Opinion Summaries

A defendant who violates a condition in a pretrial release order entered pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, may be charged with contempt of court under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). Moreover, double jeopardy principles do not preclude the State from charging the defendant with contempt based on his or her failure to comply with the "no-new offense" condition of the release order, and also charging the defendant with commission of that new offense.

Defendants failed to perfect a prior appeal, which the court dismissed on its own motion, leaving for disposition only issues raised by a non-party in a cross-appeal, to which only plaintiffs responded. The cross-appeal was decided on its merits, with the court remanding only for entry of an amended judgment in the cross-appellant's favor.

After entry of the amended judgment, defendants filed an appeal. The court dismissed the appeal because the arguments posed by defendants in the new appeal – arguments that challenged evidence rulings made during a trial that occurred more than two years earlier, as well as the trial judge's disposition of pretrial and post-trial motions – could have been pursued and decided in defendants' prior, abandoned appeal.

The Court reverses and remands for further proceedings to decide whether any Zoning Board member had a disqualifying conflict of interest in hearing the application for site plan approval and variances in this case. The trial court must assess two separate bases for a potential conflict of interest. First, did Dr. Kenneth -- as president or a member of the Board of Education -- have the authority to vote on significant matters relating to the employment of Zoning Board members or their immediate family members? Second, did any Zoning Board members or an immediate family member have a meaningful patient-physician relationship with any of the three Conte doctors? If the answer to either of those questions is yes, then a conflict of interest mandated disqualification and the decision of the Zoning Board must be vacated. The Court does not possess sufficient information to answer those questions.

The court consolidates these four appeals for the purpose of writing a single opinion because they all present the issue of whether State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 272 (2018), should be applied retroactively to reverse defendants' convictions of child sexual assault where an expert in "Child Sexual Assault Accommodation Syndrome" (CSAAS) was permitted to testify at trial. We accord J.L.G. pipeline retroactivity and reverse, because, given the State's reliance on the credibility of the victims and the paucity of other supporting evidence, the admission of CSAAS expert testimony in these four cases calls into question the validity of the guilty verdicts.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2, of his complaint, which alleged defendant terminated his employment as a funeral director because, as a cancer sufferer, he was prescribed and used medical marijuana in conformity with the Compassionate Use Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16. Plaintiff claimed his termination violated the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. The trial judge dismissed the action, concluding that the Compassionate Use Act does not require employers to accommodate an employee's use of medical marijuana. The court reversed because the Compassionate Use Act only declares that "nothing" in that Act "requires" such an accommodation, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14; while that language plainly expressed that the Compassionate Use Act had not created such an obligation, it also plainly did not foreclose the existence of such an obligation elsewhere, such as in the Law Against Discrimination, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of an employee's disability, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Moreover, the Compassionate Use Act expressly disavowed in that Act only an obligation to accommodate the use of medical marijuana "in any workplace," N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14, and plaintiff alleged he sought an accommodation for his use "off site" and after hours.

The Court cannot conclude that there is evidence of a clear intention on the part of the Legislature to deviate from the carefully constructed no-fault first-party PIP system of regulated coverage of contained medical expenses and return to fault-based suits consisting solely of economic damages claims for medical expenses in excess of an elected lesser amount of available PIP coverage. Unless the Legislature makes such an intent clearly known, the Court will not assume that such a change was intended by the Legislature through its amendments to the no-fault system in the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act.

Caraballo’s failure to utilize the Act’s administrative remedies to obtain knee replacement surgery precludes his failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD. In addition, Caraballo’s total knee replacement surgery cannot qualify as a reasonable accommodation under the LAD.

Defendant was convicted of third-degree stalking and he appealed. The court affirms the constitutionality of the anti-stalking statute as it was amended in 2009, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, holding that it is not facially overbroad nor unconstitutionally broad or vague as applied to defendant. The court rejects defendant's other claims that he was deprived of a fair trial.

The court held this indigent defendant should not have been required to proceed unrepresented in his appeal of a municipal court conviction. It resulted in a consequence of magnitude. Defendant did not waive his right to counsel, assumed he would be assigned a third attorney after two were relieved, and did not engage in such egregious conduct as to constitute a forfeiture of his right to representation. The conviction was thus reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial de novo in the Law Division.

During defendant's robbery trial, in his case-in-chief, he moved into evidence a 9-1-1 tape of his call to police. The trial judge admitted the evidence under two exceptions to the hearsay rule: present sense impression, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(1), and excited utterance, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). The judge allowed the State, in rebuttal, to introduce defendant's sanitized criminal history for impeachment purposes pursuant to N.J.R.E. 806 and gave the Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Credibility - Prior Conviction of a Defendant," (rev. Feb. 24, 2003). The court concluded that the admission of the prior criminal history was proper, accompanied by the limiting instruction. Although defendant did not testify, the rule allows the use of impeaching material when hearsay is introduced.

Because Rule 3:11 was not fully followed, and because the record does not reveal whether the shortcomings were technical or substantive, the Court remands for a full hearing consistent with Wade and Henderson. Based on the evidence developed at the hearing, the trial court will be in the best position to determine whether a new trial is warranted.

The Court stresses that the police officers had the right to enter defendant’s home under the emergency-aid doctrine, which permits warrantless entry under circumstances like those presented in this case. Because defendant’s refusal to remove the door chain did not constitute an affirmative interference for purposes of obstructing justice within the meaning of the obstruction statute, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s conviction.

In defendant's original appeal, the court reversed three convictions of theft of immovable property and remanded for a new trial, leaving the other six convictions intact. State v. Kosch, 444 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 369 (2016). The trial judge then resentenced defendant on the other six convictions – to the same aggregate sentence – without disposing of the three remanded charges; the court reversed because, among other things, the trial judge failed to comply with the prior mandate. State v. Kosch, 454 N.J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 2018). The State then voluntarily dismissed the three remanded charges, and the judge resentenced defendant; to reach an aggregate sentence the equivalent of the original sentence, the judge imposed for the first time a fifteen-year extended term on one of the remaining convictions – to which defendant had originally been sentenced to a non-extended seven-year term.

In this third appeal, the court followed State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984), and adhered to State v. Young, 379 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. 2005), in finding no double jeopardy or due process violations because the new sentence did not exceed in the aggregate that which was originally imposed and which defendant had begun serving. But the court also held that just because the sentencing judge possessed the constitutional authority to impose the same aggregate sentence didn't mean he should have. The court remanded for resentencing because, by imposing the same sentence, the judge failed to adequately appreciate the impact caused by the absence of three convictions on which the original sentence was imposed.

The record reveals that the detectives failed to inform Vincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. That failure deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted.

The question presented is whether or not defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges. Defendant was arrested and detained in New Jersey on New Jersey charges. He was thereafter transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center to answer federal charges which were lodged subsequent to his New Jersey charges. Because defendant’s transfer was performed pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, defendant was always in New Jersey custody and is entitled to jail credit for time spent detained outside of New Jersey to answer foreign charges.

The Court reiterates its holding in Olds that the entire controversy doctrine does not compel a client to assert a legal malpractice claim against an attorney in the underlying litigation in which the attorney represents the client. 150 N.J. at 443. However, the collection action at issue in this matter was not an “underlying action” as that term is used in Olds, and the entire controversy doctrine may bar the claim. The record of this appeal, however, is inadequate for an application of the equitable rules that govern here.

In this case, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that respondent orchestrated the alleged misconduct, the OAE’s complaint must be dismissed. That said, the record highlights a series of troublesome practices and leaves a number of questions unanswered. The Court briefly addresses some of those areas to offer guidance to private practitioners and prosecutors.

In the aftermath of Super Storm Sandy and the ensuing statewide gasoline shortage, appellant, the executive director of a regional sewerage authority, permitted some essential employees to fuel their private vehicles from the Authority's gasoline pump. She also permitted a member of the Authority's board of commissioners, who was an employee and authorized to sign authority checks, to gas up his private vehicle after asking him to find food for the Authority's employees at nearby restaurants and to "commandeer" a local gas station to meet the needs of the essential employees.

By permitting the board member to use Authority gas, the Local Finance Board (LFB) concluded appellant violated N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5(c), a provision of the Local Government Ethics Law (LGEL), N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25, which provides: "No local government officer or employee shall use or attempt to use his official position to secure unwarranted privileges or advantages for himself or others."

The court reversed, concluding that this provision of the LGEL, unlike others, requires proof of a specific intent on the part of the local officer to secure the unwarranted privilege or advantage. In addition, the court concludes the gasoline appellant secured for the board member and employee was not an "unwarranted privilege or advantage" under the statute.

The admissibility of medical expert testimony utilizing terms such as “somatization” and “symptom magnification” must be determined by trial courts on a case-by-case basis, consistent with N.J.R.E. 403, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s allowing use of those terms under the circumstances of this case. The Court disagrees with the Appellate Division’s equation of the terms used by the experts with the term “malingering.” The Court also disagrees with the panel’s determination that one of defendant’s experts, who is a neurologist rather than a mental-health specialist, was not qualified to testify about somatization or symptom magnification. The Court concurs, however, with the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence at trial plaintiff’s past medical history.

Tax Court: Mitchell Medoff v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n;. Docket No. 009867-2018, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided March 1, 2019. For plaintiff - David S. Neufel and Jeremy S. Cole (Flaster Greenberg, attorneys); for defendant – Ramanjit K. Chawla (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

In 2009, the Legislature amended the law to tax lottery winnings. Previously, such winnings were free from income tax. Plaintiff paid taxes from 2009 through 2012 on installments from a 1993 prize. After the Tax Court’s decisions in 2016 holding the 2009 law invalid as it applied to prizes won prior to its enactment, plaintiff sought a refund. The refund was sought outside the three year statute of limitations imposed on Gross Income Tax refunds.

Even if a tax provision is found to be invalid, a refund can only be allowed in accordance with statute. Plaintiff could have filed a timely request for refund as did the lottery winners in the 2016 decisions invalidating the retroactive application of the 2009 law. There is not any equitable basis such as square corners or manifest injustice to override the statute of limitations in this case.