Defendant was charged with first-degree murder but convicted of aggravated manslaughter. He argued in his direct appeal that the trial judge should have severed his charges from those brought against a co-defendant and that, even though not requested, the trial judge should have sua sponte instructed the jury on self-defense. In rejecting his severance argument, the court recognized a self-defense theory was "presented" and defendant received its benefit when the jury convicted him "of aggravated manslaughter rather than first-degree murder." But, in rejecting the other argument, the court held that the judge was not required to instruct on self-defense because "the defense of self-defense would likely have been unsuccessful."
In appealing the later denial of his post-conviction relief petition after an evidentiary hearing, defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions on self-defense. In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court held that trial counsel should have requested those instructions and defendant was prejudiced as a result. Even though, in the direct appeal, the court inconsistently considered the role self-defense played at trial, the court in this post-conviction relief appeal concluded that the evidence supported a self-defense theory and appropriate jury instructions might have provided benefits for defendant even greater than he received when the jury found him guilty on a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.