Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, after prevailing in an action against property owners they alleged were the sole dischargers liable pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, brought suit seeking clean-up contribution under the Spill Act from other owners of the same property.

The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding the doctrine of judicial estoppel was a defense to Spill Act claims. Although plaintiffs possessed information sufficient to put them on notice of possible Spill Act claims against other property owners, they did not name those owners as defendants in the first action. The court held the application of judicial estoppel to Spill Act claims compels plaintiffs to pursue in a single action all dischargers that are known or knowable. Plaintiffs' subsequent action against the dischargers of which they had notice was precluded.

Because the welfare of children is paramount whether the parents are married, divorced or never-married, the court reverses and remands for a plenary hearing in this non-dissolution, FD, child custody matter. The mother, J.G. (Jane) appeals from a custody and parenting time order entered after the judge denied discovery, denied Jane's lawyer the right to participate in the proceedings, did not afford cross-examination or an opportunity to call witnesses and decided the issues without fact-finding or a consideration of the statutory custody factors, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). The court reviews the appropriate way to handle FD custody matters, pursuant to Administrative Directive #01-02, "Standards for Child Custody and Parenting Time Investigation Reports" (Apr. 2, 2002), the Rules of Court and relevant statutes.

In this action arising out of the aftermath of a Ponzi scheme operated through a hedge fund, a Receiver was appointed on behalf of the fund and authorized to pursue all causes of action belonging to the fund.

The hedge fund operated through the securities trading platform of plaintiffs Interactive Brokers, and its employee, Kevin Michael Fischer. The Receiver instituted suit against plaintiffs, alleging they aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud and initiated arbitration proceedings under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Code and the Customer Agreement executed between plaintiffs and the hedge fund's founder.

Plaintiffs moved for injunctive relief, arguing the claims asserted by the Receiver were beyond the scope of his authority because they were grounded on the damages suffered by the hedge funds' defrauded investors, rather than the hedge fund itself.

The court concluded the Receiver acted within the statutory authority granted him under N.J.S.A. 49:3-69(c) and (d) and N.J.S.A. 14A:14-1 to -27. The Statement of Claims submitted to FINRA listed the hedge fund as its sole claimant. A receiver's action is not invalidated, even if the return of the assets to the receivership may ultimately benefit its investors.

As the dispute fell within the Agreement, the parties were mandated to arbitrate the dispute in FINRA.

Among other things, the panel holds that trial courts in our State have the discretion, in appropriate circumstances, to grant requests by deliberating jurors to have the closing arguments of all counsel played back or read back to them, in full or in part. In recognizing this discretionary authority, the panel follows other jurisdictions that have acknowledged the discretion of judges to allow such summation playbacks or readbacks. The panel rejects, however, defendant's contention that the denial of the jury's playback request in this case was unduly prejudicial and requires a new trial.

The court addresses and establishes the factors a trial court should consider in determining whether to make an equitable distribution of restricted stock units where the stock vests post-complaint and the employed spouse asserts the vesting is attributable to that spouse's future employment efforts.

The court holds that the party seeking to exclude assets from equitable distribution on such grounds bears the burden to prove the stock award was made for services performed outside of the marriage. That party must adduce objective evidence to prove the employer intended the stock to vest for future services and not as a form of deferred compensation attributable to the award date.

In 2011, the Legislature substantially amended multiple sections of the Construction Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-1 to -38 (the 2011 amended CLL). This appeal requires the court to decide whether N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-6(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2A:44A-8 the (signatory-requirement amendments) apply retroactively. This court limited its holding to the retroactive effect of that part of the signatory-requirement amendments that replaced the previous mandate that a "duly authorized officer" sign a corporate construction lien. This court concluded that the signatory-requirement amendments at issue are not "curative" for purposes of retroactivity analysis, and held that they applied prospectively.

In these two appeals, the court concludes that continuous satellite-based monitoring under the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.89 to -123.95, is a "special needs search," which may be justified only if the governmental need to monitor convicted sex offenders outweighs their privacy interests. That balancing of interests favors monitoring of H.R., whose expectation of privacy is limited because he is on parole supervision for life. However, monitoring violates the rights of I.R., who has greater expectation of privacy than H.R., because he is not on parole supervision. Therefore, the court affirms the trial court's order sustaining SOMA monitoring in H.R.'s case, but not in I.R.'s case.

Where the chain of title was unclear, N.J.S.A. 46:18-13(b)(2) authorized plaintiff, the claimed "established holder" of the mortgage, to file a General Equity lawsuit to establish its status as the mortgage holder, and hence, its standing to foreclose the mortgage. The Appellate Division rejected defendant-mortgagors' argument that plaintiff could only seek that relief in the context of a foreclosure action. Plaintiff filed a separate civil action joining as defendants the mortgagors and all known entities that may have had an interest in the note and mortgage. The trial court granted plaintiff relief, but also required plaintiff to indemnify defendants against any future claims by other entities seeking to enforce the mortgage or the note.

Tax Court: ADP Vehicle Registration, Inc. v. Director, Div., of Taxation; Docket No. 014946-2014, opinion by Nugent, J.T.C., decided on December 11, 2018. For plaintiff – Hollis L. Hyans, admitted pro hac vice (Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., attorneys; Steven T. Rappoport, on the briefs); for defendant – Marlene G. Brown (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

The court grants plaintiff (“Taxpayer”) partial summary judgment reversing defendant’s (“Taxation”) decision to tax 100% of Taxpayer’s income, finding Taxpayer maintained a Regular Place of Business (RPOB) outside of New Jersey, as defined by N.J.A.C. 18:7-7.2. Taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of ADP, Inc., that claimed to operate as a California holding company conducting no activity, and whose sole asset was an 80% partnership interest in a California general partnership with offices in that State that operated a computerized vehicle registration service nationwide. In its analysis, the court focused on the partnership’s business due to the unitary nature of the two entities. The parties’ dispute centered on interpretation of the RPOB regulation where Taxpayer argued the language therein did not constitute a list of absolute requirements to be met, contrary to Taxation’s strict interpretation. Based on the plain language of the regulation coupled with precedent that applied an objective standard to the RPOB analysis, the court found Taxpayer’s argument to be more persuasive. On that basis, the court concluded that Taxpayer maintained an RPOB outside of the State entitling Taxpayer to apportion income away from New Jersey, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:10A-6.

Tax Court: 160 Chubb Properties, LLC v. Township of Lyndhurst, Docket Nos. 002442-2014, 006305-2015; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided December 14, 2018. For plaintiff – Joseph G. Ragno and Robert J. Guanci (Waters, McPherson, McNeill, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Kenneth A. Porro (Chasan, Lamparello, Mallon & Cappuzzo, P.C., attorneys).

Plaintiff, 160 Chubb Properties, LLC, sought relief under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-8 (“Freeze Act”) for the 2017 tax year based on the settled and adjudged tax assessment for the 2015 base tax year. Defendant, Township of Lyndhurst, opposed application of the Freeze Act for the 2017 tax year arguing that plaintiff waived Freeze Act protection under the settlement agreement. Defendant also sought a plenary hearing arguing that plaintiff performed improvements to the property precluding Freeze Act relief. The court determined that the Freeze Act applies unless the taxpayer affirmatively waives its application. The court found that the settlement agreement did not contain an affirmative waiver, nor was any evidence offered that plaintiff agreed to limit Freeze Act protection. The court also found that defendant was not entitled to a plenary hearing since it did not make a prima facie showing that a substantial and meaningful change in value occurred to the property. The court determined that defendant’s bare allegations of increased tenant occupancy; the cost of work to be performed under construction permits; and the sales price of the property were insufficient to demonstrate a change in value. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to apply the Freeze Act to the 2017 tax year assessment.

This opinion, decided on August 4, 2017, is being published at the request of the Supreme Court. Appellants N.J. Highlands Coalition and Sierra Club N.J. challenged a settlement agreement between the NJDEP and a developer relating to the development of a 204-unit inclusionary housing project in the Borough of Oakland. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the NJDEP issued two freshwater general permits and a transition area waiver, which appellants also challenge. We held that the NJDEP correctly concluded the developer was entitled to an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(17), and the NJDEP's decision to approve the general permits and transition area waiver was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the per curiam opinion. The Court adds modifying comments to clarify that the affirmance is based solely on a plain language reading of the Highlands Act that does not incorporate the definition of “final approval” contained in the separate but related MLUL.

The Pennsylvania detectives violated Edwards by attempting to question Wint in Camden after his earlier request for counsel, and Wint did not initiate the interrogation that occurred in Bucks County. The giving of repeated Miranda warnings did not cure the Edwards violation. Wint remained in continuous pre-indictment custody for six months before the questioning in Bucks County. Pre-indictment, pretrial detainment does not qualify as a break in custody under Shatzer, and none of the exceptions set forth in Edwards apply here. Edwards requires suppression of Wint’s incriminating statement concerning the shooting in Camden. The admission of that statement was not harmless error.

When exculpatory evidence is disclosed after a detention hearing, judges should use a modified materiality standard to decide whether to reopen the hearing. If there is a reasonable possibility that the result of the detention hearing would have been different had the evidence been disclosed, the hearing should be reopened. Applying that standard in this case, the Court reverses and remands to the trial court to reopen the detention hearing.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants' interference with plaintiff's efforts to purchase property for use as a group home for autistic individuals violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. The court concluded, as the LAD makes clear, that it is, in fact, unlawful to discriminate against a buyer because of the disability of a person intending to live on the premises, even if the buyer does not fit within a protected class, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, and that it is, with a discriminatory intent, unlawful to interfere with another's transaction, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(n). In reversing the motion judge's dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), the court also rejected the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the claim that defendants sabotaged plaintiff's efforts to secure a grant from the Monmouth Conservation Fund; that nonprofit foundation was not shown to be a governmental or quasi-governmental body.

The Court reaffirms New Jersey’s longstanding adherence to the principle that a competent litigant may represent himself or herself in a matter in which he or she is a party, subject to exceptions set forth in statutes, court rules, and case law. No such exception is prescribed by the statute that governs this case. Although a parent’s decision to appear pro se in this complex and consequential litigation represents poor strategy in all but the rarest case, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 plainly authorizes that parent to proceed unrepresented. The parent’s right of self-representation, however, is by no means absolute. That right must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child. In this case, the court properly denied J.J.’s untimely and ambivalent claim.

Within fifteen years of having been convicted of "sex offenses," see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b), and sentenced to probation, each registrant was convicted of another offense. After fifteen offense-free years following those convictions, registrants moved to be relieved of their registration obligations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f), which provides in relevant part:

[A] person required to register under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.

The Law Division judges denied relief, concluding essentially that conviction for any offense within fifteen years of the conviction of or release from imprisonment for the underlying sex offense permanently barred relief.

The court reversed, concluding that although the statute was ambiguous, permanently barring relief was 1) contrary to the Legislature's intent and the remedial purposes of Megan's Law; and 2) inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), which permits termination of community/parole supervision for life "upon proof . . . that the person has not committed a crime for [fifteen] years since the last conviction or release from incarceration, . . . and . . . is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others if released from parole supervision."

In this vehicular negligence action, the court holds that the cumulative impact of multiple errors, including defense counsel's improprieties, the trial court's denial of a directed verdict as to defendant's negligence, and the trial court's grant of defendant's in limine motion to bar plaintiff's life care expert, deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. The court reverses the order of judgment entered on the jury's verdict and remands for a new trial.

The court reverses the Family Part order entered under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21. SASPA cannot be used to impose a restraining order on defendant based on conduct that occurred before SASPA's effective date. SASPA does not permit such retroactive application. The Family Part judge heard credible testimony from plaintiff that defendant had intercourse with her in 2005 when she was eleven. The Family Part judge correctly concluded the 2005 incident of intercourse was a sexual assault, however the 2005 assault was not a predicate act triggering the right to SASPA protection because SASPA was not signed into law until 2015.

Plaintiff New Jersey Transit Corporation appealed from the summary judgment dismissal of its subrogation action against the tortfeasors for reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits paid to an injured employee for wage loss and medical expenses resulting from a work-related automobile accident. Plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of the limitation on lawsuit option under AICRA, and did not seek recovery from the tortfeasors. The motion judge held AICRA trumped the WCA, ruling that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a) barred NJ Transit's claims because NJ Transit, as subrogee, stands in the shoes of the injured employee, and has no rights superior to the injured employee under AICRA. Since the injured worker was compensated by workers' compensation benefits for his medical expenses and wage loss; he suffered no uncompensated economic loss. The motion judge held NJ Transit's claim must be dismissed because AICRA bars claims for compensated economic damages.

The court reverses the summary judgment dismissal, holding the workers’ compensation carrier is permitted to pursue its Section 40 claim for reimbursement of the worker's compensation benefits paid to the injured employee against the third-party tortfeasors. If successful, the workers' compensation carrier would be reimbursed by the tortfeasors, subject to their right to indemnification from their own automotive insurers. Therefore, allowing such recovery does not conflict with AICRA's collateral source rule, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6.

Regarding the interplay of the WCA and AICRA, where only workers' compensation benefits and PIP benefits are available, the primary burden is placed on workers' compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6. Where only PIP benefits and tortfeasor liability are involved, the primary burden is placed on the PIP carrier by N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. However, where both workers' compensation benefits and the proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f). In turn, where workers' compensation benefits have been paid, but the injured employee has not sought or obtained recovery from the tortfeasor, the primary burden is placed on the tortfeasor.