Opinion Summaries

The use of fair market value credit by this debtor to obtain a money judgment against a creditor -- in the absence of a deficiency claim threatened or pursued or any objection being raised at the time of the sheriff’s sales -- is inconsistent with sound foreclosure processes and, moreover, inequitable in the circumstances presented.

In these consolidated pretrial detention appeals, the court concludes that the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, does not authorize a court to detain arrestees who are undocumented immigrants in order to thwart their potential removal from the country by federal immigration officials. Construing the Act in light of its legislative history and persuasive federal authority, the court concludes the risk of a defendant's failure to appear justifying detention must arise from the defendant's own misconduct, not the independent acts of a separate arm of government that may prevent a defendant from appearing. Inasmuch as the trial court detained defendants in part out of concern that their possible removal from the country would prevent their appearance at trial, the detention orders are reversed and the matters remanded for reconsideration.

The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, strikes a balance: it authorizes the pretrial detention of persons charged with serious crimes who pose a risk of flight, danger, or obstruction that cannot be offset by conditions, but guarantees such detained persons the right to a speedy trial. A defendant cannot be detained for more than 180 days after indictment and the start of trial, unless the court finds (1) defendant's release would pose a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" to the safety of a person or the community;and (2) the failure to commence trial was not due to unreasonable delays by the prosecutor. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a).

In this appeal the court holds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in balancing the risk to the community and defendants' right to a speedy trial when it ordered the release of two defendants three years after they had been detained and found that the failure to commence the trial was due to unreasonable delays caused by the State.

Section 12 does not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Here, defendant was given ample notice that he was extended-term eligible and that the State was seeking the benefit of Section 12 for the negotiated plea agreement, and defendant did not object to the State’s proffer that he was extended-term eligible. The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding his sentence. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provides guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the CDRA’s mandatory sentencing requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.

Under the circumstances here, the jury should have had full access to the cooperating witness’s plea agreement history through the defense counsel’s unfettered examination of that history. The trial court’s limitations on defendant’s cross examination were in error. Defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. His conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary is vacated.

After the Salem County Hospital Corporation (SCHC) filed an application for a certificate of need (CN) to transfer ownership of the Memorial Hospital of Salem County, intervenors Carneys Point Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and Golden Rehabilitation and Nursing Center objected to SCHC's requests within that application to convert thirty existing medical/surgical beds to long-term care (LTC) beds and implement a previously approved CN for twenty-six psychiatric beds. Intervenors argued that with regard to the LTC beds: 1) SCHC's application was not filed in accordance with N.J.A.C. 8:33-4.1(a), which requires a finding by the Commissioner that a need exists for such beds in the area and the issuance of a call notice inviting competing applications from other providers in the area, and 2) the administrative record failed to establish a need for LTC beds. They also contended that with respect to the psychiatric beds, N.J.A.C. 8:33-3.3(j) prohibited the transfer of a previously unimplemented CN subject to exceptions which were inapplicable in this case.

The Commissioner granted SCHC's application for transfer of ownership as well as its requests for the LTC and psychiatric beds. It concluded that with regard to the LTC beds, "the addition of [thirty] LTC beds will have a minimal impact on the health care system as a whole and will contribute to the financial viability of Salem Hospital." With respect to the psychiatric beds, the Commissioner noted that the November 17, 2017 CN approval letter "addressed the requirements of N.J.S.A. 26:2H-8(a) [to] (f)" and incorporated that analysis by reference.

The court concludes that, despite the general deference owed to administrative agencies on appeal, the Commissioner failed to apply the relevant statutory factors to determine that there was a need for LTC beds in Salem County and he improperly awarded those beds without issuing a call notice in the New Jersey Register inviting competing applications for the provision of LTC beds. Further, even if the Commissioner's final decision can be interpreted as having determined a need for LTC beds in the area, the record contained insufficient support for such a finding. The court also concludes that the Commissioner was required to conduct an independent analysis of the actual need for a proposed service regardless of whether the transaction has an otherwise meritorious purpose, such as to support a hospital's financial viability. The court agrees, however, with the Commissioner's approval of the open adult acute care psychiatric beds to SCHC consistent with an unimplemented CN.

In this appeal, the court considered the trial judge's handling of a plaintiff's mid-trial request for a twenty-four-hour adjournment or a mistrial when plaintiff's medical witness unexpectedly failed to appear to testify. The judge denied plaintiff's request for any form of relief and granted defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b), resulting in the dismissal of plaintiff's personal injury complaint with prejudice

The court holds that the judge's denial of an adjournment or a mistrial under the circumstances constituted a mistaken exercise of discretion. Because plaintiff's claim was completely dependent upon the non-appearing witness's testimony and plaintiff's inability to produce the witness was not the result of inexcusable neglect or willful failure, the court determines that the judge should have afforded some measure of relief to prevent the irretrievable loss of the claim and infringement of plaintiff's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court reverses the dismissal order and remands for a new trial.

Relying on two statutes addressing assignments, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, as well as common-law assignment principles, the Court holds that Investors had the right as an assignee of the Mortgage and transferee of the Note to enforce the Note. The Court construes N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 to address the rights of CitiMortgage as the possessor of a note or other instrument at the time that the instrument is lost, but not to supplant New Jersey assignment statutes and common law in the setting of this appeal or to preclude an assignee in Investors’ position from asserting its rights according to the Note’s terms. Read together, those three statutes clearly authorized the assignment and entitled Investors to enforce its assigned Mortgage and transferred Note. The Court does not rely on the equitable principle of unjust enrichment invoked by the Appellate Division.

The arrangement by which Gourmet Dining operates Ursino is taxable as a lease or lease-like interest. The public-benefit-oriented exemption provisions in issue were not intended to exempt the for-profit operator of a high-end, regionally renowned restaurant situated on a college campus, when the overriding purpose of this commercial endeavor is focused on profitmaking. Gourmet Dining, as the exclusive operator and manager of this restaurant establishment, must bear its fair share of the local real property tax burden.

The Court answers the certified question in the negative. Under equitable principles of New Jersey law, the made-whole doctrine does not apply to first-dollar risk, such as a self-insured retention or deductible, that is allocated to an insured under an insurance policy.

Although aggregate proof of damages can be appropriate in some settings, the Court considers such proof improper as presented in this case. The trial court erred when it initially allowed plaintiff to prove class-members’ out-of-pocket costs for brake repairs based on an estimate untethered to the experience of plaintiff’s class. The trial court properly ordered individualized proof of damages on plaintiff’s brake-repair claim based on the actual costs incurred by the class members. Thus, the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motions for a new trial and for partial decertification of the class were a proper exercise of its discretion.

Lakeview Memorial Park Association v. Burlington County Construction Board of Appeals involves a novel question of whether the New Jersey Cemetery Act, N.J.S.A. 45:27-1 to -41, preempts local municipal regulation in accordance with the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -63. Specifically, this opinion examines the interplay between the two statutory schemes to determine whether the local municipality has the power to require zoning permits pursuant to local ordinances for mausoleum construction where the Department of Community Affairs has already approved the site plans for the construction in accordance with N.J.S.A. 45:27-27(b). The Supreme Court’s only decision related to this matter, Trinity Cemetery Association v. Township of Wall, only speaks to municipal regulation of cemeteries in the Court’s concurrences, authored separately by Justice Zazzali and Justice Verniero, and does not speak directly to whether the Cemetery Act preempts municipal regulation pursuant to the MLUL. See 170 N.J. 39 (2001).

In reviewing this question, this opinion finds that the Legislature empowered the local municipalities, pursuant to the MLUL, to enact ordinances to regulate the use and development of land. As part of the regulation of land use and development, a municipality may require site plan approval to oversee the effect of the development on the public health and safety. The municipality’s power to regulate as such is not preempted by the DCA’s power to approve site plans for construction pursuant to the Cemetery Act. Therefore, the plaintiff-cemetery in this matter was required to follow municipal regulations and obtain the requisite zoning permits and site plan approval before beginning its mausoleum expansion project.

The prosecutor’s detailed account of Greene’s incriminating statement to his grandmother was not likely forgotten by the jury, despite the trial court’s best efforts in providing a curative instruction. That the prosecutor acted in good faith, moreover, did not abate the damage done to Greene’s ability to receive a fair trial, particularly because the evidence against him was not overwhelming and the prosecutor’s opening had the capacity to tip the scales in favor of a conviction. The Court therefore affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division ordering a new trial for Greene

Defendant Steven R. Fortin, whom juries twice convicted of a brutal 1994 sexual assault and murder, appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered scientific evidence that casts doubt on the reliability and scientific validity of bitemark identification. After a review of the change in this forensic area since defendant's most recent murder conviction in 2007, and in light of defendant's conviction for a subsequent brutal sexual attack involving similar bitemarks and the 2007 trial testimony questioning expert bitemark testimony, the court affirms.

A resident of a rooming house was stabbed to death by another resident. The assailant had recently been released from prison for a violent crime, although the rooming house owner and operator were not aware of that criminal history.

The decedent's estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against the rooming house owner and operator, arguing they had a duty to conduct a criminal background check before allowing the assailant to reside on the premises. The Law Division judge rejected that argument, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.

The court affirms, agreeing with the motion judge that the owner and operator of a New Jersey rooming house have no statutory or common-law duty to conduct criminal background checks of prospective new residents.

No statute or regulation in the State or opinion from another state has recognized such a duty. The imposition of such a duty also could have significant pubic ramifications.

The UFL does not authorize an affirmative cause of action against a bank but rather provides a bank with a limited immunity from liability for failing to take notice of and action on the breach of a fiduciary’s obligation. The UFL does not displace, subsume, or supplement common law claims. When an action is brought against a bank, the UFL provides that a bank’s liability depends on whether the bank acted with actual knowledge or bad faith in the face of a fiduciary’s breach of his obligations. Whether a UFL claim was adequately pled in this case is therefore a moot issue. And, recognizing the predominant role the UCC plays in assigning liability for the handling of checks, the Court also finds that Lembo had no “special relationship” with the bank to sustain the common law causes of action

Defendant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to kidnap,and felony murder, and sentenced to a sixty-year prison term. In her appeal, defendant raised numerous issues regarding her convictions as well as the sentence imposed.

The court first agreed that the jury's verdict could only be understood as supporting a conviction of second-degree kidnapping, not first-degree kidnapping for which she was sentenced, because the jury was not asked to determine whether defendant "release[d] the victim unharmed and in a safe place prior to apprehension."N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(1). The court, however, rejected defendant's argument that a new trial was required, holding instead, in accord with State v. Casilla, 362 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 2003), that the verdict simply had to be molded to reflect a conviction of second-degree kidnapping.

Second, while the molding of the kidnapping conviction required resentencing, the court also mandated resentencing – and before a different judge – because the judge based the sentence on his declaration, based on his own understanding of the evidence, that defendant "ordered [the victim's] execution" even though the jury acquitted defendant of both first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The court held that, while federal constitutional principles may permit an enhancement of a sentence based on conduct for which the defendant was acquitted, see United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), New Jersey constitutional principles do not. Because an acquittal means the State failed to overcome the accused's presumption of innocence – leaving the accused's innocence "established," State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 559 (2009) – the sentencing judge here violated defendant's due process rights and her right to trial by jury by disregarding the jury's acquittal verdict and enhancing the sentence because of his personal own view of the evidence.

An intrusion on privacy occurs when someone uses a private space where a spying device has been concealed and “the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. To bring a claim, the victim does not have to present direct evidence that she was secretly recorded. She can instead establish a case of intrusion on seclusion based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Here, however, there was not enough evidence in the summary judgment record to demonstrate, either directly or inferentially, that the plaintiffs who were dismissed used bathrooms with cameras in them during the relevant time period.

This appeal requires the court to determine whether the assignment judge correctly granted defendant's motion to overrule the State's rejection of his petition for a Graves Act waiver pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2, "which embodies the so called 'escape valve' to the mandatory sentence requirements otherwise embodied in the Graves Act," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. 137, 139 (App. Div. 1991). In granting defendant's application, the assignment judge concluded that based on the disparity in the prosecutor's treatment of similarly situated defendants and the discrepancy in the State's assessment of defendant's criminal record, defendant demonstrated "'arbitrariness constituting an unconstitutional discrimination or denial of equal protection' in the prosecutor's decision," State v. Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358, 372 (2017) (quoting Alvarez, 246 N.J. Super. at 148), that fell within the Alvarez proscription. The judge explained that while Benjamin precluded defendants challenging the denial of a Graves Act waiver from obtaining discovery of prosecutorial decisions in cases other than their own, as the judge responsible for reviewing all waiver cases, he was in the best position to determine whether the Alvarez standard had been violated. The court affirms the judge's decision and rejects the State's challenge. The court is satisfied that the judge's robust review and analysis were sound, and fulfilled the role contemplated in Benjamin, to "ensure[] that prosecutorial discretion is not unchecked." 228 N.J. at 373.

Plaintiff commenced this collection action in July 2009, and in 2010 obtained a default judgment that defendant did not seek to vacate, under Rule 4:50, until 2018. The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and found plaintiff's claim accrued no later than March 2004 – more than four years before the complaint was filed – meaning the action was time-barred when filed, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725(1), and plaintiff's filing of the action violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 – 1692p. The judge, however, also determined that defendant's failure to respond to the complaint or plaintiff's post-judgment collection efforts was inexcusable. Balancing these circumstances, the trial judge concluded defendant was entitled to relief from the judgment and dismissal of the complaint.

In affirming, the court held that the judge's decision to vindicate the federal policy in favor of curbing "abusive debt collection practice" rather than the state interest in the finality of judgments was not an abuse of discretion.