Opinion Summaries

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Alvarez’s majority opinion

The panel publishes this opinion at the Supreme Court's request. Trucking companies registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, subject to the Truth in Leasing regulations, 49 C.F.R. pt. 376, in conjunction with the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 13901, 13902, 14102, and 14704, are required to have lease agreements in place with independent drivers enumerating all deductions taken from their pay. The Truth in Leasing requirements apply even if the trucking company retains a third party to manage payments to drivers and to manage delivery paperwork. The trucking company's purpose in contracting the functions to a third party was to avoid the perception it was the drivers' employer, and to maintain the drivers' status as independent contractors. The trucking company alone, however, scheduled deliveries. That the trucks were "leased," to the third party was inconsequential so long as the trucking company retained exclusive control over the shipping schedule.

The majority further found that defendant's failure to raise a new fact-sensitive argument to the trial judge, based on records not available to the trial court, precluded the issue from being considered on appeal. Judge Accurso dissented on that point.

In this post-conviction relief appeal, defendant asserts he was denied his right to represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Defendant timely, clearly, and unequivocally asserted his right to represent himself, orally and in writing, but the court failed to rule on it. Defendant claims he believed his request was denied, and proceeded to trial with counsel. The PCR court denied relief, concluding defendant waived his right to represent himself. On appeal, the court holds that a defendant may, by conduct, waive a previously asserted right to represent himself, but the evidence must clearly demonstrate that the defendant intentionally relinquished the known right of self-representation. Proof that defendant went to trial with counsel is, on its own, insufficient proof of waiver. The court remands for an evidentiary hearing on whether defendant waived his right to represent himself

In this insurance coverage dispute, the court interprets a homeowner's insurance policy's water-damage exclusion. The court holds that damage caused by a water-main break under a public street, which released water that flowed down a driveway into plaintiff's first-floor apartment, was not excluded as a loss caused by "flood," "surface water," or "water below the surface of the ground." Therefore, the court reverses the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal of the homeowner's complaint for coverage, and remands for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division held that when a municipality violates the beach fee statute, N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20, by charging unreasonable beach fees, that violation constitutes the deprivation of a substantive civil right under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), and a successful plaintiff is entitled to counsel fees. However, because the CRA requires the violation of an unambiguous, specific statutory or constitutional provision, most of the conduct plaintiffs proved in this case, while wrongful, did not establish CRA violations or entitle them to counsel fees.

In these three similar matters, appellants were involuntarily held for longer than the law permits prior to entry of a temporary commitment order. By the time their motions to vacate could be heard, they were discharged from confinement; the trial judge thus denied the motions on mootness grounds. In these appeals, which were consolidated, the court held that, even if appellants' motions were technically moot because they had been released, they were entitled to a ruling on the merits because of the significant liberty interests at stake and because such occurrences were capable of repetition yet likely to evade review.

The court holds that where N.J.S.A. 19:23-22.4 requires that sample primary ballots be printed in Spanish and English, the official primary ballots, including mail-in ballots, must also be printed in Spanish and English.

In this action arising out of the alleged breach of a home improvement contract, a Law Division judge granted defendants' belated motion for discovery sanctions. The court barred plaintiffs from presenting expert testimony or evidence of damages at trial, resulting in the involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' case. Defendants filed the motion in disregard of discovery rules requiring them to file the motion before the discovery end date, certify they had made a good faith effort to obtain the delinquent discovery, and certify they were not delinquent in their discovery obligations. In addition, defendants had never demanded expert reports in discovery.

On appeal, the court vacated the discovery sanction and dismissal orders. The court held that a trial court abuses its discretion by effectively barring claims as a discovery sanction without explaining its reasons for overlooking the discovery rules intended to assure uniformity and fairness in such matters.

Affirming the grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff-insurer's subrogation action, the court broadly interprets the waiver-of-subrogation provisions of a widely used American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction contract. The court relies on the contract's plain language, the majority view of other states' courts, and the evident goal to transfer the risk of construction-related losses to insurers and preclude lawsuits among contracting parties. In particular, the court rejects the insurer's argument that the subrogation waiver was limited to damages to the "Work" incurred during construction. Rather, the subrogation waiver extended to claims related to damages to property outside the Work, incurred after completion, because the insurance the owner obtained to comply with the contract also provided coverage for those damages.

In this case, the court holds that a perceived disability claim based on obesity under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, must be grounded upon direct or circumstantial evidence that defendants perceived the plaintiff to be disabled due to a medical condition that caused him or her to be overweight. Such proof is absent from this record and, accordingly, the court determined that summary judgment was correctly granted.

Tax Court: VNO 1105 State Hwy 36, L.L.C., by Stop & Shop v.Township of Hazlet,;

Docket Nos. 004038-2013; 008116-2014; 007353-2015; 002076-2016; 003935-2017; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided April 2, 2019. For plaintiff - David B. Wolfe and Eileen Toll (Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., attorneys); for defendant - James H. Gorman; for New Jersey Division of Taxation and Monmouth County Board of Taxation - Michelline Capistrano Foster (Gurbir S. Grewal,Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Defendant’s motion in limine to bar testimony and report of plaintiff’s proffered expert witness, an assessor in another taxing district, Township of Wall, is granted. The court’s conclusion is based on an application of the underlying principles and provisions of the Local Government Ethics Law (which apply to assessors), which are echoed in the various published guidelines for assessors, including in N.J.A.C. 18:12A-1.9(l), and 18:17- 4.1(a)(3), all of which emphasize the importance of an assessor avoiding any engagement in a private capacity that will reasonably be considered as improper or would impair the integrity of his/her office and position as assessor. An assessor, as a face of the government, and quasi-legislative agent of the State, is expected to possess and exercise high standards of ethics, professionalism, and public responsibility. As such, there is a public expectation that an assessor would not challenge or support challenges to local property tax assessments set by another assessor. Here, Wall Township assessor’s appearance in support of plaintiff taxpayer’s challenge to defendant assessor’s assessments raises such concerns. The court can control the type and nature of testimony to be proffered, and also decide whether the individual being proffered as a witness can be accepted since it can proceed in any manner compatible with R. 1:1-2(a).

A three-year-old girl sustained personal injuries while on property owned by defendant Road Runner Sports, Inc. Her parents then filed suit against Road Runner and many others on her behalf. Defendants sought an Order compelling plaintiff, now seven years old, to attend two independent medical examinations without the presence of her parents, or any recording device. Plaintiff then cross-moved to permit either an audio or video recording of the examination and that a third party be present.

The court held that under R. 4:19 this decision lies within the court’s discretion. The court held that the benefits of an unobtrusive video recording by a cell phone or a small video recording device by the child’s parents or counsel far outweighs any prejudice that may befall the defendants. As such, the court denied defendants’ motion and granted plaintiffs cross-motion.

In this appeal, the court held that reimbursement of a section 40 workers' compensation lien following a recovery in a third-party action should be based on the fee ratio calculated for the overall settlement and not the sliding contingent fee scale set forth in Rule 1:21-7. Our Supreme Court's holding in Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259 (1955) is still controlling law.

Although the better practice would have been to read aloud the form’s waiver portion to defendant, the Court relies on the trial court’s well-supported observations and factual findings and reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment.

N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(b) provides that the surviving spouse of a military veteran who meets the statutory requirements for a property tax exemption is also entitled to the exemption which "shall continue during the surviving spouse's widowhood or widowerhood."

Plaintiff was married to a veteran who met all the statutory requirements except that he was not "declared to have suffered a service-connected disability." Although the veteran passed away in 1989, the United States Veteran's Administration declared in 2014 that he suffered from a service-related disability as a result of his exposure to Agent Orange, thus qualifying him for an exemption. As a result, plaintiff filed for a surviving spouse exemption.

Because plaintiff had remarried in 1993, the court determined plaintiff did not qualify for the exemption. The court interpreted the property-tax-exemption statutory scheme and concluded the Legislature intended the right to an exemption for a veteran's surviving spouse continued only during her widowhood from the veteran. The right to the exemption was extinguished upon her remarriage notwithstanding that she, at the time of her application for the exemption, was again widowed after the passing of her second husband in 1997. Recognizing that statutes granting property tax exemptions are subject to strict construction, the court held: "It is not our intent to deny a tax exemption to the widow of a disabled combat-veteran. But it is not our role to amend statutes to ordain what we may deem laudable."

Defendants failed to perfect a prior appeal, which the court dismissed on its own motion, leaving for disposition only issues raised by a non-party in a cross-appeal, to which only plaintiffs responded. The cross-appeal was decided on its merits, with the court remanding only for entry of an amended judgment in the cross-appellant's favor.

After entry of the amended judgment, defendants filed an appeal. The court dismissed the appeal because the arguments posed by defendants in the new appeal – arguments that challenged evidence rulings made during a trial that occurred more than two years earlier, as well as the trial judge's disposition of pretrial and post-trial motions – could have been pursued and decided in defendants' prior, abandoned appeal.

A defendant who violates a condition in a pretrial release order entered pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, may be charged with contempt of court under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). Moreover, double jeopardy principles do not preclude the State from charging the defendant with contempt based on his or her failure to comply with the "no-new offense" condition of the release order, and also charging the defendant with commission of that new offense.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2, of his complaint, which alleged defendant terminated his employment as a funeral director because, as a cancer sufferer, he was prescribed and used medical marijuana in conformity with the Compassionate Use Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16. Plaintiff claimed his termination violated the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. The trial judge dismissed the action, concluding that the Compassionate Use Act does not require employers to accommodate an employee's use of medical marijuana. The court reversed because the Compassionate Use Act only declares that "nothing" in that Act "requires" such an accommodation, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14; while that language plainly expressed that the Compassionate Use Act had not created such an obligation, it also plainly did not foreclose the existence of such an obligation elsewhere, such as in the Law Against Discrimination, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of an employee's disability, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Moreover, the Compassionate Use Act expressly disavowed in that Act only an obligation to accommodate the use of medical marijuana "in any workplace," N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14, and plaintiff alleged he sought an accommodation for his use "off site" and after hours.

The Court reverses and remands for further proceedings to decide whether any Zoning Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest in hearing the application for site plan approval and variances in this case. The trial court must assess two separate bases for a potential conflict of interest. First, did Dr. Kenneth -- as president or a member of the Board of Education -- have the authority to vote on significant matters relating to the employment of Zoning Board members or their immediate family members? Second, did any Zoning Board members or an immediate family member have a meaningful patient-physician relationship with any of the three Conte doctors? If the answer to either of those questions is yes, then a conflict of interest mandated disqualification and the decision of the Zoning Board must be vacated. The Court does not possess sufficient information to answer those questions.

The court consolidates these four appeals for the purpose of writing a single opinion because they all present the issue of whether State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 272 (2018), should be applied retroactively to reverse defendants' convictions of child sexual assault where an expert in "Child Sexual Assault Accommodation Syndrome" (CSAAS) was permitted to testify at trial. We accord J.L.G. pipeline retroactivity and reverse, because, given the State's reliance on the credibility of the victims and the paucity of other supporting evidence, the admission of CSAAS expert testimony in these four cases calls into question the validity of the guilty verdicts.