Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
April 6, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. M.B. (19-07-1182, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1363-19)
Defendant appealed his conviction for certain persons not to possess a weapon after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized with a warrant issued from an ex parte domestic violence restraining order. The court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction. Police officers were called to defendant's home, where the victim alleged that defendant kicked her. Police arrested defendant for simple assault and asked the victim if she wanted to seek a temporary restraining order (TRO), which she did. The victim told police that knives and a pistol were in the home. One officer called a Municipal Court judge and summarized the incident without being under oath and without the judge taking notes. The judge spoke to the victim, but the officer only overheard the victim's portion of the conversation. The call was recorded but subsequently destroyed pursuant to the police department's thirty-one-day record retention policy. Based on that call, the judge issued a TRO and a telephonic warrant for police to search defendant's home for weapons. Police recovered knives and defendant moved to suppress. The trial court upheld the validity of the warrant and denied suppression notwithstanding the recording of the call was destroyed. Defendant appealed. Cognizant of the principles enunciated in State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111 (2019), and State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150 (2004), the court determined that the search warrant was invalid because the procedural failures did not provide a reliable record to assure the Municipal Court judge properly authorized the warrant. The court did not conclude the thirty-one-day retention policies was bad faith per se, but that the policy fell below the obligation to retain evidence in criminal matters and that defendant was manifestly prejudiced by the destruction. Moreover, while a properly reconstructed record can remedy certain procedural failures, the reconstruction here was wholly inadequate. The motion judge only heard from the officer who overheard one side of the call—not the Municipal Court judge who issued the warrant. Reversed and conviction vacated. |
Appellate |
April 5, 2022 |
State v. Michael Konecny
(A-21-20 ; 084880)
Laurick relief and the principles underlying the prohibition against the use of uncounseled DWI convictions extend to the enhanced sentencing scheme in Section 26(b), and prior uncounseled convictions cannot be used as predicates to increase a loss of liberty for DWS. Furthermore, if a defendant obtains traditional PCR on a prior DWI or Refusal conviction and the State does not pursue a second prosecution, that vacated conviction cannot be used as a predicate in a Section 26(b) prosecution. In the present case, however, defendant was not entitled to Laurick relief in the first instance because he had counsel during his prior proceedings. Laurick is available only to defendants who were without counsel and not advised of their right to counsel during their DWI-related prosecutions. |
Supreme |
April 4, 2022 |
FACEBOOK, INC. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN RE THE APPLICATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ETC. (1527-CDW-21 AND 1311-CDW-21, ATLANTIC AND MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-3350-20/A-0119-21)
In these two appeals, the court granted the State leave to appeal from two orders, in unrelated matters, partially quashing two communication data warrants (CDWs) requiring Facebook, Inc. n/k/a Meta Platforms, Inc. (Facebook) to turn over, among other things, two of its users' prospective electronically stored communications for a period of thirty days as part of separate ongoing criminal investigations. On appeal, the court was required to determine as a matter of first impression whether CDWs or wiretap orders had to be served on Facebook, to secure the prospective electronically stored communications. For the reasons stated in the court's opinion, it concluded that only CDWs were required, where, as here, the communications sought were from information that would be stored by Facebook as compared to simultaneous transmission of information through interception. However, it also concluded the CDWs relied upon in these two matters were too lengthy in duration under our State's warrant procedures, and therefore required modification from thirty days to ten days in duration, as prescribed by Rule 3:5-5(a). |
Appellate |
April 4, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JASON M. O'DONNELL (21-02-0011, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3118-20)
Defendant was indicted and charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 based on evidence that, during his 2018 campaign for office of mayor, he agreed to accept from an attorney $10,000 to become the city's tax attorney once defendant was elected; defendant was defeated at the polls. Defendant moved for a dismissal of the indictment. The trial judge granted the motion by relying on United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012), which interpreted the statute to exclude from criminal liability unsuccessful candidates who accept bribes. The court rejected that interpretation and reversed. |
Appellate |
March 31, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ROBERSON BURNEY (16-04-1376, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1342-18)
Defendant appeals from his jury trial convictions for first -degree robbery and related crimes. He contends the trial court erred in ruling the State could use defendant's hospital-bed statements for impeachment purposes after ruling that the interrogating detectives had failed to properly administer Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant also contends the trial court erred in permitting a victim to make an in-court identification notwithstanding that her recollection was tainted when a detective told her that photographs of her stolen watch, that were taken by the perpetrator during the robbery, had been extracted from defendant's cell phone. At the time of the interrogation, defendant was in a hospital intensive care unit awaiting overdue dialysis. Defendant was hooked up to an intravenous line (IV) and an electrocardiogram (EKG). A notation in his medical chart shows that he was suffering from "toxic/metabolic derangement." The Miranda waiver colloquy and ensuing interrogation was not audio- or videorecorded, even though the detectives had traveled to the hospital for the purpose of interviewing defendant. The court concludes the detectives were not qualified to make a medical judgment as to defendant's cognitive capacity. Because the hospital -bed interrogation was not electronically recorded, the trial judge could not independently assess defendant's outward condition. Importantly, the trial judge candidly acknowledged that he did not have the benefit of an expert medical witness and thus did not fully understand the meaning of some of the terms used in defendant's hospital chart to describe defendant's medical condition at the time of the police interrogation. The court recognizes that judicial review of the circumstances of a custodial interrogation must be "searching and critical" to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights. Furthermore, the State bears the burden to prove the voluntariness of defendant's hospital-bed admissions beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore deems it necessary to remand the case for the State to present expert testimony concerning defendant's medical condition and for the trial court to make specific findings of fact and law as to the impact of that condition on the voluntariness of defendant's statements to police, considering the totality of all relevant circumstances. The court rejects the State's alternative argument on appeal that even if the trial court erred in permitting the statements to be used for impeachment purposes, that error was harmless. The record in this case clearly shows that the trial court's ruling to allow defendant's statements to be admitted for impeachment purposes significantly impacted defendant's decision to waive his right to testify on his own behalf. The court follows New Jersey and United States Supreme Court precedent that almost any error in allowing otherwise inadmissible evidence to be admitted for impeachment purposes results in reversal because an appellate court cannot not logically term "harmless" an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying. The court also addresses—and rejects—defendant's contention that the trial court erred by permitting a victim to make an in-court identification of defendant, and by declining to instruct the jury that a detective had tainted her memory by mentioning defendant's name when discussing a photograph defendant had taken of the victim's stolen watch. The court notes this is an unusual situation in that the suggestive information was not conveyed during a traditional pretrial identification procedure such as a photo-array session. Rather, the information was conveyed when the victim confirmed that the photograph, she was shown depicted her watch that was stolen during the robbery.The court concludes the information as to defendant's name, which was conveyed to the victim before trial, was suggestive in that it had the capacity to influence the victim's in-court identification. However, that circumstance was fully presented to the jury through skillful cross-examination. Indeed, the victim candidly acknowledged that her positive in-court identification was influenced by a deduction she drew from the information provided by the detective, not from her independent recollection of the physical appearance of the robber. The court concludes that in these circumstances, there was little danger that the jury might overstate its inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by an eyewitness who honestly believed her identification of the perpetrator is accurate. The court thus concludes that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that any inherent unreliability in the victim's in-court identification would be better addressed to the jury by way of cross-examination and appropriate instructions. |
Appellate |
March 31, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RAMI A. AMER (18-06-0460, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3047-18)
Defendant Rami A. Amer appeals from his convictions for a series of "smash and grab" burglaries, arguing, in part, that his charges should have been dismissed because he was not brought to trial within the timeframe permitted under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 to -15. The court concludes defendant was timely brought to trial under the IAD after he agreed, through counsel, to a trial date beyond the initial 180-day deadline. The court also determines that even absent defendant's waiver, the filing of certain motions by defense counsel tolled the time limit under the IAD during the pendency of the motions. Accordingly, the court affirms defendant's convictions, but remands for resentencing to allow the sentencing judge to address the overall fairness of the consecutive sentences imposed, consistent with the Court's guidance in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021). |
Appellate |
March 30, 2022 |
Hamid Harris v. City of Newark
(A-59-20 ; 085028)
The trial court’s order in this case was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. A trial court’s order rejecting as a matter of law a claim of qualified immunity should not be designated as a final order appealable as of right under Rule 2:2-3(a), and federal law does not require the contrary result. In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6. |
Supreme |
March 25, 2022 |
Life With Joy, Inc. v. Township of Green/Township of Green v. Life With Joy, Inc.
(9572-2016, 8566-2017, 9068-2018, 13541-2019, 10728-2020)
Tax Court: Twp. of Green v. Life With Joy, Inc.; Docket Nos. 009572-2016 and 009068-2018; Life With Joy, Inc. v. Twp. of Green; Docket Nos. 008566-2017, 013541-2019, 010728-2020; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided March 24, 2022. For Life With Joy, Inc. – Jay J. Freireich (Freireich, LLC., attorney); For Twp. of Green – Robert B. McBriar (Schneck, Price, Smith, & King, LLP., attorneys). In granting nonprofit status under N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.3, the court found that the Subject Property was actually used in furtherance of the nonprofit’s charitable purpose, to provide a living and learning center for young adults with developmental disabilities, and that any profit-making activity happening on the Subject Property pursuant to state designed and instituted programs was de minimis. The court dismissed the untimely 2019 appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In denying the township’s claim that the exemption must be denied in light of alleged zoning violations, the court revisited the current juxtaposition between municipal land use law and N.J.S.A. 54:4-6.3 presented by Soc’y of the Holy Child Jesus v. City of Summit, 418 N.J. Super. 365, 368 (App. Div. 2011). |
Tax |
March 24, 2022 |
DEBORAH MARINO, ET AL. VS. ABEX CORPORATION, ET AL. (L-0836-10, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1523-19)
The court considered defendant Ford Motor Company's (Ford) appeal from a final judgment awarding plaintiff Deborah Marino, Executrix for the Estate of Anita Creutzberger, (decedent) damages for decedent's death from peritoneal mesothelioma. Ford contended that the trial court erred in ruling that Ford violated a consent order and in implementing sanctions. Decedent's husband and son worked at several Ford car dealerships where brake dust would spread and cover them. They brought dust home on their clothing where it was laundered by decedent. Decedent's estate sued Ford alleging decedent was exposed to asbestos from Ford brakes and that this exposure caused her mesothelioma. Among other allegations, the estate asserted that Ford negligently violated its duty to protect dealership workers and their families by failing to provide them with the same warnings and guidance for handling its asbestos products that it provided to its own employees. The parties resolved a discovery dispute with a consent order. Ford agreed to search for Ford training materials that referred to asbestos or handling asbestos products and to produce any responsive documents and a corporate witness having knowledge of facts relating to Ford's training. During the deposition of this designated witness, the employee denied any knowledge of relevant training manuals and any recent testimony regarding the same. Plaintiff's counsel confronted the employee with a 1974 Ford training manual, which the employee admitted he had seen and then confirmed he had been questioned about in another case a few months earlier. The trial court, upon plaintiff's motion, sanctioned Ford by: (1) directing verdict to plaintiff on the issues of duty and breach; and (2) ordering that the jury be advised that Ford violated a court order and withheld evidence, so duty and breach of duty had been resolved against them. The court subsequently concluded that the sanctions order necessarily included a directed verdict on general, but not specific, causation. Ford appealed. This court's review found little support for Ford's claims that it acted in good faith in responding to plaintiff's discovery requests and did not violate the consent order. The trial court's sanctions directly corresponded to the violation. The trial court's subsequent inclusion of a directed verdict on general causation flowed from the fact that a duty to warn only exists when the product is dangerous. Ford presented experts to opine against specific causation of decedent's mesothelioma, but these experts also discussed general causation, mooting Ford's argument that it was prejudiced by the order's directed verdict for general causation. The court discerned no abuse of the trial court's discretion to impose sanctions for violating the consent order and affirmed. |
Appellate |
March 24, 2022 |
M.A.P. VS. E.B.A. (FD-09-0282-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1057-21)
In this appeal, the court considered whether two of the seven subsections of New Jersey's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act's long arm statute permitted exertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident alleged to have fathered a child through a sexual relationship with a New Jersey resident that occurred in New York. The court held that the out-of-state act that allegedly caused conception, even though coupled with the nonresident's knowledge that plaintiff was a New Jersey resident, could not be the nonresident's "act" under N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.129(a)(5), which authorizes personal jurisdiction when "the child resides in this State as a result of the [nonresident's] acts or directives." The court also found unavailing N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.129(a)(7), which allows for the exertion of personal jurisdiction whenever commensurate with due process, because the nonresident defendant lacked sufficient contacts with this State. As a matter of first impression, the court also held that the policies underlying N.J.R.E. 408 precluded consideration in the jurisdictional analysis of a letter sent to plaintiff by defendant's New Jersey lawyer proposing an amicable resolution. |
Appellate |
March 17, 2022 |
Aleice Jeter v. Sam’s Club
(A-2-21 ; 085880)
The mode of operation rule does not apply to the sale of grapes in closed clamshell containers. Selling grapes in this manner does not create a reasonably foreseeable risk that grapes will fall to the ground in the process of ordinary customer handling. The Court stresses that dispositive motions should not be made or decided on the eve of trial, without providing the parties with a reasonable opportunity to present their cases through testimony and argument. |
Supreme |
March 16, 2022 |
State v. Anthony Sims, Jr.
(A-53-20 ; 085369)
The Court declines to adopt the new rule prescribed by the Appellate Division and finds no plain error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police. The Court also concurs with the trial court that the victim’s testimony at the pretrial hearing was admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A)’s exception to the hearsay rule for the prior testimony of a witness unavailable at trial, and that the admission of that testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights. |
Supreme |
March 14, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. E.R. (18-08-1800, 18-08-1838 AND 18-12-2955, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1294-19)
Defendant E.R. appealed from her judgments of conviction, arguing the trial court erred when it entered an order affirming the prosecutor's denial of her application for admission to the pretrial intervention program (PTI), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12. The court concludes the State: (1) failed to detail the level of mental health supervision defendant required, considering her lack of a criminal history and her recent, significant efforts to rehabilitate herself; (2) neglected to explain how the level of supervision defendant would receive on PTI differed significantly from the level she would receive on probation and why the necessary level of supervision through PTI would be inadequate; and (3) failed to address why defendant's lack of criminal history and compliance with mental health treatment were not weighed in favor of her entry into PTI. Accordingly, the court vacates the underlying order denying defendant entry into the PTI program, and remands for further proceedings. |
Appellate |
March 14, 2022 |
Richard Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor’s Office
(A-58-20 ; 084867)
*OPRA does not permit access to internal affairs reports, but those records can and should be disclosed under the common law right of access -- subject to appropriate redactions -- when interests that favor disclosure outweigh concerns for confidentiality. The Court provides guidance on how to conduct that balancing test. |
Supreme |
March 14, 2022 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF BORDENTOWN, ETC. (L-1579-15, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0357-20)
This court addressed whether an amended agreement between the Township of Bordentown and the Fair Share Housing Center satisfied the Township's Third Round obligations under Mount Laurel. This court held the trial court correctly found the amended agreement sets forth a plan that provides a realistic opportunity for the Township to meet its Mount Laurel obligations. We also reiterated that performing work for developers in other Mount Laurel cases does not in-and-of-itself create a conflict of interest for the special master appointed by the trial judge. |
Appellate |
March 10, 2022 |
IN THE MATTER OF MICKEY YOUNG, ETC. (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)
(A-0400-20)
The sole issue raised in this administrative appeal is whether an appointing authority may unilaterally reduce a sanction from major to minor discipline after the employee is served with a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA). Because the Civil Service Act and accompanying regulations generally permit an employee to appeal only major disciplinary actions, the reduction in sanction divests the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction to hear the employee's appeal from an adverse administrative decision. The court reviewed the statutory and regulatory schemes and rejected the employee's argument that the governing provisions prohibit the appointing authority from reducing the penalty after an FNDA has been issued. The court also found unavailing the employee's contention that the reduction in penalty and resulting divestiture of the Commission's jurisdiction violated his right to due process. In doing so, the court distinguished the present matter – involving a reduction in penalty – from its prior decision in Hammond v. Monmouth County. Sheriff's Department, 317 N.J. Super. 199 (App. Div. 1999), which held an appointing authority may not add charges to the FNDA. Because the court determined no provision of the Act or accompanying regulations proscribed the appointing authority's inherent discretion to reduce a penalty after an FNDA has been issued to a Civil Service employee, the court concluded the Commission properly upheld the Administrative Law Judge's initial decision, dismissing the employee's complaint on summary decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Appellate |
March 10, 2022 |
DENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATES SOUTH JERSEY, PA, ET AL. VS. RRI GIBBSBORO, LLC, ET AL. (L-3993-20, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0320-21)
The court holds an attorney cannot be disqualified for a conflict of interest pursuant to RPC 1.9 and RPC 1.10(b) based solely on the content of the initial pleadings where the factual basis for the alleged conflict of interest is contested. The two-pronged analysis required by City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 467 (2010) mandates a factfinding before a court can conclude disqualification is required because an attorney represented a former client in a substantially related matter. |
Appellate |
March 9, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHELANGELO TROISI (2019-22, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1324-20)
Defendant, Michelangelo Troisi, appeals the Law Division order denying his de novo appeal of a guilty finding against him in Princeton Municipal Court for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3, use of hands-free and hand-held wireless communication devices while driving. At the municipal court trial, defendant argued that the manner in which he was using his cell phone while driving was not a violation of the plain meaning of the statute. Defendant testified and admitted that his conduct in the car required him to divert his attention from steering his vehicle on a public road for enough time to enter his six-digit passcode, open the Google Maps app, and place the cursor in the search window. The municipal court judge found defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3 and imposed a fine. Defendant appealed de novo to the Law Division, which found defendant guilty of the traffic violation for substantially the same reasons as the municipal court: defendant's actions in his car exceeded the bounds of the statute. Applying well-established principles of statutory construction, the court held that making multiple keystrokes on a cellphone to locate and use an app such as Google Maps while driving would constitute an offense under N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3 and that the Law Division and municipal court did not abuse their discretion in finding that defendant's conduct was a violation. The court also held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it fairly puts motorists on notice of what category of activity is impermissible. |
Appellate |
March 8, 2022 |
Kathleen M. Moynihan v. Edward J. Lynch
(A-64-20 ; 085157)
The palimony agreement, as written and signed, without the attorney review requirement, is enforceable. That portion of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which imposes an attorney-review requirement to enforce a palimony agreement, contravenes Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The parties did not enter an oral palimony agreement. |
Supreme |
March 7, 2022 |
Libertarians for Transparent Government v. Cumberland County
(A-34-20 ; 084956)
Most personnel records are confidential under OPRA. But under the law’s plain language, certain items qualify as a government record including a person’s name, title, "date of separation and the reason therefor." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10. To the extent that information appears in a settlement agreement, the record should be available to the public after appropriate redactions are made. |
Supreme |