Following the dismissal of a chancery action against them that sought a constructive trust on the proceeds of a sale of real property, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the prior suitor, alleging, among other things, the tortious interference with their contract to sell the real property. The prior suitor sought dismissal, arguing her earlier claim was cloaked by the litigation privilege. The trial judge held that the complaint and other pleadings were insulated by the litigation privilege but not the notice of lis pendens, which had been recorded but discharged in the earlier action.
In permitting review of that interlocutory disposition, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the notice of lis pendens – a mere statement of the complaint's claims – was insulated by the litigation privilege, but the litigation privilege did not absolve the prior suitor of the consequences of having filed that earlier suit; in other words, the litigation privilege protected the prior suitor's statements and communications in the earlier judicial proceeding but did not protect her from a later action based on the allegation that the earlier suit was frivolous, vexatious or tortious.