Opinion Summaries

Courts are not required to analyze the Doe factors each time a party asserts that a privacy interest exists. A party must first present a colorable claim that public access to records would invade a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. It is not reasonable to expect that details about a public auction of government property will remain private. OPRA calls for disclosure of records relating to the auction

In this appeal, the court was asked to determine whether sidewalk liability applies to an owner of a vacant church because in Gray v. Caldwell Wood Products, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2012), we imposed liability on the owner of a vacant, boarded-up building that had been used for commercial purposes. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a vacant church maintains its status as a noncommercial property, not subject to a commercial property's sidewalk liability. We reject any reading of Gray that imposes liability on owners of vacant residential or noncommercial properties that have not been put to any commercial use.

The New Jersey Rules of Evidence and supporting case law do not require that lay testimony and even lay opinion testimony, although based on scientific, technical or even specialized knowledge, automatically triggers the need for the designation of the witness providing that testimony as an expert. The fact that a person with personal knowledge of facts relevant to a dispute may also qualify as an expert in the particular field associated with those facts does not convert his or testimony into expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702 and 703.

The legal question – when enrollment into the PTI program is contingent on a defendant pleading guilty to a second-degree charge – is whether the civil consequences of wreaking devastating personal financial havoc on a defendant constitutes good cause under Rule 3:9-2. This court held that such a financial circumstance establishes good cause permitting a civil reservation. The court emphasized that the civil reservation eliminated the obstacle to avoiding an unnecessary criminal trial against defendant, who feared that the civil claimants would later use her plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability.

The right to request and obtain government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) is not limited to citizens of New Jersey. According, the out-of-state plaintiffs had standing to pursue their OPRA claims against the public entity defendants in these three cases.

The panel considers incumbent vendor Express Scripts, Inc.'s appeal of the Acting Director of the Division of Purchase and Property's final agency decision sustaining the Division's award of a three-year contract for Pharmacy Benefit Management to OptumRx, Inc. Although anticipated changes in Plan Design affecting the Contract make the question more difficult than it might otherwise appear, we conclude Optum's statement "reserv[ing] the right to modify Financial Contracted Terms based on changes by the State in formulary or any carve out of services set forth in the Agreement, including but not limited to Specialty Pharmacy services," constitutes a substantial deviation from a material, non-waivable price term in the Solicitation and thus reverse the decision of the Acting Director and order the Contract rebid as expeditiously as possible. Whether that can occur in sufficient time to allow the Vendor to prepare for open enrollment next October is a matter we leave to the Acting Director.

These consolidated appeals involve a challenge to decisions by two state agencies to finance a comprehensive renovation of the State Capitol complex. The agencies resolved to issue $300 million in bonds and to repay the bonds with rental payments pursuant to a lease of the State Capitol complex.

Plaintiff John S. Wisniewski, then a state legislator, filed a complaint challenging the agencies' actions on the basis that they violated the Debt Limitation Clause (DLC) of the New Jersey Constitution. At the time the complaint was filed, the bonds had already been sold and distributed into the marketplace. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the complaint as moot.

In No. A-4689-16, plaintiff appeals the trial court's determination that his complaint is moot. In Nos. A-4693-16 and A-4698-16, he appeals the final agency decisions. The panel finds the appeals are technically moot. Notwithstanding, the panel addresses the merits because the issue raised is a matter of significant public importance that is capable of repetition while evading review.

The panel concludes the issuance of the bonds to finance the renovations of the State Capitol complex did not violate the DLC. The panel further concludes the State Capitol Joint Management Commission acted within its delegated authority in approving the renovations and entering into the lease/leaseback agreement, and the New Jersey Economic Development Authority possessed the requisite authority to issue the bonds to fund the renovations.

In a prior appeal, State v. Kosch, 444 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 227 N.J. 369 (2016), the court vacated three of defendants' nine theft convictions and remanded for a new trial on those three theft-of-immovable-property counts; the court also held that "once those three counts are finally adjudicated, defendant should be resentenced on all " in light of potential merger issues, id. at 392-93. Without disposing of the three counts, which still remain unadjudicated, the judge reshaped the prior sentence and imposed the same aggregate prison term as before. Defendant appealed and the court reversed. Although the court recognized the new judgment was not a final order, the court granted leave to appeal out of time and reversed because the trial judge failed to comply with the "peremptory duty to obey" our mandate "precisely as it [was] written"; that mandate unambiguously precluded resentencing without an adjudication of the theft-of-immovable-property counts.

Because significant questions exist concerning the extent of the notice actually provided, either by the Commissions or through their agents to active employees, former employees, and retirees, a hearing is necessary. The hearing is to be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in this opinion and, at the hearing, the adequacy of the content of the notice can be raised.

This appeal poses the legal question of whether N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4, a statute that became effective in 1988, precludes a spouse's unsecured creditor from obtaining the forced partition of real property the spouse and his non-debtor spouse own together as tenants by the entirety. The panel affirms the trial court's ruling that the statute prohibits such non-consensual partition. The statute supersedes and nullifies earlier case law, such as Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 262 (1976), which had allowed such a creditor's remedy in certain equitable circumstances.

In these appeals, consolidated for our opinion, plaintiff sued defendants under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (PCAA), N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.1 to -60, to recover civil penalties for acts that he contended constituted animal cruelty under its provisions. Plaintiff lacked standing to sue in his individual capacity and the cases were dismissed. He contends the complaints were filed as qui tam actions under N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 which provided, in relevant part, that a person who violates the PCAA shall pay a civil penalty according to a schedule in the statute "to be sued for and recovered, with costs, in a civil action by any person in the name of the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals".

We decline to interpret N.J.S.A. 4:22-26 as authorizing private citizens, who otherwise would not have standing, to sue for civil penalties under the PCAA in qui tam actions against other parties, who they alleged may have committed acts of animal cruelty. The language relied on by plaintiff does not signal authority for qui tam litigation in light of the PCAA's other provisions nor was it supported by the legislative history or case law. We affirm the dismissal of these cases for lack of standing

The single publication rule applies to an internet article. However, if a material and substantive change is made to the article’s defamatory content, then the modified article will constitute a republication, restarting the statute of limitations. In this case, there are genuine issues of disputed fact concerning whether Adelman made a material and substantive change to the original article, and the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the defamation action based on the single publication rule. However, the modified article is entitled to the protection of the fair report privilege. The article is a full, fair, and accurate recitation of a court-filed complaint. The trial court properly dismissed the defamation action, and on that basis the Court affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment

The New Jersey Education Association challenged regulations pertaining to the disability retirement process for various State retirement systems. In upholding most of the regulations – except those requiring applicants to pay for subsequent independent medical examinations and related addenda – this court maintained the requirement that eligibility for disability retirement benefits requires members to show that they cannot work due to a disability.

The New Jersey Division Of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), and the Law Guardian on behalf of the two young children, appeal from the Family Part's order denying termination of parental rights following an extended eighteen-month trial at which twelve witnesses testified and hundreds of exhibits were admitted into evidence. This appeal involves the termination of parental rights of T.D., a mother suffering from multiple sclerosis and R.C., the father of her two youngest children, born in 2012 and 2014, and removed from the care of their parents shortly after birth. The trial judge found, in particular, that the Division did not provide meaningful services to the mother, who uses a wheelchair. Considering the limited standard of review of a decision not to terminate parental rights, we affirm.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Leone’s majority opinion

Judicial review is premature because factual disputes require resolution before the Secretary can make a properly informed decision on the grant applications. Because an informed administrative decision could not have been made without the benefit of a proper record, the matter is remanded to the Secretary, in order that a contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the ultimate administrative decision of the Secretary concerning the challenged grants

The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status.

This court consolidates these two insurance coverage cases for purposes of this opinion. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The motion judge reserved decision at the conclusion of oral argument and entered orders that same day that granted the insurers' motions for summary judgment and denied the insureds' cross-motions. The judge did not issue a written opinion or oral decision, nor make factual findings or conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). In a Final Judgment entered a month later, the judge dismissed the insureds' complaints with prejudice "for the reasons set forth in [the insurers'] motion papers."

Although the standard of review from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, the function of an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa. The requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a) are unambiguous and cannot be carried out by the motion judge by a nebulous allusion to "the reasons set forth in defendant[s]' motion papers." Reversed and remanded.

The Court now revises Rule 3:4A(b)(5) to make clear that a recommendation against a defendant’s pretrial release that is based only on the type of offense charged cannot justify detention by itself unless the recommendation is based on one of two presumptions in the statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b). A pending charge is a charge that has a future pre-disposition related court date or is pending presentation to the grand jury, or has not been disposed of due to the defendant’s failure to appear pending trial or sentencing, or that is in some form of deferred status.

Under the circumstances of this case, aggravated assault is, at most, a related offense of the State’s robbery charge. The trial court had no obligation to charge the jury sua sponte on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of the State’s robbery charge.