Opinion Summaries

We hold that New Jersey courts do not have jurisdiction to hear civil claims against foreign officials when the United States, through the State Department, has issued a suggestion of immunity (SOI) determining that those officials are entitled to conduct-based immunity. Therefore, we affirm a December 9, 2016 order dismissing plaintiff's civil complaint against six Israeli rabbinical judges and an official of the Rabbinical Religious Courts Administration of Israel after the State Department determined that the judges and official were acting within the scope of their duties for a foreign sovereign nation.

The affidavit supporting a search warrant disclosed in discovery need not be disclosed as a matter of course, and no particular circumstances necessitated disclosure of that affidavit here. To the extent that the trial court’s order of release served as a “sanction” for the State’s failure to meet what the court viewed to be the State’s discovery requirements, that release order was improper.

The court, after determining the New Jersey Council of Educational Services Commission – which represents the interests of eight educational services commissions – had standing to challenge the New Jersey State Board of Education's approval of the Middlesex Regional Educational Services Commission's request to change its name to the Educational Services Commission of New Jersey, held the State Board has the statutory authority to approve an educational services commission's name-change application even absent a concomitant application to change the scope of its services, and the State Board's action was not arbitrary and capricious.

Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of twenty, seven, and five years, for first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, resulting from his having caused, while intoxicated, an auto accident that killed a nine-year old and seriously injured two others.

In State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001), a divided Court determined that in multiple-victim vehicular-homicide matters, sentencing judges should "ordinarily" impose "at least two consecutive terms." The Court, however, also emphasized that it had not "adopt[ed] a per se rule" and the decision to impose consecutive terms remained in the discretion of sentencing judges. Id. at 419. In considering Carey's influence here, the court remanded for resentencing because, among other things, the sentencing judge appeared to have viewed Carey as imposing a presumption in favor of consecutive terms and because the judge did not fairly consider the real-time consequence of the aggregate thirty-two year sentence, all subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, imposed on an offender who was fifty-eight at the time of the incident and sixty-two at the time of sentencing.

In this statutory discrimination action under the Law Against Discrimination, the minor plaintiff retained appellant law firm to represent her against a Board of Education for failing to take appropriate steps to address bullying by other students. The retainer agreement provided for a forty-five percent contingent fee or a fee based on hourly rates, whichever was higher. After conducting discovery and surviving a defense summary judgment motion, the case settled pre-trial for $100,000, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, with plaintiff waiving the right to make application for a fee-shifting award against defendant. Plaintiff then sought approval of the settlement at a friendly hearing without the law firm seeking approval of a contingent fee higher than twenty-five percent of the net recovery pursuant to Rule 1:21-7(f).

The trial court approved the settlement amount and costs, but reduced the contingent fee to twenty-five percent of the net recovery. The court affirmed, holding that in the absence of an application for a fee-shifting award, the contingent fee is limited to twenty-five percent of the minor plaintiff's net recovery in the absence of a successful application for an enhanced fee under Rule 1:21-7(f).

N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) does not generally impose a notice-and-inquiry requirement on every claimant who has departed her work because that work aggravated a medical condition. Nonetheless, Ardan failed to meet the burden imposed by the regulation. The Appellate Division panel properly decided this appeal based on the version of the statute that was in effect when Ardan applied for unemployment benefits in 2012.

The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance, Small Employer Health Benefits Program Board (the SEH Board), engaged in rulemaking in accordance with the expedited procedure established by N.J.S.A. 17B:27A-51 (Section 51), rather than pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31. In doing so, the SEH Board repealed an administrative rule pertaining to out-of-network benefits under certain health insurance plans. We held that the repeal constituted an "action" under the plain language of Section 51, and concluded that the SEH Board correctly relied on Section 51 rather than the APA.

The court erred by allowing evidence that defendant threatened to burn down his girlfriend’s homes and by admitting John’s hearsay statements that defendant was responsible for the arson. However, the errors were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant.

A defendant in a foreclosure case may not fail to diligently pursue a germane defense and then pursue a civil case against the lender alleging fraud by foreclosure. The court affirms the dismissal of a fraud complaint alleging the lender pursued a foreclosure on the original mortgage after the mortgage was modified where the homeowner failed to object to the entry of final judgment in the foreclosure case.

The proper standard of appellate review of pretrial detention decisions is whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by making a clear error in judgment. Here, the trial court abused its discretion.

In this appeal the court considers whether draft minutes prepared for a public body's approval and adoption must be provided in response to a request under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. The Government Records Council denied the Libertarians For Transparent Government's OPRA request for unapproved minutes, contending they were records exempted from disclosure under the Act as "advisory, consultative, or deliberative material."

As the exemption under OPRA has been construed to encompass the deliberative process privilege, the court evaluated the documents under the privilege's two-pronged test, and determined that the unapproved minutes were both pre-decisional and deliberative. Because draft minutes are a preliminary document subject to revision, they remain "deliberative material" and exempt from the disclosure requirements of OPRA until approved by the public body.

In this Open Public Records Act (OPRA) litigation, the court considers whether the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NJSPCA) should be exempt from complying with OPRA requests because it does not receive public funds and, staffed only with volunteers, it lacks the monies and personnel to facilitate the requests.

Discovery revealed that the NJSCPA had a budget of over $300,000 consisting of private donations and monies collected from municipal fines and penalties assessed on violators of animal cruelty laws. The trial judge determined that the OPRA request was not burdensome; most of the information sought could be found in NJSPCA's tax returns and reports.

The court concluded that because the NJSPCA is a public agency that receives public funds and performs a traditional government function, it is subject to OPRA, and must comply with requests made under the Act. It is the province of the Legislature to exempt the agency from OPRA's mandate. The court affirmed the orders compelling NJSPCA to comply with the Act and awarding plaintiff counsel fees.

Defendant pled guilty to second degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the inculpatory statement. This court reverses the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statement. The evidence presented by the State at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing does not support the motion judge's findings that the State satisfied "the heavy burden" of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional rights under Miranda. The motion judge's decision upholding the methods used by the interrogating detectives improperly shifted this burden of proof to defendant.

Judge Fuentes wrote a separate concurrence addressing the use of police officers as interpreters when interrogating a suspect who is limited English proficient.

Because the State never proved an essential element of the certain persons charge to the jury, defendant’s conviction cannot stand.

At a detention hearing held pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to 2A:162-26 (the CJRA), the State proceeded by proffer. Defendant subpoenaed the police officer, who prepared the affidavit of probable cause as a witness, and sought to subpoena other officers. Over the State's objection, the judge entered an order that permitted defendant "to subpoena the [police] officers at the scene of the incident to testify at the [d]etention [h]earing." The court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and reversed.

The CJRA provides that at a pretrial detention hearing, a "defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, and . . . shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise." N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1) (emphasis added). However, federal courts interpreting the Bail Reform Act that contains similar language have recognized the defendant's right to produce adverse witnesses is conditional, not absolute.

The court adopts the reasoning of the majority of federal courts, which require a defendant make a proffer as to how the anticipated testimony of an adverse witness, i.e., police officers, victims, and State's witnesses, would 1) negate the State's evidence as to probable cause; or 2) rebut or diminish the State's proffered clear and convincing evidence supporting detention.

The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right to a fair trial.

In this appeal, this court was asked to determine whether a patient who requires emergent psychiatric treatment, resulting in his involuntary commitment to a hospital, should be treated differently for charity care purposes than a patient who suffers a physical injury or illness. This issue of first impression arose from a dispute regarding a hospital's attempt to recover payment from an indigent mental health patient, who was involuntarily committed to its facility after being screened by a psychiatric emergency screening service, when the hospital followed the charity care procedures applicable to a non-emergent admission instead of those applicable to an admission through the hospital's emergency room. The trial court determined on summary judgment that the procedures governing a regular admission applied, and the hospital was entitled to recover from the patient based on a theory of quasi-contract.

This court reversed, holding that when a mental health patient is admitted to a hospital on an emergent basis through the referral of a psychiatric emergency screening service, the provisions of the charity care regulations dealing with emergency room admissions applied.

Following O.Y.C.P. v. J.C.P., 442 N.J. Super. 625 (App. Div. 2015), the court further addressed the Family Part's jurisdiction over person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one who apply to the Family Part for predicate findings in special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) cases. In this case, the court addressed the Family Part's jurisdiction to grant an application for child custody, made in connection with an SIJ-related application. The court held that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, the Family Part has jurisdiction to grant a parent custody of an unemancipated child who is over eighteen, but under twenty-one, and to issue a declaratory ruling that the child is dependent on the parent and is not emancipated.

This appeal requires the court to determine the procedures that should be followed by the Family Part where a person, restrained by a final restraining order (FRO) entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, requests to modify or dissolve the FRO, but the transcript of the FRO hearing is not available through no fault of the defendant. We hold that due process requires the Family Part judge to reconstruct the record if the court cannot assess whether to deny the application or is otherwise satisfied that the record before it presents a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. We reverse and remand to the Family Part for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal requires this court to determine whether certain data the Department of Corrections (DOC) is required to maintain by federal and State regulations is no longer subject to disclosure as a "government record" under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). Specifically, whether data previously provided to the public in monthly reports is no longer available because the DOC implemented a new data collection system that does not generate these reports. The Government Records Council (GRC) upheld the DOC's denial of these records because they are no longer available in this format. This court reverses the GRC and holds that technological advancements in data storage should enhance, not diminish, the public's right to access "government records" under OPRA. Acceptance of the DOC's argument would leave the public policy of transparency and openness codified in OPRA unacceptably vulnerable to bureaucratic manipulation.