Opinion Summaries

New Jersey does not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Ferguson, Potts, or Byrd for the drug-induced death of Cabral in New York.

Appellant was serving a life sentence imposed in 1979 for murder, and a consecutive four-year term of incarceration imposed in 2003, for a 2001 drug offense committed during his incarceration. When appellant became parole eligible, the Parole Board aggregated his sentences pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(h), denied appellant parole, and imposed a 240-month future eligibility term (FET).

The Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53, promulgating a new standard for parole eligibility for offenses committed after August 18, 1997. Prior to the amendment, the Board could deny parole release if it appeared from a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time. Following the amendment, the parole eligibility standard changed and now states the Board may deny parole where it appears by a preponderance of the evidence the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation the inmate will violate conditions of parole if released on parole at that time

The question on appeal is what standard for parole eligibility should apply where a parole eligible inmate is serving sentences for offenses committed before and after the effective date of the statute promulgating the new standard. The court holds the new standard does not apply to parole determinations for inmates eligible for parole who are serving sentences entered prior to August 18, 1997. The Board must determine parole eligibility for such inmates by considering the pre-amendment standard.

The court remanded the matter to the Board to reconsider its decision applying the proper standard. The court also directed the Board to correlate its findings with the length of the FET imposed, considering the sentence for the 2001 offense, which drew the lengthy FET, was just four years.

In this tax foreclosure matter, defendant, U.S. Bank-Cust/Sass Muni VI DTR (U.S. Bank), a large tax lien investment fund, appeals from final judgment and an order denying its motion to vacate final judgment. U.S. Bank had previously obtained ownership of real property by foreclosing on a tax sale certificate, and then failed to pay property taxes. The Chancery Division granted the opposed motion for final judgment without affording the requested oral argument or providing a cogent reason to deny argument. U.S. Bank thus was not told when final judgment would be entered, which would also end its redemption period. Because oral argument was not provided, the court reverses.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the panel’s opinion.

Although the Legislature may decide that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) should not apply in juvenile proceedings based on conduct such as that at issue here, nothing in the current text of that statute precludes the adjudication in this case. The Court declines to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal. However, the Family Part court’s adjudication must be reversed because the court’s disavowal, at the disposition hearing, of critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirms on other grounds the panel’s judgment.

Defendant is charged with second degree unlawful possession of a handgun and related charges. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing or considering oral argument from counsel. This court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and now reverses the trial court's ruling. Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c), "[i]f material facts are disputed, testimony thereon shall be taken in open court." When the material facts are contested, the parties must be given the opportunity to probe the veracity of the State's witnesses.

Defendant’s confession and the drug evidence must be suppressed.

After allegedly rejecting a recommended thirty-year NERA term and entering an open plea to a nine-count indictment, defendant Lewis Hooper was sentenced to sixty years in State prison, forty-four of which were to be served without parole. He appeals his sentence and the denial of his motion to withdraw his open plea after sentencing based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Because defendant established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude the trial court erred when it refused to consider defendant's claim merely because it was raised in conjunction with a motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing and not in a PCR proceeding. In this case, there was no good reason for the trial court to have insisted that defendant file an appeal and then a petition for PCR in order to have his ineffective assistance claim heard, instead of hearing it along with defendant's Slater motion

We also vacate defendant's sentence on account of the court's failure to address the Yarbough factors after determining to impose an extended-term sentence and remand for resentencing, if necessary, following the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

A dispute over the termination of a tenured public school janitor is subject to arbitration under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education and not the Public Employment Relations commission, even if a collective negotiations agreement dictated the length of service required to attain tenure.

Nelson’s traffic stop was prolonged as he waited for the arrival of the canine unit, but the officers had developed the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to prolong the stop under State v.Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 540 (2017). The Court therefore affirms as modified the Appellate Division’s determination that the evidence seized during the car’s subsequent search should not be suppressed.

Plaintiff ex-wife appeals from post-judgment orders denying her application for a QDRO payable to plaintiff from defendant's ERISA protected annuity funds to enforce unpaid counsel fee, expert fee, and tuition reimbursement awards. She also appeals from the denial of enforcement of counsel fee judgments by an enhanced wage garnishment. The court reverses, finding the counsel fees, expert fees, and tuition reimbursement related to child support or property distribution, and enforcement of those awards by a QDRO payable to plaintiff did not violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The counsel fee judgments were also enforceable by an enhanced wage garnishment to the extent they related to an underlying support obligation

The concert was promoting the University’s educational objectives and purposes at the time of Green’s injury, and as a result, Monmouth University is afforded charitable immunity. Although Green was not a Monmouth University student, she was a beneficiary under the language of the Charitable Immunity Act.

The Education Law Center, a non-profit organization, was found to have standing to appeal the Commissioner of Education's final decisions approving increases in enrollment and the expansion of physical plants for seven Newark charter schools.The panel held that even in former Abbott districts, it is the district that bears the burden of demonstrating that charter school funding will prevent delivery of a thorough and efficient education. Furthermore, the panel decided the Commissioner's interpretation of the relevant regulation authorized the grant of approval for expansions that would require satellite campuses, in as yet undetermined locations.charter schools.

The MSA required Timothy to “maintain” life insurance to support the children in the event of Timothy’s death. Because Timothy’s suicide barred recovery of the life insurance proceeds, he failed to “maintain” life insurance and therefore breached the Agreement. A precise calculation of Timothy’s outstanding child support obligations would be speculative, and the Chancery Division did not abuse its discretion by finding that Timothy’s outstanding obligations exceed the remaining assets of Timothy’s estate. Thus, there would be no remaining estate assets to pay Sandra’s claims, and a remand for a precise damages calculation is unnecessary.

This dispute concerns the allowable scope of negotiations for employee contributions to health care and prescription coverage (collectively health insurance) costs in accordance with L. 2011, c. 78, §§ 39 and 41 (Chapter 78), codified at N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28c and N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1. Chapter 78 prescribed health insurance contribution rates for public employees over a four-year period beginning July 1, 2011 and ending June 30, 2015, at gradually increasing rates designated Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 and Tier 4.

Petitioner Ridgefield Park Education Association appealed the scope of negotiations ruling by the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) in favor of respondent Ridgefield Park Board of Education, that Chapter 78 preempted the terms of the parties' collective negotiations agreement (CNA) for the period July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2018, such that the Association members were required to contribute at the Tier 4 rate throughout the remaining three years of the 2014-2018 CNA and not just for the first year – July 1, 2014 - June 30, 2015. The court reverses the final agency decision because under the circumstances presented PERC's interpretation of Chapter 78 is contrary to the Legislature's intent since it creates the absurd result of a financial hardship of having Association members contribute at the Tier 4 level for three additional years. The court further remands the matter to PERC to fashion and implement an appropriate remedy within sixty days to refund Association members their health insurance contributions that were improperly deducted.

In State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 415 (2015), the Supreme Court revised the standards under New Jersey law governing police searches of motor vehicles that have been lawfully stopped at the roadside. The Court held such roadside searches may be conducted without a warrant if: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity; and (2) the situation arose from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances. Id. at 446-48.

The appellate court declines to engraft upon Witt a limitation that would disallow such otherwise-permissible roadside searches in situations where the police have a basis to tow away and impound the vehicle. Consequently, the trial court's suppression order that was founded upon such a rationale is reversed. Moreover, there was no unreasonable delay in this case by the officers in making their decision to proceed with the search at the scene based on probable cause.

The court affirmed defendant's burglary and criminal mischief convictions, rejecting his contentions, raised as plain error, regarding the court's jury instructions and police witnesses' identification-related testimony. The court also rejected defendant's argument that he must be resentenced because of a breakdown in his relationship with his trial counsel. Although a defendant is entitled to conflict-free representation, the court holds that he may not profit from undermining his attorney-client relationship through his own abusive or threatening conduct. Despite defendant's insults and threats, defense counsel wished to proceed, as did defendant. The court discerned no basis for resentencing.

Defendant was repeatedly and explicitly warned that the estimated 2438 days of jail credit may not affect his period of parole ineligibility and that he should not enter the plea agreement expecting as much. Defendant cannot now credibly argue that he relied on a belief that all 2438 days would be applied to his term of parole ineligibility

The only requirements for an asset sale are that a seller is conducting business by holding a valid license and is not subject to an action by the Commissioner. As such, the asset sale was valid, the Irvington location retained its grandfathered status, and DOBI’s decision to grant the license to New Loan was appropriate.

Tax Court: Valerie Shedlock and Judith Solan, Coexecutors of the Estate of Anthony Calleo v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,

Docket No.008644-2018; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided April 30, 2019.For plaintiffs – Stephen L. Klein (Law Office of Stephen L. Klein,attorney); for defendant – Miles Eckardt (Gurbir S. Grewal,Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Plaintiffs, Valerie Shedlock and Judith Solan (“Heirs”), moved to invalidate defendant’s notice of assessment and seek a refund of taxes, and interest paid, and costs of suit. The Heirs argued that defendant erroneously included the real property located at 270 Farnham Avenue, Lodi, New Jersey (“Subject Property”) as a taxable asset of the estate of the Anthony Calleo (“Decedent”) for inheritance tax purposes. Defendant, Director of the Division of Taxation (“Director”), moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice claiming that, the transfer of the Subject Property was intended to take effect upon the Decedent’s death, and is therefore subject to the inheritance tax. The court determined that the motives of the Decedent were inconsequential where the transfer of a property was made more than three years prior to the decedent’s death. The court further determined that because the Decedent transferred and conveyed his right, title and interest in the Subject Property more than three years before death, the transfer was not intended to take effect at or after the Decedent’s death. Therefore, the Heirs’ motion to invalidate the Director’s notice of assessment and refund taxes and interest paid was granted. However, the Heirs’ demand for costs of suit was denied.