Opinion Summaries

A PTI court may include a restitution condition in a PTI agreement only if it can quantify the financial obligation and assess the participant’s current and prospective ability to meet that obligation. An open-ended agreement to indemnify the victim of the participant’s alleged offense for unspecified future losses is not an appropriate condition of PTI. Moreover, a restitution condition of PTI is inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding against the PTI participant. The indemnification provision of the PTI agreement at issue should have played no role in this civil litigation.

Plaintiff's counsel informed the trial court of counsel's reasonable belief that plaintiff had diminished capacity. Under Rule 4:26-2(a)(4), a court may appoint a guardian ad litem if there is good cause to believe that a party lacks the mental capacity needed to participate in the litigation. Based upon the guardian ad litem's investigation or other information, the court may give the guardian ad litem the power to make specific decision(s) needed in the case if it finds clear and convincing evidence that the party is mentally incapable of making those decision(s). The Appellate Division disapproves older cases suggesting the court had to meet Rule 4:86's standard for appointing a guardian of the person or property. As the court found plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to decide whether to try or settle the case, the guardian ad litem could negotiate a settlement which the court properly found was fair and reasonable under Rule 4:44.

First, under the qualified immunity addressed in Rutgers a state agency must be able to demonstrate both that the planned action is reasonable and that the agency reasonably consulted with local authorities and took into consideration legitimate local concerns. Second, although an otherwise immune state entity may not be compelled to submit to review before a planning board, when its improvement directly affects off-site property and implicates a safety concern raised by a local governmental entity responsible to protect public safety with respect to that off-site property, special judicial review and action is required. In circumstances such as are presented here, a judicial finding that the cited public safety concern has been reasonably addressed shall be a necessary additional requirement before a court may either compel local regulatory action or grant declaratory relief that the planned action is exempt from land use regulation. The Court does not specify what record warrants such a finding in every case. Rather, the trial court should determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether it could make such a finding via a summary proceeding or whether a more fulsome proceeding is necessary.

When enacted in 1994, Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, provided that any registrant could

• make application to the Superior Court . . . to terminate the [registration] obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprisonment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.
• [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).]

In 2002, in order to secure federal funding, the Legislature adopted N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g), which makes subsection (f) inapplicable to those convicted of more than one "sex offense" or those convicted of aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), or sexual assault pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).

The Legislature, however, chose not to amend N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(c), by which an offender who has not committed a crime for fifteen years since his last conviction or release, and who no longer poses a threat to public safety, "may petition the Superior Court for release from" Community Supervision for Life (CSL) or Parole Supervision for Life (PSL).

Appellants were both convicted prior to 2002, and, after leading offense-free lives for more than fifteen years, applied to terminate their registration requirements and CSL. Although the Law Division judges relieved each of his CSL restrictions finding neither posed a public safety threat, the judges denied termination of appellants' registration pursuant to subsection (g).

The Court reverses, concluding the Legislature did not specifically intend the retroactive application of subsection (g), and, even if intended, retroactive application of subsection (g) to those convicted prior to its enactment results in a "manifest injustice."

In this products liability case arising out of exposure to asbestos, we consider anew whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn about the risk of harm from exposure to asbestos-containing replacement parts integral to the function of the manufacturer's product, even if the manufacturer did not fabricate or distribute the replacement parts. We conclude that a duty to warn exists when the manufacturer's product contains asbestos components, which are integral to the function of the product, and the manufacturer is aware that routine periodic maintenance of its product will require the replacement of those components with other asbestos-containing parts.

In light of our determination that a manufacturer's product includes any replacement parts necessary to its function, defendants' duty to warn extends to any danger created by those replacement parts. A careful review of the record reveals plaintiff presented sufficient evidence detailing his exposure to asbestos, either from original parts supplied by defendants or replacement parts required for the function of defendants' products, to create issues of fact as to all defendants. The panel, therefore, reverses the orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and remands for trial.

The question presented is whether a Law Division summary action seeking to vacate an award by a dispute resolution professional (DRP) as well as an appeal award of a three-member DRP panel, which affirmed the DRP's decision, was timely made within the forty-five-day time frame under N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(a), when it was filed 159 days after the DRP's award, but forty-three days after the DRP panel's award. The trial court dismissed the summary action as untimely; finding it was not filed within forty-five days after the DRP's award. We reverse and remand because we conclude that, under the governing statutory and regulatory guidelines, the summary action was timely filed within forty-five days of the DRP panel's decision.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4, a tax lienholder who can show that its “right to use, acquire or enjoy property is or may be affected” if the application is granted is an interested party and therefore may have standing to challenge a planning board’s approval of a land use application.

There is little distinction between Daubert’s principles regarding expert testimony and New Jersey’s, and Daubert’s factors for assessing the reliability of expert testimony will aid New Jersey trial courts in their role as the gatekeeper of scientific expert testimony in civil cases. Accordingly, the Court now reconciles the standard under N.J.R.E. 702, and relatedly N.J.R.E. 703, with the federal Daubert standard to incorporate its factors for civil cases. Analysis of the record in this case leads to a clear result: the trial court properly excluded plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony. Moreover, the Court reaffirms that the abuse of discretion standard must be applied by an appellate court assessing whether a trial court has properly admitted or excluded expert scientific testimony in a civil case. In this matter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidential ruling and, therefore, the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts.

The Court finds continued scientific support for only one aspect of CSAAS -- delayed disclosure -- because scientists generally accept that a significant percentage of children delay reporting sexual abuse. Expert testimony about CSAAS in general, and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure, may no longer be admitted at criminal trials. Evidence about delayed disclosure can be presented if it satisfies all parts of the applicable evidence rule. See N.J.R.E. 702. In particular, the State must show that the evidence is beyond the understanding of the average juror. That decision will turn on the facts of each case. Here, because the victim gave straightforward reasons about why she delayed reporting abuse, the jury did not need help from an expert to evaluate her explanation. However, if a child cannot offer a rational explanation, expert testimony may help the jury understand the witness’s behavior. The Court asks the Committee on Model Jury Charges to develop an appropriate instruction on delayed disclosure. In this appeal, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. As a result, the expert testimony about CSAAS introduced at trial was harmless, and defendant’s convictions are affirmed.

This case presented a novel issue in the context of self-incrimination. The court determined that it is incongruous to require the presence of a parent prior to a waiver of Miranda rights to safeguard a juvenile's right against self-incrimination, yet allow police eavesdropping on the parent-child communication that proves antithetical to that right. The court also determined that this constituted the functional equivalent of police interrogation and therefore Miranda was implicated. Since Miranda warnings were not provided prior to the parent-child communication, the statements resulting from the communication were suppressed.

Ronald Bentz v. Township of Little Egg Harbor, Docket No. 009763-2017; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Ronald Bentz, Self-Represented; for defendant - Robin La Bue (Gilmore & Monahan P.A., attorneys); for intervenor, Director, Division of Taxation – Stephen J. Colby (Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Held: Plaintiff’s complaint seeking to declare N.J.S.A. 54:4- 8.10(a) as unconstitutional because it does not list the 1986 conflict in Libya as one of defined periods of “time of war” is dismissed. The principles of separation of powers prohibit the court from engrafting a conflict into N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) when it has not been specifically designated as such by the Legislature.

Borough of Red Bank v. RMC-Meridian Health, Docket Nos. 000007-2016, 000008-2018; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided July 25, 2018. For plaintiff – Martin Allen and Kevin A. MacDonald (DiFrancesco Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, P.C., attorneys); for defendant – Susan Feeney and Farhan Ali (McCarter & English, L.L.P., attorneys).

Held: Plaintiff thus cannot seek to impose omitted assessments on defendant’s property for two tax years under the general omitted assessment law, based on a trial court’s opinion in an unrelated litigation that an unrelated hospital, which was found to be operating for profit, is not entitled to a tax exemption. Plaintiff’s complaints are therefore dismissed.

The Court affirms the panel’s order shielding the redacted document from discovery because the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege prevents its disclosure. The Court also affirms the panel’s determination that, when reviewing a discovery dispute such as this, a trial court should not be determining whether a reportable event under the PSA has occurred. The Court reverses the judgment to the extent it ends defendants’ discovery obligation with respect to this dispute, finding that defendants have an unmet discovery duty under Rule 4:17-4(d) that must be addressed. Accordingly, the Court provides direction on how the court should have addressed, through New Jersey’s current discovery rules, the proper balancing of interests between the requesting party and the responding party here, and remands to the trial court.

Although an affidavit of a police officer familiar with the investigation is preferable, a hearsay certification from an assistant prosecutor may support probable cause to compel a defendant to submit to a buccal swab if it sets forth the basis for the prosecutor’s knowledge. Second, an affidavit or certification supporting probable cause to compel a buccal swab must establish a fair probability that defendant’s DNA will be found on the evidence. Here, the State failed to show probable cause.

The principal issue in this appeal from a conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary after a guilty plea pertains to the limits placed on a prosecutor to resubmit a case to a grand jury after a previous grand jury panel refused to indict. The court concludes that the prosecutor's power to resubmit is broad but not boundless. It is subject to review in light of the grand jury's role to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecution; and the court's power to review prosecutorial discretion for abuse, and to assure fundamental fairness. However, under the circumstances of this case, the court rejects defendant's challenge to the resubmission, and affirms the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.

In this appeal, defendant filed his first post-conviction relief (PCR) petition more than five years after the trial court signed the Judgment of Conviction. Despite this, neither the PCR court nor the State challenged the timeliness of the petition under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). At the conclusion of oral argument in this appeal, this court entered a sua sponte order directing the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing: (1) whether the procedural bar in the Rule is subject to waiver if the State fails to raise it before the PCR court; and (2) if the Rule’s preclusive injunction is not subject to waiver, what should be the remedy on appeal.

Based on the policy concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575-76 (1992), this court holds that a PCR judge has an independent, non-delegable duty to question the timeliness of a petition and to require a petitioner to submit competent evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the time restrictions codified by the Court under Rule 3:22-12. Absent sufficient competent evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing these time restrictions, the PCR judge does not have the authority to review the merits of the claims asserted therein.

In this appeal, the court held that it was premature to mandate the insurance carrier to provide a defense to an insured on an environmental claim where the unambiguous exclusion contained anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language. The proper remedy at that stage in the proceedings, given the uncertainty of coverage, was to convert the duty to defend to a duty to reimburse as in Grand Cove II. The court further held that it was premature to apply the Griggs analysis to a settlement reached between the insured and the claimants prior to a determination that the insurance carrier breached its duty to defend.

The high-low agreement is a settlement subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement, the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico may not seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. The judgment of the Appellate Division is accordingly affirmed.

If the reasons given by the dealers present a colorable dispute of facts or at least the presence of mitigating evidence, the Commission is required to provide an in-person hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:10-20. An in-person hearing must be held prior to a license suspension or revocation when the target of the enforcement action requests it. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands.

In this class action against defendant Kia Motors America, Inc., (KMA) plaintiff class of 8455 Kia Sephia owners and lessees represented by Regina Little proved at a jury trial that the Sephia, model years 1997 through 2000, had a defective front brake system, which caused premature brake pad and rotor wear. Concluding that the defect amounted to a breach of express and implied warranties, and that all owners had suffered damage due to the defect, the jury awarded each member of the class $750 ($6.3 million total) in repair damages.

Determining for the first time post-trial that repair damages could not be awarded on a class-wide basis because they were dependent upon individual factors, the trial court granted KMA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the repair damages award, decertified the class for purposes of damages, and ordered a new trial on repair damages only, to proceed by way of claim forms. With the advantage of recent case law unavailable to the trial judge, the court now reverses, reinstates the jury award and remands for determination of counsel fees.