Opinion Summaries

In this appeal the court addressed the predicate state court findings necessary for a federal petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). Specifically, a state court must analyze the five prongs of the federal regulations set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2020) under state law before an applicant can file a petition to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for SIJS. The trial court erroneously concluded that a child was not dependent on New Jersey courts due to the existence of a Canadian custody order that awarded custody to plaintiff, her paternal grandmother a New Jersey resident who registered the Canadian custody order in New Jersey pursuant to the New Jersey Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (NJUCCJEA), N.J.S.A. 2A:34-79.

The court disagreed with the trial court's determination that "the juvenile is not dependent on this court and has not been placed in the custody of an agency or individual appointed by this court." The trial court here used the conjunction "and," but the federal regulations and federal statute use the disjunctive "or."

Specifically, prong two provides that the state court must determine whether the "juvenile is dependent on the court or has been placed under the custody of an agency or an individual appointed by the court." H.S.P., 223 N.J. at 210 (referring to 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3) (2020); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)).

The court reversed and remanded the matter to the Family Part for further proceedings

The tax court entered an October 18, 2019 judgment affirming tax assessments on approximately 4036 acres of watershed land owned by plaintiff City of Newark situated in defendant Township of Jefferson for the tax years 2009 to 2019. City of Newark v. Twp. of Jefferson, 31 N.J. Tax 303, 311-18 (Tax 2019). Rejecting the expert testimony of both parties' appraisers, the tax court found while plaintiff may have overcome the presumption of the correctness of the assessments, it failed to maintain its burden of proof to modify the assessments.

This court reversed, holding the assessment was defective and not entitled to the presumption of validity because it was primarily based on a settlement discussion rather than the value of the property. The assessment was also problematic because the assessor relied on another sale he failed to verify. The tax court made no findings regarding the validity of the assessment methodology and the record does not support its validity. The court remanded the matter for reconsideration and further findings on this issue and directed the tax court to make an independent finding of the value of the property for tax purposes.

Petitioner Diane Lapsley appealed from an order of a judge of compensation concluding that injuries she sustained in a February 3, 2014 accident arose out of and in the course of her employment as a Sparta Township librarian pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146. After clocking out and exiting the library premises, petitioner was struck by a snowplow in an adjacent parking lot that happened to be owned by the township. The compensation judge concluded that petitioner's injuries were compensable pursuant to the premises rule, N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which provides that "[e]mployment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer . . . ."

The court held that a mechanical application of the premises rule in the context of a public-entity employer deviates from well-settled principles applicable to private employers and invites an overbroad and unwarranted expansion of public-entity liability for workers' compensation claims. The court identified employer-directed control of an employee's use of a parking lot as a critical element in the application of the premises rule. See Novis v. Rosenbluth, 138 N.J. 92, 93 (1994). An injury will be compensable if it is sustained while the employee is using the lot where the manner of ingress or egress is dictated by the employer, or in an area where the employee parks at the employer's direction. Conversely, use of a shared parking lot that accommodates multiple tenants, without specific instruction from an employer, is not sufficient to satisfy to the premises rule.

The stipulated facts of this case established that petitioner's employer exercised no control of its employee's use of the common-use parking lot. Petitioner was off-the-clock at the time of the accident and had exited the library premises. Library employees were not given any instructions about where in the subject lot to park or indeed whether to park in that particular lot, on the street, or anywhere else in town where parking may be available. Nor were library staff instructed on the manner of ingress or egress. The lot was shared with other municipal employees and members of the public alike.

Under these facts, the court concluded that there was no reasoned basis to depart from the general rule that the library's "use" of the common-use parking lot for its employees' benefit was not sufficient to satisfy the premises rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the compensation judge's order finding the accident was compensable.

This litigation arises out of the lease of a building in which defendants-tenants intended to open a restaurant. The lease agreement contemplated an extensive rebuilding and repair of the premises. During the renovations, plaintiffs-landlord raised numerous issues regarding the quality of the construction. They eventually instituted suit seeking the termination of the lease and imposition of a forfeiture as well as an increase in rent. After a bench trial, the Chancery court entered judgment in favor of defendants, finding plaintiffs' claims meritless.

Nevertheless, the Chancery court considered plaintiffs' application for counsel and expert fees. The Chancery court determined there was no contractual or statutory basis for an award of fees. The trial court also recognized that defendants relied on their professionals – architects and engineers – as well as the municipal officials who approved the construction, issued permits and a certificate of occupancy. However, because "the safety of the public" was compromised by the faulty construction, the Chancery court found that equitable principles demanded the remedy of counsel fees. Therefore, in determining an award of fees was warranted by principles of equity, the trial court awarded plaintiffs nearly $1,000,000 in counsel and expert fees.

This court concluded that the general concept of public safety has not been recognized as an exception to the American rule and the policy preventing fee-shifting. There was no statutory or contractual basis for the award nor did the litigation fit into any exception under Rule 4:42-9. In addition, the Chancery court found defendants had not acted willfully or engaged in any intentional misconduct. Therefore, the panel concluded the award was not supported by equitable principles. The order granting counsel and expert fees is reversed.

In this appeal, the court held that an in-house attorney employed under a multi-year contract, and who was subject to termination based only on cause as defined in the agreement, was not precluded by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 to pursue contractual damages if wrongfully discharged. In reaching this decision, the court followed similar holdings in Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and Karstetter v. King County Corrections Guild, 444 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Wash. 2019), and found factually distinguishable the decision in Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, 146 N.J. 140 (1996), which limited an attorney's award of damages for a breach of contract to quantum merit.

In addition, the court concluded the trial court's award of $260,026.88 in damages was supported by sufficient credible evidence and made in accordance with applicable law. The court, however, remanded for the trial court to apply prejudgment interest to the damages award.

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Yannotti’s thoughtful opinion. The Court relies principally on the Appellate Division’s analysis of the plain language of the relevant insurance policies. 461 N.J. Super. at 454-57. The Court does not rely on the discussion of Appleman’s Rule or the doctrine of contra proferentem. See id. at 460-63.

In this appeal, the court held that an in-house attorney employed under a multi-year contract, and who was subject to termination based only on cause as defined in the agreement, was not precluded by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16 to pursue contractual damages if wrongfully discharged. In reaching this decision, the court followed similar holdings in Nordling v. Northern State Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991), and Karstetter v. King County Corrections Guild, 444 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Wash. 2019), and found factually distinguishable the decision in Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, Dist. 3, 146 N.J. 140 (1996), which limited an attorney's award of damages for a breach of contract to quantum merit.

In addition, the court concluded the trial court's award of $260,026.88 in damages was supported by sufficient credible evidence and made in accordance with applicable law. The court, however, remanded for the trial court to apply prejudgment interest to the damages award.

In this appeal, the court addressed the judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to deny a defendant's request for a waiver of the Graves Act mandatory minimum term of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. In State v. Andrews, 464 N.J. Super. 111 (App. Div. 2020), the court recently held that a prosecutor's disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants can be a relevant consideration as part of the robust judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. In Andrews, the prosecutor failed to address the trial judge's concerns regarding other cases where Graves Act waivers were granted. In the present appeal, in contrast, the prosecutor proffered specific reasons for distinguishing defendant Rodriguez from the other defendants identified by the trial judge who had previously been granted a Graves Act waiver. The court identified several basic principles to guide a trial judge in determining whether other defendants are similarly situated to the defendant challenging the prosecutor's decision to deny a waiver. Applying those principles, the court concluded that defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. The court further concluded that defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor's decision in this case constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion.

Defendants suffered no ex post facto violation as a result of being charged with failure-to-register offenses bearing the increased degree. The Legislature is free to increase the penalty for the offense of failure to comply with the regulatory registration requirement -- which is separate and apart from defendants’ predicate sex offenses -- without violating ex post facto principles as to those predicate offenses.

The detective should not have referenced defendant in his summary of the surveillance footage. Here, however, that fleeting reference did not amount to plain error in light of the other evidence produced. And the detective’s testimony regarding the sneakers was proper. He saw the sneakers on the video prior to testifying and had first-hand knowledge of what the sneakers looked like because he saw defendant wearing them on the night of his arrest. N.J.R.E. 701 requires only that testimony be rationally based on the witness’s perception and that such testimony help the jury.

The trial court determined that a board of education's decision to certify tenure charges against plaintiff in private violated her alleged right to demand a public proceeding. The school district's appeal pitted that part of the Tenured Employees Hearing Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -25, which declares a charge against a tenured employee "shall no" be discussed by a board of education "at a public meeting," N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11, against that part of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, which permits a public body to exclude the public from personnel discussions "unless" the affected employee "request[s] in writing that the matter . . . be discussed at a public meeting," N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8). Because the Legislature's broad strokes in the Open Public Meetings Act were expressly subjected to exceptions existing in other legislation, N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(1), and because tenured employees have other greater procedural rights than non-tenured employees, the court held that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11's unambiguous declaration that such proceedings "shall not" take place in public – enacted nineteen days after enactment of the Open Public Meetings Act – demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to allow tenured board-of-education employees the right – granted other public employees by N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8) – to demand a public hearing. For that reason, defendant was not required to serve this tenured employee with a Rice notice, see Rice v. Union Cnty. Reg'l H.S. Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 64 (App. Div. 1977), which serves the purpose of advising public employees of their right to demand a public hearing via N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b)(8).

The prosecutor’s comments and use of the PowerPoint slide amounted to prejudicial error.

In this appeal, the court considers whether words and gestures directed to a domestic violence complainant, by way of a consensually-activated home security camera, violated the strictures of the restraining order issued under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. During the plea hearing, the Family Part judge sua sponte rejected defendant's factual basis for the disorderly persons offense of contempt for violating the restraining order and dismissed the complaint. The judge found as a matter of law that defendant did not knowingly violate the restraining order. Instead, the judge concluded the electronic transmission of defendant's comments and lewd gesture to his estranged wife during his parenting time, were not expressly prohibited under the restraining order and, as such, defendant did not knowingly "contact" his estranged wife.

Although the restraining order did not expressly prohibit defendant from directing remarks to – or making gestures at – his estranged wife via the home security camera, the order expressly prohibited defendant from "having any oral" or "electronic, or other form of contact or communication with [her]." Because defendant directed his comments and gesture to his estranged wife, by way of a camera that was specifically activated so that she could observe his parenting time, defendant was aware of the high probability that she would hear his comments and observe his lewd gesture. Accordingly, this court vacated the trial judge's order and remanded for reinstatement of the complaint.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of sexual assault related offenses stemming from the sexual abuse of his daughter from the time she was five to the time she was twelve years old. The victim reported the molestation to police when she was thirty-one years old and, four years earlier, disclosed the abuse to her sister-in-law who testified at trial that the disclosure seemed credible to her because of defendant's "weird vibes" and her "intuition." During the investigation, detectives conducted a lengthy interrogation of defendant following the administration of Miranda warnings. In his recorded statement, despite repeated denials of the allegations, defendant made incriminating admissions relying on the fact that the victim had said "it happened." During the trial, after detailing his training and experience conducting interrogations, the interrogating detective assessed the veracity of defendant's denials during questioning after the recorded statement was played for the jury. Defendant produced eight character witnesses, each of whom testified at trial about his impeccable reputation in the community and was asked on cross-examination whether the witness' opinion of defendant would change if he or she knew that defendant had admitted to police inappropriately touching his daughter, the very allegations that were the subject of the trial.

The court reversed the convictions, reasoning that the evidentiary errors raised by defendant for the first time on appeal, either in isolation or in combination, were clearly capable of producing an unjust result pursuant to Rule 2:10-2 in the circumstances of the case. Specifically, the court found that the detective's testimony, which clearly conveyed the impression that defendant was being deceptive during questioning and, given the detective's expertise, impermissibly colored the jury's assessment of defendant's credibility, constituted impermissible lay opinion mandating reversal notwithstanding the trial judge's sua sponte curative instruction. Additionally, the testimony of the victim's sister-in-law did not satisfy the reasonable time requirement of the fresh complaint rule and injected inferential propensity evidence into the case in violation of N.J.R.E. 404. Finally, the prosecutor's inquiry into defendant's character witnesses' knowledge of defendant's alleged criminal conduct not evidenced by a criminal conviction was impermissible under N.J.R.E. 608 and 405.

Pierre applied existing jurisprudence to a specific set of facts. At a PCR hearing, an alibi witness’s false or inaccurate testimony may bear upon the witness’s credibility and, while not dispositive, the claimed alibi witness’s credibility must be weighed against the strength of the evidence presented at trial and offered post-conviction. Here, considering the strength of the State’s case and the weakness of Gideon’s alibi -- including the extent to which his proposed witnesses would have contradicted his own account of the relevant events -- the PCR court’s finding that Gideon failed to demonstrate prejudice should not have been disturbed.

In 1996, when he was sixteen years old, defendant fatally shot his mother. Defendant was waived to the Law Division, tried as an adult, and convicted of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2), and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). Following merger, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment subject to a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. The court has previously affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of four petitions for post-conviction relief.

In May 2013, defendant moved to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). He argued that the sentencing court did not consider his youth and associated mitigating factors and that his life term deprived him of an opportunity to earn his release through demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. He further argued that it is likely that he will serve much longer than thirty years because the State Parole Board can repeatedly deny parole even if demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

Defendant further argued that mere eligibility for parole does not amount to a meaningful opportunity for release because the State Parole Board regularly contravenes the intentions and expectations of sentencing judges, thereby overruling sentencing decisions and usurping the power of sentencing judges. Defendant asserted that the State Parole Board's decision-making process is statutorily and constitutionally deficient because it is not required to consider the court-accepted brain science that children are constitutionally different and not deserving of the most severe punishments.

Defendant claimed he was entitled to resentencing under State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), and Article I, Paragraph 12, of the New Jersey Constitution, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments" Defendant will be eligible for parole in 2026 at age forty-seven.

The court affirms the denial of defendant's Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that defendant's sentence is not illegal or the functional equivalent of life without parole. The court adheres to the holding in State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2018), concluding that defendant is not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012), when it imposed the sentence. Any rehabilitative actions undertaken by defendant while incarcerated were matters for the State Parole Board to consider and did not render the sentence unconstitutional. The court thus rejected defendant's argument that he is entitled to resentencing under Zuber.

The court also holds that defendant's challenges to the parole process are not ripe since he is still serving the statutorily mandated thirty-year period of parole ineligibility and is not yet eligible for parole. The court notes that if defendant is eventually denied parole and receives a future eligibility term, he may appeal that decision and challenge the constitutionality of the statutory and regulatory framework governing parole at that time.

None of the decisions identified by defendant satisfy the requirements of the good-faith defense under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2. The Court acknowledges, however, the dilemma faced by an employer such as defendant, which repeatedly prevailed in overtime disputes before subordinate Department employees but was unable to seek a ruling that would satisfy that statute because each of those disputes was resolved without further review. The Court respectfully suggests that the Department would further the Legislature’s intent if it instituted a procedure by which an employer in defendant’s position could obtain an opinion letter or other ruling clarifying its obligations under the WHL’s overtime provisions. The Court remands this matter for consideration of defendant’s argument that it is a trucking-industry employer within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4(f) and for determination of whether defendant complied with the applicable WHL overtime standards in compensating its employees.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, to his right of his access to various records, including his own Rutgers University graduate student records, and his request for attorney's fees and costs (collectively "attorney's fees").

The court concludes OPRA only allows plaintiff to obtain copies of his own academic transcripts, discipline records, and financial records subject to redaction to preclude the identity of other students. The court remands for the trial court to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to any attorney's fees related to his efforts to obtain these records.

The court also remands for the trial court to issue findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees related to defendants' voluntary release of information pertaining to specific university professors' and administrators' disclosable records. No position is taken as to whether plaintiff is entitled to any attorney's fees that shall considered on remand. All other aspects of the trial court's order are affirmed.

Pardons remove legal disabilities linked to the conviction itself but do not erase the underlying facts of an offense. Here, T.O. faced a statutory bar that prevented him from being eligible for expungement. That legal disability came into play solely because of his prior convictions. The pardon -- which removed the legal disabilities that arose from those convictions -- therefore dissolved the statutory bar. With the bar removed, T.O. is eligible to be considered for expungement on the merits. In light of the State’s concession and the trial court’s agreement that T.O. would qualify for expungement in the absence of a statutory bar, the Court grants T.O.’s petition for expungement.

The court holds that a grand jury witness, including a law enforcement witness, has absolute immunity from a civil rights claim under New Jersey law for grand jury testimony that is alleged to have omitted relevant information. Accordingly, the court adopts and applies to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367-69 (2012), which held that a witness testifying before a grand jury has absolute immunity from a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court did not decide whether a witness who lies to a grand jury has absolute immunity because there was no evidence that the witness in this case lied.

Consequently, the court affirmed an order granting summary judgment to a detective who was alleged to have violated the NJCRA in a civil action by failing to tell a grand jury certain information that may have raised questions about an eye witness' identification of a criminal defendant who was later acquitted at trial.