Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Aug. 21, 2019 |
MOSHE ROZENBLIT, ET AL. VS. MARCIA V. LYLES, ET AL. (C-000002-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1611-17T1)
This appeal challenges the legality of a section in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between the Jersey City Board of Education and the Jersey City Education Association, Inc., which requires the Board to pay the salaries and benefits of two teachers who were selected by the members of the union to serve as "president and his/her designee," during the three-year term of the CBA, and to allow them to devote all of their work-time to the business and affairs of the union. The Chancery Division, General Equity Part found this contractual arrangement did not violate Article VIII, § 3, ¶ 3 of the New Jersey Constitution, commonly referred to as the "gift clause." The court found the Board was authorized to enter into this arrangement with the union under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, which permits the payment of salary in cases of absence not constituting sick leave. This court adheres to jurisprudential principles established by our Supreme Court and declines to reach the constitutional question raised by plaintiffs in this case because there are sufficient statutory grounds to definitively decide this appeal. In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 461 (2013). This court holds that in adopting N.J.S.A. 18A:30-7, the Legislature did not expressly or implicitly intend to authorize boards of education to enter into this type of contractual arrangement. The disbursement of public funds pursuant to this contractual arrangement was an ultra vires act by the Board. |
Appellate |
Aug. 19, 2019 |
DCPP V. K.G., IN THE MATTER OF M.G. AND J.C.W., MINORS (FG-19-0024-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-1556-17T2)
This appeal involves the trial court's denial of defendant's request to have the same counsel represent him in Title Nine abuse and neglect proceedings and a criminal matter arising from the same allegations of sexual abuse of a child. In N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593 (App. Div. 2010), we held that simultaneous representation is permissible where the trial court is able to implement measures sufficient to protect the confidentiality of DCPP records disclosed during the Title Nine proceedings. We directed courts to undertake a case-by-case analysis when deciding requests for simultaneous representation. The panel held that the trial court failed to undertake the analysis required by N.S. and summarily denied defendant's request for simultaneous representation. In addition, the panel clarified that N.S. applies to both Title Nine dispositional hearings and Title Nine fact finding hearings. Finally, the panel held that the denial of defendant's choice of counsel was a structural error requiring reversal of the abuse and neglect finding reached after a hearing at which defendant was represented by counsel that was not his choice. |
Appellate |
Aug. 19, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LOUIS V. WILLIAMS (16-11-0834, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2490-17T4)
In this appeal, we address whether a resident of a boarding house has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a common hallway accessible by other residents. The court determined that the Law Division improperly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his bedroom after the police observed contraband while standing in a hallway in front of defendant's bedroom door. The court concluded that boarding house residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallways linking their bedrooms to areas traditionally contained within one living unit, such as a bathroom or kitchen, and the warrantless police entry into the home was not justified by the plain view doctrine because the officers did not have a lawful right to enter. According to the court, whether the residential structure's front door was locked was not dispositive of whether defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy extended beyond his bedroom door, as the exterior door was equipped with a lock and the evidence showed only that the door was unlocked when the police made their warrantless entry, but not at any other time. In addition, drawing on a distinction recognized by courts in other states between apartment buildings and boarding or rooming houses, the court concluded that a boarding house resident's need to use a shared hallway to access his or her bathroom supports a reasonable expectation of privacy in that hallway notwithstanding an unlocked front door. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion to suppress because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, and the State did not establish the warrantless search of the home was justified by the plain view doctrine or any other exception to the warrant requirement. |
Appellate |
Aug. 15, 2019 |
JODI SHAW, ET AL. VS. BRIAN SHAND, ET AL. (L-0408-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5686-17T1)
In this interlocutory appeal, the court considers whether a licensed home inspector home inspector is a "learned professional" and therefore excluded from liability under Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210. Considering the CFA's remedial purpose and applying well-established canons of statutory construction, the court concludes that the judicially created learned professional exception must be narrowly construed to exempt liability only as to those professionals who have historically been recognized as "learned" based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition. To the extent this court's prior decisions, including Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services, Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006), have applied the learned professional exception to "semi-professionals" who are regulated by a separate regulatory scheme, we are constrained to depart from that reasoning as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997). As the Court explicitly held in Lemelledo, the existence of a separate regulatory scheme will "overcome the presumption that the CFA applies to a covered activity" only when "a direct and unavoidable conflict exists between application of the CFA and application of the other regulatory scheme or schemes." 150 N.J. at 270. The court's decision today comports with the amicus curiae Attorney General's persuasive interpretation of the CFA and addresses the Attorney General's policy concern that an expansive interpretation of the learned professional exception unduly curtails the authority of the Attorney General and the Division of Consumer Affairs to protect New Jersey consumers and limits the redress available to private litigants. Accordingly, because home inspectors are not historically recognized learned professionals and because no direct and unavoidable conflict exists between the CFA and the regulations governing home inspectors, the court concludes that the CFA applies to the activities of licensed home inspectors and reverses the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the CFA claim against defendants. Judge Sabatino filed a concurring opinion. |
Appellate |
Aug. 13, 2019 |
OPEX REALTY MANAGEMENT, LLC V. ROBERT TAYLOR AND MILDRED TAYLOR
(LT-034082-18)
In this landlord-tenant case, the court was charged with deciding whether the City of Newark’s rent control ordinance prohibited the assessment of “additional rent,” for purposes of a summary dispossess action, if the total amount assessed, including this contractually provided for “additional rent,” exceeded the maximum rent permitted by the ordinance. The court answered the question in the affirmative. This was an action seeking eviction for non-payment of rent. The tenant brought a motion arguing that the local rent control ordinance prohibited the incorporation of additional rent of the kind that was at issue in a summary dispossess action. The tenant argued that the ordinance established a maximum rent cap and any rent that exceeded that amount could not form a basis for eviction. The tenant further argued that regardless of whether defined as “additional rent,” fees should be considered in the ordinance’s definition of “rent” and thus capped thereby. The landlord countered that assessing the additional rent was not contrary to the subject ordinance and the lease expressly provided for such assessment. The landlord further argued that the fees sought are such a common form of additional rent that the local ordinance’s failure to specifically exclude it in the definition should be understood to be mean that the ordinance does not prohibit it. The court held that the landlord was not entitled to evict the tenant based upon the failure to pay the “additional rent,” notwithstanding that the lease memorialized that legal and late fees were collectible as “additional rent.” The court found that the total amount of rent that could be assessed and thus put at issue in a summary dispossess case was limited by the local ordinance. The court established that the assessment of “additional rent” is still the imposition of rent, and because the ordinance governs all rent without exception, the rent could not exceed the municipal ordinance rate cap. Accordingly, the landlord was disallowed from seeking any rents in excess of the maximum rent permitted by the ordinance in a summary dispossess action. The landlord’s contractual remedy was preserved. |
Trial |
Aug. 12, 2019 |
KEVIN HARVARD V. STATE OF NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY, ATLANTIC-CAPE MAY VICINAGE
(A-5091-15T1)
This case stemmed from the termination of the appointment of a Special Civil Part Officer (SCPO) following the discovery of numerous violations of AOC directives. The SCPO filed a Law Division complaint against the State, the Judiciary, and the Atlantic/Cape May vicinage alleging violations of CEPA and related claims. We affirm the summary judgment dismissal of plaintiffs' claims since plaintiff was not a Vicinage employee for CEPA purposes and plaintiff failed to establish a whistle-blower claim under CEPA. This opinion was originally issued in January 2018 as an unpublished opinion. We now publish this opinion, following a request from the Committee of the Special Civil Part Supervising Judges, which submitted "that the publication of this opinion will provide important precedent to our records, practitioners and the public with regard to [SCPOs] and their status as independent contractors." |
Appellate |
Aug. 12, 2019 |
MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER VS. STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY SAINT BARNABAS MEDICAL CENTER VS. STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANY (L-2482-17 AND L-0126-18, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-3004-17T1/A-4208-17T1)
In these back-to-back appeals, State Farm Indemnity Company (State Farm) appeals from two trial court orders that vacated awards entered by dispute resolution professionals (DRP) pursuant to the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act (APDRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, in connection with payment for out-patient hospital services provided to two claimants involved in separate automobile accidents. In each appeal, the trial court entered a modified judgment against State Farm, finding that the DRP committed prejudicial error. The court determined that the trial court properly exercised the authority granted to it under the APDRA, adhered to the statutory grounds in vacating the DRPs' awards, and provided rational explanations of how the respective DRPs committed prejudicial error within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-13(c)(5). Because there was no principled reason for the exercise of the court's supervisory jurisdiction, or any unusual circumstances where public policy required the court's intervention, the court adhered to the strictures of N.J.S.A.2A:23A-18(b), barring further appeals or reviews of trial court judgments, and dismissed the appeals. |
Appellate |
Aug. 12, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF T.D., A JUVENILE.
(FJ-15-0476-18/FJ-15-0569-18)
Following juvenile T.D.’s admission to committing the offense of shoplifting, under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11, the court placed T.D. on a twelve-month deferred disposition and imposed a condition that T.D. complete thirty hours of community service. In light of the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c) indicating that “any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service[,]” the parties expressly contemplated that the community service hours imposed in this case were mandatory. The matter was returned to court post-disposition on probation’s recommendation, due to T.D.’s failure to complete the community service hours. The court concluded that the community service hours were not mandatory, notwithstanding the language within subsection (c) of the shoplifting statute. The court reasoned that the Legislature did not explicitly apply the mandatory penalty provisions of the shoplifting statute to juveniles, as it has done with other statutory schemes. The court further found that the imposition of mandatory community service hours for shoplifting offenses was incompatible with the imposition of a deferred disposition resulting in the dismissal of the complaint, in the absence of any specific requirement to impose such a penalty on juveniles. Upon consideration of T.D.’s representations that she and her mother were experiencing homelessness, and mindful of the rehabilitative goals of the Juvenile Code, the court vacated the imposition of the community service hours as a condition of T.D.’s deferred disposition. |
Trial |
Aug. 9, 2019 |
SUSAN LUCAS VS. 1 ON 1 TITLE AGENCY, INC., ET AL. SUSAN LUCAS VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ET AL. (L-3144-13 AND L-0701-14, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2217-16T2)
Appellant is a law firm who successfully represented plaintiff in the prosecution of a legal malpractice action. Appellant sought counsel fees from plaintiff that exceeded the amount of consequential damages proximately caused by the attorney/tortfeasor. Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256, 272 (1996). When plaintiff and appellant were unable to agree, the trial judge who presided over the legal malpractice action sua sponte decided to adjudicate the fee dispute over appellant's objection. This court reverses and holds the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this counsel fee dispute. Appellant was not a party in the case, had not filed a collection action against plaintiff, nor sought relief under N.J.S.A. 2A:13-5, commonly known as the Attorney's Lien Act. |
Appellate |
Aug. 8, 2019 |
State v. A.T.C.
(A-28-18 ; 081201)
The JLA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, provided that the State presents a statement of reasons explaining its decision to depart from the twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence specified in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and the court reviews the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion to determine whether it was arbitrary and capricious. So that the standard adopted today may be applied in this matter, the Court remands to the sentencing court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Supreme |
Aug. 8, 2019 |
NOEMI ESCOBAR VS. DAVID A. MAZIE, ET AL. (L-8329-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2509-18T1)
The court reverses an order entered under RPC 3.7 barring a lawyer and every lawyer in his firm, save one, from representing themselves at deposition and trial in defense of a malpractice action brought against them by a former client. The court follows established federal authority in this circuit holding RPC 3.7 is a rule addressed only to a lawyer acting as an advocate at trial. Thus there is no ethical prohibition against a lawyer acting as an advocate in a deposition in a case in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness at trial. The court further holds that RPC 3.7 does not apply to a lawyer who is a party in the case. As lawyers have the same rights as other individuals appearing in our courts, they may appear in their own behalf at trial even if likely to be a necessary witness. Law firms, likewise, are to be treated as other entities, and thus must appear through counsel to the same extent. RPC 3.7 is fully applicable to lawyers appearing on the firm's behalf, even if the lawyer is employed by the firm. Imputed disqualification is limited as set forth in RPC 3.7. |
Appellate |
Aug. 7, 2019 |
State v. Charudutt J. Patel
(A-13-18 ; 081069)
To secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence for a subsequent DWI conviction, a non-indigent defendant must establish that in the earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding, (1) he was not advised or did not know of his right to counsel and (2) had he known of his right to counsel, he would have retained a lawyer. A defendant contending he was indigent must establish that in the earlier uncounseled DWI proceeding (1) he was not advised and did not know of his right to appointed counsel, (2) he was entitled to the appointment of counsel under the applicable financial means test,R. 7:3-2(b), and (3) had he been properly informed of his rights, he would have accepted appointed counsel. Because denial of counsel is a structural defect in the proceeding, to secure relief from an enhanced custodial sentence, neither an indigent nor a non-indigent defendant must show that the outcome would have been different had he been represented. The Court removes the five-year limitation in Laurick petitions and amends Rule 7:10-2(g)(2), effective immediately, to provide the following: “(2) Time Limitations. A petition seeking relief under this Rule may be filed at any time.” Here, Patel’s unrebutted certifications established that his 1994 plea was uncounseled, and he had no obligation to establish that he would not have pled guilty or been convicted at trial had he been represented by counsel. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Supreme |
Aug. 6, 2019 |
State v. Keith V. Cuff
(A-79-17 ; 080753)
The omission of second-degree kidnapping from the verdict sheet does not constitute plain error. The jury instruction accurately described the State’s burden of proof with respect to the elements of both first-degree and second-degree kidnapping, and directed the jury to consider second-degree kidnapping as a lesser-included offense if it did not find defendant guilty of the first-degree offense. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial did not provide a rational basis for a second-degree kidnapping conviction because the victims were not “release[d] . . . unharmed and in a safe place,” an element of the second-degree offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c). Defendant was properly convicted of three counts of first-degree kidnapping. As to the sentence, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division that the terms imposed for most of defendant’s offenses constituted a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion but concludes that the trial court should resentence defendant so that it may consider whether certain offenses committed within the same criminal episode warrant concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, as well as whether the decision to make the sentences consecutive rather than concurrent made the aggregate sentence imposed on defendant an abuse of discretion. |
Supreme |
Aug. 6, 2019 |
State v. William T. Liepe
(A-7-18 ; 080788)
The trial court properly applied the factors identified in Yarbough for the imposition of consecutive sentences, and defendant’s sentence is consistent with the principles stated in Carey and does not shock the judicial conscience. The Court reverses the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstates the sentence that the trial court imposed. |
Supreme |
Aug. 1, 2019 |
State v. Rafael Camey
(A-73-17 ; 080574)
The Court affirms the suppression of DNA evidence from the first buccal swab. The trial court’s thorough and detailed reasons for denying admission of this evidence, under either of the State’s two inevitable discovery arguments, are clearly sustainable on appeal. However, the State’s application for a second buccal swab calls for a remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and its new test, derived in part from aspects of the independent source doctrine: To apply for a new buccal swab for DNA evidence under Rule 3:5A, the State must demonstrate probable cause for the new search. That showing may include evidence that existed before the initial invalid search, but cannot be tainted by the results of the prior search. In addition, to deter wrongdoing by the police, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the initial impermissible search was not the result of flagrant police misconduct. |
Supreme |
July 31, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. R.G. (17-04-0189, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-3090-18T3)
The court affirms an order of the trial court that denied the State's request to medicate defendant involuntarily with antipsychotic medication to restore him to competency to stand trial. The court agrees with the trial court that the State did not satisfy the test under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), because the first factor is determined by consideration of defendant's probable sentence not simply the maximum sentence exposure for the offense charged. The trial court also must consider the potential effect of the medication on defendant's right to a fair trial when applying Sell. Because the Sell test was not satisfied, we have no occasion to determine whether our State Constitution would afford a defendant greater protection of individual liberty and privacy rights. |
Appellate |
July 31, 2019 |
J.H. and A.R. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC
(A-6-18 ; 081128)
The Court is unpersuaded that N.J.A.C. 5:10-14.3(d) imposes any regulatory duty on landlords to cover in-unit radiators with insulating material or a cover. The regulatory scheme provides no evidence of an express or implied intent to include radiators as part of the “heating system” required to be insulated. Having concluded that no such regulatory duty has been imposed, and because the tenants in this case maintained exclusive control over the heat emanating from the radiator, the Court declines to impose on landlords a new common law duty to cover all in-unit radiators. |
Supreme |
July 30, 2019 |
State v. Joey J. Fowler and Jamil L. Hearns
(A-5-18 ; 080880)
Review of the alleged instructional error must be moored to the facts, and the Court concludes that the omission of the instructional charges was not error under the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore reverses and remands to the Appellate Division for consideration of defendants’ arguments that have not yet been addressed. |
Supreme |
July 29, 2019 |
NJ DEP/UFT C/O CREAM RIDGE GOLF, LLC V UPPER FREEHOLD TWP
(007457-2017)
Tax Court: NJ DEP/UFT c/o Cream Ridge Golf, LLC v. Twp of Upper FreeholdDocket No. 007457-2017; opinion by Gilmore, J.T.C., decided July 26, 2019. For plaintiff Cream Ridge Golf, LLC – Katherine B. Galdieri (The Kelly Firm, PC, attorneys); for plaintiff NJ DEP/UFT – Jamie M. Zug (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney); for defendant – Dennis Anthony Collins (Collins, Vella and Casello, LLC, attorneys). For-profit taxpayer/operator of State-owned golf course sought exemption from local property taxes for the subject property, which includes a golf course, pro shop, driving range, restaurant, and maintenance buildings. NJ DEP/UFT joined action in support of exemption. Taxpayer moved for summary judgment and the defendant, Township of Upper Freehold opposed. Held: Operation of State-owned golf course by for-profit entity furthers public purpose of development of lands by the State for recreational purposes. Operation of restaurant by for-profit entity on State-owned property supports primary recreational purpose of the subject property. Requirement under RFP, operation agreement, and lease agreement for payment of property taxes does not preclude application of local property exemption. Application for local property tax exemption subsequent to NJ DEP/UFT’s RFP procedure and entering into operation agreement is not in violation of public bidding laws or the square corners doctrine. The subject property qualifies for local property tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3, 2.3, and 1.10. |
Tax |
July 29, 2019 |
US Masters Residential Property (USA) Fund v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(A-78-17 ; 081137)
Flaws in the substantive reasoning of the arbitration decision as well as procedural fairness considerations undermine confidence in the outcome of this arbitration enough to persuade the Court, in the interest of fairness, to require that a new arbitration be conducted. |
Supreme |