Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Aug. 8, 2023 |
Suzanne Cardali v. Michael Cardali
(A-25-22 ; 087340)
A movant need not present evidence on all of the cohabitation factors set forth in Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) -- or in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), for cases in which the PSA was executed after the statute’s enactment -- to make a prima facie showing. If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movant has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation and should grant limited discovery tailored to the issues contested in the motion, subject to any protective order necessary to safeguard confidential information. Here, defendant presented prima facie evidence as to several of the Konzelman cohabitation factors, and that evidence, if unrebutted, would warrant a finding of cohabitation. Defendant was therefore entitled to limited discovery. |
Supreme |
Aug. 7, 2023 |
State v. Jason M. O’Donnell
(A-17-22 ; 087023)
The bribery statute applies to any “person” who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” Ibid. So even if a candidate is unable to follow through on a corrupt promise, the language of the bribery statute makes it a crime to accept cash payments for a promise of future performance. The bribery statute’s history, relevant caselaw, and commentary from the Model Penal Code, on which the statute is modeled, confirm that the law extends to candidates. |
Supreme |
Aug. 4, 2023 |
E.W. v. W.M-H.
(FV-07-2446-22)
The question presented to the trial court was whether the immunity statute relating to DCPP referrals found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.13 confers immunity to DCPP referrals made with the intent to harass a victim of domestic violence as defined under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. There was no prior precedent resolving this issue. In harmonizing the two statutes, the trial court found that it would be contrary to legislative intent to confer immunity in the realm of domestic violence as that would permit the weaponization of DCPP referrals as a means of perpetrating domestic violence. This matter arose out of an application for a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. At the conclusion of the trial, the only predicate act surviving was the act of calling DCPP to report allegations of abuse in order to harass the victim. The trial court noted that the Legislature intended to protect children as the primary purpose in enacting the immunity statute regarding DCPP referrals. Additionally, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18 expressly provides that children can suffer emotionally from the exposure to domestic violence, and that children may also be a victim of domestic violence. Thus, the trial court concluded that the application of the DCPP immunity statute to allegations of harassment under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Acts fails as a matter of law under the doctrine of absurdity. Even though the trial court found that the defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by making reports to DCPP, the trial court ultimately found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), and denied the application for a final restraining order. |
Trial |
Aug. 3, 2023 |
Leander Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board
(A-26-22 ; 087613)
The Parole Board cannot mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting. |
Supreme |
Aug. 3, 2023 |
MUSCONETCONG WATERSHED ASSOCIATION VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ET AL. (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION)
(A-2491-20)
On February 23, 2017, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a flood hazard area applicability determination (FHA Determination) to Hampton Farm, LLC (Hampton Farm). Shortly thereafter, appellant Musconetcong Watershed Association (MW Association) requested the DEP to conduct an adjudicatory hearing so it could challenge the FHA Determination. Four years later, on April 6, 2021, the DEP denied that request. MW Association timely appealed from the April 6, 2021 decision. It also sought leave to appeal from the February 23, 2017 FHA Determination, contending it had become final when the DEP denied MW Association's request for a hearing. On an interlocutory motion, a two-judge panel of the court denied leave. The court now reconsiders, reverses that interlocutory ruling, and grants leave to appeal. The court holds that the DEP's FHA Determination became a final agency decision subject to appeal when the DEP denied MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the FHA Determination. At that time, all administrative remedies were exhausted. To address the DEP's four-year time delay in deciding MW Association's request for an adjudicatory hearing, the court holds that any party, including a third-party objector, has the right to petition the DEP to rule on a pending request for an adjudicatory hearing under N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a). The DEP will then have thirty days from receipt of the petition to "inform all parties of its determination" regarding that request. N.J.A.C. 1:1-4.1(a). The court also holds that MW Association did not have a right to an adjudicatory hearing because no statute conferred that right to MW Association, which is a third-party objector, and MW Association did not have a particularized property interest warranting a hearing. Accordingly, the court affirms the April 6, 2021 final agency decision. Finally, because the court has reversed the ruling on the interlocutory motion, the DEP has two options concerning its FHA Determination. It can either (1) elect to address MW Association's challenges to its February 23, 2017 FHA Determination and a new briefing schedule will be issued; or (2) request a remand so it can expand and update the factual findings supporting its FHA Determination. |
Appellate |
Aug. 2, 2023 |
CHRISTOPHER NEUWIRTH VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. (L-1083-20, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3695-21)
Plaintiff, who had been terminated from his position as assistant commissioner for the Department of Health, filed a complaint against the State, alleging a claim under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff asserted a defamation claim against Governor Philip D. Murphy. A Law Division judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation claim, concluding plaintiff had not pleaded the element of actual malice with sufficient specificity. |
Appellate |
Aug. 2, 2023 |
State v. Roberson Burney
(A-14-22 ; 086966)
The trial court erred in admitting both the testimony placing defendant’s phone at or near the crime scene and the first-time in-court identification. Those errors, in combination, deprived defendant of a fair trial. |
Supreme |
Aug. 2, 2023 |
State v. Quintin D. Watson
(A-23-22 ; 087251)
(1) Based on the identification evidence alone, defendant’s conviction cannot stand. The inherently suggestive nature of first-time in-court identifications, conducted in front of a jury, risks depriving defendants of their due process rights. The Court holds that first-time in-court identifications may only be conducted when there is good reason for them and sets forth certain practices that must be observed in connection with in-court identifications. (2) The narration evidence in this case also ran afoul of the evidence rules, which do not allow for continuous, running commentary on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a recording. The Court identifies certain safeguards to underscore the limited use of narration evidence and adds that a party intending to present narration evidence should provide opposing counsel with a written summary of the proposed testimony before trial. (3) Confrontation Clause challenges are fact-specific. The testimony here about consultation with other law enforcement agencies violated defendant’s right to confrontation, and the Court provides guidance for remand. |
Supreme |
Aug. 2, 2023 |
State v. Dante C. Allen
(A-55-21 ; 086699)
The Court disagrees with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the trial court should have excluded all the detective’s narration of the surveillance video. The trial court properly permitted the detective to testify about the manner in which he used the surveillance video to guide his investigation. Applying principles stated today in State v. Watson, _ N.J. _ (2023) (slip op. at 46-60), the detective’s testimony opining that the video showed defendant turning and firing his weapon should have been excluded from evidence. However, that error was harmless given the strength of the State’s evidence. |
Supreme |
July 25, 2023 |
JOSEPH JOHNSON, ET AL. VS. CITY OF HOBOKEN, ET AL. (L-2813-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1596-21)
Plaintiffs sued defendants, a law firm and three individuals associated with the firm, claiming that their rights of privacy had been violated when defendants failed to redact their personal identifiers contrary to the directive of Rule 1:38-7. Plaintiffs also contended that defendants violated one plaintiff's right of privacy by including records of that plaintiff's arrest and criminal charges. The court holds that Rule 1:38-7 did not create a private cause of action for a violation of the Rule. Instead, the remedy for a violation of Rule 1:38-7 is set forth in the Rule, which states that a party or other interested individual can move, on an expedited basis, to replace documents containing unredacted personal identifiers with redacted documents. R. 1:38-7(g). The court also holds that plaintiffs failed to state viable causes of action for invasions of privacy or infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. |
Appellate |
July 25, 2023 |
Elizabeth Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc.
(A-20/21/22/23-21 ; 085547)
510(k) evidence is generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised not only on principles of negligence, but particularly on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, evidence of 510(k) clearance has significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division. However, the Court parts ways with the Appellate Division’s decision as to its suggestion that the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be determined in a Rule 104 hearing. Instead, the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which is how the issue was and, presumably, will be raised. Section 5 of the PLA does not bar plaintiffs’ recovery of punitive damages, and because evidence of 510(k) clearance should have been admitted in the first stage of trial as relevant to the reasonableness of Bard’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, it would also be admissible in the second, punitive damages stage. |
Supreme |
July 14, 2023 |
JOSEPH BERARDO VS. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET AL. (L-0324-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1342-21)
Defendant City of Jersey City's (City) Code of Ordinances Section 105 permits any individual to request a "determination of significance" from the City's Historic Preservation Officer (HPO) regarding whether a subject building warrants preservation. Consistent with local ordinances, plaintiff, who owns a circa-1900 building in Jersey City, sought a determination of significance before applying for a demolition permit. The City's HPO concluded plaintiff's building likely would not be approved for demolition due to its historic, architectural, and cultural significance. Pursuant to local zoning ordinance, plaintiff appealed to defendant Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which upheld the determination of significance. Thereafter, he filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division alleging defendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Law Division found the ZBA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and dismissed the complaint. The court concludes the HPO's issuance of a determination of significance — an advisory opinion seemingly intended to prevent plaintiff's submission of an application for a demolition permit — is not a procedure authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163. The MLUL does not authorize HPOs to unilaterally grant or deny historic preservation designations that bind a zoning officer in determining whether a demolition permit shall issue; that advisory function belongs solely to the Historic Preservation Commission, as detailed in the MLUL, and cannot be delegated to other entities or individuals. The Commission, in turn, may designate a site as historic only if it is voted upon by a majority of the full governing body. The court reverses and remands to allow plaintiff to apply for a demolition permit in accordance with the MLUL. The court also concludes Jersey City's Code of Ordinances Sections 105-3, 105-4, and 105-7 are ultra vires and inconsistent with the objectives and procedures concerning historic preservation mandated by the MLUL to the extent they delegate powers reserved for a municipality's historic preservation commission to the HPS. |
Appellate |
July 12, 2023 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF M.P. (FJ-07-0934-20, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1229-22)
M.P., a juvenile, is charged with gun possession and participation in a murder. He appeals the trial judge's decision to admit the statement he gave to detectives during a stationhouse interrogation, which was attended by his mother. M.P. asks the court to adopt a new categorical rule that would prohibit police from conducting a stationhouse interrogation of a juvenile unless the minor has consulted with an attorney. M.P. relies on neuroscience and behavioral science research that shows juveniles are not only more impulsive and compliant than adults but also tend to lack the cognitive skills to comprehend Miranda rights. He contends that in view of advances in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development, no juvenile should be subjected to a stationhouse interrogation—with or without parental participation—until the juvenile has consulted with counsel. The court explains it has no authority to pronounce any such per se requirement. While acknowledging there have been significant reforms to New Jersey's juvenile justice system in recent years based on scientific research on how a juvenile's brain develops and how it functions differently from a fully mature adult brain, the court holds those studies do not grant it authority to substantially rework the State's juvenile interrogation jurisprudence, and certainly not to overturn New Jersey Supreme Court precedents. The court concludes that while the rules and principles announced in those precedents are not immutable, it is for our Supreme Court and the Legislature—not an intermediate appellate court—to weigh the benefits and costs of the major juvenile justice system policy shift M.P. proposes. The court also declines M.P.'s request to revise the Miranda warnings to make them more comprehensible to adolescents. While noting the current warnings are not sacrosanct and might be improved based on juvenile brain research, the court concludes the task of revising the warnings to address the inherent differences between adults and juveniles would benefit from a collaborative process the court cannot provide. Turning to the application of existing precedents to the present case, although the court is mindful of the deference it owes to the trial judge's factual findings, it concludes that considering all relevant circumstances, including M.P.'s intellectual challenges, mental conditions, highly emotional state, and the role his mother played, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. The court therefore reverses the trial judge's decision. The court rejects the State's argument that reviewing courts should not consider an interrogee's personal characteristics, such as intelligence and education background, if those circumstances were not known by or "noticeable" to police. The court holds those circumstances remain relevant notwithstanding they may not manifest outwardly during an interrogation. The court explains that reviewing courts do not employ a purely objective test when determining whether the State proved a valid Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather consider the characteristics of the accused and not just the details of the interrogation. The court also rules the guidance the Supreme Court provided in State in Int. of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 354 (2020)—which held police should provide an opportunity for a juvenile and parent to consult privately after Miranda warnings are given—did not mandate a new rule of police procedure but rather amplified the existing totality-of-the-circumstances test. Accordingly, the court reasons the rationale undergirding A.A. should be given retroactive effect. |
Appellate |
July 10, 2023 |
MTAG AS CUST FOR ATCF II NJ, LLC VS. TAO INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL. (F-002270-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3138-21)
The court considered plaintiff's challenge to a trial court order vacating a final judgment by default in a tax sale foreclosure. Plaintiff obtained a final judgment by default on its tax sale lien and defendants timely moved to vacate the order, alleging defective service of process. The trial court found sufficient defects with process to warrant vacating the final judgment, which reopened the redemption period and allowed defendant to redeem. The court affirmed, concluding service of process was defective pursuant to both the general court rules governing personal service, as well as the RULLCA-specific statute governing service of process on LLCs, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. The court noted the differences between service rules in RULLCA and the Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to: 18-11, in finding plaintiff's waiver argument unavailing. Although RULLCA and the BCA contain some similarities, the rules governing service are distinct and materially different. Service upon a corporation in New Jersey is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(6) and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2, whereas service upon an LLC is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(5), and RULLCA, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. The RULLCA service of process provision contains an additional method of service lacking in the BCA, providing, as a permissive alternative, that where personal service in accordance with the court rules fails despite reasonably diligent efforts, service may be made upon the State filing office. N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17(b). The BCA service of process provisions do not authorize the State to accept process as an agent of a corporation. R. 4:4-4(a)(6); N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2. Because final judgment was vacated, the court followed Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 252 N.J. 265 (2022), in holding the period of redemption reopened and continued until barred by a valid final judgment of the Superior Court. The court interpreted the holding in Green Knight, in conjunction with Rule 4:64-6(b) and the tax sale law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), to mean the redemption period reopens when a final judgment in foreclosure is timely vacated. |
Appellate |
July 5, 2023 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JASON W. VANDEREE (19-05-0357, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2329-21)
Defendant injected himself with fentanyl-laced heroin, lost control of an SUV he had been driving, his vehicle crashed into a gas station, and tragically killed three persons and injured others. He pled guilty to three counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of thirty years, with the requirement that he serve over twenty-five years before he is eligible for parole. Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence. He argues that the warrantless search of his clothes, conducted at a hospital over an hour after his arrest, was unlawful, and that he is entitled to a resentencing. The court holds that the search of his clothes was a lawful search incident to his arrest. The court also holds that the sentencing court conducted the appropriate analysis and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three consecutive prison terms of ten years for the death of each victim. Accordingly, the court affirms defendant's convictions and his sentence. |
Appellate |
July 3, 2023 |
THOMAS MAKUCH, LLC VS. TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON, ET AL. (L-0537-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3679-20)
This appeal arises out of an action challenging the suspension of a company that had been providing towing services in a municipality. As a matter of first impression, the court holds that the company had limited constitutional due process rights when it was suspended from the Township's towing lists. The court also holds that plaintiff received the process due its limited property interest. In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments that its suspension from the towing lists violated its constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Township, its police chief, and one of its police officers. |
Appellate |
July 3, 2023 |
State v. Rami A. Amer
(A-9-22 ; 086950)
The trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court does not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD. But the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s other determinations -- that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the deadline. |
Supreme |
July 3, 2023 |
KAREN MCKNIGHT VS. BOARD OF REVIEW, ET AL. (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR)
(A-3067-20)
Appellant Karen McKnight appeals from the Board of Review's (the "Board") August 26, 2022 final agency decision, which held her liable to return an overpayment of $6,277 for unemployment benefits she was allegedly ineligible to receive for the weeks ending June 30, 2018 through May 4, 2019, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). The central issue on appeal is whether a claimant, who is otherwise separated from full-time employment, may include wages received from a part-time position, which they continue to maintain, in the calculation of their average weekly wage for purposes of unemployment benefits. The court concluded that the exclusion of the wages contravenes the legislative purpose of the unemployment benefits statute and is arbitrary as legally unsupported. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of benefits. |
Appellate |
June 30, 2023 |
ALVIN SINGER VS. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC. (L-3543-20, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2981-21)
In this appeal from the Law Division's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court was asked to consider, for the first time, whether a motor vehicle subject to a recall notice alone is sufficient to establish a claim pursuant to the New Jersey Lemon Law statute, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49. Defendant issued a recall notice that encompassed plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to the dealer to have the recall repair performed. Primarily due to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's ability to complete the recall was delayed. A Law Division judge granted defendant summary judgment. The court affirmed and held the existence of a recall notice alone is not sufficient to establish the "nonconformity" element of a Lemon Law claim. In addition, because plaintiff primarily used the vehicle for business purposes, it is excluded from the Lemon Law's coverage. |
Appellate |
June 29, 2023 |
Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey
(A-61-21/A-7-22 ; 087054)
Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution. |
Supreme |