Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Aug. 6, 2018 |
S.T. VS. 1515 BROAD STREET, LLC, ET AL. VS. VIRGINIA GLASS PRODUCTS, ET AL. (L-1651-10, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-5525-13T2)
Plaintiff's counsel informed the trial court of counsel's reasonable belief that plaintiff had diminished capacity. Under Rule 4:26-2(a)(4), a court may appoint a guardian ad litem if there is good cause to believe that a party lacks the mental capacity needed to participate in the litigation. Based upon the guardian ad litem's investigation or other information, the court may give the guardian ad litem the power to make specific decision(s) needed in the case if it finds clear and convincing evidence that the party is mentally incapable of making those decision(s). The Appellate Division disapproves older cases suggesting the court had to meet Rule 4:86's standard for appointing a guardian of the person or property. As the court found plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to decide whether to try or settle the case, the guardian ad litem could negotiate a settlement which the court properly found was fair and reasonable under Rule 4:44. |
Appellate |
Aug. 3, 2018 |
PERSONAL SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY VS. RELIEVUS A/S/O RACHEL SACKIE (L-3544-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2393-16T2)
The question presented is whether a Law Division summary action seeking to vacate an award by a dispute resolution professional (DRP) as well as an appeal award of a three-member DRP panel, which affirmed the DRP's decision, was timely made within the forty-five-day time frame under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), when it was filed 159 days after the DRP's award, but forty-three days after the DRP panel's award. The trial court dismissed the summary action as untimely; finding it was not filed within forty-five days after the DRP's award. We reverse and remand because we conclude that, under the governing statutory and regulatory guidelines, the summary action was timely filed within forty-five days of the DRP panel's decision. |
Appellate |
Aug. 2, 2018 |
Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden Planning Board
(A-82-16 ; 079146)
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax lienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is an interested party and therefore may have standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application. |
Supreme |
Aug. 1, 2018 |
In re: Accutane Litigation
(A-25-17 ; 079958)
There is little distinction between Daubert’s principles regarding expert testimony and New Jersey’s, and Daubert’s factors for assessing the reliability of expert testimony will aid New Jersey trial courts in their role as the gatekeeper of scientific expert testimony in civil cases. Accordingly, the Court now reconciles the standard under N.J.R.E. 702, and relatedly N.J.R.E. 703, with the federal Daubert standard to incorporate its factors for civil cases. Analysis of the record in this case leads to a clear result: the trial court properly excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. Moreover, the Court reaffirms that the abuse of discretion standard must be applied by an appellate court assessing whether a trial court has properly admitted or excluded expert scientific testimony in a civil case. In this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidential ruling and, therefore, the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts. |
Supreme |
July 31, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF A.A. (FJ-09-0118-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-4098-16T3)
This case presented a novel issue in the context of self-incrimination. The court determined that it is incongruous to require the presence of a parent prior to a waiver of Miranda rights to safeguard a juvenile's right against self-incrimination, yet allow police eavesdropping on the parent-child communication that proves antithetical to that right. The court also determined that this constituted the functional equivalent of police interrogation and therefore Miranda was implicated. Since Miranda warnings were not provided prior to the parent-child communication, the statements resulting from the communication were suppressed. |
Appellate |
July 31, 2018 |
State v. J.L.G. a/k/a J.L.J.
(A-50-16 ; 078718)
The Court finds continued scientific support for only one aspect of CSAAS -- delayed disclosure -- because scientists generally accept that a significant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse. Expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. See N.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannot offer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the jury understand the witness’s behavior. The Court asks the Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriate instruction on delayed disclosure. In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. As a result, the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and defendant’s convictions are affirmed. |
Supreme |
July 26, 2018 |
Red Bank Bor. V. RMD-Meridian Health
(00007-16/00008-16)
Borough of Red Bank v. RMC-Meridian Health, Docket Nos. 000007-2016, 000008-2018; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Martin Allen and Kevin A. MacDonald (DiFrancesco Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Susan Feeney and Farhan Ali (McCarter & English, L.L.P., attorneys). Held: Plaintiff thus cannot seek to impose omitted assessments on defendant’s property for two tax years under the general omitted assessment law, based on a trial court’s opinion in an unrelated litigation that an unrelated hospital, which was found to be operating for profit, is not entitled to a tax exemption. Plaintiff’s complaints are therefore dismissed. |
Tax |
July 26, 2018 |
Ronald Bentz v. Township of Little Egg Harbor
(09763-17)
Ronald Bentz v. Township of Little Egg Harbor, Docket No. 009763-2017; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Ronald Bentz, Self-Represented; for defendant - Robin La Bue (Gilmore & Monahan P.A., attorneys); for intervenor, Director, Division of Taxation – Stephen J. Colby (Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Held: Plaintiff’s complaint seeking to declare N.J.S.A. 54:4- 8.10(a) as unconstitutional because it does not list the 1986 conflict in Libya as one of defined periods of “time of war” is dismissed. The principles of separation of powers prohibit the court from engrafting a conflict into N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) when it has not been specifically designated as such by the Legislature. |
Tax |
July 25, 2018 |
Janell Brugaletta v. Calixto Garcia, D.O.
(A-66-16 ; 079056)
The Court affirms the panel’s order shielding the redacted document from discovery because the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege prevents its disclosure. The Court also affirms the panel’s determination that, when reviewing a discovery dispute such as this, a trial court should not be determining whether a reportable event under the PSA has occurred. The Court reverses the judgment to the extent it ends defendants’ discovery obligation with respect to this dispute, finding that defendants have an unmet discovery duty under Rule 4:17-4(d) that must be addressed. Accordingly, the Court provides direction on how the court should have addressed, through New Jersey’s current discovery rules, the proper balancing of interests between the requesting party and the responding party here, and remands to the trial court. |
Supreme |
July 24, 2018 |
State v. Tariq S. Gathers
(A-80-16 ; 079274)
Although an affidavit of a police officer familiar with the investigation is preferable, a hearsay certification from an assistant prosecutor may support probable cause to compel a defendant to submit to a buccal swab if it sets forth the basis for the prosecutor’s knowledge. Second, an affidavit or certification supporting probable cause to compel a buccal swab must establish a fair probability that defendant’s DNA will be found on the evidence. Here, the State failed to show probable cause. |
Supreme |
July 23, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KEVIN BROWN (08-12-2199, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0777-16T3)
In this appeal, defendant filed his first post-conviction relief (PCR) petition more than five years after the trial court signed the Judgment of Conviction. Despite this, neither the PCR court nor the State challenged the timeliness of the petition under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). At the conclusion of oral argument in this appeal, this court entered a sua sponte order directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing: (1) whether the procedural bar in the Rule is subject to waiver if the State fails to raise it before the PCR court; and (2) if the Rule’s preclusive injunction is not subject to waiver, what should be the remedy on appeal. Based on the policy concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575-76 (1992), this court holds that a PCR judge has an independent, non-delegable duty to question the timeliness of a petition and to require a petitioner to submit competent evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the time restrictions codified by the Court under Rule 3:22-12. Absent sufficient competent evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing these time restrictions, the PCR judge does not have the authority to review the merits of the claims asserted therein. |
Appellate |
July 23, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JEROME SHAW, JR. (13-04-0591, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2058-15T3)
The principal issue in this appeal from a conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary after a guilty plea pertains to the limits placed on a prosecutor to resubmit a case to a grand jury after a previous grand jury panel refused to indict. The court concludes that the prosecutor's power to resubmit is broad but not boundless. It is subject to review in light of the grand jury's role to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecution; and the court's power to review prosecutorial discretion for abuse, and to assure fundamental fairness. However, under the circumstances of this case, the court rejects defendant's challenge to the resubmission, and affirms the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. |
Appellate |
July 20, 2018 |
THERESA WEAR, ET AL. VS. SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY WOODBURY MEDICAL CENTER ASSOCIATES, LLP VS. SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY (L-1583-13, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED)
(A-5526-15T1/A-0033-16T1)
In this appeal, the court held that it was premature to mandate the insurance carrier to provide a defense to an insured on an environmental claim where the unambiguous exclusion contained anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language. The proper remedy at that stage in the proceedings, given the uncertainty of coverage, was to convert the duty to defend to a duty to reimburse as in Grand Cove II. The court further held that it was premature to apply the Griggs analysis to a settlement reached between the insured and the claimants prior to a determination that the insurance carrier breached its duty to defend. |
Appellate |
July 19, 2018 |
Lucia Serico v. Robert M. Rothberg, M.D.
(A-69-16 ; 079041)
The high-low agreement is a settlement subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement, the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico may not seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. The judgment of the Appellate Division is accordingly affirmed. |
Supreme |
July 18, 2018 |
Allstars Auto Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission
(A-72/73/74/75/76/77/78/79-16 ; 078991)
If the reasons given by the dealers present a colorable dispute of facts or at least the presence of mitigating evidence, the Commission is required to provide an in-person hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:10-20. An in-person hearing must be held prior to a license suspension or revocation when the target of the enforcement action requests it. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands. |
Supreme |
July 18, 2018 |
REGINAL LITTLE VS. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC. (L-0800-01, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0794-15T3)
In this class action against defendant Kia Motors America, Inc., (KMA) plaintiff class of 8455 Kia Sephia owners and lessees represented by Regina Little proved at a jury trial that the Sephia, model years 1997 through 2000, had a defective front brake system, which caused premature brake pad and rotor wear. Concluding that the defect amounted to a breach of express and implied warranties, and that all owners had suffered damage due to the defect, the jury awarded each member of the class $750 ($6.3 million total) in repair damages. Determining for the first time post-trial that repair damages could not be awarded on a class-wide basis because they were dependent upon individual factors, the trial court granted KMA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the repair damages award, decertified the class for purposes of damages, and ordered a new trial on repair damages only, to proceed by way of claim forms. With the advantage of recent case law unavailable to the trial judge, the court now reverses, reinstates the jury award and remands for determination of counsel fees. |
Appellate |
July 17, 2018 |
Maureen McDaid v. Aztec West Condominium Association
(A-88-16 ; 079325)
The dictates of Jerista apply to the facts presented here. The res ipsa inference of negligence is applicable because common experience instructs that elevator doors -- however complex their operation may be -- ordinarily should not strike a person entering or exiting an elevator in the absence of negligence. To warrant the inference, plaintiff had no obligation to exclude other possible causes that might explain the malfunctioning of the elevator doors or to show that defendants were on notice of some defect in the doors’ operation. |
Supreme |
July 16, 2018 |
IN THE MATTER OF BELLEVILLE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION AND BELLEVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION BELLEVILLE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION VS. BELLEVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND L-7237-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED)
(A-5104-14T3/A-2956-15T3)
This opinion involves two separate, but interrelated cases arising from the same core of operative facts. In the appeal filed by the local board of education under Docket Number A-5104-14, this court upholds the decision of the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to assert its exclusive jurisdiction to decide complaints arising under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 to -43, even when raised in the context of tenure charges. Applying the Supreme Court's holding in In re Local 195, IFPTE, 88 N.J. 393 (1982), this court also upholds the union's right to engage in good faith negotiations to ascertain the impact the installation of exposed cameras with both audio and video capabilities would have on the terms and conditions of employment for the employees. In the separate, but related appeal filed by the union under Docket Number A-2956-15, this court holds the Law Division does not have jurisdiction under Rule 4:67-6 to enforce an order entered by PERC. Adhering to the Supreme Court's holding in Galloway Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 78 N.J. 25 (1978), this court holds that only PERC may file a motion before the Appellate Division to enforce its own order under the EERA. A prevailing party in a PERC proceeding only has the right to request that PERC enforce its own order. |
Appellate |
July 13, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. PEDRO C. ANICAMA (06-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0452-16T4)
Defendant was convicted of a third or subsequent offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Municipal Court allowed him to serve the mandatory 180-day sentence under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) two days per week. The Law Division reversed. The Appellate Division holds a third or subsequent DWI offender is ineligible for periodic service. Michael's Law amended the DWI statutes to require the 180-day sentence be spent in jail, excepting only up to ninety days spent in inpatient drug or alcohol rehabilitation, and to preclude other options. The amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-51 was intended only to bar work release for such offenders, not to lift the prohibition on their release before the jail term had been served. The specific law governing DWI sentences governs over the general provision for periodic service in N.J.S.A. 2B:12-22. The court disapproves State v. Grabowski, 388 N.J. Super. 431 (Law Div. 2006), which permitted such periodic service. |
Appellate |
July 11, 2018 |
State in the Interest of A.R., a Minor
(A-67-16 ; 078672)
The Court reverses Alex’s delinquency adjudication on state-law grounds, concluding that the video-recorded statement did not possess a sufficient probability of trustworthiness to justify its introduction at trial under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Striking the juvenile’s recorded statement from the record does not leave sufficient evidence in the record to support, on any rational basis, the adjudication of delinquency against Alex. Accordingly, the sexual assault charge must be dismissed. The Court concludes that the incompetency proviso of the present version of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) is flawed and remands that rule for review to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence. |
Supreme |