Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff Egg Harbor, a New Jersey nursing facility, commenced a collection action against various parties, the Californian defendant, Corey Pagano, moved to dismiss the case based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Pagano had not lived in New Jersey in over three decades and had not set foot in our state in seventeen years. Pagano's only connection to the forum stems from his mother, New Jersey and Egg Harbor resident Patricia Scheraldi, as he served as the payee for her incurred obligations, contacted plaintiff Egg Harbor surrounding her health care, and attempted to obtain her Medicaid coverage. In accordance with the purposeful availment requirement necessary to support minimum contacts, we conclude that it is inappropriate for a nonresident defendant to be subjected to personal jurisdiction based upon contacts with the forum state that cannot be reasonably prevented by the defendant. Based upon Pagano's contacts with New Jersey, it violates the longstanding principles of minimum contacts and reasonableness outlined in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) to hale him into our courts to defend this action. We affirm and remand with directions to amend the order to dismiss the case without prejudice.

The court finds that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), the fourth-degree offense of driving while suspended, includes both driving while under the influence (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and refusal to submit to breath testing (refusal), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. They are predicate offenses even where the prior conviction history consists of one conviction under the separate sections of the Motor Vehicle Code. In other words, one DWI and one refusal suffice for the criminal offense of driving while suspended.

The mayor and council of the Borough of Belmar, in response to a protest petition seeking a referendum on an ordinance appropriating funds and authorizing the issuance of bonds and notes to construct a beach pavilion, passed a resolution to place the referendum on the ballot.

The court held a later-submitted permissive – not mandatory – interpretive statement of the ordinance was invalid because: 1) neither the borough administrator nor the borough attorney had authority to author and submit the interpretive statement to the county clerk without formal public approval of the mayor and counsel, and 2) the interpretive statement was misleading and contained extraneous language. The court also determined the interpretive statement's phraseology deprived plaintiffs of their substantive right of referendum protected by the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

The court also upheld the trial judge's award of counsel fees and costs despite the absence of a retainer agreement between plaintiffs and counsel; and the judge's refusal to allocate fees and costs to beachgoers – not Belmar voters – as beneficiaries of plaintiffs' efforts.

The panel addresses whether New Jersey's six-year statute of limitations or Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applies to a legal malpractice claim against a lawyer, who is licensed in both states and works in New Jersey, and his law firm, which has offices in both states. The legal services in question concerned a Pennsylvania lawsuit relating to a fire loss at a Pennsylvania restaurant. Applying the substantial-interest test for resolving statute-of-limitations conflicts, which our Supreme Court adopted in McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569, 574 (2017), we reverse the trial court's decision, which applied New Jersey law.

The panel erred in its application of the “plain feel” doctrine. Officer Laboy had witnessed “hundreds” of instances where defendants concealed contraband in the front of their pants and therefore immediately recognized the “rocklike” substance he felt to be similar to crack cocaine. Between the officer’s experience-derived identification of the substance and the presence of $2000 in cash, the “plain feel” exception -- which the Court adopts -- applied.

New Jersey law on the allocation of liability among insurers applies in this matter, and the Court sets forth the pertinent choice-of-law principles to resolve this dispute over insurance coverage for numerous products-liability claims. Concerning the second question, on these facts, the Court also affirms the determination to follow the unavailability exception to the continuous-trigger method of allocation set forth in Owens-Illinois.

The Borough’s zoning officer did not adhere to the precise statutory procedures for processing Harz’s appeal, and the Court does not take issue with Harz’s claims that the Borough could have responded in a more efficient way to her objections. In the end, however, Harz has not established that the Borough denied her the right to be heard before the Planning Board. She therefore cannot demonstrate that she was deprived of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act.

A forty-four-year-old emergency medical technician engaged in an unlawful sexual relationship with the then fifteen-year-old plaintiff, who, after the EMT was convicted, commenced this action for damages against the EMT, who defaulted, and against – among others – the EMT's employer and co-worker. In this appeal, the court held that the trial judge erroneously limited discovery from the prosecutor's office that investigated the crime and, also, prematurely granted summary judgment in favor of the co-worker and employer. These dispositions precluded a full and clear understanding of the extent to which the co-worker and employer knew or should have known of the EMT's unlawful acts, as well as the extent of the co-worker's relationship with the EMT. These limitations hampered the court's determination of whether it would be appropriate to extend the common-law duty imposed in J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 334 (1998) (holding that "a wife who suspects or should suspect her husband of actual or prospective sexual abuse of their neighbors' children has [a] duty of care to prevent such abuse") to a co-worker or employer or both. Thus, the orders under review were either reversed or vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

There is no obligation to send Rice notices here, where the Board determined from the start to conduct its discussion about faculty reappointments in public session. Turning to the release of meeting minutes, the delay that occurred is unreasonable no matter the excuses advanced by the Board, but the Court modifies the Appellate Division’s holding requiring the Board to set a regular meeting schedule.

In Pool v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 400 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (App. Div. 2008), this court ruled that a worker's compensation lien under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 attached to funds that an injured plaintiff received from a defendant physician in a medical malpractice case pursuant to the terms of a "high/low" agreement. Pool held that the money paid to plaintiff as the negotiated "low" figure in accordance with the agreement was subject to the statutory lien, even though a jury had rendered a "no cause" verdict in favor of the physician and absolved him of liability. Id. at 575-77.

Similarly, in the present case, despite a "no cause" decision, an injured plaintiff recovered the "low" amount under a high/low agreement he entered into with defendants who provided medical treatment to him after a work-related accident. Relying upon Pool, his employer's workers' compensation carrier seeks to enforce its lien for compensation benefits it paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that N.J.A.C. 11:1-7.3(a)(1), a regulation adopted by the Department of Banking and Insurance exempting certain payments made under a high/low agreement from physician reporting requirements, alters the analysis in Pool. Plaintiff claims the regulation renders the compensation lien unenforceable in this setting. In essence, plaintiff desires a lien-free "low."

The panel rejects plaintiff's novel argument. It concurs with the trial court that the regulation does not affect the validity and enforceability of the carrier's Section 40 lien, and that the lien applies to the proceeds collected by plaintiff from the medical malpractice defendants. A contrary result would allow plaintiff to retain an inappropriate double recovery.

The plain language of the MLUL defines an “application for development” as the application form and all accompanying documents required by ordinance.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3. Because Dunbar’s application lacked many of the documents required by the Ordinance, the application was not complete upon submission and does not benefit from the TOA Rule.

In a per curiam opinion, the panel affirms the denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing substantially for the reasons stated in the trial court's published opinion reported at 448 N.J. Super. 113 (Law Div. 2016).

The Mayor of the City of Orange Township appointed defendant as Acting Business Administrator. Plaintiff did not confirm the appointment, and the municipal ordinance required the mayor to remove acting persons after ninety days. In contravention of the Council's directive and the applicable law, the mayor appointed defendant as Deputy Business Administrator. Defendant thereafter performed functions, signed official documents and collected a salary as the Business Administrator. Following the entry of an order to show cause directing defendant to cease performing all functions of a Business Administrator, defendant left the position. The mayor then appointed him as chief of staff. A second judge vacated certain portions of the order to show cause, but left intact the provision that only a department director had authority to appoint a deputy. Nevertheless, defendant resumed the title and salary, and performed the functions of Business Administrator. N.J.S.A. 40:69A-43.1 provides that only the director of a department may appoint a deputy director. Therefore, the mayor had no authority to appoint defendant to the position. Furthermore, the City abolished the position of deputy business administrator in 1985 by municipal ordinance. The panel finds defendant's appointment as deputy was an illegal act — an act that was ultra vires in the primary sense and, therefore, void. The panel rejects defendant's argument that he accepted the position of Deputy Business Administrator in good faith and with the "reasonable understanding" that the mayor had the authority to appoint him to the post. Defendant is a highly educated man who had served in the state legislature and taught college courses in municipal government and public administration. He acknowledged having reviewed the Faulkner Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1 to -210, and the City ordinances that pertained to his employment. Defendant did not demonstrate any factual dispute in the events surrounding his appointment, nor any ambiguity in the controlling statutes. Because he lacked good faith in accepting and remaining in the post, the panel rejects defendant's argument that he should be permitted to retain his salary under equitable theories of quantum meruit or equitable estoppel. The sole remedy to make the aggrieved taxpayers whole is to disgorge defendant of the monies paid to him during his service in the unlawful appointment.

The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.

The DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime. In Jones, the State presented sufficient evidence of a continuing course of conduct to survive the motion to dismiss.

Absent a contract, statutory provision or court rule authorizing fee-shifting, New Jersey follows the so-called "American Rule," requiring litigants to bear their own litigation costs regardless of who prevails. In this consolidated action, the panel reverses an award of attorneys' fees, jointly and severally, against the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, and plaintiff's former employer, the Township of Middletown.The panel concludes the trial court, in an action in lieu of prerogative writs against the Board, Middletown, and certain of their employees, erroneously awarded counsel fees to plaintiff on equitable grounds. Because there was no legal basis to support the award of those fees, the panel reverses.

The language of Section 26.1 is plain and unambiguous. It became effective years after J.V. was waived to adult court. The Court concludes the Legislature intended the statute to apply prospectively to those juvenile waiver hearings conducted after the statute became effective. The statute does not apply to J.V.

In a residential foreclosure where an investor such as Freddie Mac owns the note but not the mortgage, the plaintiff must have both the note and a valid assignment of mortgage to have standing to foreclose. Given that defendant knew the servicer for Freddie Mac, given that Freddie Mac is a GSE (government-sponsored enterprise) that publicly declares its policy to foreclose through its servicers, and given that the servicer did possess the note at an earlier foreclosure proceeding and had a valid mortgage assignment, the irregularities are insufficient to defeat this foreclosure. Standing is not jurisdictional in New Jersey, and the equities here favor foreclosure.

These three appeals involve the non-consensual towing of vehicles and raise questions concerning the Predatory Towing Prevention Act (Towing Act), N.J.S.A. 56:13-7 to -23, the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20, and the Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18. The court holds that: (1) the Towing Act does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) or dispute resolution procedures established by municipalities that have towing ordinances; (2) the Tort Claims Act (TCA) does not provide immunity against claims based on the fees companies charge for non-consensual towing of vehicles; and (3) the Towing Act and its regulations limit the services for which a towing company can charge. The court also holds that the TCCWNA applies to the non-consensual towing of vehicles because the bills issued by towing companies are contracts and notices within the definition of the TCCWNA. Finally, the court holds that class actions may, in the right circumstances, be appropriate for claims under the Towing Act, the CFA, and the TCCWNA. Accordingly, we reverse the orders on appeal in each of these three cases and remand for further proceedings.

The CJRA -- like the federal and D.C. laws on which it is based in part -- provides defendants a qualified right to summon adverse witnesses. Before calling an adverse witness, a defendant must proffer how the witness’s testimony would tend to negate probable cause or undermine the State’s evidence in support of detention in a material way.