Opinion Summaries

     The court holds that the January 3, 2002 amendment to the criminal statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6, does not apply retroactively to an offense when the limitations period in effect when the offense was committed had expired.  Accordingly, the court reverses an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss an April 2022 criminal complaint charging him with a May 1990 second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(2).  The criminal statute of limitations in effect in May 1990 provided that a prosecution for a sexual assault had to be commenced "within five years after it is committed."  N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1) (1989).  
     Effective January 3, 2002, the statute was amended to carve out an exception for circumstances in which the prosecution includes DNA or fingerprint evidence.  L. 2001, c. 308, § 1.  The amendment provides that the limitations period "does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence."  The State argued that the 2002 amendment "tolled" the running of the statute of limitations related to defendant's May 1990 alleged sexual assault until May 2021, when it collected DNA from defendant.  
     The court rejects the State's construction of the 2002 amendment.  The court's interpretation of the amendment as applying prospectively avoids a violation of the ex post facto clauses of both the federal and New Jersey constitutions.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3.  The court, therefore, reverses the order denying defendant's motion and remands with direction that the trial court enter an order dismissing, with prejudice, the criminal complaint in this matter. 
 

The court affirms Law Division's orders denying defendants' motion to enforce an unsigned settlement agreement arising from a voluntarily entered mediation.  The court agreed with the Law Division that, in accordance with Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., LLC, 215 N.J. 242, 262 (2013), no agreement was reached because the parties did not sign the agreement before the mediation concluded.  The court, as did the Law Division, rejected defendants' argument that Willingboro's holding did not apply because, there, the mediation was court-ordered, and, in the present case, the mediation was voluntary.  Based upon the principles set forth in Willingboro, whether mediation is court-ordered or voluntary is a distinction without a difference. Furthermore, the parties' post-mediation conduct evidence there was no meeting of the minds that a settlement was reached.   

Defendant appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss an indictment, which charged him with fifteen counts of second-degree child endangerment, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4), (5)(a)(i), (5)(a)(ii); and one count of third-degree child endangerment, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii).  These provisions were enacted in 2018 as part of the child erotica amendment to the endangerment statute.  L. 2017, c. 141 (the child erotica amendment).  Finding that the statute is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court reversed.

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4) makes it a second-degree crime to photograph or film a child in a sexually suggestive manner, which necessarily requires the viewing and possession of such material.  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(5)(a)(ii) makes it a second-degree crime to possess child erotica with intent to distribute it.  Finally, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(5)(b)(iii) makes it a third-degree crime to possess child erotica.  The amendment's expanded definition of child pornography, which includes child erotica (i.e., images that "portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner"), is at odds with New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).

The child erotica amendment is overbroad because it precludes the private possession of material the United States Supreme Court has said is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Based on the amendment's definition of "portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner," any image of a child could appeal to sexual interests and thus be proscribed.  Therefore, the amendment is also vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would not understand the limits of permissible conduct.

    In this case of first impression, the court determines that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), which precludes the issuance of a handgun purchase permits (HPP) or a firearms purchaser identification card (FPIC) "where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare" is constitutional, applying the analytic paradigm adopted by the United States Supreme Court's recent Second Amendment decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).  Considering the historical traditions and analogues present leading up to and during the ratification of the Second Amendment, the court holds that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) "is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," and that individuals who engaged in repetitive misconduct without being convicted of a crime or felony-equivalent offense, are not "law-abiding citizens" whom the Second Amendment protects.  

    The court also holds that expunged records may be considered when determining whether to grant a HPP or revoke a FPIC.  The court affirms the denial of appellant's HPP application and revocation of his previously issued FPIC.  

    The court reverses the forfeiture and compelled sale of appellant's firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f), which addresses revocation of FPICs and carry permits but provides no basis for the forfeiture of firearms already possessed.  
 

In these appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated to issue a single opinion, the court granted plaintiff Norma Davis leave to challenge two separate Law Division discovery orders arising from her lawsuit alleging that defendants Disability Rights New Jersey, Gwen Orlowski, and Ellen Catanese terminated her employment in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.  The orders were stayed pending these appeals. 

In A-0269-22, the trial court order (cell phone record order) granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's motion to quash defendants' subpoena to her cellular provider seeking her cell phone records.  Plaintiff used her cell phone to perform her work duties while allowed to work from home.  The order required plaintiff:  (1) to produce a redacted copy of her personal cell phone records indicating work-related calls and texts made and received during her normal workday from January 1, 2018 to January 31, 2020; and (2) to submit to the court a copy of the redacted records provided to defendants, as well as a Vaughn[1] index of an unredacted copy of the records showing all calls and texts made and received during that period.  National Employment Lawyers Association/New Jersey (NELA) filed an amicus brief in support of plaintiff.

In A-0270-22, the trial court order (social media posts order) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to compel plaintiff to provide copies of her private social media posts, profiles, and comments (collectively "social media posts" or "social media content") from January 1, 2020 to August 29, 2022, depicting an emotion, attaching a picture of herself, or mentioning:  Disability Rights or her lawsuit's allegations; her vacations or celebrations; her being ill or worrying about being ill; and her work.  NELA and New Jersey Association of Justice (NJAJ) filed amicus briefs in support of plaintiff. 

The court is unpersuaded by plaintiff's and amici's arguments that the trial judge abused his discretion in entering orders which abridged her privacy interests.  The court concludes the judge appropriately considered plaintiff's privacy interests in her social media posts and cell phone bills and did not err in allowing defendants' discovery of limited private social media posts and cell phone bills to defend against her claims that her termination violated the LAD, causing her emotional distress.  The court, however, remands for the judge to add the requirement in the social media posts order –– similar to the cell phone record order –– that plaintiff submit a redacted copy of her private social media posts to defendants and the trial court as well as an unredacted copy of the posts with a Vaughn index to the trial court.

[1]  As pronounced in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 

The trial court properly instructed the jury on the State’s burden in disproving self-defense and no specific unanimity charge was required.

In this interlocutory appeal, the court considered the protective breadth of the Expungement of Records statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -31.1 (the expungement statute), against the statutory provisions regulating Transportation Network Companies N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27 (the TNC statute), where a conviction for aggravated assault bars employment as a rideshare driver and Uber's potential culpability under a theory of negligent hiring or employment.  T.C., an Uber driver, had a previous conviction for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer.  Uber had knowledge of T.C.'s prior conviction for aggravated assault—in the form of the two background checks—for some period of time prior to the entry of an order of expungement. 

The court addressed the narrow issue of whether the expungement gives T.C.'s employer the ability to assert T.C.'s rights so as to imply ignorance of the prior assault conviction.  The court read N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 to prevent the evidence of an expunged record to be used against the person for whom the expungement is meant to benefit: the recipient of the expungement.  The court does not read N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 to give instant cover to third parties without further examination of that third-party's conduct, duty and responsibility in a negligent hiring claim.  The court remanded for further development of the record.

The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs.

Like many older buildings, the Library needed improvements in a number of areas. But the record did not establish that it suffered from obsolescence, faulty arrangement, or obsolete layout in a way that harmed the welfare of the community. To designate property for redevelopment under the LRHL, a municipality must demonstrate that certain specified problems exist and that they cause actual detriment or harm. There is insufficient evidence in the record to meet that standard. The designation of the Library as an area in need of redevelopment is invalid.

The circumstances giving rise to probable cause in this case were not “unforeseeable and spontaneous.” Those circumstances included investigating previous information from the CI and concerned citizen about defendant, the vehicle, and narcotics trafficking in the area; lengthy surveillance of defendant and the vehicle; reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had engaged in a drug deal; and a positive canine sniff of the vehicle. The Court therefore affirms the order suppressing the physical evidence seized from the vehicle.

At issue in this medical negligence matter is the kind-for-kind specialty requirement embodied in the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (PFA), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to -42.  This appeal requires the court to determine whether the affidavit of merit (AOM) of a board-certified hematology expert satisfied the PFA's equivalency requirement where neither defendant doctor specialized, nor was board certified, in hematology when they rendered care to the decedent.  Instead, both defendants specialized in internal medicine at the time of the alleged treatment, and one was board certified in that specialty, but plaintiff's proffered expert did not specialize in internal medicine.  The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to provide a sufficient AOM, essentially concluding the affiant's hematology subspecialty was "subsumed" in defendants' internal medicine specialty and, as such, the affiant was qualified to opine that defendants deviated from the standards of medical care by improperly prescribing heparin to the decedent.

The court granted defendants leave to appeal from the April 14, 2022 Law Division order.  The court holds the PFA's kind-for-kind specialty requirement embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) is not satisfied when the AOM's affiant specialized in a subspecialty of the treating doctor's specialty but did not specialize, nor was board certified, in the physician's specialty when the alleged medical negligence occurred.  The court therefore concludes plaintiff failed to satisfy the PFA's equivalency requirements and reverse the trial court's order denying defendants' dismissal motion.  In doing so, the court rejects plaintiff's alternate argument that she satisfied the waiver exception to the PFA under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(c), which would have rendered moot defendants' appeal.

Appellants, parents of children enrolled in the Lakewood Public School District (District or Lakewood), filed a petition alleging the District was not providing its public-school students a thorough and efficient education as required by our State's Constitution.  N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1.  They contend this is due to the failure of the New Jersey Department of Education (DOE) to adequately fund the District.  To that end, they assert the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -70, which sets certain standards for the DOE, is unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood.  The record demonstrates Lakewood's school district is in a unique and precarious position.  Due, in large part, to demographic trends in the area.  Lakewood Township has seen a population rise in recent decades, primarily resulting from a thriving Orthodox Jewish community.  As a result of this demographic shift, the township has approximately 37,000 school-aged children, however, only about 6,000 are enrolled in the secular public schools.  The majority—eighty-four percent—are enrolled in private religious schools.  Testimony before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) established this demographic trend is likely to continue and accelerate.

Like other districts, Lakewood's state-issued school aid is calculated based upon its 6,000 enrolled public-school students.  The total budget for the most recent school year at the time of that decision was $143.45 million.  Of that, over half—$78 million—went to transportation and special education tuition for non-public students.  This is an abnormal and unsustainable imbalance.  The court concluded the record generated before the ALJ cannot fairly be said to support a finding Lakewood's students are receiving a constitutionally sound education.

The court held the Commissioner utilized an incorrect standard in rejecting the ALJ's finding, and further held the Commissioner owed appellants a thorough review of their substantive argument:  the funding structure of the SFRA was unconstitutional as applied to Lakewood's unique demographic situation.  The court reversed and remanded for the agency to consider the substantive arguments pertaining to SFRA in light of our Supreme Court's previous directive in Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 199 N.J. 140, 146 (2009):  the State has a continuing obligation to "keep SFRA operating at its optimal level" and "[t]here should be no doubt that we would require remediation of any deficiencies of a constitutional dimension, if such problems do emerge." 

The court granted defendants leave to appeal from the Law Division's orders denying summary judgment and reconsideration.  Plaintiff was injured while driving his motorcycle when defendants' tractor trailer pulled into plaintiff's lane of travel.  Plaintiff admitted having several drinks throughout the day and that he was speeding at the time of the accident, but, at his deposition, equivocated as to whether he was intoxicated.  Blood was drawn at the hospital, and defendants' expert extrapolated from that sample that plaintiff's BAC at the time of the accident was between .159 and .162.  Police issued no motor vehicle summonses to plaintiff.

In moving for summary judgment, defendants relied upon N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b), which provides:

Any person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50, [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a], or a similar statute from any other jurisdiction, in connection with an accident, shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of the accident.

[(Emphasis added).]

The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that the statute did not apply to plaintiff because he was not convicted of DWI and also because there were material disputed facts as to whether plaintiff was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident.

The court affirmed, agreeing with the motion judge that there were material factual disputes as to plaintiff's state of intoxication at the time of the accident.  More importantly, the court concluded the plain language of the statute denied a cause of action only to those plaintiffs actually convicted of DWI. 

     In this matter arising out of the purchase of a vehicle, the court considered whether parties may expand the scope of judicial review of an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16.  The agreement here contained a clause that permitted a court to review an arbitrator's award for errors of New Jersey law.  Guided by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the court concluded that when the FAA controls an arbitration agreement, its vacatur terms are exclusive and cannot be modified by contract.  Therefore, the pertinent clause in the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and severable from the remainder of the agreement.  The court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint seeking to vacate the arbitration award.

     On April 13, 2022, plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of a proposed class, filed a complaint seeking relief under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL), alleging defendant failed to pay them for pre- and post-shift work.  Defendant moved to partially dismiss the complaint, arguing plaintiffs sought the retroactive application of L. 2019, c. 212 (Chapter 212), which became effective August 6, 2019.  
     Chapter 212 amended both statutes, permitting employees to seek liquidated damages equal to 200% of the wrongfully withheld wages.  Additionally, Chapter 212 permitted successful WPL claimants to recover counsel fees and costs, previously allowed only under the WHL.  And, Chapter 212 extended the "look-back" period under the WHL, i.e., that period of time for which an employee could seek unlawfully withheld wages, from two to six years, prior to the "commencement" of the action in court.  The WPL has never had a similar provision, and Chapter 212 did not amend the WPL in this regard.
     The Law Division judge granted defendant's motion dismissing plaintiffs' WPL and WHL claim based on violations that occurred prior to August 6, 2019.  The court granted leave to appeal and reversed.
     Relying largely on the Court's recent decision in W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506 (2023), the court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the statutory remedies available as of the date they "commenced" their action in court.  See W.S., 252  N.J.  522 ("Applying the law in effect at the time a complaint is filed . . . is not applying a statute retroactively; it is applying a statute prospectively to cases filed after its effective date.").  The court also held that based on the legislative history of Chapter 212, the Legislature clearly intended to permit a six-year look back period under the WPL.       
 

    This appeal raises the novel issue of whether the statutory bar set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) precludes plaintiff's wrongful death and survivor claims stemming from the second of two separate motor vehicle accidents occurring a half hour apart at the same location, the latter of which resulted in the death of the uninsured driver as he attempted to retrieve a cell phone from his disabled vehicle.  In considering this question, the court addressed whether decedent was "operating" his uninsured vehicle at the time of the second accident for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).  The court further distinguished Perrelli v. Pastorelle, where the Supreme Court determined the statutory bar to recovering damages under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) applied to the owner of an uninsured vehicle, even where the owner was injured while a passenger in the vehicle.  206 N.J. 193, 208 (2011).  The court ultimately concluded the statutory bar pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) was not implicated because decedent was not operating his vehicle.

          We consider whether plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual abuse by a teacher, is barred from seeking pain and suffering damages under the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12.3, because he has not incurred the requisite amount of medical expenses.  Despite the Legislature's recent amendments to the TCA regarding child sexual abuse claims, it did not eliminate the statutory threshold regarding medical expenses.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order barring plaintiff from seeking pain and suffering damages.

          In this medical malpractice matter, defendants Herve Boucard, M.D. and Hamilton Gastroenterology Group, PA appeal from a July 26, 2022 order, which denied defendants' motion to bar the standard of care opinions of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Andrew Bierhals, at trial.  That expert opined that codefendant Yang, who settled prior to trial, did not deviate from the standard of care, contrary to plaintiff's prior position that Yang (as well as Boucard and others) was negligent.  On appeal, defendants argue that Glassman v. Friedel, 249 N.J. 199 (2021), which precludes a plaintiff from disavowing the negligence of an initial tortfeasor who settled in a later action against a successive tortfeasor, should be extended to cases involving a settling joint tortfeasor. 

          The court concludes that Glassman is expressly limited to successive tortfeasors and an extension of its holding to joint tortfeasors is not warranted.  Glassman sets forth a method of fixing damages caused by a first, independent source of injury to afford a credit to a successive tortfeasor who would otherwise have no remedy against the settling tortfeasor.  Glassman's assignment of damages to a preceding event is not possible where, as here, plaintiff seeks to establish fault as to a single, indivisible injury where two or more persons are subject to common liability.

          Equally important is the fact that, unlike a successive tortfeasor, joint tortfeasors are not left without remedies against a settling codefendant.  Whereas Glassman expressly prohibits an allocation of fault against an initial tortfeasor, a joint tortfeasor may seek an allocation of liability against the settling codefendant at trial.  Any percentage of fault thus allocated "operates as a credit to the remaining defendants."  In addition, the right of contribution assures that a joint tortfeasor can seek a remedy for the fault allocated to settling codefendants.  It is plain that the equitable concerns underpinning Glassman do not exist in the joint tortfeasor context.

          Finally, the court is unpersuaded by defendant's argument that it would be unfair to allow plaintiff to disavow its prior position that Yang was negligent.  Defendant bears the burden of proving Yang's negligence for purposes of an allocation.  That plaintiff will not assist him in that endeavor does not evince any intent to manipulate or mislead the court; rather, the court finds it to be sound trial strategy.  Given the remedies available to defendant, the court concludes it is unwarranted to invoke the extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel as it is not "necessary to secure substantial equity."  Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Gleason v. United States, 458 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1972)).

          The question presented on this appeal is whether University Hospital is a state administrative agency whose final decisions are directly appealable to this court under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2).  University Hospital is an acute care facility and trauma center located in Newark.  It was established in 2012, when the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed the New Jersey Medical and Health Sciences Education Restructuring Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-1 to -43.  The Act states that University Hospital was established "as a body corporate and politic [that] shall be treated and accounted for as a separate non-profit legal entity from Rutgers, The State University," and as "an instrumentality of the State."  N.J.S.A. 18A:64G-6.1a(a).

          In 2019, University Hospital issued a request for proposals (RFP) to design, construct, and operate a pharmacy at its hospital.  Sumukha, LLC (Sumukha), one of the unsuccessful bidders, appeals from University Hospital's denial of its protest of the award of the contract to Shields Pharmacy of University, LLC (Shields).  The court holds that the Legislature did not intend to make University Hospital a state administrative agency when it created the Hospital "as a body corporate and politic" that is not situated in an executive branch department.  Consequently, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice to Sumukha's right to file an action in the Law Division.

A JIF established under the Joint Insurance Fund Act affords liability protection to public entities through “self-insurance,” not insurance. Here, Star’s “other insurance” clause is not triggered because “self-insurance” protection through JIF membership is not “other insurance.” Star’s coverage is therefore primary.