Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff has served as the Tax Assessor for defendant Township of Tewksbury for many years.  After a series of disagreements among the parties regarding plaintiff's assessments and her other work duties, Tewksbury attempted to remove plaintiff from her position.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that defendants retaliated against her in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, from 2008 to 2019 for objecting to their attempts to unlawfully influence her assessment determinations and operate a "tax scheme." 

Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiff could not establish a CEPA cause of action because she was not an "employee" under the statute entitled to CEPA protection.  The trial court granted the motion, relying on Casamasino v. Jersey City, 304 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 158 N.J. 333 (1999), and found that, as a tenured and statutorily protected tax assessor, plaintiff is not an "employee" under CEPA. 

After a careful review, we conclude that Casamasino does not establish a bright line rule that all tax assessors are exempt from CEPA protection.  Despite the unique position a tax assessor holds because of the statutory protection from removal from employment, a court determining the applicability of CEPA should still assess the employment relationship under the framework established in Feldman v. Hunterdon Radiological Assocs., 187 N.J. 228 (2006), and D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110 (2007). See also Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362 (2015).  The court vacated the order granting summary judgment and remanded for the consideration of the factors articulated in Feldman and D'Annunzio and a determination whether plaintiff is an employee entitled to CEPA protection.

This court was asked to decide whether the State of New Jersey, Office of the Attorney General (OAG) was required to defend the Monmouth County Prosecutors Office (MCPO) in an action in lieu of prerogative writs filed against it by the former Township of Marlboro Deputy Police Chief.  The MCPO conducted an internal affairs investigation into allegations against the Deputy Chief pursuant to Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2022-14 (Directive 2022-14) and the OAG's Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures, November 2022 Version (IAPP).  After the MCPO issued a report of its findings, the Deputy Chief entered into an agreement with the Township and resigned, reserving his rights to challenge the MCPO's determinations.

The former Deputy Police Chief's prerogative writs action sought only injunctive relief against the MCPO, including an order prohibiting the MCPO from following the IAPP and Directive.  The OAG denied the MCPO's request for representation and the MCPO appealed.

The issue before the court was whether the OAG's duty to defend pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3, arises when the underlying action demands no monetary damages and seeks only injunctive or equitable relief through an action in lieu of prerogative writs. 

In this case, the State's obligation to defend, if any, would stem solely from sections 10A-1 to -3 of the TCA.  Under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1, the duty to defend state employees is mandatory only for tort actions demanding monetary damages.  The defense of all other actions is discretionary under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-3, as interpreted by the Court in Wright v. State, 169 N.J. Super. 422 (2001), and its progeny.

Since the action in lieu of prerogative writs at issue here sought no monetary damages, the court affirmed the OAG's discretionary decision denying representation to the MCPO. 

At issue is whether the holding in State v. Jackson, 243 N.J. 52 (2020), that the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant be permitted to cross-examine a cooperating codefendant with respect to their maximum sentencing exposure prior to their entry into a plea agreement, should be given full retroactive application.  The court concludes that Jackson does not apply to convictions for which direct appellate review was complete when the opinion in Jackson was issued. As a result, the court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief to defendant, whose direct appeal of her convictions for three offenses arising out of a mortgage fraud scheme was completed approximately a month before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jackson.

The court was asked to consider whether a defendant, serving sequentially several consecutive periods of driver's license suspensions imposed for various convictions including driving while under the influence (DWI) offenses, can be charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) for driving during the suspension period for a non-DWI-related offense while awaiting commencement of a court-imposed DWI license suspension.  The court determined because the effective date of defendant's most recent DWI-related conviction was delayed only due to other consecutively imposed accumulated sentences, defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) when he operated his vehicle prior to the conclusion of the suspension for his DWI offense.

The court distinguished State v. Perry, 439 N.J. Super. 514 (App. Div. 2015).  It noted the Perry court determined N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) "punishes those who drive while suspended for violations of the DWI . . . law . . . when they drive during the court-imposed period of suspension," and it was not intended to criminalize "driving during a period of administrative suspension" when driving privileges could have been restored but for the defendant's failure to complete the process for administrative restoration.  Id. at 531-32.  

The court observed defendant was not driving during a period of administrative suspension after having completed his court-ordered suspension.  Rather, he had not yet completed his suspension term for the most recent of his four DWIs.  The court concluded it would be illogical for defendant to avoid a conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), in light of defendant's four prior DWIs, merely because the suspension for his latest DWI had not yet commenced because he incurred multiple other intervening license suspensions.

         The court adopted the rationale of State v. Cuccurullo, 228 N.J. Super. 517, 520 (App. Div. 1998), holding in the context of applying the enhanced penalties under N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 for driving while suspended for DWI, that "[a] person is 'under suspension' from the time that the suspension is imposed even though the period of suspension may not begin until later."  Ibid.

In these back-to-back appeals consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, the court addressed the statutory receiver requirements for discharge under the New Jersey Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:14-1 to -27, and New Jersey Court Rules 4:53-1 to -9.  Appellants Mori Restaurant, LLC (Mori), and Lucille Lopez and Robert P. Lopez, Jr. (the Lopezes), appealed from a November 17, 2023 Law Division order denying reconsideration of an October 6, 2023 order, which discharged Alan I. Gould, Esq. as the court-appointed statutory receiver. 

Following the court's review of the record and applicable law, it concluded the Law Division improvidently granted Gould's discharge as the statutory receiver because he failed to comply with mandatory provisions of the BCA, including written notice to creditors within thirty days of appointment, and court rules, requiring an accounting and inventory.  The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.  In the unpublished section of this opinion, the court addressed other discrete matters. 

Plaintiffs in the underlying out-of-state litigation served a subpoena on a non-party, New Jersey resident, seeking his deposition pursuant to Rule 4:11-4(b).  The trial court denied the witness's motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order.  On appeal, the witness argued the trial court had misapplied the law regarding discovery of non-party witnesses and had failed to recognize that the subpoena was harassing and sought duplicative, irrelevant, and confidential information. 

The court affirmed the order. Acknowledging a court must consider certain factors when addressing a discovery dispute involving a non-party witness, the court held the trial court had not abused its discretion or misapplied the law when it concluded the non-party witness could not avoid being deposed by claiming a lack of relevancy or relying on unsupported, blanket assertions of harassment and confidentiality.   

In this matter, the court considered whether an employee in the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) who submits an application for retirement benefits and thereafter, prior to the effective retirement date, begins the process to attain a nomination for a Superior Court judgeship, has violated N.J.A.C. 17:1-17.14(a)(2), which requires a person collecting PERS retirement benefits to complete 180 days severance from their employment prior to any further public employment in New Jersey. Specifically, under the regulation, if the retiree has a "pre-arranged agreement for reemployment" prior to their effective retirement date, the retiree has not satisfied the severance of employment requirement.  N.J.A.C. 17:1-17.14(a)(2)(v).

Appellant was nominated by the governor for a Superior Court judgeship and confirmed by the Senate in the weeks after her retirement date. Prior to taking the judicial oath, the Division of Pensions and Benefits (Division) advised appellant there was no complete termination of the employment relationship because of the "pre-planning that occurred prior to [her] December 1, 2021 retirement and during the 180 days after [her] retirement."  The PERS Board (Board) affirmed the decision.

After a careful review, the court determined that the Board mistakenly applied the regulation to these specific circumstances.  The regulation prohibits a "pre-arranged agreement," not "pre-planning" that may occur prior to a retirement date.  The nature of the judicial selection process precludes any ability to make an "arrangement" for the position as an individual seeking a judgeship has no control over the process.  There also was no "agreement" that appellant would be offered the judgeship until, at the earliest, the date the Senate confirmed the nomination, which did not occur until after her retirement date. 

To date, appellant has not taken the judicial oath, and considerably more than 180 days have passed since she terminated her prior employment.  Therefore, the court found appellant did not violate N.J.A.C. 17:1-17.14(a)(2). Appellant is entitled to accept the judgeship by taking the judicial oath of office without foregoing her PERS pension and benefits.  The court reverses the Board's final administrative decision. 

         Following the demise of the Council On Affordable Housing (“COAH”), and at the direction of the Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel IV, 221 N.J. 1 (2015), New Jersey trial courts assumed responsibility for evaluating municipal compliance with the State’s constitutionally mandated affordable housing obligations.  Although most municipalities obtained certification of their municipal plans through settlements of declaratory judgment actions, Princeton and West Windsor in Mercer County sought certification from the court, requiring it to determine each town’s fair share of low and moderate housing units for 1999 to 2015 (Gap Present Need) and from 2015 through 2025 (Prospective Need). Their applications for certification were opposed by the Fair Share Housing Center, an affordable housing advocacy group.  The parties presented to the trial court competing and very divergent methodologies in support of the number of units each claimed satisfied constitutional requirements.

         After a lengthy trial, the Mercer County Superior Court issued a decision reviewing the methodologies proposed by both sides and adopting a formula that the court then applied to each town to establish its fair share of low and moderate income housing units for the period 1999 through 2025.  In 2024, the New Jersey Legislature subsequently incorporated the court’s formula into the amended Fair Housing Act at N.J.S.A. 52:27D-304.3. 

On leave granted, the court reviewed a Law Division order denying defendant's motion to permit his expert to testify remotely at an evidentiary hearing in this criminal matter without the State's consent and at his jury trial.  The motion was based on the expert's medical condition and desire to remain at home to care for his ill spouse.

At issue were the seemingly conflicting provisions of: (1) Rule 1:2-1(b), which authorizes the trial court to allow testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location upon a showing of good cause and with appropriate safeguards; and (2) the October 27, 2022 Order of the Supreme Court which provides that evidentiary hearings in criminal matters shall procced in person, unless all parties consent to proceed virtually, and that criminal jury trials shall proceed in person.

The court held that Rule 1:2-1(b) and the October 27, 2022 Order can be read harmoniously.  While the October 27, 2022 Order establishes a general framework for how the many categories of proceedings heard in our courts will take place in light of the lessening need for the restrictions imposed in response to the COVID-19 emergency, the Order does not limit the authority granted to the trial courts in Rule 1:2-1(b) to permit the remote testimony of individual witnesses at proceedings that will otherwise take place in person.

The trial court, therefore, had the authority to hear motion by defendant to permit his expert to testify remotely in this criminal matter at an evidentiary hearing without the State's consent and at his jury trial.  The factors established in Pathri v. Kakarlamath, 462 N.J. Super. 208, 216 (App. Div. 2020), issued prior to both the adoption of Rule 1:2-1(b) and the issuance of the October 27, 2022 Order, are useful guidelines for deciding "good cause" and "appropriate safeguards" under the Rule.

The court also held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendant's motion, in light of the technical and complicated nature of the expert's expected testimony, the prevalent role video evidence will play at the hearing and trial, the difficulty the State would have in cross-examining defendant's expert during remote testimony, the physical proximity of defendant's expert to the courthouse and his ability to travel, defendant's knowledge of the expert's desire to testify remotely when he retained the expert, and the absence of medical evidence establishing that appropriate safeguards would be insufficient to protect the expert were he to testify in person.

STATE AND LOCAL TAXES – SALES TAX, IMPOSITION OF TAX – ADMINISTRATION & PROCEDURE, ASSESSMENTS – PRESUMPTIONS, REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTIONS – EVIDENCE – LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY - HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS – BUSINESS RECORDS – PUBLIC RECORDS 

Tax Court:  La Troncal Food Corp. and Vincente Intriago v. Dir., Div. of Taxation; Docket No. 013472-2017, opinion by Nugent, J.T.C., decided October 2, 2024.  For plaintiff – Chinemerem Njoku (C.N. Njoku, LLC, attorney); for defendant – Heather Lynn Anderson, Deputy Attorney General (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). 

Held:  Where defendant’s auditor did not testify at trial, the court rejected defendant’s proffered lay opinion testimony from the auditor’s supervisor regarding the reasonableness of the auditor’s actions in setting the estimated tax assessment. The court found the witness’s testimony was inadmissible under Evid. R. 701 due to the supervisor’s lack of personal knowledge of the auditor’s examination. The court also rejected defendant’s proffer of the non-testifying auditor’s report and work papers as an exception to hearsay under Evid. R. 803(c)(6) and Evid. R. 803(c)(8) since the data underlying the estimated assessment included information obtained from the wrong business and the auditor’s methodology was unexplained.  The court found the documents untrustworthy and thus, could not conclude that the auditor performed his duty in a “proper, careful and prudent manner” for purposes of Evid. R. 803(c)(8).

 
The court found plaintiff overcame the presumption of correctness that attaches to the tax assessment by production of credible evidence attacking the reasonableness of the methodology and data the auditor utilized.  The court further found the methodology was aberrant given the auditor’s collection and use of unreliable data wholly irrelevant to Taxpayer’s business and unexplained methodology.  Accordingly, the court set the assessment aside. The court determined plaintiff’s expert’s reconciliation of plaintiff’s sales records to be credible, thus, plaintiff met its burden of persuasion that the sales tax and corporate business tax owed should be less than that owed under defendant’s estimated assessment. 

(38 pages)

Defendant, who was convicted of murder and other offenses at his 2017 jury trial, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing.  He alleges his trial counsel's representation was compromised because his co-parent and girlfriend, who was called at trial as a fact witness for the State, paid for the legal fees of his private criminal defense attorney.  Defendant contends the fee arrangement created an untenable conflict of interest.

The court affirms the PCR judge's determination that defendant was not deprived of effective representation of his counsel, who represented him zealously at trial.  In particular, defense counsel vigorously cross examined the witness who had paid his fees about certain incriminating statements she made about defendant to police detectives.

The fee arrangement, of which defendant was surely aware, did not create a per se conflict of interest that disqualified his counsel in the circumstances presented.  Nor has defendant shown he was actually prejudiced or subject to a great likelihood of such prejudice.

Going forward, the court recommends that private criminal defense counsel document the client's informed consent with a written acknowledgment or some other recorded means at the time the third-party payer's fee arrangement is made. 

There may be instances in which the payer's testimony for the State is anticipated to be so hostile to a defendant's interests that the lawyer is, in fact, materially limited, but this is not one of them.

Following a joint trial, the family court found that defendants R.G. and C.R.A.G., husband and wife, abused or neglected two-year-old M.R., who was unrelated to them but under their care, causing him actual harm.  The family court in turn determined defendants' actions or inactions against M.R. resulted in the abuse or neglect of their children by "creating [im]minent danger or a substantial risk of being impaired due to their failure to exercise a minimum degree of care." 

Defendants' back-to-back appeals raising several issues are consolidated in this one opinion.  They contend the family court lacked jurisdiction over them because they were not M.R.'s legal caretakers under N.J.S.A. 9:6-2 and N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, and M.R. was not named as a subject child in the complaint.  Assuming the family court had jurisdiction, they contend there was insufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of abuse or neglect of M.R.  Moreover, despite that finding, they contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court's determination that their conduct towards M.R. placed their children at risk of imminent harm. 

C.R.A.G. separately argues the record demonstrates she appropriately cared for M.R.  She also contends the Division of Child Protection & Permanency (DCPP) failed to present a sufficient cause of action for abuse and neglect of her children.  Relatedly, she contends that the family court improperly relied on her treatment of M.R. to support its findings on behalf of her biological children, as it constituted inadmissible other crimes evidence.

The Law Guardian cross-appeals, joining R.G.'s contention that he was not M.R.'s guardian under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(a).  The Law Guardian argues the family court engaged in impermissible burden shifting by concluding defendants actually harmed M.R.  The Law Guardian also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that R.G. abused or neglected his children. 

After reviewing the record and applicable law, the court reverses and remands.  As to R.G., the court concludes the family court did not have jurisdiction over him because there was insufficient evidence that he was M.R.'s guardian under Title 9.  As to C.R.A.G., the court concludes the family court had jurisdiction over her because there was sufficient evidence that she was M.R.'s guardian under Title 9, but there was insufficient evidence that she caused M.R. actual harm and/or placed her children at risk of imminent harm.  The court therefore remands to the family court to remove defendants' names from DCPP's child abuse registry maintained under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11.

In this appeal, the court is asked to reconsider our decision in State in the Interest of K.B., 304 N.J. Super. 628 (App. Div. 1997), where the court held that juveniles adjudicated delinquent who seek nondisclosure of their name must demonstrate harm specific to their individual circumstances.  Juvenile M.P. contends due to the public disclosure of his juvenile delinquency adjudication and name over the Internet, he suffers far greater harm than the juvenile in K.B. faced some twenty-seven years ago, when online news reporting was nascent.  He contends he "demonstrate[d] a substantial likelihood that specific and extraordinary harm would result from such disclosure," the standard under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60(f) to bar disclosure.  Given that K.B. was based upon our interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60(f), a statute which still governs the disclosure of a juvenile delinquency adjudication and has not been amended to reflect the Internet's impact, the court affirms the trial court's order because M.P. failed to show how disclosure of his name would violate the statute.

In these consolidated appeals, the court addressed former foster caregivers' administrative and Family Part appeals involving the Kinship Legal Guardianship placement of a minor child.  Appellants claim the final agency decision affirming the removal of the minor child from their home was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and also argue they should have been granted intervention within the Family Part action.

The court concluded that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency's removal of the minor child was supported by the regulatory officer's consideration of the experts' bonding evaluations which properly interpreted the law, court orders, and Division records.  In addition, the court concluded that appellants, as foster caregivers, have no right to intervene under Rule 4:33-1, without other statutory support.  The placement of the minor child was supported by the 2021 statutory amendments to both the Termination of Parental Rights Statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1, and the Kinship Legal Guardianship statute, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7.  The trial court did not misapply the updated law.  Regarding permissive intervention under Rule 4:33-2, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding when the State may be compelled to provide field and health reports of narcotics detection canines in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013).  Defendant was indicted with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, fourth-degree possession of hollow nose bullets, third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and second-degree certain persons not to have a weapon.  The Law Division denied defendant's motion to compel the State to provide discovery of records related to a narcotics detection canine used to conduct a sniff of the vehicle and whose positive alert gave the basis for probable cause to conduct a full search.

Upon granting leave to appeal, the court concludes that under Harris, the canine's field and health records are not per se irrelevant to reliability and probable cause determinations and, therefore, the trial court should have first heard the State's motion challenging the expert before denying the defendant's motion for discovery. 

The court reverses and remands for consideration of the State's motion to bar defendant's expert.

     This appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) presents a novel statutory construction question under the current version of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (Wiretap Act).  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c), law enforcement officers may intercept and record a telephonic communication when a party to the conversation allows them to listen in on the phone call.  Recordings made under this provision are known as "consensual interceptions."  While a consensual interception does not require prior judicial approval in the form of a wiretap order, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c) requires police to obtain the prior approval of the Attorney General or designee, or a county prosecutor or designee.  In this appeal, the court addresses whether prior prosecutorial approval must be in writing.

     The court concludes that nothing in the plain text, legislative history, or case law interpretation of the Wiretap Act requires prior approval of consensual interceptions be made in writing.  The court deems it especially noteworthy that the plain text of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4(c) stands in stark contrast to the plain text of the Wiretap Act section governing the internal law enforcement procedure for getting approval to apply to a wiretap judge for an interception order.  N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-8 explicitly provides that the Attorney General, county prosecutor, or a person designated to act for such an official . . . may authorize, in writing, an ex parte application to a judge." (Emphasis added).  The court reasons that provision confirms the Legislature knows how to specify when Attorney General/county prosecutor/designee prior approval must be in writing but chose not to include that requirement with respect to approving a request to conduct a consensual interception.

     The court concludes the Legislature did not intend to impose procedural requirements regarding prosecutorial approval of consensual interceptions other than the two conditions expressly articulated in the statutory text: (1) the approval be made by a person designated by the Attorney General or county prosecutor, and (2) such approval be given prior to initiating the consensually-intercepted telephonic communication.  Because the record shows the prosecutor complied with both requirements, the court affirms the denial of defendant's PCR petition.

The court in this post-conviction relief (PCR) appeal addresses a question of first impression under the Jessica Lunsford Act (JLA), which prescribes a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen.  The mandatory minimum sentence can be reduced by up to ten years, but only by the prosecutor through a plea agreement.  A judge, moreover, may not impose a prison term less than the one agreed to by the prosecutor. 

To ensure statewide uniformity, the JLA required the Attorney General to issue guidelines channeling the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in making plea offers.  Under the Attorney General Guidelines, prosecutors are expressly prohibited from tendering the most lenient plea offer allowed under the JLA once a defendant is indicted.  In this case, the prosecutor's initial plea offer was tendered after indictment.  Defendant contends the Guidelines' graduated plea provision imposes an impermissible "indictment penalty," violating due process, the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the right under the doctrine of fundamental fairness to a plea offer that is not arbitrary or capricious. 

In State v. A.T.C., the Supreme Court upheld the JLA and Attorney General Guidelines against a facial constitutional challenge, subject to an important condition.  239 N.J. 450, 475 (2019).  The Court held prosecutors must provide a statement of reasons explaining their decision to offer a defendant a reduced term of imprisonment.   That requirement is designed to ensure statewide uniformity and facilitate judicial review to guard against the arbitrary or capricious exercise of prosecutorial discretion.   

The A.T.C. Court had no occasion, however, to address the constitutionality of the Guidelines' graduated plea provision at issue in this appeal since the defendant in A.T.C. waived his right to indictment.  Following the analytical template and remedy devised in A.T.C., the court upholds the constitutionality of the challenged Guidelines' graduated plea feature subject to a condition:  when a prosecutor elects to tender the initial plea offer after indictment, the statement of reasons required by A.T.C. should include an explanation for the timing of the plea offer or else an explanation that the graduated plea provision had no impact on the plea offer.  Applying that rule, the court remands the case for the prosecutor to explain the reason for not tendering a pre-indictment plea offer, and for the PCR judge to review that explanation to determine if the prosecutor's decision constitutes an arbitrary or capricious exercise of prosecutorial discretion resulting in prejudice to defendant.  In all other respects, the court rejects defendant's constitutional arguments.  

In this appeal, as a matter of first impression, the court considered whether the State may move to expand the scope of notification under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, based on an increased risk of harm to the community not otherwise accounted for in the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (Scale).

Having reviewed precedent concerning heartland applications, the court was satisfied the State may, in limited circumstances, request notification more expansive than indicated by a registrant's confirmed Scale score.  As with a registrant's heartland application, the State may only request an expansion of notification in the "unusual case where relevant, material, and reliable facts exist for which the Scale does not account, or does not adequately account . . . .  Those facts must be sufficiently unusual to establish that a particular registrant's case falls outside the 'heartland' of cases."  In re Registrant G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 82 (1996).

The court agreed that this case, which resulted in the "ultimate harm" of death to the victim, presented facts not taken into account by the Scale, and that the judge's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

In 2022, the Government Records Council (GRC) adopted N.J.A.C. 5:105-1.6(a)(1).  The regulation provides that all submissions made to the GRC during its adjudication of a denial-of-access complaint under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, "shall not be considered government records subject to public access pursuant to" OPRA "during the pendency of [the] adjudication."  This direct appeal challenges the regulation's validity.

The court holds the regulation is invalid because it violates OPRA's plainly stated requirements, finds no support in OPRA, and is inconsistent with the legislative mandate embodied in OPRA that the citizens of this state are entitled to prompt and full public access to government records.  The court further finds that in its adoption of the regulation, the GRC, which is charged with enforcing OPRA's broad policy of construing its terms "in favor of the public's right of access," N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, invalidly shields itself from public scrutiny during its performance of one of its core responsibilities—the adjudication of denial-of-access complaints.    

The issue presented, one of first impression, is whether a court-appointed Special Adjudicator's fees to resolve discovery disputes can be charged to an individual or entity who were not parties to the underlying litigation but petitioned the court to quash a subpoena.  Because we conclude Rule 4:41-2 limits the imposition of the Special Adjudicator's fees to the parties in the underlying litigation, we reverse the trial court's order imposing fees on the nonparty appellants, who moved to quash the subpoena, as they are nonparties to the underlying litigation.