Opinion Summaries

The Court concurs in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holds that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that respondent committed the Code violations charged. The Court modifies the ACJC’s recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however, and instead imposes on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial duties.

Post Accutane, the court reversed summary judgment granted to defendants regarding plaintiffs' claims that their use of Johnson & Johnson baby powder had a causal connection to their development of ovarian cancer. In re: Accutane, 234 N.J. 340 (2018). The cases were the first two selected to be tried in the talc-based baby powder multi-county litigation.

Applying the analytical structure found in the Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (Third Ed. 2011), the court concluded, after detailed consideration of the experts’ lengthy N.J.R.E. 104 hearing testimony and reports, that their methodology was generally recognized in the field and the data upon which they relied was generally accepted for that use in the field. See Accutane, 234 N.J. at 352-53, 390. The experts hypothesized a connection between the migration of talc and inflammation to explain the development of ovarian cancers like plaintiffs’. The trial judge's suppression of their opinions was an abuse of discretion, as he failed to limit his decision to whether their methodology and data were generally accepted and relied upon in the relevant scientific field and instead rejected the merits of the opinions themselves, finding them less credible than those of defendants’ experts

When all factors bearing upon retroactivity are weighed -- whether the rule's purpose "would be furthered by a retroactive application," the State's reliance on the previous rule, and "the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice," State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 300 (2011) -- pipeline retroactivity is appropriate. Considering the evidence presented in G.E.P.'s case, the admission of CSAAS testimony did not deny him a fair trial, and the Court reverses the Appellate Division's judgment as to him. As to R.P., C.P., and C.K., the CSAAS testimony bolstering the alleged victims' testimony was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, and their convictions were thus properly reversed by the Appellate Division.

The language of the kidnapping statute, along with the case law construing that language, must be read in a sensible manner and not taken to an illogical conclusion. Holding a victim in captivity for a period of four to five hours, while assaulting and sexually abusing her, satisfies the “substantial period” requirement of the kidnapping statute -- even if the length of the confinement is co-extensive with the continuous sexual and physical abuse of the victim. In addition, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, the terrifying four-to-five-hour period of C.M.’s confinement was “merely incidental” to the sexual violence committed against her. There is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict.

In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, the court addressed several issues raised by defendant in a longer unpublished opinion affirming defendant's convictions. The two issues of first impression in New Jersey addressed in its published opinion are: (1) whether discharge from probation constitutes "release from confinement" for the purpose of triggering the ten-year time limit under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1)'s more stringent standard for the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and (2) whether a "no-permit" affidavit prepared by a non-testifying police witness is testimonial and thereby subject to the Confrontation Clause. As to the former, the court held that the plain language of N.J.R.E. 609, coupled with the construction of identical language by the federal courts and sister states, as well as prior interpretation of confinement by New Jersey State courts in related and unrelated contexts, compel the conclusion that probation does not qualify as confinement as required under N.J.R.E. 609(b)(1). As to the latter, the court determined that the "no-permit" affidavit was not testimonial under the primary purpose test, and its admission without the testimony of the affiant who conducted the permit search did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court reasoned that the affidavit established the absence of an objective fact, rather than detailing the criminal wrongdoing of defendant.

Applying the three-step sequential analysis of Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 118 (2000), in this legal malpractice action to ascertain the last possible date a motion to permit a late tort claim notice could have been filed to preserve plaintiff's medical malpractice claim, we reverse, on leave granted, the denial of third-party defendant attorney's motion to dismiss his predecessor's contribution claim. Because the Beauchamp analysis makes clear that plaintiff's claim was irretrievably lost by the first lawyer who represented her, a year before the second lawyer entered his appearance, the first lawyer could have no claim for contribution against his successor. Accordingly, the second lawyer's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification should have been granted as a matter of law.

In this appeal of an award of counsel fees in a class action consumer fraud lawsuit that resulted in a settlement, the court held that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion when it relied on personal experience in private practice as well as unpublished decisions to reduce the hourly rates for the participating attorneys. In support of the fee application, class counsel submitted certifications by the lead attorneys, both highly experienced in class action consumer protection litigation, attesting that the hourly rates were consistent with their standard hourly rates and had been previously approved in several New Jersey state and federal cases. The claimed rates were further bolstered by supporting certifications from three experienced unaffiliated practitioners, certifying that the hourly rates billed were reasonable and consistent with rates charged in the community by lawyers of comparable experience. The court concluded that class counsel's submissions, which were not contested by defense counsel but were rejected by the trial court, mirrored the methodology deemed acceptable in Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (1995), governing the award of attorney's fees under a fee-shifting statute.

The Court answers the certified question in the affirmative. A CFA claim alleging express misrepresentations -- deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices -- may be brought in the same action as a PLA claim premised upon product manufacturing, warning, or design defects. It is the nature of the claims brought, not the nature of the damages sought, that is dispositive of whether the PLA precludes the separate causes of action. In other words, the PLA will not bar a CFA claim alleging express or affirmative misrepresentations.

All claims related to the MCPO defendants’ acts or alleged omissions associated with duties imposed by the Directive constitute state prosecutorial functions. The Department’s parsing of the pleadings in this matter led to crabbed determinations about the scope of law enforcement activity that are inconsistent with the letter and purpose of Wright. The Court finds the Department’s four determinations -- which reflect shifting and conflicting positions -- to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

Appellants' Medicaid benefits under the New Jersey FamilyCare Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) Program were terminated by the Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (the Division). Prior to termination, appellants applied for benefits under another Medicaid Program, the Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMB) Program, but the Division rejected their application. Although appellants qualified for the SLMB Program, they were advised their application could not be processed until the ABD Program benefits were terminated. Because State Medicaid agencies are required under federal regulations to assess beneficiaries' eligibility for other Medicaid programs before terminating benefits, the court held that the Division was required to conduct an ex parte pre-termination review, and, based on appellants' undisputed eligibility, transition them from the ABD Program to the SLMB Program with no gap in coverage. As a result, the court reversed the Division's final agency decision and remanded for further proceedings.

In this appeal, the court considers whether the performances of defendant's plea attorneys were deficient by: (1) negotiating an agreement that required defendant to plead guilty as a condition of admission to pretrial intervention (PTI), when the Guideline to the Rule in effect at the time of defendant's plea prohibited such a requirement by the State; and (2) failing to advise defendant, a non-citizen of the United States, that his acknowledgment of guilt subjected him to removal proceedings – even though the charges would be dismissed upon defendant's successful completion of PTI. Because the record does not reveal the substance of the plea negotiations between the State and defense counsel, nor the advice counsel rendered to defendant about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, the court vacates the post-conviction relief court's order and remands for an evidentiary hearing.

The sole issue presented in plaintiff's appeal from the grant of summary judgment to defendants is whether the Casino Control Act, which grants the Division of Gaming Enforcement authority to regulate gaming-related advertising, N.J.S.A. 5:12-70(a)(16), preempts plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and common law claims alleging a casino hotel falsely advertised a poker tournament. Based on its review of the two statutes, and relevant case law, including the Supreme Court's test for determining preemption of the CFA in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp.,

A municipal board of education (BOE) challenged the grant of a use and bulk variances by a local zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) to permit construction of multi-family residential structures. The BOE alleged it had standing to bring the suit because the additional families would further tax an already overcrowded school district. In addition, the BOE argued that the ZBA violated the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21, because it failed to include on its meeting agenda any item reflecting its intention to adopt a memorializing resolution. The trial court rejected these arguments, and this court affirmed.

The court concluded that the BOE lacked standing, because it was not an "interested party," N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, based on a generalized claim that more families might overburden the school district. The court also concluded that the ZBA did not violate the OPMA, because it included the particular meeting as a "special meeting" on its annual published notice of meetings. See Witt v. Gloucester Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 94 N.J. 422, 433 (1983) (holding that "[p]ublication of an agenda . . . is required only in those instances where no annual notice has been provided in accordance with N.J.S.A. 10:4-18

The expert report relied on by the Township did not apply any reliable methodology to assure that the assessment allocating the costs among the properties was “in proportion to and not in excess of the benefits conferred,” as required by N.J.S.A. 58:4-12(d)(1) and other statutes. The Court is constrained to invalidate Sparta Township Resolution 6-1, which imposes a special assessment on plaintiffs’ properties to recoup the costs of the dam restoration project. The Township must pass a resolution allocating costs based on a valid methodology in accordance with the applicable statutes and relevant case law.

The Court answers the certified question in the negative. A party who files a successful motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not precluded by the entire controversy doctrine from asserting claims in a later suit that arise from the same transactional facts.

The history of the CJRA reveals the Legislature did not intend to authorize criminal contempt charges for violations of release conditions. Beyond that, allowing such charges for all violations of conditions of release, no matter how minor, is at odds with the purpose and structure of the CJRA. No-contact orders are treated differently, however, because the CJRA did not modify settled law relating to them. In State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010), the Court held that violations of no-contact orders -- even if issued as part of a pretrial release order -- can serve as a basis for contempt charges. That precedent remains firmly in place. Because neither appeal here involved a violation of a no-contact order, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and dismisses the contempt charges against both defendants.

It was error to grant summary judgment because, construing all inferences in Christian Mission’s favor, there is evidence that the property might have been used in a manner that could satisfy N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6’s actual use requirement -- storage of religious items and/or other church-related activities at the property before construction began, during construction, and as of the valuation date in 2012.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

The NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under section 1 of the FAA. Therefore, the parties in both Colon and Arafa are not exempt from arbitration and their arbitration agreements are enforceable. In Arafa, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under the NJAA. In Colon, the arbitration agreements are enforceable under either the FAA or the NJAA, which will be determined by the trial court upon remand when it resolves whether the employees in that case were transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.

For summary judgment purposes, the Court must accept as true the sworn deposition testimony of Baskin and the independent eyewitness, who both stated that Baskin’s open and empty hands were above his head, in an act of surrender, when Detective Martinez fired the shot. Under that scenario, a police officer would not have had an objectively reasonable basis to use deadly force. The law prohibiting the use of deadly force against a non-threatening and surrendering suspect was clearly established, as evidenced by cases in jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Thus, Detective Martinez was not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.