Supreme Court Opinions

There is no support in the governing statutes, the court rules, or New Jersey case law for the fee awards sought in this appeal. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the fee applications, and the Appellate Division ruled correctly when it affirmed the trial court’s determination.

The Court now resolves those limited areas in which the parties could not agree regarding the implementation of the Special Adjudicator’s findings and legal conclusions: (1) the proper procedure for challenging a prior Dennis-affected DWI conviction when facing enhanced sentencing on a subsequent DWI; and (2) the appropriate availability of Exhibit S-152.

A New Jersey State-issued diploma awarded based on passing the GED is not a “regular high school diploma” under 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(iv). Therefore, a student who receives such a State-issued diploma remains entitled to receive a free appropriate public education under the IDEA.

Based on the plain language deliberately crafted by the Legislature, read in context with the law as a whole, “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the remaining activities.

The only precondition to applying “the PSA’s privilege is whether the hospital performed its self-critical analysis in procedural compliance with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) and its implementing regulations.” Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 247 (2018). One of those regulations requires that a facility’s patient safety committee operate independently from any other committee within the facility. See N.J.A.C. 8:43E-10.4(c)(4). The facilities in these consolidated appeals did not comply with that procedural requirement, and the disputed documents are therefore not privileged.

The plain language of the Compact authorizes the Commission to require the use of a PLA in a publicly bid construction project. The Commission’s ability to do so is not constrained by Ballinger.

The Court concurs with the trial court and Appellate Division that the Division met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19 in this matter. The Division established good cause and compelling need based on specific facts for an order authorizing it to use Arlo’s expunged records at the Title 9 abuse and neglect factfinding trial. It demonstrated that the subject matter of the criminal proceeding will also be the subject matter of the Title 9 trial. The trial court properly granted the Division’s application, and the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Accurso’s opinion. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division “that ‘local telephone exchange’ as used in N.J.S.A. 54:4-1 means a local telephone network within a defined geographical area as depicted on Verizon’s tariff exchange maps.”
___ N.J. Super. at ___ (slip op. at 52).

The six members of the Court who participated in this appeal unanimously agree that the standard set forth in in McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 51, applies in this case. The Court thus readopts that standard, with two refinements to accord with recent United States Supreme Court precedent, as set forth in Section III.C. of Justice Patterson’s concurring opinion. See infra. at ___ (slip op. at 26-32). The members of the Court are equally divided as to whether discovery is required in this case. As a result, the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on summary judgment without discovery, is affirmed

The Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably for failing to credit the Department of Corrections’ view that the sustained charges against the officer undermined prison security and touched directly at the heart of his ability to obey the protocols pertaining to his employment at a correctional facility. The Commission’s decision to impose a six-month sanction is disproportionate to the serious and highly concerning offenses found in this record.

The AOM plaintiff submitted complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. First, an AOM does not need to specify that the affiant reviewed medical records. Second, a doctor to whom the affidavit attributed negligence is the agent of a named defendant and is identified in the AOM as one of the John or Jane Doe defendants included in the complaint. The Court stresses the importance of the Ferreira conference in professional negligence actions.

Class action waivers in consumer contracts are not per se contrary to public policy, but they may be unenforceable if found to be unconscionable or to violate other tenets of state contract law. In this case, because plaintiffs clearly and unambiguously waived their right to maintain a class action and the lease contract is not unconscionable as a matter of law, it is enforceable.

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b)(2), a Megan’s Law registrant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the registrant demonstrates that there exists a 
genuine issue of material fact about whether the registrant’s conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior. The 
State may rely on an earlier psychological report that had been prepared pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3, but the independent findings by a  Megan’s Law judge as to compulsivity and repetitiveness must be based on clear and convincing evidence.

Because J.A. was adjudicated delinquent and not convicted of a sex offense, he is required to satisfy the public safety prong of subsection (f), not the offense-free prong. See In re Registrant R.H., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2024) (slip op. at 3). Based on the reasoning of R.H. and the trial court’s finding that J.A. does not pose a safety threat, he is eligible for termination of his Megan’s Law obligations under subsection (f). The Court does not reach arguments about the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.2C:7-2(f) as applied to juveniles.

Based on the plain language the Legislature used in crafting N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), the requirement to remain offense-free for fifteen years 
applies to juveniles who are prosecuted as adults and convicted of a listed sex offense, or released from a correctional facility, but not to those who are adjudicated delinquent in the family court. Consistent with the law’s text, however, all registrants including juveniles must satisfy the second requirement -- the public safety requirement -- to be eligible to terminate their obligations under Megan’s Law. Here, the offense-free prong does not apply to R.H. and T.L. because they were adjudicated delinquent, and not convicted, of a sex offense. The Court therefore remands each matter to the appropriate trial court to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that R.H. and T.L. satisfy the public safety prong.

Considerations of fairness lead the Court to hold that all commercial landowners -- including owners of vacant commercial lots -- have a duty to maintain the public sidewalks abutting their property in reasonably good condition and are liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their negligent failure to do so. Consistent with the rule it adopts today, the Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and remands the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

The ambiguous indemnification provision at issue here must be construed against the indemnitee, and the Court therefore reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment. Prospectively, parties to a contract intending to extend indemnification to first parties should include express language to achieve such an agreement.

The family court does not have the authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 to dismiss a Title 30 action -- and with it, a parent’s appointed counsel -- but continue restraints on a parent’s conduct. If the family court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to continue the restraints on a parent’s conduct, it must keep the case open to facilitate judicial oversight of the Division’s continued involvement, while safeguarding a parent’s right to counsel.

The Court finds no evidence in University Hospital’s enabling statute that the Legislature intended the Hospital to be a “state administrative agency” under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). University Hospital’s decisions and actions may not be directly appealed to the Appellate Division.

The TPAF Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably when it denied Seago’s interfund transfer application. Under the unique facts of this case, equity requires that the TPAF Board grant Seago’s interfund transfer application. Seago’s reasonable and good-faith attempts to ensure that her interfund transfer application was timely filed, coupled with the absence of apparent harm to the pension fund, necessitate this outcome.