Posted Date | Name of Case (Docket Number) | Type |
---|---|---|
Aug. 2, 2022 |
EUGENE BERTA VS.NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD)
(A-1889-20)
The court reverses and remands the decision by the State Parole Board to deny state prison inmate Eugene Berta parole and to set a future eligibility term (FET) of seventy-two months. The court applies principles recently reaffirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Acoli, 250 N.J. 431 (2022). The court, however, does not grant parole as in Acoli, but rather remands for the Board to reconsider its decision and, if it chooses again to deny parole, to more fully explain its reasons for doing so and for imposing such a lengthy FET. In 1984, Berta was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and was sentenced to a life term with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. The Board denied his first application for parole in 2015. The latest denial of parole was based on three supposedly negative circumstances: (1) Berta was committed to incarceration for multiple offenses; (2) he has a "serious" and "persistent" history of institutional disciplinary infractions; and (3) his continued denial of guilt constitutes "insufficient problem resolution." The court concludes the Board improperly relied on the first two purportedly negative circumstances. Berta's jury trial convictions for murder and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose were merged at the sentencing hearing and thus he was not committed to state prison based on multiple offenses. As to Berta's record of institutional infractions, the court concludes that the Board was unreasonable in characterizing Berta's infraction history as persistent given that he has been infraction-free for nearly twenty years. As to Berta's denial of guilt, the court concludes that the Board has yet to satisfactorily explain why that circumstance, viewed in context with his overall rehabilitative efforts, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is substantially likely to re-offend. While Berta's ongoing refusal to accept responsibility for the murder he committed is a relevant circumstance, the court holds that admitting guilt is not a categorical prerequisite to parole. Accordingly, the Board shoulders the burden to explain why Berta's refusal to acknowledge his guilt foreshadows that he will commit a future crime. Although the court recognizes the Board's expertise in assessing inherently subjective circumstances such as "negative attitudes" and "insufficient problem resolution," it is not enough for the Board to state a conclusion, especially in view of in-depth psychological evaluations that show that Berta presents a low risk of re-offense. The court also addresses the Board's decision to impose an FET almost three time as long as the presumptive twenty-seven-month FET that applies to inmates convicted of murder. The Board is authorized to set a higher FET only "if the future parole eligibility date which would be established pursuant to [N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)] is clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future behavior." (emphasis added). The court views the "clearly inappropriate" standard to be a high threshold to vault. To impose a higher FET, the Board must overcome the presumption by explaining why a twenty-seven-month FET is clearly inappropriate. Furthermore, the court holds that the Board cannot simply pick a number out of thin air. The court stresses that: (1) an FET must not be imposed as a form of punishment; and (2) the decision to impose an FET beyond the presumptive FET, like the underlying decision to deny parole, must be tied directly to the goal of reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior. The court also emphasizes that it will not permit the Board to use Berta's ongoing refusal to admit guilt as an artifice to convert his life sentence into a sentence of life without parole. Judge Geiger joins in the result and issues a concurring opinion. |
Appellate |
Aug. 2, 2022 |
East Bay Drywall, LLC v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development
(A-7-21 ; 085770)
The Commissioner’s finding that East Bay did not supply sufficient information to prove the workers’ independence under the ABC test’s prong C was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, but rather was supported by the absence of record evidence as to that part of the test. The Court is satisfied that all sixteen workers in question are properly classified as employees, and it remands to the Department for calculation of the appropriate back-owed contributions. |
Supreme |
Aug. 1, 2022 |
Jaguar Land Rover N.A. v. Director, Division of Taxation & Mahwah Twp.
(14046-2018)
Tax Court: Jaguar Land Rover North America v. Director Division of Taxation and Township of Mahwah; Docket No. 014046-2018; opinion by Bianco, J.T.C., decided July 29, 2022. For plaintiff – Joseph E. Bock, Esq. (Spiotti & Associates, P.C., attorney); for defendant Director, Division of Taxation – Anthony D. Tancini, Esq. (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney); for defendant Township of Mahwah – Nylema Nabbie (Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri Jacobs, LLC, attorney). In interpreting an exemption under the Statewide Non-residential Development Fee Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-8.1 to -8.7, the court found that an urban transit hub must be located within one-half mile radius surrounding the mid point of a New Jersey Transit Corporation, Port Authority Transit Corporation or Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation rail station platform area and be specifically delineated by the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA). The court found that while the Subject Property was within one-half mile of a qualifying rail station, it was not specifically delineated by the NJEDA and thus was ineligible for the exemption under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-8.4(b)(4). Because the court found the Statute to be unambiguous and plain on its face, it declined to consult extrinsic sources in its interpretation of the statute. |
Tax |
July 29, 2022 |
IN THE MATTER OF NJ TRANSIT AWARD OF CONTRACTS NO. 21-048A AND NO. 21-048B, ETC. (NEW JERSEY TRANSIT)
(A-2598-21)
We granted Academy Express LLC's application to file an emergent motion to stay New Jersey Transit's award or execution of a contract for regular route local bus services in Hudson County pending Academy Express's appeal of NJ Transit's decision to award the contract to Orange, Newark, Elizabeth Bus Inc. (ONE Bus) and permitted ONE Bus to intervene as an interested party, entering a temporary stay pursuant to Rule 2:9-8 pending our disposition of the motion. Having considered the briefs and oral argument — and without prejudice to the merits panel's ultimate disposition of the matter — we deny the motion and dissolve our temporary stay, concluding Academy Express has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits. The powers of NJ Transit are "vested in the voting members of the board." N.J.S.A. 27:25-4(e). The corporation has been statutorily exempted from the need to bid the contracting-out of bus routes, N.J.S.A. 27:25-6(b), N.J.S.A. 27:25-11(g)(3)(d), and may choose the proposal the Board determines to be "the most advantageous to the corporation, price and other factors considered," N.J.S.A. 27:25-11(c)(1),(2). The Board also has broad discretionary authority to reject any proposal when it determines "it is in the public interest to do so," N.J.S.A. 27:25-11(c), and "shall" consider the "adequacy of performance by a carrier or its affiliates under other contracts . . . with NJ Transit" under its "contracting out" regulations, N.J.A.C. 16:85-2.3(a)(4). Given that broad authority, NJ Transit could certainly consider the recently settled qui tam action against Academy Express and its affiliated companies and determine it was in the public interest to reject a proposal from a carrier that had only weeks before entered into a multi -million-dollar settlement with the State in a massive fraud case involving the same routes covered by these contracts. See Keyes Martin & Co. v. Dir., Div. of Purchase & Prop., 99 N.J. 244, 262 (1985) (upholding Director's rejection of a bid "in the public interest" based on an appearance of wrongdoing attributable to a possible conflict of interest). |
Appellate |
July 20, 2022 |
DORETTA CERCIELLO, ETC. VS. SALERNO DUANE, INC., ET AL. (L-1690-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3090-20)
In this class action matter arising out of the purchase of a vehicle, the court considers whether defendants' material breach of an arbitration agreement––the failure to pay the administration fees––precludes them from asserting the waiver of the right to pursue a class action in the subsequent Superior Court litigation. The arbitration agreement clearly informed consumer purchasers they were waiving their right to pursue a class action in court and in arbitration. Although defendants cannot compel arbitration because of their failure to pay the requisite fees, their breach of the agreement does not eradicate the other provisions to which plaintiff agreed––namely the waiver of the right to pursue a class action in court. This court affirmed the orders denying class certification. |
Appellate |
July 19, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. HINDRAJ L. BALANI
(MA-13-2019)
The municipal court found the defendant guilty of violating N.J.A.C. 5:23-2.32(a), a regulation enacted under the Uniform Construction Code Act that prohibits unsafe structures. The municipal court then ordered his building demolished. The defendant appealed to the Law Division, which on de novo review found that the municipal court lacked the authority to order the building’s demolition. The Law Division then dismissed the complaint after finding that the municipality failed to follow the procedures that would have allowed the municipal court to impose a fine. |
Trial |
July 18, 2022 |
Crystal Point Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kinsale Insurance Company
(A-76-20 ; 085606)
Crystal Point may assert direct claims against Kinsale pursuant to the Direct Action Statute in the setting of this case. Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 17:28-2, however, Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are derivative claims, and are thus subject to the terms of the insurance policies at issue, including the provision in each policy mandating binding arbitration of disputes between Kinsale and its insureds. Crystal Point’s claims against Kinsale are therefore subject to arbitration. |
Supreme |
July 15, 2022 |
HOLLYWOOD CAFÉ DINER, INC. VS. GERI JAFFEE, ET AL. (L-2786-19, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2272-20)
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties in this legal malpractice action exchanged minimal discovery before the court issued its notice pursuant to Rule 4:36-2, advising that discovery would end in sixty days and any application for an extension must be made before the discovery end date (DED). Thirty days later, the court issued a trial date. The parties secured a consensual sixty-day discovery extension, see Rule 4:24-1(c), but when defendants moved before expiration of the DED for a further extension, the judge denied the motion, concluding the exceptional circumstances standard applied because a trial date was set, and defendants failed to meet that standard. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied, but not before defendants sought summary judgment, essentially arguing the lack of expert opinion doomed plaintiff's complaint. The judge granted defendants summary judgment. The court reversed. The court construed Rule 4:24-1(c), which states a judge shall grant an extension motion upon good cause if made before the DED, but also states a court may grant a discovery extension only in exceptional circumstances once an arbitration or trial date is set. The court concluded that while court administrators may send notices setting future arbitration and trial dates before discovery ends, the plain language of the Rule, read in pari materia with other rules, requires judges to apply the good cause standard if the motion for a discovery extension is made before the DED. Plaintiff met the good cause standard. |
Appellate |
July 15, 2022 |
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE BOROUGH OF ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, ETC. (L-6119-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-3119-20)
Following years of litigation and a trial, the Borough of Englewood Cliffs (the Borough) was found to have failed for decades to comply with its constitutional obligations to provide its fair share of affordable housing. Thereafter, the Borough entered into settlement agreements to allow affordable housing to be built. Following a change in the membership of the Borough's council, however, the Borough moved to vacate the settlement agreements, contending that two council members who had voted for the agreements had conflicts of interest. That argument was in direct contradiction to the position the Borough had taken before the trial court and in a related litigation where the Borough had argued that there were no conflicts of interest. The court affirms the trial court's rejection of the Borough's arguments for several reasons, including that the Borough was judicially estopped from claiming any conflict. The record establishes that for years the Borough has stalled various efforts to allow affordable housing to be built. The court emphasizes that the time for delaying constitutional compliance is over. |
Appellate |
July 15, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALBERTO LOPEZ (15-01-0014, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2694-18)
In this appeal, the court held that a statement elicited in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights could be used for impeachment purposes, and the defendant's status as a juvenile waived to adult court had no impact on this conclusion. In doing so, the court relied upon the United States Supreme Court ruling in Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 592 (2009), which held that voluntary statements obtained in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel are admissible to impeach a defendant's inconsistent testimony at trial. Although the New Jersey Constitution provides a more robust right to counsel than the Federal Constitution, see State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261, 275 (1992), the court reasoned that excluding the statement for all purposes "would add little appreciable deterrence" to police conduct. Ventris, 556 U.S. at 593. In addition, acknowledging New Jersey's "special protections" accorded to juveniles in criminal proceedings, the court held that any inherent impulsivity or vulnerability due to defendant's age was remedied by the preclusion of his statement in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court declined to expand New Jersey's juvenile protections so far such that a juvenile waived to adult court would be permitted to lie under oath, without permitting the State the opportunity to confront the defendant with his or her prior inconsistent statement. |
Appellate |
July 14, 2022 |
SHENISE MONK, ET AL. VS. KENNEDY UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, ET AL. (L-3527-20, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED)
(A-3361-20/A-3362-20/A-3363-20)
Defendants' motions for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint as untimely because it was filed four and a half years after decedent's death were denied by the trial court, which allowed the action to proceed by applying the minority tolling provision found in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a), concluding the Legislature did not make clear whether the Act intended to distinguish between minors who died and minors who survived. The court reversed, finding minority tolling applies only to actions brought on behalf of minors, and not to actions brought on behalf of decedents or their estates. The word "minor" requires a living human being and the plain legal meaning of "minor's 13th birthday" demonstrates the Legislature's intent that only living minors have birthdays. Plaintiffs were limited to wrongful death and survival claims causes of action, each of which applies a two-year statute of limitations. The court vacated the orders denying summary judgment but remanded to the trial court for findings as to whether defendants had substantially complied with those statutes. |
Appellate |
July 11, 2022 |
RAVENSCROFT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., V. GALINA DERROISNE, ET AL.
(DC-002519-20)
Plaintiff moved to accept service by mail as good service in a Special Civil Part case based on electronic tracking information. The markings on the mail piece did not indicate good service. The court found that the law requires reference to the mail piece over the electronic tracking information and denied the motion. |
Trial |
July 11, 2022 |
YONY LIRIANO, JR. V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
(L-5379-20)
In Liriano v. Liberty Mutual insurance Company, (Docket Essex L-5379-20), the court found that the plaintiff was barred by the entire controversy doctrine from asserting a claim for underinsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff had previously brought a lawsuit in another county naming the same defendant and based on the same accident and the same policy of insurance. In the earlier suit, which resulted in entry of a final judgment, plaintiff had made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff had become aware during the pendency of the earlier suit that the tortfeasor was underinsured, not uninsured. The court found in the circumstances of this case, that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. |
Trial |
July 7, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SUPREME LIFE (18-04-0537, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-5005-18)
Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of passionprovocation manslaughter and attempted murder. His son was acquitted of all charges. The judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of twenty-years' imprisonment subject to NERA. Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial, asserting self-defense and defense of his son. Defendant admitted during cross-examination that the statement he provided to police on the night of the incident failed to include critical details, for example, that his son was present or that defendant stabbed the two victims. Defendant admitted that he lied to police. During the course of his summation, the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion that defendant was guilty, repeatedly called defendant a "liar," told the jury "we know he's a liar," and said defendant's testimony was "a story created by a liar." The court concluded the prosecutor's repeated derogatory comments amounted to plain error requiring reversal. The court also held the judge's charge was fatally deficient because the judge never told the jury that self-defense and defense of others also applied to passion-provocation manslaughter, and the judge failed to instruct the jury on the lawful use of a weapon for a protective purpose with respect to the two weapons convictions. |
Appellate |
July 6, 2022 |
Linden Democratic Committee v. City of Linden
(A-30-21 ; 086255)
In amending in 1990 Sections 11 and 13 of the Municipal Vacancy Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:16-11 and -13, the Legislature removed the governing body’s discretion to keep vacant a seat previously occupied by a nominee of a political party. Instead, the Legislature empowered the municipal committee of the political party whose nominee previously occupied the vacant seat to submit three names to the governing body. N.J.S.A. 40A:16 11. Section 11 mandates that the governing body choose one of the municipal committee’s three nominees. |
Supreme |
July 5, 2022 |
State v. Nazier D. Goldsmith
(A-77-20 ; 085636)
The information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not amount to specific and particularized suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the officers did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory detention of defendant, and the evidence seized must be suppressed. |
Supreme |
June 30, 2022 |
Thomasenia L. Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc.
(A-5-21 ; 085939)
As to the duty to warn, an asbestos manufacturer or supplier that places inadequate warnings on asbestos bags used in the workplace has breached its duty to the worker, regardless of whether it provides the employer with the correct information, which is reasonably intended to reach its employees. As to medical causation, the trial court’s modified Model Jury Charge on proximate cause sufficiently guided the jury. |
Supreme |
June 30, 2022 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KYLE A. SMART (21-10-1417, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
(A-2334-21)
In this criminal prosecution, the court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal from an order suppressing evidence seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant. Police conducted an investigatory stop after surveilling the car for more than an hour and developing information that the front seat passenger, defendant Kyle A. Smart, was engaged in drug activity. At the roadside stop, no evidence of drug activity was observed in plain view; the occupants of the car neither made incriminating statements nor furtive movements; and the driver denied consent to search. Police then requested a K-9 unit. The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, leading to a warrantless search of the car and seizure of a loaded handgun and drugs from the cabin. Finding police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to pull over the vehicle, the motion judge upheld the stop and further determined probable cause arose when the canine sniff revealed the presence of narcotics in the car. However, the judge found the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not "unforeseeable and spontaneous," justifying a warrantless search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement pursuant to State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 450 (2015). Accordingly, the judge suppressed the evidence seized. Although the court agrees with the State that police could not have secured a warrant before the car was stopped and, in that sense, they did not "sit" on probable cause, under the circumstances proscribed by Witt, the court disagrees with the State's contention that probable cause was unforeseeable and spontaneous within the meaning of Witt. Because probable cause did not arise until the canine alerted for the presence of narcotics, the court concludes those circumstances were not unforeseeable and spontaneous and, as such, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to this warrantless search. The court thus affirms the motion judge's order for slightly different reasons. |
Appellate |
June 29, 2022 |
M.K. v. T.K.
(FM-13-0477-16)
This matter concerns the right of a foreign country to modify a child support order entered in New York and subsequently registered in New Jersey. The parties, who had three children together, were divorced in New York in 2011. At the time, they entered into a marital settlement agreement which required Plaintiff to pay Defendant child support in the amount of $1,700 per month. Defendant and the children moved to New Jersey in 2012 and the parties later consented to the registration of the foreign divorce in New Jersey. Defendant and the children have lived in New Jersey continuously since that time. Plaintiff was deported to Ireland in 2014. While there, the Probation Division commenced proceedings for the international enforcement of Plaintiff’s child support obligation. In response to this enforcement action, Ireland entered an order reducing Plaintiff’s child support obligation. Plaintiff eventually returned to the United States. Defendant sought to enforce the original child support obligation and argued that Plaintiff owed her the balance between what he was required to pay under the original support order and what he actually paid pursuant to the Ireland order. Conversely, Plaintiff argued that the Ireland order was binding, his future support obligation should be the amount established by the Ireland court and he did not owe Defendant any arrears. The court first determined which treaty governing the international enforcement of child support orders applied: The United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, New York, 1956 (1956 UN Convention) or The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Hague Convention). The court concluded that the Ireland court inappropriately applied the 1956 UN Convention, because the United States was never a signatory to this treaty. The court then determined that it was the Hague Convention that was binding on the two nations, since both Ireland and the United States were signatories to that treaty at the time the Ireland order was entered. The Court next analyzed the provisions of the Hague Convention and its implementing legislation, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), to ascertain those circumstances where a receiving country may modify a support order. It concluded that Ireland did not have the authority to modify the support order in this case, where Defendant and the children have lived in New Jersey since 2012. The court further concluded that, under UIFSA, the original child support order is the "controlling order" since Defendant and the children continuously resided in New Jersey, making New Jersey the children’s “home state” and because both parties consented to jurisdiction in New Jersey, even when Plaintiff was residing in Ireland. Accordingly, the court held that Ireland did not have the authority to modify the original child support order and that Plaintiff owed the amounts that had accrued since the Ireland order was entered. |
Trial |
June 29, 2022 |
State v. Quinnizel J. Clark
(A-67-20/A-37-21 ; 085271)
Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation should have stopped. Not only did the interrogation continue, but during the questioning, the detective strongly suggested that defendant would give them the information they sought if he were truly innocent. Allowing that entire exchange to be played for the jury was harmful error. In addition, the error was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place. The Court discerns no error regarding the witness testimony or any of the prosecutor’s other comments during summation. |
Supreme |