Opinion Summaries

510(k) evidence is generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised not only on principles of negligence, but particularly on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, evidence of 510(k) clearance has significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division. However, the Court parts ways with the Appellate Division’s decision as to its suggestion that the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be determined in a Rule 104 hearing. Instead, the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which is how the issue was and, presumably, will be raised. Section 5 of the PLA does not bar plaintiffs’ recovery of punitive damages, and because evidence of 510(k) clearance should have been admitted in the first stage of trial as relevant to the reasonableness of Bard’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, it would also be admissible in the second, punitive damages stage.

Defendant City of Jersey City's (City) Code of Ordinances Section 105 permits any individual to request a "determination of significance" from the City's Historic Preservation Officer (HPO) regarding whether a subject building warrants preservation.  Consistent with local ordinances, plaintiff, who owns a circa-1900 building in Jersey City, sought a determination of significance before applying for a demolition permit.  The City's HPO concluded plaintiff's building likely would not be approved for demolition due to its historic, architectural, and cultural significance.

Pursuant to local zoning ordinance, plaintiff appealed to defendant Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which upheld the determination of significance.  Thereafter, he filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division alleging defendants' actions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.  The Law Division found the ZBA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and dismissed the complaint. 

The court concludes the HPO's issuance of a determination of significance — an advisory opinion seemingly intended to prevent plaintiff's submission of an application for a demolition permit — is not a procedure authorized by the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163.  The MLUL does not authorize HPOs to unilaterally grant or deny historic preservation designations that bind a zoning officer in determining whether a demolition permit shall issue; that advisory function belongs solely to the Historic Preservation Commission, as detailed in the MLUL, and cannot be delegated to other entities or individuals.  The Commission, in turn, may designate a site as historic only if it is voted upon by a majority of the full governing body. 

The court reverses and remands to allow plaintiff to apply for a demolition permit in accordance with the MLUL.  The court also concludes Jersey City's Code of Ordinances Sections 105-3, 105-4, and 105-7 are ultra vires and inconsistent with the objectives and procedures concerning historic preservation mandated by the MLUL to the extent they delegate powers reserved for a municipality's historic preservation commission to the HPS.   

M.P., a juvenile, is charged with gun possession and participation in a murder.  He appeals the trial judge's decision to admit the statement he gave to detectives during a stationhouse interrogation, which was attended by his mother.  M.P. asks the court to adopt a new categorical rule that would prohibit police from conducting a stationhouse interrogation of a juvenile unless the minor has consulted with an attorney.  M.P. relies on neuroscience and behavioral science research that shows juveniles are not only more impulsive and compliant than adults but also tend to lack the cognitive skills to comprehend Miranda rights.  He contends that in view of advances in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development, no juvenile should be subjected to a stationhouse interrogation—with or without parental participation—until the juvenile has consulted with counsel.

The court explains it has no authority to pronounce any such per se requirement.  While acknowledging there have been significant reforms to New Jersey's juvenile justice system in recent years based on scientific research on how a juvenile's brain develops and how it functions differently from a fully mature adult brain, the court holds those studies do not grant it authority to substantially rework the State's juvenile interrogation jurisprudence, and certainly not to overturn New Jersey Supreme Court precedents.  The court concludes that while the rules and principles announced in those precedents are not immutable, it is for our Supreme Court and the Legislature—not an intermediate appellate court—to weigh the benefits and costs of the major juvenile justice system policy shift M.P. proposes.

The court also declines M.P.'s request to revise the Miranda warnings to make them more comprehensible to adolescents.  While noting the current warnings are not sacrosanct and might be improved based on juvenile brain research, the court concludes the task of revising the warnings to address the inherent differences between adults and juveniles would benefit from a collaborative process the court cannot provide. 

Turning to the application of existing precedents to the present case, although the court is mindful of the deference it owes to the trial judge's factual findings, it concludes that considering all relevant circumstances, including M.P.'s intellectual challenges, mental conditions, highly emotional state, and the role his mother played, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination.  The court therefore reverses the trial judge's decision. 

The court rejects the State's argument that reviewing courts should not consider an interrogee's personal characteristics, such as intelligence and education background, if those circumstances were not known by or "noticeable" to police.  The court holds those circumstances remain relevant notwithstanding they may not manifest outwardly during an interrogation.  The court explains that reviewing courts do not employ a purely objective test when determining whether the State proved a valid Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather consider the characteristics of the accused and not just the details of the interrogation.   

The court also rules the guidance the Supreme Court provided in State in Int. of A.A., 240 N.J. 341, 354 (2020)—which held police should provide an opportunity for a juvenile and parent to consult privately after Miranda warnings are given—did not mandate a new rule of police procedure but rather amplified the existing totality-of-the-circumstances test.  Accordingly, the court reasons the rationale undergirding A.A. should be given retroactive effect.

The court considered plaintiff's challenge to a trial court order vacating a final judgment by default in a tax sale foreclosure.  Plaintiff obtained a final judgment by default on its tax sale lien and defendants timely moved to vacate the order, alleging defective service of process.  The trial court found sufficient defects with process to warrant vacating the final judgment, which reopened the redemption period and allowed defendant to redeem. 

The court affirmed, concluding service of process was defective pursuant to both the general court rules governing personal service, as well as the RULLCA-specific statute governing service of process on LLCs, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17.  The court noted the differences between service rules in RULLCA and the Business Corporations Act (BCA), N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 to: 18-11, in finding plaintiff's waiver argument unavailing.  Although RULLCA and the BCA contain some similarities, the rules governing service are distinct and materially different.  Service upon a corporation in New Jersey is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(6) and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2, whereas service upon an LLC is governed by Rule 4:4-4(a)(5), and RULLCA, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17. 

The RULLCA service of process provision contains an additional method of service lacking in the BCA, providing, as a permissive alternative, that where personal service in accordance with the court rules fails despite reasonably diligent efforts, service may be made upon the State filing office.  N.J.S.A. 42:2C-17(b).  The BCA service of process provisions do not authorize the State to accept process as an agent of a corporation.  R. 4:4-4(a)(6); N.J.S.A. 14A:4-2.

Because final judgment was vacated, the court followed Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 252 N.J. 265 (2022), in holding the period of redemption reopened and continued until barred by a valid final judgment of the Superior Court.  The court interpreted the holding in Green Knight, in conjunction with Rule 4:64-6(b) and the tax sale law, N.J.S.A. 54:5-86(a), to mean the redemption period reopens when a final judgment in foreclosure is timely vacated.

Defendant injected himself with fentanyl-laced heroin, lost control of an SUV he had been driving, his vehicle crashed into a gas station, and tragically killed three persons and injured others.  He pled guilty to three counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of thirty years, with the requirement that he serve over twenty-five years before he is eligible for parole.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence.  He argues that the warrantless search of his clothes, conducted at a hospital over an hour after his arrest, was unlawful, and that he is entitled to a resentencing.  The court holds that the search of his clothes was a lawful search incident to his arrest.  The court also holds that the sentencing court conducted the appropriate analysis and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three consecutive prison terms of ten years for the death of each victim.  Accordingly, the court affirms defendant's convictions and his sentence. 

          This appeal arises out of an action challenging the suspension of a company that had been providing towing services in a municipality.  As a matter of first impression, the court holds that the company had limited constitutional due process rights when it was suspended from the Township's towing lists.  The court also holds that plaintiff received the process due its limited property interest.  In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's arguments that its suspension from the towing lists violated its constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights.  Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Township, its police chief, and one of its police officers. 

The trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court does not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD. But the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s other determinations -- that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the deadline.

          Appellant Karen McKnight appeals from the Board of Review's (the "Board") August 26, 2022 final agency decision, which held her liable to return an overpayment of $6,277 for unemployment benefits she was allegedly ineligible to receive for the weeks ending June 30, 2018 through May 4, 2019, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d).  The central issue on appeal is whether a claimant, who is otherwise separated from full-time employment, may include wages received from a part-time position, which they continue to maintain, in the calculation of their average weekly wage for purposes of unemployment benefits.  The court concluded that the exclusion of the wages contravenes the legislative purpose of the unemployment benefits statute and is arbitrary as legally unsupported.  Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of benefits.

         In this appeal from the Law Division's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the court was asked to consider, for the first time, whether a motor vehicle subject to a recall notice alone is sufficient to establish a claim pursuant to the New Jersey Lemon Law statute, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49.  Defendant issued a recall notice that encompassed plaintiff's vehicle.  Plaintiff subsequently brought the vehicle to the dealer to have the recall repair performed.  Primarily due to disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant's ability to complete the recall was delayed.

         A Law Division judge granted defendant summary judgment.  The court affirmed and held the existence of a recall notice alone is not sufficient to establish the "nonconformity" element of a Lemon Law claim.  In addition, because plaintiff primarily used the vehicle for business purposes, it is excluded from the Lemon Law's coverage.

Based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution.

The court considers whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for monetary damages, filed years after the statutory deadline for filing a tax appeal, based on allegations that municipal officials committed fraud and other torts by assessing real property in a manner inconsistent with law and at an amount above its true market value.  The court concludes that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such claims because they are substantively equivalent to a tax appeal properly venued in the Tax Court or a county board of taxation, and the statutory deadlines for challenging local property tax assessments may not be circumvented by a late-filed complaint seeking damages for alleged torts arising from the tax assessment process.  In light of these conclusions, the court affirms the trial court order dismissing the complaint in this matter with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Expanding the search to the engine compartment and trunk went beyond the scope of the automobile exception. Although the trooper smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car, his initial search yielded no results and provided no justification “to extend the zone of the . . . search further than the persons of the occupants or the interior of the car.” State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1980). As a result, the seized evidence should be suppressed.

Defendant voluntarily went to the police station to give a witness statement. At the police station, defendant was interviewed twice. During his first interview, defendant was not in custody and thus not yet owed Miranda warnings. The factors set forth in O’Neill therefore do not need to be considered to assess the admissibility of the second interview. And before police interviewed defendant the second time, they properly administered Miranda warnings. With his rights in mind, defendant executed a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. During his second interview, defendant confessed. Neither the Fifth Amendment nor state common law calls for suppression of defendant’s statements.

The Court affirms as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court declines to adopt an exception to the American Rule for common law right of access claims to public records. Those claims impose significant burdens on municipal clerks and other records custodians; they require a careful balancing of competing interests and the application of an array of factors that can challenge even a seasoned judge. Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.

Plaintiff and decedent were partners for twenty-five years but never married.  During their relationship, decedent owned an income-producing property in fee simple, which, unbeknownst to plaintiff, he transferred during his lifetime to himself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.  Decedent signed and recorded the transfer deed.  Plaintiff discovered her interest in the property only after decedent passed away.  Plaintiff sought injunctive relief to quiet title and was granted summary judgment, based on the trial court's holding that all elements of a valid inter vivos gift were present.

Defendant, who is decedent's son and administrator of the estate, urges reversal, claiming material issues of fact precluded summary judgment, specifically challenging the validity of the inter vivos gift of real property.

The court affirms.  Defendants presented no evidence to rebut the presumptions of donative intent, delivery and acceptance raised by the recorded transfer deed.  Acceptance is presumed subject to plaintiff's right to disclaim her interest within a reasonable time of becoming aware of it.  The additional element of relinquishment required for a valid inter vivos gift in New Jersey was also satisfied upon recordation of the transfer deed because decedent could not unilaterally restore his former fee simple estate.

The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements. The Court further affirms that video recording, in addition to audio recording, should be included in the range of options; that the parties shall enter into a protective order when a defense expert is concerned about the disclosure of proprietary information; that when third-party observation is permitted, the trial court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent any disruption of or interference with the exam; and that, if a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed, a neutral interpreter shall be selected by the parties or, failing agreement, by the court.

         These consolidated cases require us to consider the scope of the statutory self-critical analysis privilege and determine whether materials developed as part of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to a facility's patient safety plan are subject to discovery, disclosure, and admissible at trial.  This analysis hinges upon whether the facilities involved in these cases met the requirements imposed by the Patient Safety Act (PSA), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25, and related regulations, rendering the materials sought by plaintiffs privileged and protected from disclosure.

Defendants argue the trial court erred by ruling incident/investigation reports concerning separate incidents resulting in injuries at two facilities are not privileged under the PSA and therefore discoverable.  The court reversed the trial court's orders. 

Surveying the case law interpreting the PSA and regulations, the court notes that the PSA was designed to reduce medical errors by promoting internal self-reporting and self-critical analysis related to adverse events and near misses by health care facilities.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25 renders the entire self-critical-analysis process privileged, shielding a health care facility's deliberations and determinations from discovery or admission into evidence.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), does not condition the privilege on the finding of a Serious Preventable Adverse Event (SPAE).  That an event is not reportable does not abrogate the self-critical-analysis privilege.  The privilege unconditionally protects the process of self-critical analysis, the results of the analysis, and the resulting reports developed by a facility in its compliance with the PSA.  A court may not order the release of documents prepared during the process of self-critical analysis. 

N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(c) requires health care facilities to report every SPAE that occurs in that facility to the Department of Health (DOH).  The documents, materials and information submitted to the DOH pursuant to this requirement are absolutely privileged and shall not be "subject to discovery or admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding."  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f).  The statute provides no rationale or standard for parsing the contents of the documents, allowing for some portions to be privileged and others not privileged. 

However, when information sought to be protected from disclosure is not submitted to the DOH, the path to a privilege is different.  N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g) establishes the self-critical analysis privilege for internal documents that are the product of an 'investigative process that may or may not lead to reporting to the DOH.  Any documents, materials, or information developed by a health care facility as part of a process of self-critical analysis conducted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(b) is not subject to discovery, disclosure or admissible as evidence in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 

Accordingly, if documents are submitted to the DOH pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(f) or meet the requirements of N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(g), they are absolutely privileged and not subject to discovery.  Under either of those circumstances, a trial court does not engage in a redaction process and release the redacted document.  The entire document is statutorily protected from disclosure. 

At the same time, the PSA expressly preserves plaintiffs' right to discover facts through conventional means of discovery if obtained from any source or context other than those specified in the PSA.  Moreover, documents created outside the self-critical analysis process are subject to discovery. 

In each case, plaintiffs are free to engage in discovery of facts from non-privileged sources.  Additionally, if defendants produced voluminous medical records in response to a discovery request in either case, plaintiff may request, and the court may order, that defendants provide a "narrative to steer them to information contained in thousands of pages of medical records" in accordance with Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J. 225, 252 (2018).

Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position, and the Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s award of “full back pay, benefits, and emoluments, less mitigation.” But the Court rejects the extension of Bridgewater-Raritan to impose a duty on school boards to notify, in advance, full-time teachers who consider voluntarily transferring to part-time teaching positions that they may not have a right to return to their full-time position.

This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding whether a claim can be made under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, where (1) an employer merges with another employer, (2) the employee does not apply for a position with the new employer, but (3) the employee contends that while all other employees were offered employment with the new employer, the employer did not extend the same offer, for reasons proscribed by the LAD.

Because of the LAD's remedial purpose, plaintiff's claim that the decision not to transition her employment from Graham Curtin, P.A. –– the closing employer –– to McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP. –– the new employer –– was based on discriminatory factors may constitute a viable cause of action.  There are genuine disputes of material facts regarding whether the decision not to employ her at McElroy Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter was, in fact, discriminatory.  Therefore, the court reverses the motion court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

In addition, because the motion court did not address the specifics of plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination, retaliatory termination, and aiding and abetting harassment based on age, disability, and use of disability leave,  we do not either.       

Judges are encouraged, when practical, to respond “yes” or “no” to unambiguous and specific questions posed by juries during deliberations rather than solely re-read sections of the final jury charge. In general, when a specific request for clarification clearly calls for and is capable of a “yes” or “no” answer, like here, then judges should respond accordingly. Here, the answer to the jury’s question is indisputably “yes,” one can be a “supervisor” but not hold a “high-level” position in a drug trafficking network. Instead of responding “yes” to the question, however, the judge re-read the entire model kingpin charge; opined that those elements, three and four, sounded similar; and may have implicitly suggested that being a “supervisor” is sufficient to establish that a defendant held a “high-level” position within such an organization. The response to the question was an error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.