Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Jan. 12, 2022 |
STEINER VS. STEINER (FM-07-2818-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2440-20)
After sixty-three years of marriage, plaintiff Sylvia Steiner commenced this divorce action. At the conclusion of a bifurcated trial for the sole purpose of resolving the parties' dispute about whether there were grounds for divorce, the trial judge found irreconcilable differences and entered a judgment of divorce. In appealing, defendant David Steiner argued, among other things, that bifurcation should not have been permitted and that the trial judge erred in finding irreconcilable differences. The court affirmed, holding that what constitutes irreconcilable differences varies from couple to couple and that the judge's determination that this couple's differences were irreconcilable and had endured for six months, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(i), was entitled to deference. The court also held that the presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in bifurcating the cause of action from the parties' equitable distribution issues because of both the parties' ages and judicial economy, considering that a potential ruling on the cause of action in defendant's favor would negate the need for a time-consuming and costly trial on the parties' extensive equitable distribution issues. |
Appellate |
Jan. 10, 2022 |
State v. James C. Zarate
(A-43-20 ; 084516)
*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012). |
Supreme |
Jan. 10, 2022 |
State v. James Comer
(A-42-20 ; 084509)
*The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the "mitigating qualities of youth." 567 U.S. 460, 476-78 (2012). |
Supreme |
Jan. 10, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TIMOTHY J. CANFIELD (16-12-3619, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5586-18)
This case arises from a violent confrontation during which defendant shot and killed his sister-in-law's former boyfriend with a bow and arrow. The case examines when a trial court in a murder prosecution must instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter when the court decides to instruct the jury on self-defense. The court rejects the notion that passion/provocation manslaughter must always be charged when self-defense is raised, noting that that the two doctrines are triggered by different material elements, serve different purposes, and produce markedly different results. The court nonetheless recognizes that both doctrines address when and how a victim's conduct may affect a defendant's culpability for causing the victim's death; the same circumstances that prompt a responsive use of deadly force may provoke an impassioned reaction, requiring that the jury in a murder trial be given the option to convict for the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. Accordingly, the court recommends a new rule of procedure that when a trial court at a Rule 1:8-7(b) charge conference decides to instruct the jury on self-defense, the court should make findings on the record whether to charge on passion/provocation manslaughter, regardless of whether the defendant requests that instruction. This will help ensure that the decision is made in the first instance by the trial court, informed by the arguments of the parties, and not by an appellate court reviewing a cold record after a verdict has already been reached. The court also highlights the significant differences between the "rational-basis" test that applies when a defendant requests a jury instruction at trial and the more demanding "clearly-indicated" test that applies when a defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the court should have delivered the instruction sua sponte. The court also addresses the geographic scope of the self-defense principle that a person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling before using deadly force, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(c). The court rejects defendant's argument that the term dwelling includes the "curtilage" of a home. The court also explains that a trial court need not instruct the jury on the principles of legal causation unless causation is at issue at trial. |
Appellate |
Jan. 3, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JESUS M. HERRERA (18-08-0668, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2021-20)
This case examines whether and in what circumstances a jury trial conviction for leaving the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, merges with a conviction for endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2. The State appealed from the trial court's decision to impose concurrent state prison terms, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2 both expressly require that the sentences be served consecutively. Defendant cross-appealed, arguing that the trial judge should have merged the two convictions. Because the decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent prison terms necessarily presupposes that a defendant has been convicted of at least two separate crimes, the threshold question is whether defendant's two convictions merge. The court applies the "flexible" multi-faceted test for merger that focuses on the elements of the crimes and the Legislature's intent in creating them, and on the specific facts of each case. See State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15 (2019). The court compared the elements of the leaving-the-scene and endangering crimes and also construes the express non-merger provisions codified in both N.J.S.A. 11-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 12-1.2. Both crimes are designed to protect injured individuals by creating incentives for persons to remain at the scene of an injury, to report the incident, and to render or summon aid. The two offenses thus offer alternative bases for punishing the same criminal conduct. With respect to the critical fact-sensitive portion of the multi-part merger test, the court concludes that there was no continuous transaction to split into stages; rather, the criminal conduct was initiated and completed in a brief instant. In this instance, the leaving-the-scene and endangering crimes involved a single voluntary act—defendant's split-second decision to abscond from the accident scene—and were committed in the same place at exactly the same time. Considering all of the relevant circumstances, the court concludes that the convictions must be merged, rendering academic the State's contention that consecutive sentences should have been imposed. |
Appellate |
Dec. 30, 2021 |
State v. William A. Gerena
(A-72-20 ; 085359)
The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Sabatino’s published opinion. The determination of whether to admit, under N.J.R.E. 701, lay opinion testimony estimating the perceived ranges of children’s ages or heights is best suited for case-by-case assessment. The Court disapproves of State v. Koettgen and its categorical approach to the admission of such lay opinion evidence about age. Henceforth, the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, shall assess whether there exists a proper foundation for the lay opinion being offered, and if so, allow its admission subject to a Rule 403 balancing of the relative probative value and prejudicial effect of the testimony. The Court generally endorses and adds to the Appellate Division’s helpful guidance to trial courts when performing that gatekeeping role and protecting against the admission of unreliable age-related lay opinion testimony. |
Supreme |
Dec. 30, 2021 |
Michele Meade v. Township of Livingston
(A-52-20 ; 085176)
Here, sufficient evidence was present for a reasonable jury to find that what Livingston Township Councilmembers perceived to be Police Chief Handschuch’s discriminatory attitude toward Township Manager Meade influenced the Council’s decision to terminate her, in violation of the LAD. Accordingly, the Court reverses the grant of summary judgment and remands this matter for trial. |
Supreme |
Dec. 29, 2021 |
SEAVIEW HARBOR REALIGNMENT COMMITTEE, LLC, ET AL. VS. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP, ET AL. (L-0079-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3048-19)
In this appeal, plaintiffs, Seaview Harbor Alignment Committee and certain residents of Seaview Harbor, challenge Egg Harbor Township's denial of their deannexation petition, which would have permitted Seaview Harbor to secede from the Township and annex with neighboring Borough of Longport. The trial court correctly affirmed the Township's decision. In doing so, the court considered and applied the three-part test enumerated in N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and concluded that although plaintiffs established that the Township's refusal to consent to deannexation was detrimental to a majority of Seaview Harbor residents, the Township's decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and plaintiffs failed to establish that deannexation would not cause significant harm to the well-being of the Township. The court holds that a petition under N.J.S.A. 40:7-12.1 may be appropriately denied where a municipality establishes that deannexation would be detrimental to the majority of residents despite the undisputed fact that deannexation would produce considerable property tax savings for the petitioning homeowners, who seek to become part of a lower tax municipality. That detriment can include the loss of significant services to the community at large, removal of a diverse citizenship, and likely erosion of valuable civic participation caused by the absence of those homeowners who seek to deannex from the community Here, the harm to the residents of Egg Harbor included not only the potential loss of revenue and attendant services, but the removal of a critical municipal resource – the diverse Seaview residents. That unique loss was not limited to its current and future economic impact, but also encompassed the transfer of a portion of Egg Harbor's population that historically participated in all phases of local government, and brought significant and substantive value to the deliberative decision-making process necessary for a healthy and robust community and government. |
Appellate |
Dec. 29, 2021 |
State v. Cynthia Rivera
(A-7-20 ; 084419)
A defendant’s youth may be considered only as a mitigating factor in sentencing and cannot support an aggravating factor. On resentencing, the sentencing court should consider mitigating factor fourteen -- that “the defendant was under [twenty six] years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). The weight to be given to that factor is within the sentencing court’s discretion. |
Supreme |
Dec. 27, 2021 |
New West Developers, LLC v Twp. of Irvington/Crown Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v Twp. of Irvington
(14704-2013, 010653-2014, 009474-2015, 014706-2013, 010648-2014, 009475-2015, 009727-2016, 009728-2016)
Tax Court: New West Developers, LLC v. Township of Irvington, Docket No. 014704-2013; 010653-2014; 009474-2015; 014706-2013; 010648-2014; 009475-2015; Crown Real Estate Holdings, Inc. v. Township of Irvington, Docket Nos. 009727-2016; 009728-2016, opinion by Bedrin Murray, J.T.C., decided December 23, 2021. For plaintiff – Daniel G. Keough (Ventura, Miesowitz, Keough & Warner, PC, attorney); for defendant – Jarrid H. Kantor (Antonelli Kantor, PC, attorney). Held: Defendant’s motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaints under N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b), which requires a taxpayer to satisfy certain local property tax obligations prior to filing an action in the Tax Court, are granted. While the requirement was previously jurisdictional, allowing the court no discretion in determining if a matter should proceed, the statute was amended in 1999 to provide for relaxation of the tax payment provision in the interests of justice. Plaintiff New West, owner of the 15 properties during tax years 2013 through 2015, offers no reason for relaxation. Plaintiff Crown, owner of the properties for tax year 2016, contends its difficulty in ascertaining arrearages owed for all tax years warrants relaxation of the tax payment requirement. The court rejects plaintiff’s argument, holding that the interests of justice would be subverted by allowing the complaints to go forward under the circumstances. In addition, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s failure to object to the non-payment of property taxes when these matters were before the county tax board bars it from raising the same objection in Tax Court. The court holds that while the county tax boards and Tax Court are governed by tax payment provisions under N.J.S.A. 54:3-27 and N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1(b) respectively, they are separate and distinct, and contain different payment schemes. Thus, the court concludes defendant is not barred from raising the objection in Tax Court. |
Tax |
Dec. 27, 2021 |
State v. Jose Carrion
(A-14-20 ; 084390)
The State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court cannot conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’ confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses in judicial proceedings, the Court addresses a method to avoid confrontation violations in these settings. |
Supreme |
Dec. 27, 2021 |
State v. Tywaun S. Hedgespeth
(A-22-20 ; 084892)
A violation occurred when the State was allowed to enter into evidence information set forth in the affidavit of a non-testifying officer concerning the no-permit results from a search of the State firearm registry, and that violation was not cured by testimony concerning the search of an Essex County firearm database. Further, the trial court’s incorrect N.J.R.E. 609 ruling constituted harmful error requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the Court declines to adopt the position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless. |
Supreme |
Dec. 23, 2021 |
Todd B. Glassman v. Steven P. Friedel, M.D.
(A-48/49/50/51-20 ; 085273)
The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the Ciluffo pro tanto credit does not further the legislative intent expressed in the Comparative Negligence Act and does not reflect developments in case law over the past four decades. In its stead, the Court sets forth a procedure to apportion any damages assessed in the trial of this case and future successive-tortfeasor cases in which the plaintiff settles with the initial tortfeasors prior to trial. |
Supreme |
Dec. 22, 2021 |
Cooper Hospital University Medical Center v. Selective Insurance Company of America
(A-46-20 ; 085211)
Because Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee in 2016, Cooper -- a Medicare provider -- was required to bill and accept payment from Medicare, which promptly covered Mecouch’s medical expenses in accordance with its fee schedule. Cooper could not seek payment from Selective other than for reimbursement of the Medicare co-payments and deductibles. |
Supreme |
Dec. 21, 2021 |
W.S. VS. DEREK HILDRETH, ET AL. (L-0043-20, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2066-20)
Plaintiff alleged he was sexually molested by his sixth-grade teacher during the 1996–97 school year, but he reasonably did not realize he suffered injury as a result until 2016. His 2017 motion to file a late notice of claim was denied without prejudice; the judge concluding the certifications in support of the motion were not based on personal knowledge and otherwise inadequate. In 2019, the Legislature made sweeping changes to the Tort Claims Act, the Child Sexual Abuse Act, and the Charitable Immunity Act, and it also enacted entirely new statutes of limitations for tort claims arising from sexual abuse and exploitation of minors, and sexual crimes committed against adults. See L. 2019, c. 120, and L. 2019, c. 239. In particular, effective December 1, 2019, plaintiffs alleging sexual abuse as a minor that occurred prior to, on or after the effective date, may file suit at any time until reaching the age of fifty-five. The date the claim accrued no longer mattered. Effective the same date, a suit alleging sexual abuse by a public employee or employer no longer needed to comply with the predicate procedural requirements of the TCA, including, the notice of claim provision in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. Plaintiff filed this suit in January 2020, and defendants — elementary school and school district — moved to dismiss, contending plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within ninety days of the accrual of his claim. Ibid. The court affirmed the motion judge's denial of defendants' motion, albeit for different reasons than he expressed. The court concluded that a retroactivity analysis was not required under the facts of this case, because plaintiff filed suit after the effective date of the new legislation and within the new statute of limitations; and, when filed, the complaint was no longer subject to the TCA's procedural requirements. |
Appellate |
Dec. 21, 2021 |
Punish and Indu Malhotra v. Director, Division of Taxation
(10788-2018)
Tax Court: Punish and Indu Malhotra v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 010788-2018; opinion by Orsen, J.T.C., decided December 16, 2021. For plaintiffs - Punish and Indu Malhotra (Self-represented); for defendant - Miles Eckardt, Deputy Attorney General (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Plaintiffs sought relief from penalties and interest after being assessed for an erroneous income tax refund due to an error on their tax return for New Jersey income tax withholding. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery of the erroneous refund with applicable penalties and interest. Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment requesting that penalties and interest be abated due to the lengthy passage of time for assessment. The court first determined whether defendant had statutory authority to recover the erroneous refund pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant argued that the statute of limitations to obtain the erroneous refund was either three years from the date the tax return was due or an extended five-year statute of limitations due to a misrepresentation of material fact on the tax return. Plaintiff argued that the mistake on the tax return does not qualify as a misrepresentation. The court found that the three-year statute of limitations expired three years from the making of the refund and the five-year statute of limitations did not apply because plaintiffs’ mistake did not rise to the level of a misrepresentation. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment to recover the erroneous refund. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was granted to abate the penalties and interest as there was no tax due and any payments made, or tax refunds withheld, were to be returned with applicable interest. |
Tax |
Dec. 16, 2021 |
Cargill Meat Solutions v. Director, Division of Taxation
(08146-2018)
Tax Court: Cargill Meat Solution, Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n; Docket No. 008146-2018, opinion by Cimino, J.T.C., decided December 15, 2021. For plaintiff - Kyle O. Sollie (Reed Smith LLP, attorneys; Kylie O. Sollie and Matthew L. Setzer on the brief); for defendant – Joseph A. Palumbo, Deputy Attorney General (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Held: The Clean Communities and Recycling Grant Act imposes a user fee, commonly referred to as the litter tax. The fee is based upon the sales of litter-generating products by manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Wholesaler-to-wholesaler sales are exempt. While plaintiff admits it manufactures the products at issue, it also asserts the wholesaler-to-wholesaler exemption applies for sales it makes to wholesalers. The court noted that under plaintiff’s argument, all manufacturers that sell to wholesalers would claim the exemption thus rendering the statutory reference to manufacturer sales superfluous. In addition, the court held that the plain language of the Act provides that the fee is based upon sales within the state, not whether the manufacturing occurred in-state. Moreover, the Legislature did not intend to put local manufacturers at a disadvantage. Finally, the longstanding regulations adopted by the Director provide that the location of where the manufacturing takes place is not determinative. |
Tax |
Dec. 16, 2021 |
E.C., ET AL. VS. LEO INGLIMA-DONALDSON, ET AL. (L-1419-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-2752-20)
In 2019, the Legislature expanded public-entity civil liability for claims based on sexual assaults and other sexual misconduct by enacting N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a), which disables in those instances the immunities provided by the Tort Claims Act. In this action, plaintiff alleges he was the victim of the sexual misconduct of a teacher employed by the defendant board of education. In appealing the partial denial of its summary judgment motion, the board argued that this new statute does not apply unless the public entity – and not just the public employee – has engaged, in the words of the statute, in "willful, wanton or grossly negligent" conduct. The board also argued that even if triggered, N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a) deprives the public entity only of its Tort Claims Act immunities, and not two defenses under the Act: the verbal threshold, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), and the declaration that a public entity "is not liable for the acts or omissions of a public employee constituting a crime . . .," N.J.S.A. 59:2-10. In affirming the denial of the board's summary judgment motion, the court enforced N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) as written, concluding that a public employee's sexual offense was sufficient to provide the "willful, wanton or grossly negligent" conduct required of "the public entity or public employee" (emphasis added). The court also held that N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 is an immunity disabled by N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) but that the verbal threshold in N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) is a limitation of liability, not an immunity, and remained applicable. |
Appellate |
Dec. 13, 2021 |
COLUMBIA FRUIT FARMS, INC., ET AL. VS. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, ET AL. (DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS)
(A-3155-19)
Appellants are a group of twenty-nine New Jersey farms that maintained barns and other storage facilities on their properties. During the growing season, appellants housed farm workers in these structures. Despite this obvious change of use from structures intended to store agricultural products and equipment to residences for human beings, appellants refused to implement the additional fire safety measures required for residences by the New Jersey Uniform Construction Code (UCC), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-119 to -141. In May 2018, the Director of the Division of Codes and Standards in the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) sent a letter to local construction officials reminding them of their responsibility to issue notices of violation when a farm failed to add fire suppression systems to the buildings in which their workers lived as required by the UCC. In March 2019, the Director sent a similar letter to the construction officials. As a result, the officials cited eighteen of the twenty-nine appellants for violating DCA's fire safety regulations between 2018 and 2019. None of these farms challenged the notices of violation. On February 4, 2020, the Director sent a third letter to the construction officials again instructing them to enforce the change-of-use regulation when a farm converted a commercial farm building to residential living quarters for workers. The Director forwarded a similar letter to the New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture outlining the UCC requirements for residential structures used to house farm workers and the Secretary distributed that letter to a number of farms. Appellants thereafter filed a notice of appeal alleging that the Director's February 4, 2020 inter-agency letter to the Secretary constituted a "new agency rule" that DCA did not adopt in accordance with the rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31. The court rejected this argument and concluded the Director's February 4 letter bore few of the qualities that characterize a rulemaking activity subject to the procedural requirements of the APA as set forth in Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984). Because the letter was not a new agency rule, the court dismissed appellants' appeal. |
Appellate |
Dec. 13, 2021 |
STATE IN THE INTEREST OF E.S. (FJ-20-0380-21, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3559-20)
This interlocutory appeal presents an unsettled question concerning the fair and appropriate sequence of proceedings in the prosecution of a juvenile offender who the State wishes to waive to adult court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1. The question arises in a context where the juvenile moves to suppress evidence that the State will rely upon at the waiver hearing and also possibly seek to admit at an eventual trial. The juvenile, joined by amici, argues the suppression hearing should take place first in the Family Part. Conversely, the State argues the waiver hearing should occur first, and, if the juvenile is waived, the Criminal Part then should hear the suppression motion. Responding to the motion judge’s observation of the need for guidance in the absence of a Court Rule or precedent on point, the court holds the Family Part has the discretion to determine the optimal sequence of proceedings, depending upon the circumstances presented in a particular case. In exercising that discretion, the trial court should apply a general preference to have the suppression hearing conducted first in the Family Part. As explained in this opinion, however, that preference may be outweighed by other considerations, such as whether (as is the case here) an adult alleged co-perpetrator or an already-waived juvenile co-perpetrator has filed a cognate suppression motion in the Criminal Part. Thus, unless a future Court Rule prescribes a different approach, the sequencing decision is best handled in the trial court in a case-by-case discretionary manner with that preference in mind. Additionally, the court adopts the State's concession that if the juvenile offender is waived first but a Criminal Part judge thereafter grants the suppression motion, the offender can move to have the case remanded back to the Family Part if the remaining non-suppressed evidence can no longer support the continued prosecution of the juvenile as an adult. Because the Family Part judge in this case did not misapply his discretion in choosing to proceed with the waiver hearing first, the court affirms that determination. |
Appellate |