Opinion Summaries

Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, the Court finds that the Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency requirement to receive survivor benefits. The Court’s finding is consistent with the PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of deceased PFRS members.

In this case, the court affirms the entry of judgment for the defendant, a psychiatrist, and dismissal of the personal injury case against him. Plaintiff is the estate of a woman killed by the psychiatrist's patient when the patient hit the woman with her car while the woman was riding a bicycle on a narrow country road. Plaintiff sued the psychiatrist after learning the driver was his patient and he had prescribed numerous medications that had the capacity to impair driving.

Plaintiff asserted the psychiatrist's negligent prescription of medications without a warning not to drive was the proximate cause of the fatal crash. Plaintiff argued the psychiatrist had a duty to warn for the benefit of third parties. The trial court's order was affirmed because the court concluded the record did not establish the patient was impaired by the medications prescribed by the psychiatrist when she caused the fatal injury.

The jury in this case found defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b), when he subjected his victim to four to five hours of uninterrupted sexual abuse. On appeal, defendant contended that the kidnapping charge should not have been presented to the jury because, notwithstanding the extended duration of the criminal attack, the victim's confinement was incidental to, and not independent from, the underlying sex crime with which defendant was separately charged.

Authoritative precedent interpreting the kidnapping offense defined in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice makes clear that not every confinement is a kidnapping. State v. LaFrance, 117 N.J. 583, 586 (1990). N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b) has been interpreted to require the State to prove that the victim's restraint was not merely incidental to the underlying substantive crime. Id. at 591. A key question is whether the circumstances of the confinement created a significant danger to the victim independent of the risk of harm posed by the underlying offense. Id. at 587.

Applying those legal principles to the particular facts of this case, this court concluded that the force and threats defendant used to physically restrain the victim were the same force and threats he used to commit the underlying sex crime. A close review of the proofs presented by the State at trial show there was never a point during the prolonged criminal episode when the victim was being restrained but was not being sexually abused. In other words, the acts constituting the alleged kidnapping were coextensive and coterminous with the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault. This court also concluded that the risk of harm the victim faced throughout her hours-long ordeal, while substantial, was not independent of the danger posed to her by defendant's continuous sexual attack.

Accordingly, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to submit the kidnapping count to the jury, and defendant was therefore entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge. This court's ruling with respect to the kidnapping charge does not affect defendant's convictions for aggravated criminal sexual contact and aggravated assault, and does not affect his sentence to parole supervision for life as a convicted sex offender.

Plaintiff, a middle school student, was injured while playing in a student-teacher fundraising basketball game. She appeals from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing her claims against defendants, who were her school, the school board, and a teacher. The court affirms because the undisputed facts establish that defendants did not breach a duty of care to plaintiff.

School officials have a duty to supervise the children in their care. Here, there was no showing of a breach of that duty because the basketball game was officiated by a referee and additional supervision was provided by approximately five teachers who did not participate in the game. Moreover, there were no facts showing that the game was being conducted in a reckless or out-of-control manner.

"[T]he duty of care applicable to participants in informal recreational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct." Schick v. Ferolito, 167 N.J. 7, 12 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 497 (1994)). Here, there was no showing that the teacher-player was intentionally trying to injure plaintiff or acting recklessly.

The Court has significant concerns about the procedure followed in this case. Neither the script set forth on the Miranda card nor the detective’s statement to defendant addressed whether defendant agreed to waive his rights before answering questions. However, any error in the trial court’s admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the State presented overwhelming independent evidence of defendant’s guilt. And, although the State should have moved to dismiss the charges on which the jury had deadlocked before the court considered evidence relevant to those charges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying three aggravating factors to impose an extended-term sentence at the high end of the statutory range.

The trial judge terminated the parents' rights, relying upon representations that the grandmother and great aunt were each committed to adopting the children. On appeal, the parents argued the record contained ambiguous hearsay statements by those resource relatives, which arguably indicated they were amenable to or might prefer a kinship legal guardianship ("KLG") arrangement over adoption.

This court upheld most of the trial judge's decision on the statutory factors for termination, but remanded to clarify the record with respect to whether the grandmother and great aunt respectively preferred KLG over adoption.The court construed the policies of the Kinship Legal Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, and the Kinship Legal Guardianship Notification Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-89 to -92, to make relevant a resource parent’s preferences as between adoption and KLG. The resource parent's consent to adopt the children in lieu of KLG must be adequately informed, as well as unambiguous, unequivocal, and unconditional.

Defendant New Jersey Manufacturers appeals an order requiring it to reimburse an ambulatory surgical center (ASC) for a Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code. The Department of Banking and Insurance's medical fee schedule listed the designation "N-1" for this CPT code, meaning it could be performed at an ASC but was "not separately reimbursable because the service [was] included in another procedure." In accord with N.J. Manufacturers Ins. Co. v. Specialty Surgical Center, 458 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div. 2019), the court holds that the insurer was not required to reimburse the ASC for this CPT code, even though Medicare would permit reimbursement, because the Department's fee schedule did not list any payment amount for the code.

Plaintiff Elmer Branch and the putative class of similarly situated truck drivers appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Cream-O-Land Dairy and dismissal of their class-action complaint alleging a failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("WHL"), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a38. Under the WHL's good-faith defense, an employer is entitled to a complete bar on liability for violations of the WHL if it acted "in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation by the Commissioner of the [Department of Labor and Workforce Development] or the Director of the Wage and Hour Bureau, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such department or bureau with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged." N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to the good-faith defense based on its reliance on three determinations made by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("DOL") officials in response to complaints brought by individual employees.

Considering the legislative purpose and the plain language of the WHL, the court holds, in this matter of first impression, that such discrete determinations by DOL officials – which do not rise to a degree of formality so as to constitute broadly applicable guidance by the DOL and are in any event subject to further administrative appeal – do not constitute an "administrative practice or enforcement policy" and are thus insufficient to invoke the good-faith defense. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. Accordingly, the court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remands for further proceedings..

The Court defers to the trial judge’s determination that the disputed footage was played for the jury during the State’s case-in-chief and notes that defense counsel consented to the admission of the surveillance footage depicting the moments surrounding the shooting, including the video segment at issue. The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to play the video segment during his closing remarks, and the prosecutor’s comments were reasonable and fair inferences supported by the evidence presented at trial.

With two limited exceptions, this court upheld the validity of an Ordinance enacted by the City of Newark, which created a civilian complaint review board (CCRB) in response to an alarming "pattern or practice of constitutional violations" by the Newark Police Department. First, the Ordinance improperly required the Chief of Police to accept the CCRB's findings of fact, absent clear error; and second, it allowed for disclosure of complainant and police officer identities. The practical impact of upholding the Ordinance means that the CCRB can function as intended – providing a vital oversight role – by investigating alleged police misconduct, conducting hearings, developing a disciplinary matrix, making recommendations, and issuing subpoenas.

The Court modifies the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands this matter to the OAL for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records are admissible as business records, and the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility.

In this appeal, the court examined the scope of available damages when a defendant's negligence has caused a homeowner to be displaced; that is, the court considered whether a homeowner's damages are generally limited to the cost of alternate shelter or whether the homeowner may also seek additional damages based on a broader concept of inconvenience. In adhering to the legal concepts expressed in Camaraza v. Bellavia Buick Corp., 216 N.J. Super. 263, 265 (App. Div. 1987), where the court held a motor vehicle owner's damages were not necessarily limited to the rental cost of a replacement, and in expanding Camaraza to claims other than those involving the loss of use of a motor vehicle, the court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the defense and remand for trial.

In this appeal, the court considered whether indigent parents and guardians – once notified that an investigation has substantiated them for child abuse or neglect – are entitled to the appointment of counsel when exercising their right to an administrative hearing to challenge that determination. The court held that, because the potential consequences of such administrative proceedings – including permanent listing in the Child Abuse Registry – are of significant magnitude, counsel must be made available for indigent parents and guardians both at the administrative level and in any appeal of right to this court, just as that right exists in Title Nine actions commenced in Superior Court. The court also determined that until such time as the Legislature addresses this constitutional right, the Madden list may be utilized for the appointment of counsel.

Plaintiffs sought recusal of assigned trial judge based upon alleged violation of "objectively reasonable" standard of impropriety set forth in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502 (2008) based on the alleged personal animus of the judge against plaintiffs’ counsel. Before becoming a member of the judiciary, the judge had been a candidate for local office in his town approximately 14 years prior. Plaintiffs’ counsel was a member of the opposite party and also resided in the same town and was politically active. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged that anonymous and other sources had indicated the judge held him responsible for campaign materials which called into question the judge’s character and fitness for office during the campaign in 2004. Plaintiffs’ counsel alleged the judge, when he was county chairman, took action to thwart his renomination to a state commission in 2013 four years before joining the judiciary, which was alleged to evidence the judge’s personal animus. Additionally, the judge had also served as county chairman of his political party for the 6 years prior to joining the judiciary. During this time, the son of the principal member of plaintiff LLC was an elected official in the judge’s home town and a member of the judge’s opposite party during which time the judge, as county chairman, had supported the members of his own party over the principal member’s son.

The court held that, under the DeNike standard, a reasonable, fully-informed person would not have doubts about the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances in this matter. The court considered the lack of a prospective financial benefit to the judge, the remoteness in time of the alleged statements by the judge to the present matter, the lack of evidence of a continuous personal animus, the professional dealings between Plaintiff’s counsel and the judge when he was a practicing attorney, and the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, of which Plaintiffs’ counsel was a named partner, had previously appeared before the judge without objection or incident, all weighed against recusal under the standard. The court also found political motive is not objective evidence of personal animus. The motion to recuse was denied.

The State filed an appeal from a judgment of conviction imposing a probationary sentence on defendant for third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2), involving domestic violence, although aggravating factor fifteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(15), was found by the court and thus a presumption of incarceration applied, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d). Because the State has no authority to appeal from a sentence for a third-degree crime that is statutorily permitted, the court dismissed the appeal.

Plaintiff Mary Richter, a middle school teacher who suffers from diabetes, alleges she fainted while teaching due to low blood sugar levels when she was unable to eat lunch at an earlier class period and suffered significant and permanent injuries. She contends the accident would not have occurred had defendants Oakland Board of Education (the Board) and Gregg Desiderio granted her accommodation request to eat lunch earlier. The motion judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint, denied Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied reconsideration of the dismissal. The judge held that as a matter of law, Richter failed to prove a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her disability because she did not establish an adverse employment action. Thus, her bodily injury claim, which is the subject of the Board's cross-appeal, was denied as moot.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court reverses the motion judge's grant of summary judgment dismissing Richter's complaint. Based on our consideration of Supreme Court decisions in Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2008) and Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482 (2017), the court concludes that Richter need not demonstrate an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of a failure to accommodate claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Because there were genuine issues of material facts concerning whether Richter was provided an accommodation and whether the accommodation was adequate, which must be determined at a trial, the court affirms the denial of Richter's cross-motion for summary judgment. As to the Board's cross-appeal, the court concludes the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, does not bar Richter's bodily injury claim, but should she prevail at trial, the Board should receive a credit based on the amount of medical bills and lost wages it paid in her workers' compensation claim in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-40..

In this case, two children under the age of five have been in the continuous care, custody, and supervision of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency due to the abuse and neglect of their parents. The trial court granted the Division's application to vaccinate the children with age-appropriate immunizations over the religious-based objections of the parents. The court granted the mother leave to appeal.

The children are not students. Therefore, the religious-based exemption to immunization of students afforded by N.J.S.A. 26:1A-9.1 and N.J.A.C. 8:57-4.4(a) does not apply. Rather, the matter is governed by the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1 to -6, and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.86(b), which collectively require that children in placement receive adequate and appropriate medical care to maintain and advance their mental and physical well-being, and N.J.A.C. 3A:51-7.1(a)(2), which specifically requires the administration of all age-appropriate immunizations.

Parental rights are not absolute and must yield to the safety and well-being of the children. While parents do not lose all of their parental rights when their children are placed in the custody of the Division, they are situated differently than parents who retain legal and physical custody. Pursuant to the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children, the Division has a duty to provide appropriate medical care and treatment to children in its custody. This duty encompasses the authority to administer age-appropriate immunizations over the religious objections of the parents. The court perceives no meaningful distinction between the power to order prophylactic medical care in the form of vaccinations to prevent a child from contracting infectious diseases and medical treatment for diseases already contracted.

The circumstances at issue in McKenney, which heavily depended on the prejudice caused to the party disadvantaged by the surprise change in trial testimony, are distinguishable from the change in testimony here. Here there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard does not compel reversal, especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic. Under the circumstances, T.L. is not entitled to a new trial.

In this wrongful death case, the defendant liquor store sold vodka and beer to the nineteen-year-old decedent without checking his identification. Decedent and a group of his friends – all of whom were likewise young adults under the legal drinking age of twenty-one – then converged at the home of one of the youths. They drank the purchased alcohol in the young host's bedroom. Decedent then left the house as a passenger in the car of one of the inebriated youths. He died when the driver lost control of the car and it flipped over.

The decedent's estate sued the car driver and its owners for negligence and the liquor store under the Dram Shop Act. The liquor store pled a third-party complaint against the young man who had hosted the gathering and his parents. The trial court granted them summary judgment, finding they had not violated any established legal duty.

Under the circumstances presented, the parents had no statutory or common law duty to prevent their adult son from allowing his adult underage friends to drink alcohol in their home without their proven knowledge or consent. Nor did the son who hosted the gathering have a duty of care under current law.

In this appeal, the court clarifies the standard for evaluating a claim of the work-product privilege. Consistent with the language of Rule 4:10-2(c), the court holds that there is no per se or presumptive rule that materials prepared or collected before litigation are not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Instead, as set forth in Rule 4:10-2(c), there is a multi-part, fact-specific test. The first inquiry is whether the materials were prepared or collected in anticipation of litigation or trial by another party or that party's representative. If so, to obtain the materials, a party must satisfy a two-part standard. The party seeking the materials must (1) show a substantial need for the discovery, and (2) demonstrate that he or she is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials