In this guardianship action, defendant appeals from a January 7, 2022 judgment that terminated her parental rights to her two biological children, who have resided in a non-adoptive home since shortly after their removal in March 2019. At the time of trial, the Division's plan for the children was termination of parental rights followed by placement with their maternal relatives in Dubai. Concurrently, the Division was exploring select home adoption.
At trial, the Division elicited hearsay testimony and lay opinion from the adoption caseworker concerning the Division's conversations with the consulate and unspecified attorneys in Dubai. Referencing those conversations, the worker testified that placement with the maternal relatives was not a viable option for the children under Dubai law unless the court makes certain findings about defendant's inability to care for the children and defendant consented to the transfer. The trial judge relied on that hearsay testimony and lay opinion to find there were no alternatives to termination under the second part of prong three of the best interests of the child test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).
The court concludes the admission of the caseworker's testimony constituted harmful error. The feasibility of adoption or a Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG)-type arrangement under United Arab Emirates law is best elicited through expert testimony. Further, it appears the testimony elicited by the Division at trial may not have been accurate. Post-judgment, the Division has been exploring placement with the maternal relatives in Dubai – in the absence of defendant's consent. Because the Division's plan appears to be a form of KLG, the Division has not clearly and convincingly proven all alternatives to termination have been ruled out.
The court therefore remands the matter to the trial judge to reopen the guardianship proceedings. On remand, the judge should consider whether adoption or a KLG-type custodial arrangement with the maternal relatives in Dubai is feasible under Dubai law only after considering the testimony from a qualified expert; and whether, under the current circumstances, termination would not do more harm than good, under the fourth prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The court does not foreclose the judge from considering whether defendant has continued therapeutic services and whether she could safely parent the children in the foreseeable future under the second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2).