Defendant was charged with sexual crimes committed against two child victims, one of whom was his daughter and the other the daughter of defendant's girlfriend. The judge denied defendant's motion for severance, accepting the State's proffer that joinder was permitted under Rule 3:7-6, because evidence regarding both victims would be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) if the two sets of crimes were tried separately. See State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996) ("If the evidence would be admissible at both trials, then the trial court may consolidate the charges because 'a defendant will not suffer any more prejudice in a joint trial than he would in separate trials.'" (quoting State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. Div. 1983)). The court reversed, concluding the judge misapplied Rule 404(b) in denying the severance motion.
The court also questioned the continued vitality of the Chenique-Puey analytic paradigm, noting that unlike situations where the State seeks to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes at trial, and must meet Cofield's rigorous four-prong test at a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing, a defendant's severance motion in these circumstances is most often decided solely on the State's proffer. In this case, the State's proffer in opposition to defendant's motion misstated some evidence and included evidence never adduced, or even admissible, at trial.
The court also traced some historical background regarding Rule 3:7-6, proposed revisions to the Rule never adopted by our Supreme Court, and case law interpreting the Rule in the context of severance motions.