Opinion Summaries

A.M. suffers from end-stage multiple sclerosis, a progressive condition that renders her physically incapable of conducting any activities of daily life and requires twenty-four-hour daily medical care. After serving eight years of her forty-year sentence for the murder of her husband, she petitioned for release on parole to a medical facility pursuant to the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e.

Subsection (f)(1) of the CRA authorizes a court to grant a petition for release on parole where there is clear and convincing evidence the inmate suffers from a "permanent physical incapacity" rendering the inmate "permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released" and the conditions "under which the inmate would be released would not pose a threat to public safety." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1). Here, the motion court conducted hearings, determined A.M. satisfied the permanent physical incapacity and public safety requirements, but denied her petition based on its conclusion N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1) vested it with discretion to do so.

The court reverses the denial of A.M.'s petition for compassionate release parole, concluding the plain language of the CRA does not vest a court with discretion to deny a petition where it otherwise determines there is clear and convincing evidence satisfying the permanent physical capacity and public safety criteria for release set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1).

Because a detective here repeatedly contradicted and minimized the significance of the Miranda warnings -- starting at the outset of the interrogation and continuing throughout -- the State cannot shoulder its heavy burden of proving defendant’s waiver was voluntary. The Appellate Division majority correctly concluded defendant’s statement had to be suppressed.

Tax Court: Giant Realty, LLC v. Lavalette Borough; Docket No. 001063-20142014, opinion by Fiamingo, J.T.C., decided April 28, 2022. For plaintiff – Michael I. Schneck (Schneck Law Group, LLC., attorneys); for defendant - Dominic P. DiYanni (Eric M. Bernstein & Associates, LLC, attorneys).

HELD: Plaintiff moved to apply the provisions of the Freeze Act, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8, for the judgment entered in tax year 2014 to tax years 2015 and 2016. Defendant opposed arguing that the issuance of a permit to develop the subject property under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J.S.A. 13:19-1 to -51 ("CAFRA"), constituted a change in value so that the Freeze Act should not apply. The court ruled that the issuance of a CAFRA permit in and of itself was insufficient to establish a prima facie case that an external change in the value of the subject property materialized which "substantially and meaningfully" increased the value of the property. Such change can only be demonstrated by showing the value of the property before and after the change. Having failed to make the required prima facie showing, defendant was not entitled to a plenary hearing on the applicability of the Freeze Act. Plaintiff’s motion to apply the Freeze Act was granted.

Although the court affirmed defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction and sentence, it reversed defendant's convictions for second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1), and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), based on errors in the judge's final charge.

Despite charging self-defense, because he concluded defendant's return to the scene with a gun was "unreasonable," the judge refused to provide instructions on the unlawful purpose count that explains the use of a firearm for a "protective purpose." However, the model charge clearly explains the difference between self-defense, which requires both an honest and reasonable belief in the need to use force, and the use of a weapon for a protective purpose, which only requires an honest belief, not a reasonable one. See State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 334–35 (2001) (explaining the difference between the two concepts).

Regarding the unlawful possession count, the judge failed to orally provide instructions regarding the permissible inference a jury may draw from the lack of any permit in defendant's name in the State Police database. Although the written instructions the judge provided included that portion of the model charge, the court held State v. Lindsey, 245 N.J. Super. 466, 475 (App. Div. 1991), and the current iteration of Rule 1:8-8(b)(2), do not relieve the judge of the obligation to orally provide instructions and not rely on copies of the written charge given to the jury.

By leave granted, defendant appeals from a trial court order, denying his motion to dismiss an indictment that charges him with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault by penile-vaginal penetration, and two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The indictment was returned four months after the East Orange Police Department issued complaint-warrants; seven years after the alleged victim reported the crimes to the police; and fourteen years after the last incident allegedly occurred. The alleged victim, who was five and six years old at the time of the alleged incidents, is defendant's biological daughter.

On appeal, as he did before the motion judge, defendant contends his right to due process was violated in three respects. Initially, defendant maintains the State's delay in presenting the case to the grand jury violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and, as such, the motion judge misinterpreted the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473 (2006). Secondly, defendant claims the indictment, and the State's ensuing response to his bill of particulars, failed to provide sufficient notice of the dates and locations of the sexual assaults under the criteria established in State in the Interest of K.A.W., 104 N.J. 112 (1986). Finally, defendant asserts the cumulative effect of the State's delayed prosecution and its vague indictment warrant dismissal under the fundamental fairness doctrine.

Because the court concludes defendant failed to demonstrate "actual prejudice" under the second Townsend prong, the court declines to address defendant's assertion under the first Townsend prong that the judge erred in requiring him to establish the State acted in bad faith. The court concludes defendant's due process rights were not violated by the State's delay in seeking the indictment and affirms the motion judge's decision in that regard. However, the court clarifies the burden of proof required under the first Townsend prong.

Turning to the sufficiency of the indictment under the K.A.W. factors, the court cannot discern from the record on appeal whether the State discharged its obligation to narrow the dates of the alleged incidents. Notably, the record is devoid of any evidence that the State attempted to question the victim about life events occurring around the time of the two alleged incidents. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter for the State to furnish the motion judge with documentary evidence of its efforts, if any, to narrow the time frame alleged in its responses to defendant's bill of particulars.

In view of its remand order, the court declined to address defendant's fundamental fairness argument.

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Messano’s published opinion. The Court requires that, going forward, a plaintiff claiming taxpayer standing in an action challenging the process used to award a public contract for goods or services must file a certification with the complaint. As to the merits of this appeal, the Court departs from the Appellate Division’s decision in only one respect: the Court does not rely on the leasing and financing arrangements contemplated by the BCIA and defendant County of Bergen.

The court resolves the jurisdictional question of whether the Commissioner of the Department of Banking and Insurance ("DOBI") may pursue an administrative action against two out-of-state companies and their two licensed New Jersey affiliates for engaging in alleged improper insurancerelated practices in this State—or whether the Commissioner must instead rely on the Attorney General to bring a lawsuit against those companies in the Superior Court.

Specifically, the court interprets N.J.S.A. 17:32-20 ("Section 20"), which the Legislature enacted in 1968 as part of the Non-Admitted Insurers Act, N.J.S.A. 17:32-16 to -22. In pertinent part, Section 20 reads:

Whenever it shall appear to the commissioner that any insurer, or any employee, agent, promotional medium, or other representative thereof, has violated, is violating, or is about to violate the provisions of this act, the Attorney General, upon the request of the commissioner, shall institute a civil action in the Superior Court for injunctive relief and for such other relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.

[N.J.S.A. 17:32-20 (emphasis added).]

The court holds that Section 20 does not restrict the Commissioner to the path of a Superior Court action in this circumstance. Based on the text, legislative history, and public policies of the statute as a whole, as well as principles of primary jurisdiction, the Commissioner has the authority to choose to pursue an administrative complaint against the companies instead of a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General.

Consequently, the court remands this matter to DOBI and directs that a previously stayed hearing in the Office of Administrative Law be reactivated.

This criminal prosecution arises out of a head-on collision that killed a passenger in defendant’s car. Defendant had driven the car into the lane of oncoming traffic, and an accident reconstruction expert estimated he had been speeding at over 80 mph in a 25 mph zone at the moment of impact. His blood sample was extracted at a hospital later that day, yielding apparent test results from the State Police laboratory of a blood alcohol content (BAC) well over the legal limit.

A grand jury charged defendant with vehicular homicide, drunk driving, and other offenses. After seven witnesses for the State had testified, a testifying nurse revealed that the State had inadvertently misattributed to defendant the blood sample of a deceased hospital patient, which the hospital had mistakenly released, and which the State then failed to authenticate. In addition, it came to light that defendant's own blood sample had been irretrievably lost.

The trial judge declared a mistrial and found the State had acted in bad faith in its misattribution of the blood samples. The judge denied defendant’s motion to dismiss all charges with prejudice, but did dismiss with prejudice the three counts of the indictment that hinged on the BAC level. Defendant appealed; the State did not cross-appeal the judge’s finding of bad faith.

The court holds the proper remedy in this unusual situation is to re-present the matter to a new grand jury, solely based on the reckless driving allegations, without proof or contentions by the State of defendant's intoxication or impairment. The court rejects defendant’s claim of a double jeopardy violation, as the mistrial was justified on the grounds of manifest necessity. The court also rejects defendant’s argument that it is fundamentally unfair to maintain any charges against him.

Defendant appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on a predicate act of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1. The court agrees with defendant's argument that procedural due process requires trial judges, before trial, inform defendants in domestic violence proceedings, both of the serious consequences resulting from the entry of an FRO and of their right to retain legal counsel. Because the judge in this case did not advise defendant of his legal exposure or of his due process right to counsel, the court vacates the order and remands for a new trial.

Defendant appeals his conviction after a trial de novo in the Law Division of driving while intoxicated (DWI), contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He also appeals his sentence, arguing the court erred when it considered his conviction to be a second DWI offense for sentencing purposes.

The court affirms defendant's conviction. However, because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior DWI conviction was not based on an Alcotest breath sample test result rendered inadmissible by the holding in State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018), the court vacates his sentence, and remands for resentencing as a first offense.

Cassidy arose from the misconduct of State Trooper Marc Dennis who falsified Alcotest calibration records over a number of years. The Cassidy Court held that breath sample test results obtained on Alcotest instruments calibrated by Dennis are inadmissible, calling into question the validity of tens of thousands of DWI convictions based on such results. The Cassidy Court directed the State to provide notice to all defendants whose prior convictions were subject to challenge because they were based on test results from Alcotest instruments calibrated by Dennis. The State subsequently compiled a list of defendants who received notice as directed by Cassidy.

In the present appeal, defendant was convicted of DWI during the time Dennis was falsely certifying Alcotest calibration records. At sentencin g for the present offense, defendant argued the State was required to produce the calibration records from his prior conviction to prove that Dennis was not involved in his conviction. The trial court agreed with the State's argument that the absence of defendant's name on the list of defendants who were sent a Cassidy notice was sufficient proof that defendant's prior conviction was not tainted by Dennis.

The court held that in the absence of evidence of how the Cassidy list was compiled and that it definitively includes all prior DWI convictions that relied on test results from Alcotest instruments calibrated by Dennis, the absence of a defendant's name on the list was insufficient proof that the defendant's prior conviction was not invalidated by Cassidy. The court made a similar holding with respect to the State's assertion, without supporting evidence, that Dennis was not involved in any DWI convictions that arose out of Camden County. The court noted that the burden of Dennis's malfeasance as a law enforcement officer falls on the State, which cannot escape on the grounds of convenience and expediency its obligation to prove that a prior conviction on which it relies for an enhanced sentence in a subsequent prosecution was not tainted by his misconduct.

Defendant was charged with sexual crimes committed against two child victims, one of whom was his daughter and the other the daughter of defendant's girlfriend. The judge denied defendant's motion for severance, accepting the State's proffer that joinder was permitted under Rule 3:7-6, because evidence regarding both victims would be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) if the two sets of crimes were tried separately. See State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996) ("If the evidence would be admissible at both trials, then the trial court may consolidate the charges because 'a defendant will not suffer any more prejudice in a joint trial than he would in separate trials.'" (quoting State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. Div. 1983)). The court reversed, concluding the judge misapplied Rule 404(b) in denying the severance motion.

The court also questioned the continued vitality of the Chenique-Puey analytic paradigm, noting that unlike situations where the State seeks to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes at trial, and must meet Cofield's rigorous four-prong test at a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, a defendant's severance motion in these circumstances is most often decided solely on the State's proffer. In this case, the State's proffer in opposition to defendant's motion misstated some evidence and included evidence never adduced, or even admissible, at trial.

The court also traced some historical background regarding Rule 3:7-6, proposed revisions to the Rule never adopted by our Supreme Court, and case law interpreting the Rule in the context of severance motions.

The court in this case interprets and applies the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Sims, __ N.J. __ (2022). Defendant appeals from his jury trial conviction for aggravated arson. During police investigation of a nightclub fire, detectives determined that defendant was a suspect. After discovering that he had open traffic warrants, the detectives arrested him on authority of those warrants even though their true purpose was to question him about the nightclub fire. After defendant waived his Miranda¹ rights and before posing any substantive questions, the detectives informed him they wanted to talk about the nightclub, not the traffic warrants. Defendant contends that his incriminating statements should have been suppressed because the interrogating detectives did not inform him during the Miranda waiver colloquy that he would be charged with aggravated arson.

In Sims, the majority re-affirmed that, when administering Miranda warnings, police are not required to advise an interrogee that he or she is suspected of committing a particular crime not yet charged by an arrest or complaint-warrant. The court highlights that while the majority in Sims rejected any such per se suspect-notification rule, it expressly retained the principle that the failure by police interrogators to disclose a defendant's suspect status can be a relevant factor as part of the totality of the circumstances. The court stresses, moreover, that the totality-of-the-circumstances analytical paradigm is rigorous because under New Jersey law, the State bears the burden of proving that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights beyond a reasonable doubt. The court explains that it is the formidable proof-beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, rather than a bright-line suspect notification requirement, that safeguards the Fifth Amendment rights of interrogees who have not been formally charged with the crime that is the subject-matter of the custodial interrogation.

The court also reaffirms that in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, it has little tolerance for police interrogation tactics that affirmatively mislead an interrogee as to the seriousness of the crime that is the subject-matter of the interrogation. In this case, the court agrees with the trial court's finding that defendant was "[b]y no means . . . misled or unaware of the nature of the questions." The court thus concludes that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights.

The court addresses concerns raised by the dissenting justices in Sims that individuals should not be taken from their homes or off the street without being told the reason for their arrest and should not be detained for hours without explanation. Sims, __ N.J. __ (slip op. at 1) (Albin, J., dissenting). The court notes that, in this case, defendant was immediately told the reason for his arrest —the open traffic warrants—and thereafter was quickly informed as to the true reason why the detectives wanted to question him.

The court rejects defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the lead investigating detective to testify as both a fact witness and as an arson expert. The court concludes that the trial court took reasonable precautions to clearly delineate for the jury the detective's role as a fact witness and his role as an arson expert.

The court also concludes that the trial judge did not commit plain error by allowing the jury to watch a recording of the stationhouse interrogation in which the detectives repeatedly accused defendant of being the arsonist shown in a surveillance video. The court declines to apply the "invited error" doctrine, rejecting the State's argument that defendant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal because he did not object to the jury viewing this portion of the interrogation recording even as he sought to redact of other portions of the recording. Instead, the court applies the plain error standard of review. The court determines that the trial judge should have issued a limiting instruction explaining to the jury that the accusatory statements made by the detectives during the interrogation is not testimony and could only be considered in the context of understanding how the interrogation was conducted and how defendant responded to those accusations. Ultimately, however, the court concludes that any error in failing to instruct the jury does not rise to the level of plain error considering the strong evidence of guilt. The court also reasons that defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice by the jury hearing the detectives' accusatory remarks because it appears that defense counsel had made a strategic decision not to object as shown by counsel's argument in summation that the detectives were "overzealous" and were so convinced of defendant's guilt that they stopped looking for the true culprit.

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¹Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Defendant's bedroom was searched pursuant to a warrant after law enforcement received cyber tips about emails and Instagram messages containing images of child endangerment which were linked to an email address which incorporated defendant's last name and first initial. Among other devices, officers retrieved a cell phone from defendant's bedroom, but were unable to access the cell phone because it was passcode protected. The State filed a motion to compel production of the passcode by defendant. The Law Division denied the motion, finding the State failed to establish defendant's ownership of the phone. The State appealed.

The court held that the motion court erred by misapplying the foregone conclusion standard set forth in State v. Andrews, 243 N.J. 447 (2020), which established a testimonial exception to a defendant's right against self - incrimination under the United States Constitution as well as in New Jersey statutory and common-law. The court also held that the motion court erred by overlooking facts in the record which were probative on the issue of defendant's ownership or possession of the cell phone.

The AOM statute does not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee.

After many years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, reserving for the matrimonial court's consideration a single issue about a bank account; the wife claimed the account was a marital asset and the husband claimed it consisted of investor funds. After a plenary hearing, the judge found the Investment Advisers Act deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14a. An order was entered denying the wife's claim "without prejudice." Her reconsideration motion filed three months later was denied as untimely.

Soon after the wife appealed, the court entered an order that limited the appeal to a review of the order denying reconsideration. Later, however, the court allowed the parties to brief all issues, including the merits of the order denying the claim on jurisdictional grounds and whether the merits panel was barred from reconsidering the earlier motion order by the law of the case doctrine.

The court held that the order denying the wife's claim to the account "without prejudice" caused sufficient uncertainty about its finality that the interests of justice permitted the court's consideration of the jurisdictional ruling. The court also held that 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14a grants state courts concurrent jurisdiction, so the case was remanded for a disposition of the wife's claim to the account on its merits.

Appellants should have included Tennessee as an "interested party" pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d) when they filed their initial Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement in the Appellate Division. Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the arguments advanced under Rules 4:33-1 and -2. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Division to permit appellants to file an amended Notice of Appeal and Case Information Statement that names Tennessee as an interested party pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d).

As part of a homicide investigation, defendant gave a statement to a detective following the administration and waiver of Miranda¹ rights before the filing of a complaint-warrant or the issuance of an arrest warrant. Shortly after the statement began, defendant asked whether it would cause problems with his record because he was an undocumented noncitizen. The detective responded, "No. No," and told defendant his "status has nothing to do with this. I am not going to ask you any questions on your status, or how you got here to this country. Absolutely nothing." Defendant did not invoke any of his Miranda rights during the statement, initially denied involvement, asserted an alibi, and later in the statement made incriminating admissions.

Defendant opposed the State's motion to admit the statement, arguing he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because the detective falsely responded to his immigration status concerns. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion.

The trial court also granted the State's motion to admit evidence of defendant's impecuniosity and prior thefts of personal property from the homicide victim's family, finding the four-part Cofield² test was satisfied.Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, related weapons offenses, and tampering with evidence but acquitted of robbery and theft. He was sentenced to a fifty-year term for the murder, subject to a forty-two and onehalf-year period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.2C:43-7.2, and concurrent terms on the other offenses. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence.In State v. Sims, the Court determined that "officers need not speculate about additional charges that may later be brought" and declined to adopt a bright-line rule that requires police officers to inform a suspect, "based on information learned to date in a developing investigation, of what charges may be filed" against him in the future. ___ N.J. ___ (2022) (slip op. 28, 30).Applied here, the clear import of Sims is that police officers need not speculate about or disclose possible immigration consequences of charges that may be brought in the future. Requiring police officers to do so is unwarranted, impractical, and contrary to the holding in Sims.The court declined to adopt: (1) a bright-line rule requiring officers to engage in such speculation and to inform an interrogee that their statements could result in deportation or other immigration consequences; or (2) a brightline rule requiring suppression of a statement following inaccurate advice regarding its potential immigration consequences, even where the officer knowingly provides affirmative misadvice (e.g., making false assurances to a suspect that that they will not be deported even if they admit to committing the offense). Instead, as was done in this case, the trial court should consider any bad-faith conduct as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances test when determining whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court affirmed the admission of defendant's statement.The court also declined to expand Miranda warnings to include advising interrogees of the right to consult with an immigration attorney about the impact of the statement on their immigration status.

Due to the complexity of federal immigration law, the court recommended that law enforcement officers not engage in speculation and risk misadvising an interrogee. If an interrogee asks about the immigration impact of giving a statement, the officer can merely state that they cannot give any legal advice, and reiterate that the interrogee has the right to consult with an attorney and to have an attorney present during questioning.

The court rejected the argument that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant to produce a witness to corroborate a central facet of his defense, and the claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation.

The court affirmed the admission of evidence of defendant's impecuniosity as he had placed his financial status in issue by asserting an alibi, claiming he was working in New York on the day of the homicide, and thus had no motive to rob the victim. The court also affirmed that the evidence of defendant's thefts and impecuniosity satisfied the four-part Cofield test, concluding the record showed the thefts were close in time to the homicide and led to defendant's firing, the evidence was clear and convincing, and its probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.

The court affirmed defendant's sentence, finding the trial court properly applied and weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, which were in equipoise. Accordingly, a midpoint sentence was appropriate. Because the length of the term and period of parole ineligibility were lower than midpoint, the sentence was not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive.

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¹ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
² State v. Cofield 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).

Defendant appealed his conviction for certain persons not to possess a weapon after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized with a warrant issued from an ex parte domestic violence restraining order. The court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction.

Police officers were called to defendant's home, where the victim alleged that defendant kicked her. Police arrested defendant for simple assault and asked the victim if she wanted to seek a temporary restraining order (TRO), which she did. The victim told police that knives and a pistol were in the home.

One officer called a Municipal Court judge and summarized the incident without being under oath and without the judge taking notes. The judge spoke to the victim, but the officer only overheard the victim's portion of the conversation. The call was recorded but subsequently destroyed pursuant to the police department's thirty-one-day record retention policy.

Based on that call, the judge issued a TRO and a telephonic warrant for police to search defendant's home for weapons. Police recovered knives and defendant moved to suppress. The trial court upheld the validity of the warrant and denied suppression notwithstanding the recording of the call was destroyed. Defendant appealed. Cognizant of the principles enunciated in State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019), and State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150 (2004), the court determined that the search warrant was invalid because the procedural failures did not provide a reliable record to assure the Municipal Court judge properly authorized the warrant.

The court did not conclude the thirty-one-day retention policies was bad faith per se, but that the policy fell below the obligation to retain evidence in criminal matters and that defendant was manifestly prejudiced by the destruction. Moreover, while a properly reconstructed record can remedy certain procedural failures, the reconstruction here was wholly inadequate. The motion judge only heard from the officer who overheard one side of the call—not the Municipal Court judge who issued the warrant.

Reversed and conviction vacated.

Laurick relief and the principles underlying the prohibition against the use of uncounseled DWI convictions extend to the enhanced sentencing scheme in Section 26(b), and prior uncounseled convictions cannot be used as predicates to increase a loss of liberty for DWS. Furthermore, if a defendant obtains traditional PCR on a prior DWI or Refusal conviction and the State does not pursue a second prosecution, that vacated conviction cannot be used as a predicate in a Section 26(b) prosecution. In the present case, however, defendant was not entitled to Laurick relief in the first instance because he had counsel during his prior proceedings. Laurick is available only to defendants who were without counsel and not advised of their right to counsel during their DWI-related prosecutions.

Defendant was indicted and charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 based on evidence that, during his 2018 campaign for office of mayor, he agreed to accept from an attorney $10,000 to become the city's tax attorney once defendant was elected; defendant was defeated at the polls. Defendant moved for a dismissal of the indictment. The trial judge granted the motion by relying on United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012), which interpreted the statute to exclude from criminal liability unsuccessful candidates who accept bribes. The court rejected that interpretation and reversed.