Defendant appeals from Family Part orders enforcing provisions of a marital settlement agreement (MSA). A critical area of dispute centered on plaintiff's desire to obtain a get—a divorce recognized under Jewish religious law through a process known as a beis din proceeding. Before a verdict was reached in the Family Part divorce trial, the parties reached an agreement on all issues, including each party's obligations with respect to participation in beis din proceedings.
The court rejects defendant's argument that the Family Part judge violated his First Amendment rights by ordering him to participate in beis din proceedings and to sign an arbitration agreement with the beis din. The court acknowledges the fundamental principle that civil courts may not become entangled in religious proceedings. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause bars a state from placing its support behind a religious belief, while the Free Exercise Clause bars a state from interfering with the practice of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. The court concludes the Family Part judge was asked to enforce a civil contract, not a religious one. The court holds the MSA is a legally binding contract based on ample consideration from both parties and entered into knowingly and voluntarily. The Family Part judge therefore had the lawful authority to enforce the agreement as written.
New Jersey Supreme Court precedent permits civil courts to resolve controversies involving religious groups if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law and does not require the interpretation of religious doctrine. Defendant agreed in the MSA to abide by the beis din ruling, whatever that might be. The Family Part judge did not interpret religious doctrine and scrupulously avoided entanglement with religion because the judge applied well-established principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law. The latter body of law remained solely within the province of the beis din and was not interpreted or applied by the Family Part judge.
The court concludes that the orders defendant challenges served the secular purpose of enforcing the parties' contractual obligations under the MSA, which in turn serves the secular purpose of encouraging divorce litigants to resolve their disputes by negotiating and entering an MSA.