergen.  The County of Bergen argued entitlement to immunity under the LLA. 

The court, focusing on "the dominant character of the land" where plaintiff fell rather than the land uses surrounding the park, agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the park constituted a "premises" under the LLA.  Therefore, the County of Bergen was entitled to immunity absent "willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against a dangerous condition."

Given the dwindling available open space in this State, the LLA reflects an important public policy of encouraging large land areas, consisting of natural outdoor expanses, where the general public may participate in sport and recreational activities free of charge.  Premises under the LLA may consist of large tracts of rural or semi-rural lands or "lands having similar characteristics," such as the park owned by the County of Bergen.     

The AOM plaintiff submitted complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. First, an AOM does not need to specify that the affiant reviewed medical records. Second, a doctor to whom the affidavit attributed negligence is the agent of a named defendant and is identified in the AOM as one of the John or Jane Doe defendants included in the complaint. The Court stresses the importance of the Ferreira conference in professional negligence actions.

Class action waivers in consumer contracts are not per se contrary to public policy, but they may be unenforceable if found to be unconscionable or to violate other tenets of state contract law. In this case, because plaintiffs clearly and unambiguously waived their right to maintain a class action and the lease contract is not unconscionable as a matter of law, it is enforceable.

Defendant insurance company appeals from an order granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff policy holder finding a duty to defend and indemnify.  The trial court found that defendant had unreasonably withheld consent to settle in the underlying actions and was precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 72 N.J 63 (1976), from declining coverage pursuant to the policy's capacity exclusion.

The court first concluded that on the undisputed facts in the record, defendant's conduct was not unreasonable, and that the facts were distinguishable from Fireman's Fund.  After engaging in de novo review of the record, including the policy, the court concluded the capacity exclusion applied to bar coverage.  

The court reverses defendant's driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction because it was based on evidence obtained by a police officer following his unlawful entry into defendant's garage.  The court remands for the Law Division judge to determine whether defendant's careless driving conviction can be sustained based on information learned before the officer unlawfully crossed the threshold of defendant's home.

The court addresses the circumstances in which a police officer may enter a suspect's residence in connection with a drunk or careless driving investigation.  The court holds that while police have the authority to perform various "community caretaking" functions—such as determining whether a suspected drunk driver needs medical attention—they may not make a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to execute an investigative detention without consent or exigent circumstances.    The court holds this rule applies to defendant's garage. 

The court also holds this was not a fleeting or de minimus entry.  The officer entered the garage to execute an investigative detention, that is, to seize defendant.  The court stresses that even the brief entry of the home to effectuate the seizure of a resident is a significant constitutional intrusion.  The court ultimately concludes the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the officer lawfully entered the garage to render emergency aid under the exigent circumstances exception.