Defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to kidnap,and felony murder, and sentenced to a sixty-year prison term. In her appeal, defendant raised numerous issues regarding her convictions as well as the sentence imposed.
The court first agreed that the jury's verdict could only be understood as supporting a conviction of second-degree kidnapping, not first-degree kidnapping for which she was sentenced, because the jury was not asked to determine whether defendant "release[d] the victim unharmed and in a safe place prior to apprehension."N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1). The court, however, rejected defendant's argument that a new trial was required, holding instead, in accord with State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 2003), that the verdict simply had to be molded to reflect a conviction of second-degree kidnapping.
Second, while the molding of the kidnapping conviction required resentencing, the court also mandated resentencing – and before a different judge – because the judge based the sentence on his declaration, based on his own understanding of the evidence, that defendant "ordered [the victim's] execution" even though the jury acquitted defendant of both first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The court held that, while federal constitutional principles may permit an enhancement of a sentence based on conduct for which the defendant was acquitted, see United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), New Jersey constitutional principles do not. Because an acquittal means the State failed to overcome the accused's presumption of innocence – leaving the accused's innocence "established," State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 559 (2009) – the sentencing judge here violated defendant's due process rights and her right to trial by jury by disregarding the jury's acquittal verdict and enhancing the sentence because of his personal own view of the evidence.