Opinion Summaries

Defendant Frank Campione, a licensed physician assistant, who was federally registered to prescribe opioid medications, was indicted on charges of the unlawful practice of medicine, distribution of a controlled dangerous substance to patients, and possession of prohibited weapons. The State alleged that Campione misrepresented himself as a physician to patients, improperly wrote prescriptions in non-traditional settings, such as vehicles and restaurants, and wrote prescriptions for opioid medications that were not medically necessary. Defendant Howard Katz, a licensed physician who agreed to serve as Campione's supervising physician, was charged with unlawful practice of medicine.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the entire indictment was granted by the motion court. The motion court also granted defendants' motion for discovery of the identity, opinions, and reports of the experts consulted by the State post-dismissal of the indictment.

The court affirmed the dismissal of all charges against Katz. The State presented no evidence to the grand jury that Katz participated in Campione's alleged acts of improperly holding himself out as a physician to patients.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the counts alleging the unlawful practice of medicine based on Campione's alleged failure to practice under the direct supervision of a physician and failure to provide notice of his employment to the State Board of Medical Examiners. Such conduct involves professional misconduct punishable by civil penalties, not criminal acts.

Similarly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the count charging defendants with conspiring to commit the unlawful practice of medicine. Because Campione was a licensed physician assistant who was registered to prescribe opioid medications and Katz was a licensed physician, violating the Physician Assistant Licensing Act (PALA), N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28, is professional misconduct punishable by civil penalties, not criminal conduct under our Criminal Code. Thus, conspiring to violate PALA is not a crime

The court reversed the dismissal of the weapons counts because the State was not precluded from introducing evidence of the possession of the prohibited weapons in a subsequent grand jury proceeding that was not introduced during the first presentment.

The court also reversed the order compelling the State to provide postdismissal discovery of the State's experts. Because the indictment was dismissed in its entirety, the criminal action was no longer pending.Accordingly, the discovery afforded under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1) does not apply even though defendant Campione still faced a civil forfeiture action and administrative disciplinary proceedings brought by the Board of Medical Examiners.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of murder, arguing he was denied the right to a jury of his peers

During the voir dire, after an African American male juror was found acceptable to the court and seated in the jury box, the prosecutor performed acriminal background check on the juror and discovered someone with the same name had an outstanding municipal warrant. Without explanation to or from the juror, the trial judge granted the State's motion to remove the juror for cause so he could be arrested outside the presence of other jurors. Defendant argued the exclusion of the juror was racially motivated

The court reverses because the judge did not question the juror himself to ascertain the accuracy of the State's representation and the judge should have addressed defendant's objection under a Batson/Gilmore analysis.

In these two consolidated appeals, calendared back-to-back for the purposes of a single opinion, plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of his access, to the names and addresses on dog license records issued by defendant municipalities. The Law Division determined plaintiff was not entitled to the information because his sole purpose was to solicit dog licensees to install invisible fences at their homes. The court reverses.

The court concludes there is no outright prohibition under OPRA for the access of public records for commercial purposes, Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 435 (2009), and the licensees' names and addresses are public records in which they have no, or an insufficient, expectation of privacy in the information, Brennan v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 233 N.J. 330, 338, 342 (2018). Accordingly, the court need not reach plaintiff's common law argument.

Defendant, while incarcerated for a parole violation, was arrested for a homicide he committed while on parole. After defendant completed his parole violation sentence, he remained in jail awaiting resolution of the homicide charges. He thereafter entered a guilty plea to the homicide charges. At sentencing, the trial court, following the holding in State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), awarded defendant eighty-six days of jail credits for the period from the day he completed his parole violation sentence to the day of sentencing.

Defendant acknowledged that if Black applies, the trial court awarded the correct number of jail credits. He argued, however, that the holding in Black was effectively overruled by the Court in State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), and as a result, he is entitled to 1149 days of jail credits for the period from the day he was arrested on the homicide charge to the day of sentencing.

The court rejected defendant's argument, noting that Hernandez concerns circumstances unlike those in Black and that in Hernandez, the Court discussed its holding in Black at length without stating it was departing from that holding. In addition, the court reviewed a number of precedents cited by defendant applying the holding in Hernandez but found all inapposite to the circumstances addressed in Black. In the absence of a Supreme Court decision overruling its prior decision, the court declined to stray from the unequivocal holding in Black and affirmed the award of jail credits.

The court addressed whether the unconscionability standard embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act is preempted by federal regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) provides that the unconscionability of a rent increase is a defense in a summary dispossess action to removal for cause based on a tenant's failure to pay rent. Relying on the language in the governing HUD regulations, explicitly preempting the entire field of rent regulation, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) is preempted by the regulations. As a result, HUD-approved rent increases are not reviewable in summary dispossess proceedings, and the trial judge properly precluded evidence challenging the increase as unconscionable. The court also concluded that if the unit in which the tenant resides is subject to a HUD Section 8 housing assistance payments contract, then the operation, management, and maintenance of that unit, including the approval of rent increases, is governed by HUD's regulatory control irrespective of whether the tenant receives a Section 8 housing subsidy.

The court considered whether the omission of one of the Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation adequately conveys the substance of the warnings and concluded it did not, notwithstanding the fact that defendant continuously interrupted the administration of the warnings. Acknowledging out-of-state authority holding that a suspect may waive Miranda warnings by interrupting their delivery, the court concluded that the suspect's interruption of the warnings does not discharge law enforcement of their duty to deliver them. Finding that the erroneous introduction of the partially unwarned statements was not harmless error, the court reversed defendant's conviction, which followed a bifurcated jury trial, and vacated his guilty plea on the weapons offense. Relying on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), however, the court rejected defendant's contention that suppression of the weapon was mandated as a remedy for the Miranda violation despite the fact that the weapon was seized as a result of a search warrant based on the statements.

The court held that when police file a use of force report (UFR) regarding an officer's interaction with a minor charged as a delinquent, it is available under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, if redacted to remove the minor's name, as are UFRs filed regarding interactions with adults. Deletion of the minor's name preserves the confidentiality of a juvenile's records of delinquency or family in crisis as guaranteed pursuant to Rule 5:19-2 and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60. Redacted UFRs filed regarding police encounters with minors charged as a delinquent are not records "pertaining to juveniles"—they are government records capturing details of police conduct available to the public.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression, requiring the court to determine whether Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339 (2012), require defense counsel to advise their clients whether – and under what circumstances – the successful completion of the pretrial intervention program would permit a defendant to avoid immigration consequences. The Law Division judge denied defendant's petition for postconviction relief, finding Padilla and Gaitan did not apply here, where defendant did not enter a guilty plea.

Because neither Padilla nor Gaitan expressly limits its holding to cases in which a defendant enters a guilty plea, the court declines to narrowly construe their application only to those dispositions. Instead, the court interprets those decisions to impose an obligation upon defense attorneys to advise their clients of the potential immigration consequences of any criminal disposition, whether that disposition will result from a guilty plea, trial, or diversionary program. Accordingly, the court reverses and remands for an evidentiary hearing.

In this appeal, the court held that an intoxicated defendant asleep and behind the wheel of a parked motor vehicle with its engine running is "operating" the vehicle within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, a fellow golfer, with whom plaintiff was playing in a foursome. Defendant rented a golf cart, and plaintiff alleged that defendant – contrary to the rental agreement – allowed the cart to be driven by another golfer, who was allegedly unfamiliar with its operation and who, while operating the cart, struck plaintiff, causing his injuries. The trial judge granted summary judgment because, among other things, he viewed the rental agreement as a contract of adhesion that benefitted only the golf course, not other golfers like plaintiff.

In reversing, the court held, among other things, that the rental agreement was irrelevant because defendant owed plaintiff a common law duty to refrain from negligently entrusting the golf cart to an allegedly incompetent operator. The court also rejected the argument that the rental agreement was a contract of adhesion, as well as defendant's argument that plaintiff was not a beneficiary of the promises contained in that agreement.

This case probes the boundaries of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that under the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. In this case, defendant's original sentence to special probation was revoked for a series of violations. He was resentenced on his second-degree robbery conviction to the statutory maximum ten-year sentence after already serving roughly four years of special probation. He was given credit towards his prison sentence for the time spent in county jail and in residential treatment but not for the time he participated in outpatient treatment.

Defendant claims his prison sentence violates Apprendi because the combination of the ten-year prison term and time previously spent on special probation exceeds the ten-year maximum sentence for a second-degree conviction. In State v. Hawkins, __ N.J. Super. __ (App. Div.), certif. denied, __ N.J. __ (2019), the court rejected the argument that under Apprendi, a year on special probation undergoing outpatient treatment counts as a year in prison. However, the court in Hawkins affirmed the defendant's eight-year prison sentence on his second-degree conviction “without ruling directly on . . . whether imposition of the maximum custodial sentence plus special probation would be constitutionally defective.” __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op. at 12).

The court in the present case addresses that issue and holds that such a sentence, which was actually imposed in this instance, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. The court embraces the reasoning in Hawkins and concludes that time on special probation outside a residential treatment facility cannot be combined with a prison term when determining whether a sentence exceeds the "prescribed statutory maximum." The court finds further support for that conclusion in the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the line of Apprendi cases, United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). Based on an analysis of Haymond and other precedents, the court holds that the Sixth Amendment issues raised in Apprendi and its progeny apply only to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment; Apprendi principles simply do not apply to non-custodial forms of punishment such as special probation.

A general contractor hired a subcontractor to design and construct a renewable solar generating facility on the campus of the Mercer County Community College. The Mercer County Improvement Authority issued bonds in excess of $29,000,000 to fund the project. The subcontractor filed a mechanics' lien notice against the Authority when it was unable to resolve a payment dispute with the general contractor. The subcontractor settled its claim against the general contractor and filed a complaint against the Authority to foreclose on its mechanic's lien.

The Law Division granted the Authority's motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court held that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:37A-127, all of the Authority's property was exempt from judicial process.

In this appeal, the subcontractor argues it's municipal mechanic's lien is enforceable against the Authority's project fund pursuant to the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44-125 to -142. Amicus curiae Utility and Transportation Contractors Association of New Jersey, Inc. supports the subcontractor's legal position. The Authority argues the subcontractor's mechanic's lien is not valid under the County Improvement Authorities Law, N.J.S.A. 40:37A-44 to -135.

This court affirms the Law Division's order dismissing the foreclosure complaint as a matter of law under Rule 4:6-2(e), but for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court. Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018). As a matter of first impression in a published opinion, this court holds that the Municipal Mechanics' Lien Law does not apply to county improvement authorities.

The Court agrees with both the Tax Court and the Appellate Division that the Division properly taxed the entirety of the residence when both life interests were extinguished, and the remainder was transferred to Marita. The property’s transfer, in its entirety, took place “at or after” Mary’s death, and was appropriately taxed at its full value at that time. In light of the estate-planning mechanism used here, any other holding would introduce an intolerable measure of speculation and uncertainty in an area of law in which clarity, simplicity, and ease of implementation are paramount.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion. As the Appellate Division noted, in the 2012 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:15-15, the Legislature did not expressly address the statute of limitations. The Legislature is, of course, free to do so in the future.

The court holds that New Jersey's Constitution should be construed consistent with the federal Constitution in that a "class-of-one" equal protection claim cannot be asserted by a public employee. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). Accordingly, the court affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's constitutional equal protection claim. The court also affirms the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, because those claims were precluded when he asserted retaliation as a defense in the administrative proceedings upholding his termination as a municipal police officer. Therefore, plaintiff cannot relitigate the retaliation issue in a CEPA action. See Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 (2012).

This application raises a novel question concerning whether an error made by condemnation commissioners should negatively impact the right of the defendant property owner to file an appeal of the commissioners’ award. More specifically, if the commissioners’ award is filed without the statutorily required oath, does the time limit to appeal the award start to run when the award is filed or when the oath is subsequently filed? The court also considered whether good cause exists to extend the time to file the appeal. In a case of first impression, the court held that the report was not considered “filed” until the oath was filed; thus, the appeal was timely as it was filed within forty-five days of the filing of the commissioners’ oath.

Tenure is a statutory right controlled by law. The tribunals that concluded petitioner suffered no deprivation of her tenure rights engaged in legal error by labeling the position as “extracurricular” and then short-circuiting the requisite analysis based on that classification. This instructional and tenure-eligible position did not become extracurricular and tenure ineligible simply because petitioner already held tenure in another position. Petitioner met the statutory criteria for tenure and is entitled to a remedy for the violation of her right not to be removed or reduced in salary while protected by tenure for her work in the BookBinders program.

The invalidation of the retainer agreement is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Although the Appellate Division’s concerns over the retainer agreement in this case are understandable, the ethical pronouncements issued in its opinion may have far-reaching and negative effects, not only on employment-law attorneys and attorneys handling fee-shifting claims, but also on their clients. Some of those pronouncements appear too broad and some unsound, and others are worthy of the deliberative process by which new ethical rules are promulgated by the Court. The Court addresses those issues under its constitutional authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys in this State, N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3, and directs that an ad hoc committee be established to address the professional-responsibility issues discussed in this opinion. The Court expresses no ultimate opinion on the matters referred to the committee, which will report its recommendations to the Court.

The Directive, issued pursuant to the Court’s administrative rulemaking authority, requires a hearing and is controlling on this issue. The Court remands this matter to the Law Division to conduct a hearing on Carlstrom’s application for a carry-permit and provides guidance as to the scope of that hearing.

The circumstances of this case do not legitimize the stop. Law enforcement must have reasonable and articulable suspicion of a traffic violation, the commission of a crime, or unlawful activity before executing a traffic stop. Accordingly, the roadside statement given by defendant during the unlawful stop should have been excluded at trial, and the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s reversal of her convictions for hindering apprehension and false reporting. Because defendant’s roadside statement permeated the trial, severely affecting her credibility and ability to mount a defense to the separate burglary charge, that conviction is reversed as well.