Supreme Court Opinions

An MDT query revealing that a vehicle’s owner has a suspended New Jersey driver’s license provides constitutionally valid reasonable suspicion authorizing the officer to stop the vehicle -- unless the officer pursuing the vehicle has a sufficient objective basis to believe that the driver does not resemble the owner. If, upon stopping the vehicle, it becomes reasonably apparent to the officer that the driver does not look like the owner whose license is suspended, the officer must cease the vehicle’s detention and communicate that the motorist is free to drive away without further delay. Based on the specific facts presented here, the initial stop of the vehicle was valid because it was based on reasonable suspicion. However, the detention of defendants and the borrowed car was unconstitutionally prolonged after the officer recognized the driver was not the car’s owner. The officer’s admittedly uncertain ability to tell if he smelled marijuana was inadequate evidence of “plain smell” to justify a continuation of the stop and a search of the vehicle.

Defendant’s statements in the courtyard and stationhouse were both properly suppressed. Under the totality of the circumstances, the courtyard statements must be suppressed because the Miranda warnings given in the courtyard were lacking and could not have apprised defendant of his rights such that any waiver and agreement to speak to police was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. By the time defendant arrived at the police department and was given full Miranda warnings, he had already admitted to the very crime that the officers were investigating. Defendant had “let the cat out of the bag” with his admissions, see State v. Carrion, 249 N.J. 253, 275-76 (2021), so the psychological pressure of having already confessed was not cured by the administration of Miranda warnings prior to the interview at the station.

The Court endorses and applies the two-factor test of State v. Lentz, 463 N.J. Super. 54, 70 (App. Div. 2020), authorizing delayed warrantless searches of a person incident to that person’s arrest so long as both (1) the delay itself and (2) the scope of the search were objectively reasonable. The totality of circumstances here establishes such reasonableness, particularly given the officers’ observation and video footage showing that defendant appeared to be removing some substance from his fingers and rubbing his clothing while he was being interviewed, as well as the risk that biological evidence would dissipate during the delay while the warrant application was processed.

N.D. had apparent authority to consent to the officer’s search of the storage trailer. However, the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the officer’s search of the black bag or his seizure of the weapons in that bag, and the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress constituted error.

Section 543(a)(1) of the Cable Act does not preempt the proration requirement in N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8. The regulation does not regulate “rates for the provision of cable service,” but rather prevents cable companies from charging for cable service that customers have cancelled. The regulation does not set the “rate” that companies can charge. It simply protects cable users from paying for service they no longer want. Furthermore, contrary to Altice’s alternative argument, neither Altice nor its predecessor sought or received a BPU waiver from prorating cable bills.

The Court reverses as to all three issues and remands for a new trial. The Court prescribes a framework for trial courts to assess requests for access to internal affairs records and provides guidance for the application of that framework on remand in this case. Because the defense argues Officer Lee discharged his firearm first, defense counsel could potentially be allowed to explore Officer Lee’s history of past shootings on cross-examination. On remand, defendant will be entitled to access the internal affairs file as outlined in the Court’s opinion, and that evidence may be used to cross-examine Officer Lee subject to any objections pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403 or 404(b). Detective Green’s testimony was based entirely on his lay opinion from watching the video, which was impermissible under N.J.R.E. 701. The video was already in evidence, so the jury was able to view the video and determine for themselves what the video showed. Finally, applying the factors in N.J.R.E. 609(b)(2), it was error for the trial court to admit defendant’s remote convictions because the State did not meet its burden of establishing that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of admitting the old convictions.

The trial court properly instructed the jury on the State’s burden in disproving self-defense and no specific unanimity charge was required.

The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs.

Like many older buildings, the Library needed improvements in a number of areas. But the record did not establish that it suffered from obsolescence, faulty arrangement, or obsolete layout in a way that harmed the welfare of the community. To designate property for redevelopment under the LRHL, a municipality must demonstrate that certain specified problems exist and that they cause actual detriment or harm. There is insufficient evidence in the record to meet that standard. The designation of the Library as an area in need of redevelopment is invalid.

The circumstances giving rise to probable cause in this case were not “unforeseeable and spontaneous.” Those circumstances included investigating previous information from the CI and concerned citizen about defendant, the vehicle, and narcotics trafficking in the area; lengthy surveillance of defendant and the vehicle; reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had engaged in a drug deal; and a positive canine sniff of the vehicle. The Court therefore affirms the order suppressing the physical evidence seized from the vehicle.

A JIF established under the Joint Insurance Fund Act affords liability protection to public entities through “self-insurance,” not insurance. Here, Star’s “other insurance” clause is not triggered because “self-insurance” protection through JIF membership is not “other insurance.” Star’s coverage is therefore primary.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a) and -5.2(d), the trial court should have charged the jury to allocate percentages of fault and should have molded the judgment based on the jury’s findings. The trial court’s failure to apply the CNA warrants a new trial on remand so that a new jury may apportion percentages of fault under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). The Court does not disturb the first jury’s findings on the issues of liability under the IFPA, the WCA, or Liberty’s common-law claims, or its determination of total compensatory damages. The Court finds no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge in this complex matter.

Persons who received pre-CREAMMA conditional discharges for specified marijuana offenses -- just like persons who had pre-CREAMMA convictions for those marijuana offenses -- are no longer categorically precluded from future admission into PTI. Instead, prosecutors and reviewing courts must consider the merits of their PTI applications, without regard to the existence or circumstances of the earlier marijuana-related conditional discharges. The holding harmonizes CREAMMA and its manifest legislative intent with the pre-existing general language of the PTI and expungement statutes, including the Legislature’s command in CREAMMA to apply its reforms to “any case” that arose before its enactment.

Informed by the Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the Court concurs with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf is eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Court holds that defendant may not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Court disagrees with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause.