Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Jan. 28, 2020 |
In re Application for Permit to Carry a Handgun of Calvin Carlstrom
(A-63-18 ; 081981)
The Directive, issued pursuant to the Court’s administrative rulemaking authority, requires a hearing and is controlling on this issue. The Court remands this matter to the Law Division to conduct a hearing on Carlstrom’s application for a carry-permit and provides guidance as to the scope of that hearing. |
Supreme |
Jan. 27, 2020 |
State v. Donna M. Alessi
(A-41/42-17 ; 079255)
The circumstances of this case do not legitimize the stop. Law enforcement must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of a traffic violation, the commission of a crime, or unlawful activity before executing a traffic stop. Accordingly, the roadside statement given by defendant during the unlawful stop should have been excluded at trial, and the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s reversal of her convictions for hindering apprehension and false reporting. Because defendant’s roadside statement permeated the trial, severely affecting her credibility and ability to mount a defense to the separate burglary charge, that conviction is reversed as well. |
Supreme |
Jan. 27, 2020 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ARTHUR R. BURNS STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VAUGHN WILLIAMS (16-05-0528, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-2393-17T3/A-2478-17T4)
These consolidated appeals present an issue of first impression, requiring the court to decide whether the State's utilization of federally-contracted civilian monitors, who were sworn as "Special County Investigators," violated the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37. Unlike Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, New Jersey's Wiretap Act does not expressly permit delegation of wire interception to civilian personnel. Because the Prosecutor exercised his inherent power to appoint personnel as part of his responsibility to carry out the duties of his office here, the court concludes the monitors were cloaked with the investigative responsibility of law enforcement officers when they intercepted the communications at issue. Accordingly, the court discerns no violation of the Wiretap Act, and affirms the Law Division order that denied defendants' motion to suppress the intercepted communications and the evidence seized as a result of those communications. |
Appellate |
Jan. 27, 2020 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LUCIAN FAULCON (19-03-0150, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5235-18T1)
Criminal defense counsel who represented a State witness who was questioned in the investigation of a murder may not then represent the defendant in the same case. On leave granted, the State argues that because defense counsel was present for the witness's interview with detectives, she will be hampered in her ability to effectively cross-examine the witness at trial, materially limiting her ability to represent defendant Lucian Faulcon. The anticipated testimony of the witness involves his identification of a phone number that the police connected to defendant and used to trace defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder. Defense counsel's former representation of the witness materially limit's counsel's ability to represent defendant. To allow this conflicted representation is contrary to the fair administration of justice. |
Appellate |
Jan. 24, 2020 |
CLARENCE HALEY VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL. (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR)
(A-4973-17T2)
The court affirms a decision by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development's Board of Review (Board) that disqualified petitioner from unemployment benefits. Petitioner was arrested on multiple charges and incarcerated for fifty-five days. While he was in jail, his employer filled his position. The grand jury did not indict petitioner. He was released from jail and the charges were dismissed. He unsuccessfully filed for unemployment compensation benefits after his release. The court agrees petitioner is disqualified from benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30. It is consistent with the Act's amendment in 1961 to review petitioner's incarceration as a voluntary separation that is "without good cause attributable to such work . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Because his loss of employment was not related to his work, petitioner was disqualified from benefits. |
Appellate |
Jan. 23, 2020 |
PHANINDER PATHRI VS. SRIVANI KAKARLAMATH (FM-09-2150-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4657-18T1)
The court granted leave to appeal to review an order entered in this matrimonial action that denied plaintiff the opportunity to appear at the trial and testify by contemporaneous video transmission from his home in India. Recognizing that the court rules neither authorize nor prohibit such relief, the court identified and described the factors a judge should consider in ruling on the propriety of allowing a witness to testify remotely, and remanded so that plaintiff may provide the trial judge with a more fulsome application for the relief he requested. |
Appellate |
Jan. 23, 2020 |
Baldwin Shields v. Ramslee Motors
(A-53-18 ; 081969)
Ramslee Motors’s lease agreement directly addressed responsibility for maintenance of the property, which includes removal of snow and ice. That duty rested solely with Ramslee Motors, whether based on the lease or common law. Ramslee Motors retained complete control over the premises where plaintiff fell and was exclusively responsible for plaintiff’s injuries. The Court declines to hold the landlord responsible for property over which it had relinquished control. |
Supreme |
Jan. 23, 2020 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MIGUEL A. ROMAN-ROSADO (16-12-0968, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3703-17T4)
Following the stop of defendant's car for allegedly violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 because the license plate frame on the car's rear license plate "conceal[ed] or otherwise obscure[d]" the words "Garden State" at the bottom of the license plate, a warrantless search of the car uncovered an unloaded handgun. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the search and seizure of the handgun, and defendant subsequently pled guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). In defendant's appeal, the court was asked to decide: (1) whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33; and (2) whether the subsequent search and seizure of the handgun was legally permissible. Based upon the common understanding of the words "conceal" and "obscure," this court concludes there was no reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 where the minimal covering of "Garden State" did not make the words indecipherable. Hence, the seized gun was inadmissible to prove a second-degree certain persons offense. For the sake of completeness, the court further decides that even if there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car for a N.J.S.A. 39:3-33 violation, the subsequent search was not legally permissible because it did not satisfy the State's proffered exceptions to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, i.e., a search incident to arrest, or a protective sweep. Accordingly, the court reverses and vacates the conviction for second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, and remands so defendant can move to vacate his guilty plea and have the judgment of conviction vacated pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f). |
Appellate |
Jan. 22, 2020 |
State v. Roger Covil
(A-35/36-18 ; 081267)
The new rule stated in Cain and Simms was intended to apply prospectively to guide future trials, not retroactively to proceedings conducted prior to those decisions. At the time of defendant’s trial, the governing law authorized the use of hypothetical questions such as the questions posed to the State’s experts in this case. And in light of the distinctions between Melendez and the present case, there was no error in the trial court’s admission of defendant’s notice of motion for a writ of replevin and certification.
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Supreme |
Jan. 21, 2020 |
In the Matter of the Investigation of Burglary and Theft
(A-61-18 ; 082243)
In light of the federal and state requirements to obtain a follow-up sample, the State has shown that the physical characteristics sought in this case cannot practicably be obtained by any means other than investigative detention pursuant to Rule 3:5A-1. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division. |
Supreme |
Jan. 16, 2020 |
Bernice Pisack v. B&C Towing, Inc.; Eptisam Pellegrino v. Nick’s Towing Service, Inc.; Christopher Walker v. All Points Automotive & Towing, Inc.
(A-17/18-18 ; 081492)
The 2018 legislation amending the Towing Act does not have retroactive effect, and the Court agrees with the Appellate Division’s construction of the pre-2018 Act. The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s thorough and thoughtful decision as to exhaustion of administrative remedies, derivative immunity, and the remand as to the Towing Act and CFA claims, all substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Gilson’s opinion. The Court separately addresses whether plaintiffs can pursue claims under the TCCWNA and finds that plaintiffs are unable to state a claim under that statute. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division on that issue but affirms as to all others. |
Supreme |
Jan. 15, 2020 |
State in the Interest A.A.
(A-50-18 ; 081793)
The actions of the police amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation. As a result, A.A. should have been advised of his Miranda rights in the presence of his mother. To hold otherwise would turn Presha and the safeguards it envisioned on their head. To address the special concerns presented when a juvenile is brought into custody, police officers should advise juveniles of their Miranda rights in the presence of a parent or guardian before the police question, or a parent speaks with, the juvenile. Officers should then let the parent and child consult in private. That approach would afford parents a meaningful opportunity to help juveniles understand their rights and decide whether to waive them. Because A.A.’s inadmissible statements comprised a substantial part of the proofs against him, a new hearing is necessary. |
Supreme |
Jan. 15, 2020 |
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN VS. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, ET AL. (DC-004942-18, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1473-18T1)
In this special civil part action, defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority filed an answer but did not plead any affirmative defenses and never moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to trial. Despite SEPTA's waiver of the defense, the trial judge raised it on his own at the trial's outset, and, after hearing brief argument, dismissed the claim against SEPTA for lack of personal jurisdiction. In reversing the dismissal of the claim against SEPTA and remanding for a trial on the merits, the court concluded that once the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived, a judge is not empowered to resurrect it. |
Appellate |
Jan. 13, 2020 |
VINCENT HAGER VS. M&K CONSTRUCTION (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)
(A-0102-18T3)
In this case of first impression, the court considers whether a workers' compensation judge can order an employer to reimburse its employee for the employee's use of medical marijuana prescribed for chronic pain following a work-related accident. Because the court concludes the order does not require M&K to possess, manufacture or distribute marijuana, but only to reimburse petitioner for his purchase of medical marijuana, the court discerns no conflict between the federal Controlled Substance Act, (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 841, which makes it a crime to manufacture, possess or distribute marijuana, and the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (MMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -29. Furthermore, M&K's compliance with the order does not establish the specific intent element of an aiding and abetting offense under federal law. The court also concludes M&K is not a private health insurer. Therefore, it is not excluded under the MMA from reimbursing the costs of medical marijuana. Here, where petitioner has demonstrated the severity and chronic nature of his pain, his attempts to unsuccessfully alleviate the pain with multiple surgeries and medical modalities, and the validated efficacy of the prescribed medical marijuana, the court finds the use of medical marijuana is reasonable and necessary. Finding no legislative or legal barrier to an employer's reimbursement of its employee's expense for medical marijuana in a workers' compensation setting, the court affirms the order. |
Appellate |
Jan. 13, 2020 |
State v. Randy K. Manning
(A-10-18 ; 080834)
During the three-year interim period between passage of the amendment to the Wiretap Act in 2010 and the effective date of the Court’s Earls decision in 2013, individuals possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information cognizable under our State Constitution. As in other contexts, exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement -- such as consent or exigent circumstances -- apply to securing cell-phone records. Therefore, in 2011, our Constitution required law-enforcement officers to obtain either a warrant or court order for cell-phone location information in accordance with the standards of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29 or to satisfy one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It also follows that, under Article I, Paragraph 7, the exclusionary rule applies to unconstitutional searches and seizures of cell-phone records. Here, the State did not obtain a warrant or court order and failed to satisfy its burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search, requiring suppression of defendant’s cell-phone records. |
Supreme |
Jan. 13, 2020 |
Saulwill, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation (2 complaints)
(014062-2013)
Tax Court: Saulwil, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, Docket No. 014062-2013; Samuel and Louise Hammer v. Dir., Div. of taxation, Docket No. 014061-2013; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C.,decided January 10, 2020. For plaintiff – Robert A. Fee (Robert A. Fee, Esq., attorneys); for defendant - Heather Lynn Anderson (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Held: Defendant’s decision that the books and records of corporate plaintiff were inadequate, which therefore required that its reported sales be increased using an estimated markup, was unreasonable and unsupportable. Therefore,defendant’s final determination assessing additional sales tax on the corporate plaintiff based on its markup methodology is reversed. Also reversed is defendant’s final determination imposing additional gross income tax upon the individual plaintiffs on the constructive receipt of the deemed additional corporate sales. |
Tax |
Jan. 10, 2020 |
Plaza Twenty Three Station, LLC v. Township of Pequannock
(002870-2018, 002215-2019)
Tax Court: Plaza Twenty Three Station, LLC v. Township of Pequannock, Docket Nos. 002870-2018; 002215-2019; 000062-2019; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided January 9, 2020; published opinion January 22, 2020. For plaintiff – Daniel P. Zazzali and Michael D. Benak (McCarter & English, LLP, attorneys); for defendant – Robert H. Oostdyk, Jr. (Murphy McKeon, PC, attorneys). HELD: The court invalidated the 2018 and 2019 local property tax assessments, along with a 2018 added assessment, imposed by defendant upon the subject property owned by plaintiff. The court found that these assessments were based on and carried forward, the 2017 added assessment, which this court had held constituted an unconstitutional spot assessment, the same being based on the 2017 sale of the subject property. |
Tax |
Jan. 10, 2020 |
DCPP VS. A.L. AND S.B., IN THE MATTER OF AU.L. (FN-12-0172-17, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1399-18T3)
After the court's affirmance of an abuse/neglect determination, defendant – with new appellate counsel – moved for reconsideration, claiming: (1) the court did not adequately review the record as evidenced by its short, three-paragraph opinion, and (2) the court ought to reopen the record so defendant may now assert arguments that prior appellate counsel was ineffective. In finding no merit in the first contention, the court rejected defendant's theory that suggested the size of an appellate opinion reflects the time and effort expended by the court in considering the record and the issues. The court found that the second argument presented a novel question as to how a defendant in an abuse/neglect matter should pursue a claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. The court determined that a reconsideration motion in the appellate court is not an inappropriate method but – because Rule 2:6-11(a) provides only a ten-day window for seeking such relief – the appellate ineffectiveness argument could also be pursued by way of a Rule 4:50 application in the trial court. Because the ineffectiveness arguments posed here warranted further factual development, the court remanded the matter to the trial court. |
Appellate |
Jan. 9, 2020 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. THOMAS HAWKINS (12-02-0380, MIDDLESEX COUNTY, AND 11-08-1383, HUDSON COUNTY, AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5777-17T3)
The court rejects defendant's argument that the imposition of an eight-year custodial sentence after serving almost five years of special probation was an unconstitutional judicial extension of the statutory ten-year maximum custodial sentence, contrary to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Years served on special Drug Court probation are not equivalent to incarceration. Special Drug Court probation is an extraordinary rehabilitative opportunity, provided to defendants who choose to accept it with the clear explanation that a violation could result in the imposition of the maximum term of incarceration. |
Appellate |
Jan. 9, 2020 |
Moshe Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP
(A-20/21-18 ; 081534)
The firm did not breach any fiduciary duty where the firm was not made aware, nor did it have any basis on which it reasonably should have been aware, of plaintiff or of a claim by plaintiff to the funds. As such, there was no relationship between the firm and plaintiff on which a fiduciary duty was owed. On that issue, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division. However, defendants cannot be found to have engaged in conversion in this matter. Where, as here, a law firm lawfully holds in trust wired funds for its client’s real estate transaction, which funds are received with no limiting direction or instruction and for which the firm receives no demand from the non-client, the firm’s disposition of the trust funds in accordance with the client’s instructions does not give rise to a claim for conversion. The Court rejects the reasoning that under these circumstances the obligation to make a demand is excused and reverses as to the conversion claim.
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Supreme |