Along with another offense, a grand jury indicted defendant on first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. At sentencing, defendant argued N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) was not subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), which requires a mandatory period of parole ineligibility because N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) did not enumerate N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j). The sentencing judge disagreed and held N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) is a grading statute, and sentenced defendant to a ten-year sentence with a five-year period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the Graves Act.
Defendant's appeal was initially heard on the court's sentencing oral argument calendar. It was then transferred to the plenary calendar given the question of law raised, and to resolve differing interpretations of the Graves Act and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) in unpublished opinions, and reported uneven practices in the trial courts. The central question on appeal was whether N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) is a substantive offense not subject to the Graves Act or whether N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) acts as a grading statute, thereby enhancing the penalty, which is subject to the Graves Act.
The court concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) is not a separate offense but instead a grading statute that is subject to the Graves Act penalty. Reading the statute to the contrary would lead to an absurd result because a person convicted of a first-degree unlawful weapons offense could serve less time than a person convicted of a lesser-degree offense by virtue of parole eligibility. The court concluded the more sensible reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j) was as a grading statute and therefore affirmed defendant's sentence.