Opinion Summaries

In these eight appeals, appellants argued that the Department of Health made numerous errors in its selection of entities to operate Alternative Treatment Centers to grow, process, and dispense marijuana as part of the State's Medicinal Marijuana Program. They complained about, among other things, the Department's selection process, including the criteria used, the manner in which applications were scored, and the overall sufficiency and explanation of the final agency decisions; they specifically contended that the Department should at least have engaged in an interim process by which disappointed applicants could question or challenge the scores received prior to the issuance of final agency decisions that left it to the court to act as a clearing house for all such challenges. In agreeing the scoring system produced arbitrary results that have gone unexplained, the court vacated the final agency decisions and remanded for further proceedings.

These consolidated appeals ask the court to determine whether the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office (Prosecutor's Office) can condition defendants' admissions into the pretrial intervention program (PTI) applications, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12, on service of jail time after they were released on their own recognizance.

In accordance with plea agreements, defendants pled guilty to amended charges of third-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3, and they were each sentenced to a four-year term of noncustodial probation. Pursuing rights preserved in their plea agreements, defendants sought to overturn the denials of their PTI applications with appeals to the trial judge, claiming the Prosecutor's Office abused its discretion by proposing that they serve jail time to gain admission. The trial judge rejected defendants' requests without addressing the impact of the jail time proposals.

We reverse. The Prosecutor's Office abused its discretion by tainting the PTI application process through unsuccessfully seeking to have defendants agree to serve jail time to gain admission. Although imposing the condition of jail time for PTI admission was not expressly permitted or prohibited by the governing statute, court rule, or guidelines in effect at the time, we conclude it was illegal to do so because vesting such authority to the Prosecutor's Office would afford it powers contrary to the Legislature's intent in creating PTI. The trial court shall therefore enter orders vacating defendants' guilty pleas and admit them into PTI.

Rule 3:26-2(c)(2) governs a defendant's motion to relax conditions of his or her pre-trial release under the Criminal Justice Reform Act. The Rule empowers the trial court to recalibrate a releasee's conditions upon a showing of "a material change in circumstance." The court holds that pre-trial discovery that has reduced the "weight of the evidence" against the defendant may constitute such changed circumstances. So may a defendant's compliance with restrictive conditions over an extended period, if such compliance coincides with another material change demonstrating that the defendant's pre-trial behavior may be adequately managed by less restrictive means than initially imposed. Because the trial court here did not review defendant's motion to relax his release conditions under Rule 3:26-2(c)(2), the court granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal, reversed the trial court's order denying relief, and remanded for reconsideration.

In this multi-vehicle accident case involving a dump truck, the court concludes that New Jersey law requires a commercial motor carrier to provide a minimum insurance coverage amount of $750,000 when engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, as prescribed by N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32 and N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1. Here, the individual driving the dump truck was an employee of defendant trucking company and responsible for the accident but was not listed as a covered driver on the policy. However, he was a permissive user and therefore, the commercial insurance policy issued to the trucking company required a minimum coverage amount of $750,000 and the step-down provision in the insured's combined single limit policy is not triggered. The trial court's order granting summary judgment and capping the tortfeasor's exposure at $35,000 is reversed.

Defendant Mell, a wealthy businessman, engaged in sexual relations with B.B. over a period of months when she was fifteen years old. Upon discovery, Mell was arrested and soon convicted of federal and state crimes; he is presently incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. B.B. commenced this action for damages against Mell and others and obtained an order attaching some of Mell's assets. Soon after, Mell sought an order permitting the payment of his attorneys in this civil action from the attached funds; the judge granted that motion and later entered another order fixing the amount of fees to be paid from the fund. The court granted B.B.'s motions for leave to appeal those two orders and reversed, holding that B.B. had a greater priority to the fund even though she has yet to obtain a judgment and that the equities preclude such an invasion of the fund, noting it would be perverse to allow Mell's expenses to be paid from the fund established through valid court procedures for the benefit of his victim.

In this action brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, the court was asked to determine whether a parochial school's knowledge of the pregnancy of an unmarried lay teacher, who started as a teacher's aide for toddlers, later taught art, and had no responsibility for religious instruction, can serve as the nondiscriminatory basis for the teacher's termination for violating the school's morals code, where the school never made any effort to determine whether any of its other employees have violated the school's prohibition against "immoral conduct" that is allegedly incorporated into each employees' terms of employment. The court held that knowledge or mere observation of an employee's pregnancy alone is not a permissible basis to detect violations of the school's policy and terminate an employee.

The court determined that real estate auction sales contracts prepared by attorneys, licensed real estate brokers, or salespersons need not contain the three-day attorney review clause mandated by N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. N.J. Ass'n of Realtor Boards, 93 N.J. 470 (1983), as codified in N.J.A.C. 11:5-6.2(g). Here, a blank, pre-printed contract was sent to the highest bidder, defendant, and recommended an attorney review the contract. The court rejected defendant's claim that she was entitled to a return of her $121,000 deposit monies after not being able to secure financing in this cash deal. The liquidated damages provision in the sales contract was validated, and the $121,000 deposit monies, plus interest, were equally divided between plaintiffs/sellers and co-defendant.

The court reverses summary judgment to defendants Orange Board of Education, Sussex County Regional Transportation Cooperative and K&H Transport Inc., the bus company responsible for transporting a seventeen-year-old special needs student to and from an out-of-district, State-approved school for students with disabilities. The trial judge determined the bus company owed no duty to plaintiffs "to protect against the alleged injury" — sexual assault — and that no reasonable person could find the bus company's actions caused plaintiff's injury. The court finds that whether the minor-plaintiff's sexual assault, by young men she encountered after being dropped off unsupervised blocks from the designated bus stop outside her home, was a foreseeable risk of injury to her was impacted by the extent of the minor's disability, and that the trial court erred in resolving that question on disputed facts.

The process for the expungement of a voluntary or involuntary commitment can be found in N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8 to -80.11. The statutory scheme does not prohibit additional applications if a first petition is unsuccessful. The relevant language in the statute requires a petitioner seeking expungement to present his or her personal history since the hospitalization, as well as his or her present circumstances, and reputation in the community. N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.8; N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9. Therefore, the court concludes the dismissal of a petition entered after an evidentiary hearing should be designated as "without prejudice."

Following the denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence, defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. Police officers seized the evidence following an investigatory stop of an automobile in which defendant was a passenger. The arresting officer testified he stopped the car because he was advised two black men had robbed a store. The officer used a spotlight mounted to his car to illuminate the interiors of passing vehicles as he traveled to the store. In one car, he observed three black men who did not react to the light. The officer stopped the car based on those observations. The court holds that knowledge of the race and gender of criminal suspects, without more, does not establish a reasonable articulable suspicion that the men in the car had robbed the store. Accordingly, the court reverses defendant's conviction, vacates his sentence, and remands for further proceedings.

Based on the facts of this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in that court’s opinion.

Tax Court: B & D Assoc., LTD. v. Township of Franklin Docket Number 6112-2017 and 6387-2018, opinion by Brennan, J.T.C.,decided October 26, 2020. For plaintiff – Lawrence S. Berger (Berger & Bornstein LLC, attorneys); for defendant – Gregory B. Pasquale (Shain Schaffer PC, attorneys)

Held: The municipality’s summary judgment motion was denied.Municipality’s summary judgment motion challenged a property owner’s standing to pursue tax appeals during a time when the property was in foreclosure and tax payments were made by the mortgagee. The Tax Court found that an owner of real property has a sufficient stake in the property’s tax assessment while it holds title to the property and therefore qualifies as an aggrieved taxpayer pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. The court held that plaintiff had standing to appeal the 2017 and 2018 tax assessments as it held title to the property until at least August 8, 2018, which was beyond the October 1 valuation date and the April 1 filing date for those years.

In this appeal from a contested private adoption matter, the court reversed the termination of the biological mother's parental rights and vacated the judgment of adoption in favor of the child's stepmother. The court held the evidence did not support the finding that the biological mother had failed to affirmatively assume the duties of a parent, and found error in the trial court's reliance upon the biological mother's child support arrears as proof of intentional abandonment of financial obligations. Further, the court held the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, relied on hearsay, and erroneously imported the "best interest" standard applicable to Title 30 guardianship proceedings.

On leave granted, defendant, a Mississippi attorney (and his associated law firms), appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. R. 4:6-2(b). Defendant was admitted pro hac vice to represent plaintiff in a federal lawsuit filed in the federal district court for the district of New Jersey alleging, among other things, RICO claims against the New Jersey Attorney General and other state officials. The federal suit was ultimately dismissed; the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

Plaintiff initiated this suit alleging malpractice and excessive billing in defendant's representation of him in the prior federal action. As he did before the Law Division, defendant, who never physically appeared in New Jersey in connection with the federal suit, argued that he never personally availed himself of the privileges of doing business in New Jersey, lacked requisite minimum contacts with the state, and that requiring him to defend himself in state court in New Jersey offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

The court affirmed the Law Division's denial of the motion to dismiss, finding particular significance in defendant's pro hac vice admission, since it required defendant to abide by certain New Jersey Court Rules, including, a limit on contingent fees, financial contribution to the Client Security Fund, and an obligation to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by our Supreme Court.

Tax Court: Metz Family Ltd. Partnership v. Township of Freehold, Docket Nos. 001064-2015; 000482-2016; 000783-2017;opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided October 20, 2020. For plaintiff - Daniel J. Pollak and Michael Rienzi (Brach Eichler, L.L.C. attorney); for defendant - Martin Allen and Wesley E. Buirkle (DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, P.C., attorney); for the Monmouth County Board of Taxation and the Director, Division of Taxation - Abiola G. Miles and Michelline Capistrano Foster (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Defendant’s motions to require joinder of the Monmouth County Board of Taxation and the Director, Division of Taxation under R. 4:28-1 are granted. Only these two governmental entities can explain why they considered, verified, and certified the annual assessments in the defendant to be “reassessments” excepted from the application of the Chapter 123 ratio (or the average ratio), which is an issue of first impression and involves significant public interest.

Charged with numerous weapons and drug offenses, defendant moved in the trial court for the suppression of evidence – guns, ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia – seized pursuant to a search warrant based on information police obtained during a warrantless entry into defendant's home. The trial judge denied the suppression motion, finding the police conducted a permissible protective sweep of the home. The court disagreed with the trial judge's application of State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010), concluding that the police lacked both a reasonable and articulable suspicion of danger and a legitimate purpose for remaining on the premises, since defendant was arrested outside the home and handcuffed before police conducted the sweep.10/

In these five consolidated appeals, petitioners and intervenors mount a facial challenge to Attorney General Grewal's Directives 2020-5 and 2020-6, which ended New Jersey's decades-long practice of shielding the identities of law enforcement officers receiving major discipline for misconduct

The court upholds the Directives, finding the Attorney General acted within his authority under the Law and Public Safety Act of 1948, the Criminal Justice Act of 1970, and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181, and not in violation of Executive Order 11 (Byrne), OPRA, or any right of plaintiffs'. The court's conclusion that the Directives constitute a valid exercise of the Attorney General's authority does not preclude any officer from bringing an as-applied challenge to publication of his or her name pursuant to Directives 2020-5 or 2020-6 for discipline finalized before release of those Directives.

Defendant was convicted in municipal court of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). In a de novo appeal pursuant to Rule 3:23-8, the Law Division found defendant guilty, but reduced the period of license suspension from nine months to seven months because the municipal court judge improperly relied on defendant's lack of credibility to support a lengthier period of license suspension. In this appeal, defendant argues the Law Division should have vacated his municipal court conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.

This court also notes the Law Division's failure to follow the standard in State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138 (2017) when it stayed the execution of defendant's sentence pending the outcome of this appeal.

This case presents the unsettled legal question of whether a campus police officer who has been terminated by a State university or college because of alleged non-criminal misconduct may challenge his termination through what is known as "special disciplinary arbitration" administered by the Public Employment Relations Commission ("PERC" or "the Commission"), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-209 and -210.

The legal issue arises in the context of an attempt by the New Jersey Institute of Technology ("NJIT") to terminate one of its campus police officers for alleged misconduct in using force to apprehend a potential juvenile offender who was bicycling through the university grounds. Over NJIT's objection, PERC referred the dispute to a special disciplinary arbitrator.

This court affirms PERC's determination that the NJIT police force is a "law enforcement agency" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-200. However, NJIT officers nonetheless are not eligible for special disciplinary arbitration because that option is restricted by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 to officers who work for municipal police departments in jurisdictions that are not part of the civil service system.

In addition, even if that statutory restriction under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 did not pertain, the officer in this case is ineligible because he has not been suspended without pay, as required by N.J.S.A. 40A:14-209 and -210.

Tax Court: Grace Ashkenazi v. Borough of Deal, Docket Nos.003252-2016; 000434-2017; 000107-2018; 001026-2019, opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided October 2, 2020. For plaintiff – Michael I. Schneck (Schneck law Group, LLC, attorney); for defendant – Martin M. Barger (Barger & Gaines, attorney).

Held: Plaintiff’s appraiser’s sales comparison approach as a valuation methodology for the subject property, a 11,330 square-feet single-family home located on a 2.54-acre lot, is rejected due to the quantum of adjustments and reliance on a computer-generated linear regression computation as the basis for certain adjustments. The court agrees with defendant’s appraiser (who found the subject property’s value to be lesser than the assessment for each tax year) that the cost approach was the most credible valuation methodology and accepts his land value conclusions. Based on the cost data included in plaintiff’s appraiser’s report, and other credible cost provisions, and after using higher depreciation rates than used by defendant’s appraiser, the court finds the value of the subject property at an amount lesser than defendant’s appraiser value conclusions for each tax year. The court will decide the issue of whether the average ratio should apply in a separate hearing.