Opinion Summaries

Where the chain of title was unclear, N.J.S.A. 46:18-13(b)(2) authorized plaintiff, the claimed "established holder" of the mortgage, to file a General Equity lawsuit to establish its status as the mortgage holder, and hence, its standing to foreclose the mortgage. The Appellate Division rejected defendant-mortgagors' argument that plaintiff could only seek that relief in the context of a foreclosure action. Plaintiff filed a separate civil action joining as defendants the mortgagors and all known entities that may have had an interest in the note and mortgage. The trial court granted plaintiff relief, but also required plaintiff to indemnify defendants against any future claims by other entities seeking to enforce the mortgage or the note.

Tax Court: ADP Vehicle Registration, Inc. v. Director, Div., of Taxation; Docket No. 014946-2014, opinion by Nugent, J.T.C., decided on December 11, 2018. For plaintiff – Hollis L. Hyans, admitted pro hac vice (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., attorneys; Steven T. Rappoport, on the briefs); for defendant – Marlene G. Brown (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The court grants plaintiff (“Taxpayer”) partial summary judgment reversing defendant’s (“Taxation”) decision to tax 100% of Taxpayer’s income, finding Taxpayer maintained a Regular Place of Business (RPOB) outside of New Jersey, as defined by N.J.A.C. 18:7-7.2. Taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ADP, Inc., that claimed to operate as a California holding company conducting no activity, and whose sole asset was an 80% partnership interest in a California general partnership with offices in that State that operated a computerized vehicle registration service nationwide. In its analysis, the court focused on the partnership’s business due to the unitary nature of the two entities. The parties’ dispute centered on interpretation of the RPOB regulation where Taxpayer argued the language therein did not constitute a list of absolute requirements to be met, contrary to Taxation’s strict interpretation. Based on the plain language of the regulation coupled with precedent that applied an objective standard to the RPOB analysis, the court found Taxpayer’s argument to be more persuasive. On that basis, the court concluded that Taxpayer maintained an RPOB outside of the State entitling Taxpayer to apportion income away from New Jersey, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.

Tax Court: 160 Chubb Properties, LLC v. Township of Lyndhurst, Docket Nos. 002442-2014, 006305-2015; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided December 14, 2018. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Ragno and Robert J. Guanci (Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan, Lamparello, Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C., attorneys).

Plaintiff, 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, sought relief under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8 (“Freeze Act”) for the 2017 tax year based on the settled and adjudged tax assessment for the 2015 base tax year. Defendant, Township of Lyndhurst, opposed application of the Freeze Act for the 2017 tax year arguing that plaintiff waived Freeze Act protection under the settlement agreement. Defendant also sought a plenary hearing arguing that plaintiff performed improvements to the property precluding Freeze Act relief. The court determined that the Freeze Act applies unless the taxpayer affirmatively waives its application. The court found that the settlement agreement did not contain an affirmative waiver, nor was any evidence offered that plaintiff agreed to limit Freeze Act protection. The court also found that defendant was not entitled to a plenary hearing since it did not make a prima facie showing that a substantial and meaningful change in value occurred to the property. The court determined that defendant’s bare allegations of increased tenant occupancy; the cost of work to be performed under construction permits; and the sales price of the property were insufficient to demonstrate a change in value. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to apply the Freeze Act to the 2017 tax year assessment.

This opinion, decided on August 4, 2017, is being published at the request of the Supreme Court. Appellants N.J. Highlands Coalition and Sierra Club N.J. challenged a settlement agreement between the NJDEP and a developer relating to the development of a 204-unit inclusionary housing project in the Borough of Oakland. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the NJDEP issued two freshwater general permits and a transition area waiver, which appellants also challenge. We held that the NJDEP correctly concluded the developer was entitled to an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(17), and the NJDEP's decision to approve the general permits and transition area waiver was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the per curiam opinion. The Court adds modifying comments to clarify that the affirmance is based solely on a plain language reading of the Highlands Act that does not incorporate the definition of “final approval” contained in the separate but related MLUL.

The Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for six months before the questioning in Bucks County. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment does not qualify as a break in custody under Shatzer, and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards apply here. Edwards requires suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden. The admission of that statement was not harmless error.

When exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened. Applying that standard in this case, the Court reverses and remands to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing.

The Court reaffirms New Jersey’s longstanding adherence to the principle that a competent litigant may represent himself or herself in a matter in which he or she is a party, subject to exceptions set forth in statutes, court rules, and case law. No such exception is prescribed by the statute that governs this case. Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented. The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child. In this case, the court properly denied J.J.’s untimely and ambivalent claim.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants' interference with plaintiff's efforts to purchase property for use as a group home for autistic individuals violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. The court concluded, as the LAD makes clear, that it is, in fact, unlawful to discriminate against a buyer because of the disability of a person intending to live on the premises, even if the buyer does not fit within a protected class, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, and that it is, with a discriminatory intent, unlawful to interfere with another's transaction, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(n). In reversing the motion judge's dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), the court also rejected the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the claim that defendants sabotaged plaintiff's efforts to secure a grant from the Monmouth Conservation Fund; that nonprofit foundation was not shown to be a governmental or quasi-governmental body.

Within fifteen years of having been convicted of "sex offenses," see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), and sentenced to probation, each registrant was convicted of another offense. After fifteen offense-free years following those convictions, registrants moved to be relieved of their registration obligations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), which provides in relevant part:

[A] person required to register under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.

The Law Division judges denied relief, concluding essentially that conviction for any offense within fifteen years of the conviction of or release from imprisonment for the underlying sex offense permanently barred relief.

The court reversed, concluding that although the statute was ambiguous, permanently barring relief was 1) contrary to the Legislature's intent and the remedial purposes of Megan's Law; and 2) inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), which permits termination of community/parole supervision for life "upon proof . . . that the person has not committed a crime for [fifteen] years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, . . . and . . . is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others if released from parole supervision."

In this vehicular negligence action, the court holds that the cumulative impact of multiple errors, including defense counsel's improprieties, the trial court's denial of a directed verdict as to defendant's negligence, and the trial court's grant of defendant's in limine motion to bar plaintiff's life care expert, deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. The court reverses the order of judgment entered on the jury's verdict and remands for a new trial.

The court reverses the Family Part order entered under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21. SASPA cannot be used to impose a restraining order on defendant based on conduct that occurred before SASPA's effective date. SASPA does not permit such retroactive application. The Family Part judge heard credible testimony from plaintiff that defendant had intercourse with her in 2005 when she was eleven. The Family Part judge correctly concluded the 2005 incident of intercourse was a sexual assault, however the 2005 assault was not a predicate act triggering the right to SASPA protection because SASPA was not signed into law until 2015.

Plaintiff New Jersey Transit Corporation appealed from the summary judgment dismissal of its subrogation action against the tortfeasors for reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits paid to an injured employee for wage loss and medical expenses resulting from a work-related automobile accident. Plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of the limitation on lawsuit option under AICRA, and did not seek recovery from the tortfeasors. The motion judge held AICRA trumped the WCA, ruling that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) barred NJ Transit's claims because NJ Transit, as subrogee, stands in the shoes of the injured employee, and has no rights superior to the injured employee under AICRA. Since the injured worker was compensated by workers' compensation benefits for his medical expenses and wage loss; he suffered no uncompensated economic loss. The motion judge held NJ Transit's claim must be dismissed because AICRA bars claims for compensated economic damages.

The court reverses the summary judgment dismissal, holding the workers’ compensation carrier is permitted to pursue its Section 40 claim for reimbursement of the worker's compensation benefits paid to the injured employee against the third-party tortfeasors. If successful, the workers' compensation carrier would be reimbursed by the tortfeasors, subject to their right to indemnification from their own automotive insurers. Therefore, allowing such recovery does not conflict with AICRA's collateral source rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.

Regarding the interplay of the WCA and AICRA, where only workers' compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available, the primary burden is placed on workers' compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. Where only PIP benefits and tortfeasor liability are involved, the primary burden is placed on the PIP carrier by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. However, where both workers' compensation benefits and the proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). In turn, where workers' compensation benefits have been paid, but the injured employee has not sought or obtained recovery from the tortfeasor, the primary burden is placed on the tortfeasor.

Plaintiff, a shareholder in a closely-held corporation, brought an action against the only other shareholder, asserting both direct claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and derivative shareholder claims alleging breach of fiduciary trust, mismanagement, conversion, and fraud. Following the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial judge dismissed the action in its entirety without prejudice for lack of standing.

The court reverses the dismissal of plaintiff's direct claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and remands those claims to the trial court to render a decision on the merits, finding plaintiff had standing to pursue those direct claims.

The court rejects plaintiff's argument that the prior denial of defendant's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted constituted the law of the case. The court affirms the dismissal without prejudice of the remaining derivative claims because it is unable to determine from the record if allowing the derivative claims to proceed would prejudice the corporation's creditors.

The court remands to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for reconsideration and the articulation of appropriate reasons for the sanctions imposed on the inmate consistent with N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.17(a) and Mejia v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 446 N.J. Super. 369, 378-79 (App. Div. 2016). The court suggests the DOC amend its regulations so that particularized reasons for sanctions are provided in all future disciplinary matters.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s two prior DWI convictions here. Although the Court imposes no per se exclusion of prior DWI convictions in a prosecution for vehicular homicide while intoxicated, this case does not present the rare circumstances that would render their admission appropriate.

In this appeal, plaintiff argues that she was entitled to have the post-judgment motion judge establish the marital lifestyle pursuant to Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000) notwithstanding a waiver of that determination at the time the judgment of divorce was entered; and that she was entitled to an increase in her alimony payment. Affirming denial of her motion, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the court was obligated to conduct a Crews analysis post-judgment because: their Property Settlement Agreement was recently entered; did not reserve such a determination; and was not the product of coercion or duress. Consequently, the court found no basis to impute a higher income to defendant and increase plaintiff's alimony payments.

In this appeal, defendant argued that she was an oppressed minority shareholder under N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c) even though she contracted to be an employee at-will. After serving as plaintiff's Chief Financial Officer for thirteen years, she claimed that she had a reasonable expectation of continued employment and that her at-will designation was irrelevant and erroneous. A Consent Order entered by the parties in prior litigation between them validated their Shareholder Agreement and confirmed defendant's at-will status.

The court rejected defendant's reliance upon unpublished out-of-state cases as factually distinguishable and unpersuasive that defendant urged us to adopt for the proposition that an oppressed shareholder may have an expectation of continued employment. The court declined to do so, and affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of defendant's counterclaim on the basis that her at-will status was paramount.

Defendant challenged plaintiff's right to foreclose, arguing N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 precluded the enforcement of a note, lost prior to the assignment of a concomitant mortgage, because plaintiff never owned or controlled the underlying debt. The court interpreted the statute as allowing the enforcement of a lost note where the assignor – which provided a lost-note affidavit to plaintiff – possessed the note and was entitled to enforce it when the loss occurred, and plaintiff proved the terms of the note and its right to enforce it.

The court reverses two murder convictions. The motion to suppress a photograph of a gun and ammunition similar to that used in the double murder should have been granted because the photograph was mistakenly provided by Sprint in response to a communications data warrant (CDW) that did not seek photographs. The State argued that the photograph was in plain view, but as the file containing the photograph was clearly identified as a photograph, and labeled as outside the time frame of the CDW, the court rejects the plain view argument. Admission of that photograph was not harmless error, given the State's repeated emphasis on the photograph in summation as well as the fact that the jury declared itself deadlocked three times.