In this matter, the court considered whether defendant's act of making and disseminating a video accusing her estranged husband of improperly withholding a get, a Jewish bill of divorce, and asking community members to "press" her husband to deliver the get constituted the predicate act of harassment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), to justify the issuance of a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The court held that defendant's communication was protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the New Jersey Constitution and did not fall into any of the narrow exceptions—incitement to imminent violence or true threats—which would rob it of its protected status. The court likewise concluded that because defendant's communication was not impermissibly invasive of plaintiff's privacy and was animated by a legitimate purpose, the acquisition of a get, rather than a purpose to harass, it was not violative of the harassment statute. Lastly, the court held that plaintiff's allegation that there was a general tendency of violence toward get refusers in the Jewish community was inapposite because the claim was not supported by the record and because the theoretical possibility that a third party will commit a criminal act cannot render otherwise permissible speech unlawful. As a result, the court vacated the final restraining order entered against defendant.