Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Nov. 25, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GREGORY J. PARKHILL (13-07-2155, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4802-17T4)
In this vehicular homicide case, the State contended that defendant recklessly caused a pedestrian's death by speeding excessively. Defendant denied excessive speed and disputed that he caused the death of a pedestrian, alleging the pedestrian unexpectedly crossed the roadway outside the crosswalk and against the light. The court reverses defendant's conviction because the trial court should have delivered the model jury charge on causation, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3(c), and it also should have instructed the jury, as defendant requested, that the motor vehicle code, N.J.S.A. 39:4-36(a)(4), requires pedestrians outside a crosswalk to yield to vehicles in the roadway. |
Appellate |
Nov. 22, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ENOC PIMENTEL (15-06-0517, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2814-17T2)
Defendant was charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 with the fourth-degree criminal offense of driving with a license that had been suspended because of multiple previous drunk driving convictions. The court rejects defendant's claims that the 180-day mandatory minimum jail sentence prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 is cruel and unusual punishment, and that it also violates federal and state constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. The stringent penalty chosen by the Legislature is constitutionally permissible to advance legitimate policy objectives of deterrence and public safety. The court also reaffirms that the clear terms of statute do not allow judges the discretion to impose a lesser sentence. |
Appellate |
Nov. 18, 2019 |
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION VS. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON, ET AL. (L-6977-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-1026-17T1/A-1027-17T1)
For the period from July 2012 to July 2013, New Jersey Transit (NJT) had insurance policies that provided up to $400 million in coverage for property damage, but included a $100 million sublimit for losses generally "caused by flood." The damage to NJT property sustained during Superstorm Sandy came within the specific definitions in the policies of damage caused by "wind driven water" or a "storm surge" associated with a "named windstorm." Therefore, NJT's Sandy-related property damages do not fall within the general definition of losses "caused by flood," and are not subject to the $100 million flood sublimit. |
Appellate |
Nov. 18, 2019 |
RAYMOND NESBY, ET AL. VS. SHERYL FLEURMOND, ET AL. (L-1923-16, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0958-16T4)
In this automobile insurance coverage action, plaintiff sought recovery of his unpaid medical expenses from the defendant carriers that issued policies to the tortfeasor's mother and sister, with whom the tortfeasor resided. Plaintiff had exhausted his personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. And, he settled his claims with the tortfeasor and owner of the vehicle by accepting the policy limit under the owner's policy. Because plaintiff was not a named insured under the tortfeasor's relatives' policies, did not reside with the named insureds nor occupy a vehicle insured under those policies – and released the tortfeasor from any and all claims arising from the accident – the court held his claims against the defendant insurers fail. |
Appellate |
Nov. 15, 2019 |
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT A.A. (ML-09-07-0111) (ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0678-18T1)
This court addressed what general procedure and related due process protections are afforded to individuals who committed crimes outside New Jersey when law enforcement allege that those crimes are "similar to" Megan's Law offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and therefore require registration in this State. This court held that an assistant prosecutor first makes the "similar to" determination. If required to register, the offender can challenge that obligation in the Law Division. At a summary hearing, in accordance with R.B.,1 the judge should (1) undertake an element-by-element legal comparison of the criminal codes of New Jersey and the other state; and (2) compare the elements of the crimes with the purposes of the underlying criminal statutes. Consistent with R.B., the judge may also examine trustworthy relevant evidence as to the underlying factual predicate for the out-of-state conviction. |
Appellate |
Nov. 14, 2019 |
JOSEPH JARDIM VS. MICHAEL EDWARD OVERLEY (L-2341-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-1073-18T3)
This appeal calls for the court to revisit the application of traditional constitutional principles of personal jurisdiction and due process in the context of a retail sale contract made over the Internet. After viewing an Internet posting that advertised a vintage car for sale, a New Jersey customer sent an email to the California owner offering to buy it. The seller responded with a counteroffer, and the parties swiftly agreed on a price. The buyer arranged to have the purchased car shipped from California to New Jersey. When the vehicle arrived here, the buyer discovered it was in poor condition. He sued the seller in the Law Division. The seller moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, and the buyer now appeals. The court affirms the dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California seller. The seller in this one-time-sale scenario did not "purposely avail" himself of this State's retail market to a degree that rises to the level of "minimum contacts" needed to support personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. The parties' follow-up communications that occurred after they agreed on the car's price were insufficient to create a jurisdictional nexus to New Jersey. In addition, their simple contractual documents lacked a forum selection clause, which could have specified New Jersey as an agreed-upon forum. The court does not foreclose a finding of specific jurisdiction in future Internet retail sale contexts in which more extensive transactional activities connected to this State occur. |
Appellate |
Nov. 13, 2019 |
C.R. VS. M.T. (FV-08-0021-19, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-0139-18T4)
The trial judge found, in this action under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act (SASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21, that plaintiff's claim that she did not consent to a sexual encounter, or that she submitted out of fear, was in equipoise with defendant's contention that the sexual encounter was consensual. But, in entering a restraining order in plaintiff's favor, the judge determined that plaintiff was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting. Applying the definition of "mentally incapacitated" in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), the court determined that the intoxication required to render the alleged victim incapable of consenting could have been voluntarily consumed. And the court held that the intoxication level required to render an alleged victim incapable of consenting must have caused a prostration of faculties. Because the judge did not apply the prostration standard, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
Appellate |
Nov. 13, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION VS. ALSOL CORPORATION (29-2017, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3546-17T1)
In this appeal, this court must determine whether the Law Division correctly decided that municipal courts have jurisdiction to impose civil penalties in an enforcement action filed by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) pursuant to the Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to -23.24 (the Spill Act). After reviewing the record developed by the parties, this court holds municipal courts have jurisdiction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11u(d) to impose civil penalties under the Spill Act in a summary proceeding conducted pursuant to the Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999, N.J.S.A 2A:58-10 to -12.
|
Appellate |
Nov. 6, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VINCENT A. PALEY (18-11-1495, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-0308-19T6)
In this interlocutory appeal, the court is asked to determine whether the trial court's August 28, 2019 order violated N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(2)(a), the speedy trial requirements of the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26, and Rule 3:25-4(c)(1). The order excluded 137 days – August 19, 2019 to January 2, 2020 – from the October 15, 2019 speedy trial deadline for defendant Vincent A. Paley. Defendant is consequently confined in jail until his scheduled January 2, 2020 trial date. |
Appellate |
Nov. 6, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHAEL CLARITY (13-10-0621, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
(A-4596-17T3)
When originally sentenced, defendant was found to be a persistent offender eligible for an extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), even though his last prior conviction occurred more than ten years earlier; the sentencing judge determined that the probationary term imposed on that earlier conviction constituted "confinement" and therefore reasoned that defendant's "last release from confinement" occurred within ten years. We rejected the holding that probation may be equated with confinement and remanded for resentencing. State v. Clarity, 454 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 2018). At the subsequent sentencing proceedings, the State came forward with new information purporting to show defendant violated the terms of the earlier probationary sentence and was imprisoned for thirty months as a result, so that his last release from confinement occurred within ten years. When confronted with this information at resentencing, defense counsel conceded defendant was eligible to be sentenced to an extended term as a persistent offender. |
Appellate |
Nov. 4, 2019 |
BRENDA MILLER V. STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK
(A-0078-16T3)
Petitioner, a former employee of the Newark school district, appealed from a Commissioner of Education decision finding that time she was employed in various classified Civil Service secretarial positions could not be used to calculate her entitlement to tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. The statute provides that board of education employees holding secretarial or clerical positions obtain tenure after employment for three consecutive years and the beginning of the next succeeding school year. Although petitioner was employed in secretarial positions for more than three consecutive years, the Commissioner determined petitioner did not obtain tenure because under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-2 petitioner's employment in classified Civil Service secretarial titles did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2.
|
Appellate |
Nov. 4, 2019 |
Brenda Miller v. State-Operated School District of the City of Newark
(A-52-18 ; 081771)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority’s opinion. |
Supreme |
Oct. 31, 2019 |
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT, B.B. IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT, A.V. (ML-99-07-0009 AND ML-99-07-0140, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-0060-18T1/A-0572-18T1)
This case concerns superfluous language contained in orders relieving sex offenders from Community Supervision for Life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, ordering that the court rendered no decision as to any obligations the registrants may have in any other jurisdiction or state as a result of their status as a convicted sex offender, and shall remain in full force and effect until relief is granted in other jurisdictions. The subject language was unnecessary and improper because the language was ambiguous, future, contingent, and uncertain. Therefore, this court reverses and remands for the entry of orders without the superfluous language.
|
Appellate |
Oct. 29, 2019 |
KEVIN BLANCHARD VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS)
(A-3834-17T4)
In this Department of Corrections disciplinary appeal, the court holds that the Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in denying a confirmatory laboratory test of a powder, seized from the inmate, which a field test indicated contained cocaine. The court reaches this conclusion in light of the field test's inherent limitations; the lack of other direct or circumstantial evidence that the inmate possessed drugs; the department's regulation compelling routine confirmatory tests of drug specimens; and the absence of any reasoned explanation for the Department's refusal to subject the seized powder to a confirmatory laboratory test. |
Appellate |
Oct. 29, 2019 |
In the Matter of Registrant G.H.; In the Matter of Registrant G.A.
(A-38-18 ; 081737)
Like the Appellate Division, the Court finds no statement of legislative intent, express or implied, that subsection (g) should be applied retroactively. Nor does it find that subsection (g) was curative, or that the parties’ expectations warranted retroactive application. |
Supreme |
Oct. 29, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GREGORY A. MARTINEZ (17-05-0586, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3479-18T4)
This novel case concerns a prosecutor's office's use of body wires on a paid informant, an anticipated trial witness for the State in a narcotics case, to secretly monitor and record a criminal defense attorney's pre-trial interview of that informant. |
Appellate |
Oct. 28, 2019 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOE D. NICOLAS (15-09-1200, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-4852-17T1)
Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction, arguing the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because the substance he possessed alpha-PVP, also known as "flakka", was not listed as a Schedule I drug under New Jersey law. When the federal government schedules a substance, N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) gives the Director of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Law and Public Safety thirty days to do one of two things: (1) control the substance consistent with the federal government's scheduling, or (2) file an objection in the New Jersey Register. Absent is a requirement that the Director give notice when he or she intends to control the substance as directed by federal law. Thus, if the Director fails to file an objection to the federal government's scheduling within thirty days, as was the case with alpha-PVP, the Director must control the substance consonant with federal law. Thus alpha-PVP was automatically included in Schedule I because the Director did not object to the federal government's designation. |
Appellate |
Oct. 25, 2019 |
Anita K. Leather v. Director, Division of Taxation
(000852-2018)
Tax Court: Anita K. Leather v. Director, Division of Taxation, Docket No. 000852-2018; opinion by Sundar, J.T.C., decided October 23, 2019. For plaintiff – Anita Leather (Self-Represented); for defendant – Gurbir S. Grewal, ttorney General of New Jersey (Miles Eckardt, Deputy Attorney General). Held: Defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint challenging the assessment of New Jersey gross income tax (“GIT”) is enied. Although legally obtained Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability benefits are exempt from GIT, if such benefits are fraudulently obtained, as plaintiff’s ex-husband did during tax years 2000-2009 when plaintiff and he were married and filed joint tax returns, then the benefits are subject to GIT under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1(o) as income from a criminal act. As defendant assessed plaintiff after the normal three-year statute of limitations had expired, for suspension of the same and for the assessment to stand, the returns subject to assessment must have been “false or fraudulent” and “filed with an intent to evade tax.” N.J.S.A. 54A:9-4(c)(1)(B). Such intent must be evinced by “conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the administration and collection of the taxes imposed by the laws of this State.” N.J.A.C. 18:2-2.9(b); 2.9(d). The facts in support of defendant’s summary judgment motion only show that plaintiff did not know that her then-husband’s VA benefits were obtained by fraud, or whether the benefits were includable as income, and that she reported the benefits to the CPA who prepared the GIT returns. Defendant however presented no evidence to prove that plaintiff filed a false or fraudulent GIT return for tax years 2000-2009 with an intent to evade tax that was known to be due. The statute of limitations thus acts to bar granting summary judgment as a matter of law. The lack of evidence in support of an intent to evade tax similarly means that defendant is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to the 50% civil fraud penalty imposed on plaintiff. Because summary judgment is denied on statutory grounds, there is no need to address plaintiff’s equitable argument that she should be afforded “innocent spouse relief” like that available under the I.R.C. § 6015. |
Tax |
Oct. 24, 2019 |
Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund
(A-48-18 ; 081507)
Neither membership nor prior approval of a retirement application is required for modification of a retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence are shown. The Court remands this matter for further proceedings to allow petitioner Christine Minsavage the opportunity to argue in favor of modification under that standard. |
Supreme |
Oct. 23, 2019 |
State v. Shangzhen Huang
(A-62-18 ; 082140)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority’s opinion. |
Supreme |