Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
April 26, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHAEL CLARITY (13-10-0621, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-4831-16T2)
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) permits imposition of an extended prison term when a defendant was convicted of at least two separate prior crimes but only if "the latest" of those crimes was committed or the defendant's "last release from confinement" occurred – "whichever is later" – within ten years of the charged crime. Because the last of defendant's prior crimes was committed in Florida ten years and three weeks before the crime charged here, and because defendant was not "confined" – he was sentenced in Florida to a probationary term and being on probation is not the same as being "confined" – the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, including development of the State's late claim that the consequences of defendant's violation of the Florida probationary term within the ten-year period permits a finding of "confinement" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). |
Appellate |
April 25, 2018 |
NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. VS. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP., ET AL. CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS CORP. VS. NRG REMA LLC, ET AL. (L-3587-15 AND L-0344-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-5432-15T3/A-0567-16T3)
In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind. |
Appellate |
April 25, 2018 |
State v. Todd Dorn
(A-54-16 ; 078399)
The amendment to count two of defendant’s indictment was a violation of defendant’s right to grand jury presentment under the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant waived his right to object to the map’s authentication. |
Supreme |
April 24, 2018 |
JANELL GOFFE VS. FOULKE MANAGEMENT CORP., ET AL. SASHA ROBINSON, ET AL. VS. MALL CHEVROLET, INC. (L-4162-16 AND L-4122-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-2658-16T4/A-2659-16T4)
In these appeals, the court reviewed orders compelling arbitration because the automobile sales contracts executed by plaintiffs included an agreement to arbitrate all disputes. Although the record revealed disputed facts about contract-formation issues that the trial courts must be resolved before arbitration may be compelled, the court also recognized there was no dispute that the parties mutually agreed to rescind those sales contracts. Consequently, among other things, the court held that the trial judges erred in compelling arbitration of any claims relating to the agreements to rescind, which did not contain arbitration provisions. The orders under review were reversed and both cases remanded for trial court proceedings to determine, among other things, whether plaintiffs' claims were based on the sales contracts or on the agreements to rescind |
Appellate |
April 24, 2018 |
SAVE CAMDEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ET AL. VS. CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. (L-1552-16, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0133-16T2)
In this appeal the court interprets two statutes concerning the right of Camden citizens to vote on the classification of their school district. That vote will determine whether members of the Camden City Board of Education (Board) are elected or appointed by the mayor. Plaintiffs contend that a vote on that issue was required in April 2014, under a 2010 amendment to the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act (MRERA), N.J.S.A. 52:27BBB-63.1(c). Defendants counter that because the school district was placed into full State intervention in 2013, the classification vote is not required until the district satisfies certain performance indicators under the Quality Single Accountability Continuum Act (QSAC), N.J.S.A. 18A:7A-49(e). MRERA and QSAC contain provisions that set forth different frameworks for school district classification votes. The court holds that the 2010 amendment to MRERA governs because its language is clear in granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote, and nothing in QSAC restricts that right. Granting Camden citizens the right to a school district classification vote does not interfere with the State's full intervention because the Board will continue to serve in an advisory role until the conditions of QSAC are satisfied. Accordingly, the trial court's August 15, 2016 order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is reversed. The case is remanded with direction that the trial court conduct a hearing within thirty days to determine when the school district classification vote will be held. |
Appellate |
April 24, 2018 |
State in the Interest of C.K.
(A-15-16 ; 077672)
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent as sex offenders. In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period. |
Supreme |
April 23, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LUIS MELENDEZ (11-02-0332, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1301-15T1)
The case concerns the State's use, in a criminal prosecution, of defendant's answer filed in a parallel civil forfeiture action. As part of its proof that defendant was the occupant of a bedroom in which drugs were seized, the State introduced in evidence the defendant's forfeiture answer, in which he asserted that he owned $2900 in cash seized from the same bedroom. While rejecting defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment arguments, the court held that the process by which defendant was induced to file his answer in the civil forfeiture action was fundamentally unfair. Although the State should have been barred from introducing the answer, it was harmless error in light of the other evidence linking defendant to the premises. The court also provided some procedural guidance for future forfeiture cases, and referred the issue to the Criminal and Civil Practice Committees for their consideration |
Appellate |
April 23, 2018 |
State v. Malcolm C. Hagans
(A-37-16 ; 078014)
Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.
|
Supreme |
April 19, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. A.T.C. (15-05-0305, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-4302-15T4)
The court holds the Jessica Lunsford Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, which imposes mandatory minimum sentencing and parole ineligibility requirements for aggravated sexual assault of a victim less than thirteen years old, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by impermissibly impairing the State's right to engage in plea bargaining, nor does it impermissibly limit the trial court's authority to reject the plea agreement. The court further holds the Jessica Lunsford Act was not superseded by the earlier enacted and later effective amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7). |
Appellate |
April 19, 2018 |
State v. Dorian Pressley a/k/a Justin Belton
(A-52-16 ; 078747)
Based on the record, the Court cannot determine whether part or all of the protections outlined in Henderson should apply to identifications made by law enforcement officers. For the reasons expressed, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division and upholds defendant’s convictions |
Supreme |
April 19, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN GORMAN (14-08-1450, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3481-16T4)
After determining defendant's plea allocution did not establish a factual basis for each element of theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, because defendant did not admit he deceived the victims at the time he obtained their money, the court ruled the trial judge's reliance on the theft consolidation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a), to accept defendant's factual basis for a different form of theft was misplaced as that statute applies only in trial settings — not to plea proceedings. |
Appellate |
April 18, 2018 |
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders
(A-71-16 ; 079277)
The plain language of the Religious Aid Clause bars the use of taxpayer funds to repair and restore churches, and Morris County’s program ran afoul of that longstanding provision. Based on its understanding of the current state of the law, including the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017), the Court concludes that that the application of the Religious Aid Clause in this case does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. |
Supreme |
April 17, 2018 |
Mark R. Krzykalski v. David T. Tindall
(A-55-16 ; 078744)
The jury properly apportioned fault between defendant and the John Doe defendant because plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the role of John Doe in the accident, plaintiff’s UM carrier was aware of the litigation, and plaintiff had fair and timely notice that defendant would assert that John Doe was the cause of the accident. |
Supreme |
April 16, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMES HEMENWAY (12-10-1597, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0622-15T2)
Defendant's putative paramour filed a complaint against defendant under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, alleging he forcibly entered her residence and assaulted and threatened her. After considering the victim's sworn testimony, a Family Part judge issued an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(g) and a warrant to search defendant's apartment and seize any firearms as authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(j). The police arrested defendant on fourth degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(1), when he refused to permit the officers to enter his apartment to execute the domestic violence search warrant. Once inside, the officers found in plain view cocaine and drug paraphernalia. Based on the sworn testimony of a detective, a Criminal Part judge issued a telephonic warrant to search the apartment for narcotics. |
Appellate |
April 16, 2018 |
IN RE: VICINAGE 13 OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT; WARREN COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR; NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, WARREN REGION; WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS (L-1806-12, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4293-15T3)
The remodeling of Courtroom No. 2 in Warren County has been the subject of years of litigation. The matter was first initiated by the Office of Public Defender (OPD), when it successfully objected to a criminal trial being conducted there, after renovations made in 2008. The OPD took the position that a defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the design of the courtroom. Warren County eventually filed an action for judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-5 to -62, that more recent modifications satisfied any constitutional concerns. The panel reversed the judge's decision that the OPD lacked standing to participate in the proceedings, remanded the case, and suggested the appointment of a special master to make findings and develop a more complete factual record under Rule 4:41-1. |
Appellate |
April 16, 2018 |
David Spade v. Select Comfort Corp.; Christopher Wenger v. Bob’s Discount Furniture, LLC
(A-57-16 ; 078611)
(1) The inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) in contracts of sale or sale orders for the delivery of household furniture may alone give rise to a violation of a "clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller" for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. (2) A consumer who receives a contract that includes language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), but who suffers no monetary or other harm as a result of that noncompliance, is not an "aggrieved consumer" entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. |
Supreme |
April 12, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RENE M. RODRIGUEZ STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ELIZABETH A. COLON STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ERIC L. LOWERS STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. STEPHEN E. NOLAN STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. COURTNEY D. SWIDERSKI (14-01-0102, 14-04-1027, 14-07-2144, 13-04-1
(A-5077-15T3/A-5078-15T3/A-5146-15T3/A-5147-15T3/A-5160-15T3)
Each defendant in these five back-to-back appeals by the State was convicted of fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The statute prescribes a sentence of a "fixed minimum " term of at least 180 days without parole eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c). The State contended the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing intermittent sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7). The panel concluded that a minimum period of parole ineligibility measured in days requires service of continuous twenty-four-hour periods, but does not require an uninterrupted 180-day term. The panel rejected the State's argument that intermittent periods of release were akin to parole.The panel held the trial court was authorized to impose weekend sentences running from Friday night to the same time Sunday night. Such a sentence would allow a defendant to accrue two days of credit each weekend toward the 180-day sentence. But, a sentence of nights only was not an authorized sentence, as aggregation of part-days is not permitted. The panel therefore modified two sentences; reversed two others; and remanded one for reconsideration. |
Appellate |
April 11, 2018 |
Robert Ferrante v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group
(A-87-16 ; 078496)
Due to the complete absence of notice by Ferrante to NJM at any point over years of litigation, including the lack of notice about the high-low agreement or completed jury trial during the UIM process, NJM may refuse to pay the UIM benefits. |
Supreme |
April 10, 2018 |
DWIGHT MORRIS VS. T.D. BANK, ET AL. (L-0796-15, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2268-16T1)
Plaintiff was in line at the bank behind a man of the same race who passed a note to defendant-bank's teller demanding money. The teller complied and the robber left. Another employee, seeing the note and believing the man in front of the teller's window — plaintiff — was the robber, called 9-1-1 and provided a description, including the race of the suspect. Police arrived and questioned defendant, who claimed he suffered from PTSD as a result of the incident. Plaintiff sued the bank alleging negligence in the violation of bank policies and in his misidentification as the robber. The court concludes, consistent with decisions in several other states, that there is no cause of action for negligent identification/misidentification, nor should New Jersey recognize such a tort, given the state's strong public policy to foster cooperation between citizens and law enforcement. |
Appellate |
April 4, 2018 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF T.C. (FJ-15-0859-16, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1784-16T1)
To preserve its constitutionality, the Juvenile Justice Code (Code) must be interpreted to prevent incarceration of all developmentally disabled juveniles in county detention facilities, because not all counties have access to an approved post-disposition short-term incarceration program. Because the Code prohibits the incarceration of developmentally disabled youth in a State facility, the inequity must be avoided of developmentally disabled juveniles in one county facing incarceration while those similarly situated in another do not. T.C., who was seventeen at the time of the offense, admitted participating with two other juveniles in the unarmed forcible theft of marijuana from the backpack of a fourth juvenile. Although he has already served the thirty days of incarceration imposed, the matter is not moot because he is serving juvenile probation that he could violate, and the issue is one of public importance that may evade review in the future. The disposition is reversed. |
Appellate |